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goh63
2023-03-09
$Mullen Automotive(MULN)$
goh63
2023-03-07
$Mullen Automotive(MULN)$
goh63
2023-03-01
$Mullen Automotive(MULN)$
goh63
2023-03-01
$Mullen Automotive(MULN)$
goh63
2023-02-24
$Mullen Automotive(MULN)$
goh63
2023-02-03
$Mullen Automotive(MULN)$
goh63
2022-04-08
Good
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2022-04-05
Kk
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goh63
2022-03-18
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goh63
2022-02-22
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US inflation, a bit of the 70s flavor
goh63
2022-02-11
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10:12","market":"us","language":"zh","title":"US inflation, a bit of the 70s flavor","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=2213603512","media":"中金点睛","summary":"摘要：虽然美国通胀已经创四十年来的新高，但市场对美国通胀的持续性仍有分歧。那么，到底如何看待本轮美国通胀背后的逻辑与走势？去年前三季度当美联储和市场坚称通胀是暂时的时候，我们坚定看多美国通胀；去年底当","content":"<p><html><head></head><body>Abstract: Although U.S. inflation has hit a new high in 40 years, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation? In the first three quarters of last year, when the Fed and the market insisted that inflation was temporary, we were firmly bullish on U.S. inflation; At the end of last year, when the market judged that the Fed might have \"bluffing\" and \"Fed put options\", we suggested that the market underestimated the Fed's determination to fight inflation and that macro fluctuations would intensify as a result; Although U.S. inflation has hit a four-decade high, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation? In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and the \"Great Inflation\" period, trying to find out the possible evolution of future inflation and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>In the first three quarters of last year, when the Fed and the market insisted that inflation was temporary, we were firmly bullish on U.S. inflation; At the end of last year, when the market judged that the Fed might have \"bluffing\" and \"Fed put options\", we suggested that the market underestimated the Fed's determination to fight inflation and that macro fluctuations would intensify as a result; Although U.S. inflation has hit a four-decade high, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation?</p><p>U.S. inflation has repeatedly exceeded expectations. In January, the CPI increased by 7.5% year-on-year, a 40-year high since 1982. In fact, since the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. CPI exceeded 5% in May last year, it has continued to hit record highs at an unexpected pace almost every month, and the time window for new highs is getting longer and longer. In the article \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\" in October last year, we analyzed the macro, policy and international environment during the \"Great Inflation\" period in the United States from 1960s to 1980s, and pointed out that the three points at this time were similar to those at that time. Therefore, this round of inflation may last longer. At the same time, there are three differences between the two periods, so the probability of repeating double-digit inflation in the 1970s is also low.</p><p>In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and then, trying to find out the possible evolution of inflation in the future and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>Finally, we will answer ten questions that investors are concerned about rate hike shrinking balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.</p><p>U.S. inflation has repeatedly exceeded expectations. In January, the CPI increased by 7.5% year-on-year, a 40-year high since 1982. In fact, since the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. CPI exceeded 5% in May last year, it has continued to hit record highs at an unexpected pace almost every month, and the time window for new highs is getting longer and longer. In the article \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\" in October last year, we analyzed the macro, policy and international environment during the \"Great Inflation\" period in the United States from 1960s to 1980s, and pointed out that the three points at this time were similar to those at that time. Therefore, this round of inflation may last longer. At the same time, there are three differences between the two periods, so the probability of repeating double-digit inflation in the 1970s is also low.</p><p>In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and then, trying to find out the possible evolution of inflation in the future and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>Finally, we will answer ten questions that investors are concerned about rate hike shrinking balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.</p><p>1. Policy environment: Finance is relatively dominant, and the Fed has repeatedly misjudged</p><p>First of all, we believe that double monetary and fiscal easing is the fundamental force driving inflation and its center to remain high. The degree of monetary and fiscal easing since the epidemic has far exceeded that in the early stage of the \"Great Inflation\" (1965-1970), laying the foundation for high inflation. Regardless of active support or passive support, objectively speaking, since the epidemic, the degree of coordination between U.S. monetary policy and fiscal policy has reached the highest level since World War II [1], and fiscal policy has relatively dominated the macro policy paradigm. From the perspective of money supply, the average year-on-year growth rate of M2 from the first quarter of 1965 to the fourth quarter of 1970 was 6.6%, while the average year-on-year growth rate of M2 from the first quarter of 2020 to the fourth quarter of 2021 was as high as 18.0%, far exceeding any previous year in history period. In addition to the total amount, the structure of M2 is more noteworthy, in which the financial \"water release\" contributes more than half of the strength [2], and \"helicopter money\" is practiced. In addition, the Fed's QE has objectively supported the unprecedented issuance of government debt since the epidemic. Since 2020, the ratio of public debt to GDP in the United States has remained at a historical high of more than 120%, and the proportion of Treasury Bond held by the Fed has also exceeded 20%, a record high. According to the Fiscal Determination Theory of Price Level (FTPL), large-scale fiscal expansion will push up government debt, a high degree of coordination of monetary policy, and expectations that future fiscal deficits may further expand will all push up inflation. Looking ahead, although monetary and fiscal policies will tighten marginally, from the perspective of stock, compared with history, monetary and fiscal policies will still be loose for a long time.</p><p>Secondly, during the \"Great Inflation\" period, the Federal Reserve's initial underestimation and inaction of inflationary pressures were important reasons for the out-of-control inflation in the later period. In the early days of the \"Great Inflation\" (1965-1970), McChesney Martin, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, underestimated the persistence of inflationary pressures and attached great importance to promoting full employment. Even when the employment rate was below 4%, the Federal Reserve still cut interest rates twice in June 1967 and July 1969, further exacerbating inflationary pressures. Although Martin later realized that his wrong monetary policy would make the United States face unprecedented high inflationary pressure, his successor Arthur Burns did not pay attention to inflation. Burns believes that the high inflation rate is caused by unstable \"special factors\" such as food and energy, which is a \"noise\" unrelated to monetary policy [3], and the new \"thermometer\" of core inflation is also born. Soon after, this new \"thermometer\" also soared across the board, and inflation was completely out of control. Under the influence of Burns' wrong judgment and multiple supply shocks, the United States entered a long-term \"stagflation.\" In 1979, Volcker was appointed as the chairman of the Federal Reserve to start an extraordinary monetary tightening policy to fight inflation, and the Federal Funds rate once rose to 20%. Although Volcker succeeded in subduing high inflation, it also plunged the United States into the worst economic depression since the 1930s. Looking back at the present, it seems that we can see the shadow of the Federal Reserve in the early days of the \"Great Inflation\" period. At the beginning of the U.S. inflation problem in 2021, the Federal Reserve repeatedly emphasized that inflation is \"temporary.\" However, subsequent inflation data that repeatedly exceeded expectations and the Fed's continuously revised inflation expectations showed that the uncertainty facing the macro economy after the epidemic has intensified. Policy formulation and implementation are facing unprecedented difficult challenges since the \"Great Detente\" period. If the Federal Reserve does not face inflation more timely, decisively and forcefully this time, it may once again become the driving force behind out-of-control inflation.</p><p>2. Imbalance between supply and demand: Supply constraints are hard to ease, and long-term worries are increasingly emerging</p><p>First, let's look at the supply shortage caused by supply shocks. The U.S. economy suffered multiple supply shocks in succession in the 1970s. The \"Nixon shock\" and the soaring energy and food prices caused by the oil crisis and food crisis were important supply-side factors driving up inflation [4]. At present, the supply pressure of energy, grain and industrial metal markets cannot be ignored.</p><p>► First, the risk of geopolitical conflicts in oil-producing countries has exacerbated the pressure on energy prices. The \"two oil crises\" that broke out in the 1970s caused the international crude oil price to rise by about 32 times in ten years, becoming one of the important factors of the great inflation in the United States. Among them, the causes of the first and second oil crises were the Fourth Middle East War and the Islamic Revolution in Iran respectively. Looking back at the Fourth Middle East War that occurred in October 1973, after the war, oil producers led by Arab countries used oil as a weapon to sanction the United States and other countries supporting Israel through \"price increases, production reductions, embargoes, and supply cuts\", thus triggering the \"first oil crisis\" [5]. The current tense situation on the Russia-Ukraine border is behind the ongoing geopolitical game between Russia and NATO countries. Although the current situation between Russia and Ukraine has eased marginally, the risks have not been lifted. According to calculations by CICC Bulk Group, if Russian crude oil exports are affected, oil prices may face a supply premium of US $30/barrel throughout the year. In addition, the slowdown in OPEC + production increases in January, Libya's production cuts due to pipeline maintenance and supply chain bottlenecks caused by the epidemic may strengthen the impact of supply risks on global energy costs and commodity prices.</p><p>► Second, the pressure on global food supply has intensified. Looking back at the \"Great Inflation\" period, the El Niñ o event broke out in 1972. Extreme weather worsened the global food shortage and triggered the subsequent 1972-1974 global food crisis. The rise in food prices has further pushed up the general price increase, making inflation in the United States further out of control. At present, there are certain risks to global food. In the past two years, affected by extreme weather and natural disasters, global grain production has faced the risk of reducing production. In addition, in addition to the impact of global climate, the current global food supply is also affected by the following factors: (1) The direct impact of COVID-19 pandemic on food production. Labor shortages and supply chain disruptions caused by the epidemic have put pressure on the production of the food industry, resulting in a sharp drop in output. Global food prices rose by more than 40% in 2021. (2) Geopolitical risks. Russia and Ukraine are both important grain suppliers and exporters in the world. The uncertainty of the situation between Russia and Ukraine has intensified market concerns about grain supply. (3) Global prices of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and other products have soared. Continued supply chain disruptions have caused global fertilizer prices to rise roughly twice in the past 18 months, which in turn may dampen global crop production in the coming year.</p><p>► Third, the inventories of some important commodities in the commodity market are at historical lows, and supply risks have intensified. Industrial metals in the global commodity market and some<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/000061\">Agricultural products</a>Inventories of such important raw materials are at historically low levels, making prices very sensitive to minor disturbances. At present, the tight supply situation of global industrial metals is affected by multiple factors: geopolitical risks, surge in demand caused by global economic recovery and supply chain bottlenecks caused by the epidemic, and long-term underinvestment in traditional industries. Among them, Ukraine is an important exporter of industrial metals, and the uncertainty of the situation between Russia and Ukraine has intensified related metal price fluctuations, boosting short-term futures prices and spot premiums. Coupled with factors such as increased global demand and limited recovery from supply chain bottlenecks, industrial metal inventories in the global supply chain are rapidly consumed. The decline in supply stability and the sound of short-term alarms such as inventory shortages have exacerbated the risk of rising prices of related commodities.</p><p>In addition to short-term factors, medium and long-term factors affecting industrial metal inventories have also been further highlighted. In the past ten years, the sluggish return rate of traditional industries, the rise of global carbon neutrality policies and ESG investment concepts have restricted the flow of capital to traditional industries, resulting in long-term underinvestment in traditional industries, with a more obvious impact on fossil fuel industries such as oil and gas and traditional smelting industries. Insufficient investment in traditional industries and aging infrastructure have led to a rapid decline in supply capacity, which in turn has become an important factor in soaring energy costs and shortages of important commodities, making price centers easy to rise but difficult to fall. Specifically, the growth rate of new economic transformation (advanced manufacturing, new energy, etc.) is less than expected and it is difficult to fill the growing supply gap. Rising energy costs and restrictions on carbon emissions have forced a large number of non-ferrous metal smelters in China, Europe and other regions to reduce production. After the outbreak of the epidemic, the blockade policies of various countries reduced global transportation capacity and greatly depleted inventory. As the economies of various countries gradually recover after the epidemic, demand has risen sharply, and inventories have bottomed out, thus enlarging the supply gap, highlighting the problem of underinvestment in the traditional economy. Coupled with a new round of global capital expenditure cycle that may start after the epidemic, the price center of related industrial metals may trend upward in the next few years.</p><p>Secondly, in addition to the direct supply shocks in the above three aspects, the supply chain bottleneck problem may hardly improve significantly in the short term. In the past six months, congestion in the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach in the United States has become an important factor in the disruption of global supply chains. Due to yard congestion, import detention and labor shortages, data in February 2022 showed that the waiting time for ships at the Port of Los Angeles was 25-35 days and that at the Port of Long Beach was 38-42 days [6]. At the same time, Canadian truck drivers went on strike to further hinder key border transportation in the United States. Strike protests make the busiest in the United States and Canada<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/00536\">Tradelink</a>The \"Ambassador Bridge\" was blocked, which carried more than a quarter of the total trade volume between the United States and Canada, which had a serious impact on the U.S. supply chain. For example, some automobile manufacturers and food suppliers have faced production suspension due to the cut-off of key components or raw materials. The continued disruption of the U.S. supply chain is likely to further expand the imbalance between supply and demand and exacerbate inflationary pressures.</p><p>3. The road ahead is cold: the inflation spiral is established, and the Fed has no retreat</p><p>In \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\", we point out that there are three differences between this time and then: 1. The current scale of trade union organizations is much smaller than that during the \"Great Inflation\" period, resulting in relatively unsmooth wage-price transmission; 2. Compared with that time, the global collaborative production model reduced product costs and the bargaining power of American workers; 3. Compared with that time, the Federal Reserve implemented a (average) inflation targeting system, with inflation controlling as an important task. Based on these three differences, we believe in the above report that it is unlikely that this inflation will repeat the mistakes of the 1970s. Based on the marginal changes in the past few months, we find that the differences between the first two points are weakening. Although trade unions are still relatively weak, the \"great turnover\" in the United States and the continued widening gap between labor supply and demand have significantly improved employees' bargaining power and strengthened the price-wage inflation spiral. In addition, the global supply chain is still severely hindered, greatly reducing production efficiency and increasing product and labor costs. We can hope that millions of people in the United States will quickly return to the labor market, that the global supply chain will be repaired smoothly in the short term, and that the above-mentioned supply shocks will be short-lived, but these factors are beyond the control of policies. We believe that the only thing the policy can do at present is to stick to and vigorously implement the third difference: bold action, pre-emptive strike, control inflation as the only task, and once again establish the credibility of controlling inflation.</p><p>To sum up, the \"Great Inflation\" in the United States in the 1960s and 1980s was mainly the result of the combined effect of multiple supply shocks and \"double-wide\" fiscal and monetary effects. Based on the current situation, the \"good luck\" that has rarely had serious supply shocks since the \"Great Detente\" period and the \"good policies\" that are relatively easy to implement may be becoming history. We won't go into details about the former. As for the latter, since the global outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, a series of factors such as the evolving mutant strains, the increasingly fragile global industrial chain, and the rising government debt have caused the global economic recovery to continue to encounter challenges.</p><p>Specifically, the difficulty of macro policy may come from three aspects. First, when monetary policy is loose for a long time and supply shocks reappear, it is more difficult for policymakers to judge the inflation outlook. This can be seen from the inflation data in the United States that has repeatedly exceeded expectations since last year and the \"sharp turn\" made by the Federal Reserve at the end of last year. Second, from a cyclical perspective, regardless of rate hike or shrinking balance sheet, the Federal Reserve hopes to suppress demand to control inflation. How to balance inflation and growth is full of challenges: monetary tightening is not enough, and inflation cannot be controlled; If the currency tightens too much, the risk of economic recession will increase. Third, in the medium and long term, the space for monetary policy is limited. After the epidemic, U.S. government debt hit a record high. Under the macro policy paradigm where fiscal policy is relatively dominant, monetary policy may be constrained. Even if it is not for the consideration of directly reducing government financing costs, excessive rise in interest rates will make the economy's high debt unsustainable, which may directly lead to economic growth in trouble. Therefore, low interest rates, high inflation and high government debt will reinforce each other, and the space for monetary policy and fiscal policy will shrink [7].</p><p>In the face of the increasing risk of the Fed's unexpected tightening, how to deploy major asset classes? See How the Fed's Accelerated Tightening Is Affecting Asset Prices.</p><p>In the face of a high inflation environment and intensified macro fluctuations, how to do a good job in macro hedging? Please see \"One of the Global Asset Classes: Macro Logic, Rotation System and Supply Shock\".</p><p>4. Investors' ten questions and answers about the Federal Reserve's monetary tightening:</p><p>1. Q: Will the Federal Reserve be wary of economic slowdown or financial market turmoil?</p><p>A: We don't think it will look good at the moment, depending on whether inflation eases significantly. The \"Fed put option\" was born during the \"Great Easing\" period of low inflation and low volatility. Inflation is basically not an issue that the market and the Fed need to worry too much about. Therefore, the monetary policy goal is relatively single and the policy is easy to implement. Over the past three decades or so, even though inflation has occasionally overheated periods, inflation was only an economic problem at that time, and the Federal Reserve made a trade-off between inflation and employment to solve the problem of minimizing economic costs and volatility. However, at present, in the face of inflation risks that have not been seen in 40 years, inflation has risen to a political and social issue, and controlling inflation has become a top priority for the Biden administration. In the context of the current tightest labor market in decades, it can be said that inflation is forced to become the Fed's most concerned target at the moment.</p><p>2. Q: What are the conditions or triggers for the slowdown of monetary tightening?</p><p>A: We believe that the wage growth rate has cooled down significantly, thus breaking the wage-price inflation spiral. The slowdown in energy price growth will help inflation fall, especially as energy and food prices have now been transmitted to core inflation. To be sure, it will be difficult for the Fed to abandon its rapid tightening strategy at a time when inflationary pressures are unlikely to ease significantly in the coming months.</p><p>3. Q: With the marginal weakening of demand, if supply continues to push up inflation, will monetary policy be effective?</p><p>Answer: It is true that supply is an important reason for pushing up inflation in the United States (widening labor supply and demand gap, supply chain bottlenecks, energy metals and other supply shocks), but the impact of demand is very large. Assuming an extreme scenario, the Federal Reserve completely extinguishes demand through monetary tightening, and inflation will naturally slow down sharply. So the Fed needs to find a delicate balance.</p><p>4. Q: Are there any other inflation control policies besides monetary policy?</p><p>A: The Biden administration released strategic oil reserves at the end of last year, but it was basically ineffective in suppressing oil prices. The Biden administration wanted U.S. shale oil companies and OPEC countries such as Saudi Arabia to accelerate production increases, but failed. As for lowering or abolishing tariffs, it may help alleviate the inflationary pressure of goods, but it cannot fundamentally solve the problem.</p><p>5. Q: Will the interest burden of U.S. Treasury Bond become a constraint on rate hike's shrinking balance sheet?</p><p>A: We don't think anytime soon. According to our calculations, the US Treasury yields curve still has a lot of room for upside. Specifically, even if the ten-year interest rate rises to 3.0% this year and remains at that level for the next few years, the ratio of U.S. bond interest payments can remain relatively stable. In fact, for the interest burden, the stock bonds issued at lower interest rates in the past were \"ballast stones\".</p><p>6. Q: How long is the time lag for monetary policy to be transmitted to the real economy? The relationship between inflation and rate hike?</p><p>A: According to the official general equilibrium model of the Federal Reserve, we estimate that the time lag is about 6-12 months. Therefore, in order to control inflation, monetary tightening should be done sooner rather than later. According to the empirical experience of the Taylor Rule, every time inflation rises by one percentage point, it often takes rate hike 1.5 percentage points to control inflation back to the initial level. Therefore, we think the Fed needs to act boldly.</p><p>7. Q: Some indicators of inflation expectations show that expectations are slowing down. Can it be interpreted as inflation will slow down?</p><p>Answer: The ten-year breakeven inflation rate (breakeven rate) has declined since its high point in November last year, which has something to do with the Federal Reserve's \"big turn\" in November. However, breakeven is not a good indicator to measure inflation expectations. It is traded (so there is a tendency to misjudge and mark-to-market). Since liquidity is far inferior to ordinary Treasury Bond, its liquidity premium is large. It distorts the market's truer reflection of future inflation expectations to a large extent. Especially since the epidemic, the Federal Reserve's massive QE has significantly lowered its interest rates, causing its implied inflation expectations to further deviate from their due level.</p><p>While the University of Michigan survey inflation expectations have slowed down in the past month or two, and New York Fed inflation expectations are peaking, this does not reflect the likely future inflation path. When inflation is low, inflation expectations tend to be better anchored, giving the market the illusion that inflation expectations lead actual inflation (such as the lack of a \"great easing\" period of supply shocks). However, when inflation is high, especially in the context of many uncertainties caused by multiple supply shocks, inflation expectations are likely to be the result of actual inflation, not the other way around. A Federal Reserve working paper reflects on the role of inflation expectations [8].</p><p>8. Q: The interest rate derivatives market is already fully priced. Can the Fed be more aggressive than market expectations?</p><p>A: First of all, even though the market expects the Fed rate hike for the remaining seven meetings this year, it does not expect several meetings to increase 50bp at a time (except for the March meeting). Moreover, for shrinking balance sheet, where long-term interest rates and financial conditions are more important, it is difficult for the market to predict its way, strength and rhythm through asset prices.</p><p>Secondly, we believe that this market pricing or market expectations may not be as important as in previous rate hike cycles. Since the \"Great Easing\", especially after the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve has repeatedly lagged behind the market curve, so market pricing is of great significance for us to judge the policy path of the Federal Reserve. To some extent, the market curve hints at the \"upper limit\" of the Fed curve. This time, however, it's different: While the Fed lags significantly behind the inflation curve, it has repeatedly led the market curve since the middle of last year. Market expectations and pricing are constantly following the judgment and pace of the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Reserve is constantly adjusting to follow the pace of inflation. When the market curve lags behind the Fed (and we expect it still will in the coming months), its reference will also be discounted.</p><p>9. Q: How does the Fed's tightening affect commodities?</p><p>A: Historically, bulk has been sensitive to dollar liquidity. But this time may be different. In the short term, we expect oil, gold and copper to remain strong, accompanied by upside risks. Demand, supply, anti-inflation attributes and the situation between Russia and Ukraine may intensify the risk of further rises in oil and gas. There are three downwind factors and one headwind factor for gold this year: (1) Under high inflation or even quasi-stagflation, the value of gold allocation is highlighted; (2). This year's safe-haven demand is stronger than last year's (geopolitical risks superimposed on Fed tightening risks); (3) The diversion effect of digital currency on gold has been significantly weakened (it was obvious last year that digital currency was under significant pressure this year under the tightening of the Federal Reserve); (4) The upward trend of real interest rates limits the upside of gold. Finally, with continued demand support, superimposed on historically low inventories of industrial metals such as copper, slight supply disturbances will bring greater price fluctuations.</p><p>10. Q: Did U.S. stocks rebound after the first rate hike in March?</p><p>A: We don't think it is necessarily. It depends on the evolution of inflation. This first rate hike does not mean that the boots have completely landed. If the rate hike at the March interest rate meeting is 25 basis points, investors who are firmly bullish on inflation may believe that 25 basis points are not enough to have a significant effect on curbing inflation, thereby increasing the risk of out-of-control inflation, and selling risky assets, especially the Nasdaq. If a rate hike is 50 basis points, investors with a \"moderate\" or \"temporary\" view of inflation will panic sell risky assets amid a rate hike not seen in the past two decades. In either case, we believe that the high volatility of the stock market may continue after the interest rate meeting in March.</p><p></body></html></p>","source":"zjdj","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>US inflation, a bit of the 70s flavor</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nUS inflation, a bit of the 70s flavor\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">中金点睛</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2022-02-21 10:12</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><html><head></head><body>Abstract: Although U.S. inflation has hit a new high in 40 years, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation? In the first three quarters of last year, when the Fed and the market insisted that inflation was temporary, we were firmly bullish on U.S. inflation; At the end of last year, when the market judged that the Fed might have \"bluffing\" and \"Fed put options\", we suggested that the market underestimated the Fed's determination to fight inflation and that macro fluctuations would intensify as a result; Although U.S. inflation has hit a four-decade high, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation? In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and the \"Great Inflation\" period, trying to find out the possible evolution of future inflation and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>In the first three quarters of last year, when the Fed and the market insisted that inflation was temporary, we were firmly bullish on U.S. inflation; At the end of last year, when the market judged that the Fed might have \"bluffing\" and \"Fed put options\", we suggested that the market underestimated the Fed's determination to fight inflation and that macro fluctuations would intensify as a result; Although U.S. inflation has hit a four-decade high, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation?</p><p>U.S. inflation has repeatedly exceeded expectations. In January, the CPI increased by 7.5% year-on-year, a 40-year high since 1982. In fact, since the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. CPI exceeded 5% in May last year, it has continued to hit record highs at an unexpected pace almost every month, and the time window for new highs is getting longer and longer. In the article \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\" in October last year, we analyzed the macro, policy and international environment during the \"Great Inflation\" period in the United States from 1960s to 1980s, and pointed out that the three points at this time were similar to those at that time. Therefore, this round of inflation may last longer. At the same time, there are three differences between the two periods, so the probability of repeating double-digit inflation in the 1970s is also low.</p><p>In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and then, trying to find out the possible evolution of inflation in the future and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>Finally, we will answer ten questions that investors are concerned about rate hike shrinking balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.</p><p>U.S. inflation has repeatedly exceeded expectations. In January, the CPI increased by 7.5% year-on-year, a 40-year high since 1982. In fact, since the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. CPI exceeded 5% in May last year, it has continued to hit record highs at an unexpected pace almost every month, and the time window for new highs is getting longer and longer. In the article \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\" in October last year, we analyzed the macro, policy and international environment during the \"Great Inflation\" period in the United States from 1960s to 1980s, and pointed out that the three points at this time were similar to those at that time. Therefore, this round of inflation may last longer. At the same time, there are three differences between the two periods, so the probability of repeating double-digit inflation in the 1970s is also low.</p><p>In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and then, trying to find out the possible evolution of inflation in the future and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>Finally, we will answer ten questions that investors are concerned about rate hike shrinking balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.</p><p>1. Policy environment: Finance is relatively dominant, and the Fed has repeatedly misjudged</p><p>First of all, we believe that double monetary and fiscal easing is the fundamental force driving inflation and its center to remain high. The degree of monetary and fiscal easing since the epidemic has far exceeded that in the early stage of the \"Great Inflation\" (1965-1970), laying the foundation for high inflation. Regardless of active support or passive support, objectively speaking, since the epidemic, the degree of coordination between U.S. monetary policy and fiscal policy has reached the highest level since World War II [1], and fiscal policy has relatively dominated the macro policy paradigm. From the perspective of money supply, the average year-on-year growth rate of M2 from the first quarter of 1965 to the fourth quarter of 1970 was 6.6%, while the average year-on-year growth rate of M2 from the first quarter of 2020 to the fourth quarter of 2021 was as high as 18.0%, far exceeding any previous year in history period. In addition to the total amount, the structure of M2 is more noteworthy, in which the financial \"water release\" contributes more than half of the strength [2], and \"helicopter money\" is practiced. In addition, the Fed's QE has objectively supported the unprecedented issuance of government debt since the epidemic. Since 2020, the ratio of public debt to GDP in the United States has remained at a historical high of more than 120%, and the proportion of Treasury Bond held by the Fed has also exceeded 20%, a record high. According to the Fiscal Determination Theory of Price Level (FTPL), large-scale fiscal expansion will push up government debt, a high degree of coordination of monetary policy, and expectations that future fiscal deficits may further expand will all push up inflation. Looking ahead, although monetary and fiscal policies will tighten marginally, from the perspective of stock, compared with history, monetary and fiscal policies will still be loose for a long time.</p><p>Secondly, during the \"Great Inflation\" period, the Federal Reserve's initial underestimation and inaction of inflationary pressures were important reasons for the out-of-control inflation in the later period. In the early days of the \"Great Inflation\" (1965-1970), McChesney Martin, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, underestimated the persistence of inflationary pressures and attached great importance to promoting full employment. Even when the employment rate was below 4%, the Federal Reserve still cut interest rates twice in June 1967 and July 1969, further exacerbating inflationary pressures. Although Martin later realized that his wrong monetary policy would make the United States face unprecedented high inflationary pressure, his successor Arthur Burns did not pay attention to inflation. Burns believes that the high inflation rate is caused by unstable \"special factors\" such as food and energy, which is a \"noise\" unrelated to monetary policy [3], and the new \"thermometer\" of core inflation is also born. Soon after, this new \"thermometer\" also soared across the board, and inflation was completely out of control. Under the influence of Burns' wrong judgment and multiple supply shocks, the United States entered a long-term \"stagflation.\" In 1979, Volcker was appointed as the chairman of the Federal Reserve to start an extraordinary monetary tightening policy to fight inflation, and the Federal Funds rate once rose to 20%. Although Volcker succeeded in subduing high inflation, it also plunged the United States into the worst economic depression since the 1930s. Looking back at the present, it seems that we can see the shadow of the Federal Reserve in the early days of the \"Great Inflation\" period. At the beginning of the U.S. inflation problem in 2021, the Federal Reserve repeatedly emphasized that inflation is \"temporary.\" However, subsequent inflation data that repeatedly exceeded expectations and the Fed's continuously revised inflation expectations showed that the uncertainty facing the macro economy after the epidemic has intensified. Policy formulation and implementation are facing unprecedented difficult challenges since the \"Great Detente\" period. If the Federal Reserve does not face inflation more timely, decisively and forcefully this time, it may once again become the driving force behind out-of-control inflation.</p><p>2. Imbalance between supply and demand: Supply constraints are hard to ease, and long-term worries are increasingly emerging</p><p>First, let's look at the supply shortage caused by supply shocks. The U.S. economy suffered multiple supply shocks in succession in the 1970s. The \"Nixon shock\" and the soaring energy and food prices caused by the oil crisis and food crisis were important supply-side factors driving up inflation [4]. At present, the supply pressure of energy, grain and industrial metal markets cannot be ignored.</p><p>► First, the risk of geopolitical conflicts in oil-producing countries has exacerbated the pressure on energy prices. The \"two oil crises\" that broke out in the 1970s caused the international crude oil price to rise by about 32 times in ten years, becoming one of the important factors of the great inflation in the United States. Among them, the causes of the first and second oil crises were the Fourth Middle East War and the Islamic Revolution in Iran respectively. Looking back at the Fourth Middle East War that occurred in October 1973, after the war, oil producers led by Arab countries used oil as a weapon to sanction the United States and other countries supporting Israel through \"price increases, production reductions, embargoes, and supply cuts\", thus triggering the \"first oil crisis\" [5]. The current tense situation on the Russia-Ukraine border is behind the ongoing geopolitical game between Russia and NATO countries. Although the current situation between Russia and Ukraine has eased marginally, the risks have not been lifted. According to calculations by CICC Bulk Group, if Russian crude oil exports are affected, oil prices may face a supply premium of US $30/barrel throughout the year. In addition, the slowdown in OPEC + production increases in January, Libya's production cuts due to pipeline maintenance and supply chain bottlenecks caused by the epidemic may strengthen the impact of supply risks on global energy costs and commodity prices.</p><p>► Second, the pressure on global food supply has intensified. Looking back at the \"Great Inflation\" period, the El Niñ o event broke out in 1972. Extreme weather worsened the global food shortage and triggered the subsequent 1972-1974 global food crisis. The rise in food prices has further pushed up the general price increase, making inflation in the United States further out of control. At present, there are certain risks to global food. In the past two years, affected by extreme weather and natural disasters, global grain production has faced the risk of reducing production. In addition, in addition to the impact of global climate, the current global food supply is also affected by the following factors: (1) The direct impact of COVID-19 pandemic on food production. Labor shortages and supply chain disruptions caused by the epidemic have put pressure on the production of the food industry, resulting in a sharp drop in output. Global food prices rose by more than 40% in 2021. (2) Geopolitical risks. Russia and Ukraine are both important grain suppliers and exporters in the world. The uncertainty of the situation between Russia and Ukraine has intensified market concerns about grain supply. (3) Global prices of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and other products have soared. Continued supply chain disruptions have caused global fertilizer prices to rise roughly twice in the past 18 months, which in turn may dampen global crop production in the coming year.</p><p>► Third, the inventories of some important commodities in the commodity market are at historical lows, and supply risks have intensified. Industrial metals in the global commodity market and some<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/000061\">Agricultural products</a>Inventories of such important raw materials are at historically low levels, making prices very sensitive to minor disturbances. At present, the tight supply situation of global industrial metals is affected by multiple factors: geopolitical risks, surge in demand caused by global economic recovery and supply chain bottlenecks caused by the epidemic, and long-term underinvestment in traditional industries. Among them, Ukraine is an important exporter of industrial metals, and the uncertainty of the situation between Russia and Ukraine has intensified related metal price fluctuations, boosting short-term futures prices and spot premiums. Coupled with factors such as increased global demand and limited recovery from supply chain bottlenecks, industrial metal inventories in the global supply chain are rapidly consumed. The decline in supply stability and the sound of short-term alarms such as inventory shortages have exacerbated the risk of rising prices of related commodities.</p><p>In addition to short-term factors, medium and long-term factors affecting industrial metal inventories have also been further highlighted. In the past ten years, the sluggish return rate of traditional industries, the rise of global carbon neutrality policies and ESG investment concepts have restricted the flow of capital to traditional industries, resulting in long-term underinvestment in traditional industries, with a more obvious impact on fossil fuel industries such as oil and gas and traditional smelting industries. Insufficient investment in traditional industries and aging infrastructure have led to a rapid decline in supply capacity, which in turn has become an important factor in soaring energy costs and shortages of important commodities, making price centers easy to rise but difficult to fall. Specifically, the growth rate of new economic transformation (advanced manufacturing, new energy, etc.) is less than expected and it is difficult to fill the growing supply gap. Rising energy costs and restrictions on carbon emissions have forced a large number of non-ferrous metal smelters in China, Europe and other regions to reduce production. After the outbreak of the epidemic, the blockade policies of various countries reduced global transportation capacity and greatly depleted inventory. As the economies of various countries gradually recover after the epidemic, demand has risen sharply, and inventories have bottomed out, thus enlarging the supply gap, highlighting the problem of underinvestment in the traditional economy. Coupled with a new round of global capital expenditure cycle that may start after the epidemic, the price center of related industrial metals may trend upward in the next few years.</p><p>Secondly, in addition to the direct supply shocks in the above three aspects, the supply chain bottleneck problem may hardly improve significantly in the short term. In the past six months, congestion in the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach in the United States has become an important factor in the disruption of global supply chains. Due to yard congestion, import detention and labor shortages, data in February 2022 showed that the waiting time for ships at the Port of Los Angeles was 25-35 days and that at the Port of Long Beach was 38-42 days [6]. At the same time, Canadian truck drivers went on strike to further hinder key border transportation in the United States. Strike protests make the busiest in the United States and Canada<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/00536\">Tradelink</a>The \"Ambassador Bridge\" was blocked, which carried more than a quarter of the total trade volume between the United States and Canada, which had a serious impact on the U.S. supply chain. For example, some automobile manufacturers and food suppliers have faced production suspension due to the cut-off of key components or raw materials. The continued disruption of the U.S. supply chain is likely to further expand the imbalance between supply and demand and exacerbate inflationary pressures.</p><p>3. The road ahead is cold: the inflation spiral is established, and the Fed has no retreat</p><p>In \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\", we point out that there are three differences between this time and then: 1. The current scale of trade union organizations is much smaller than that during the \"Great Inflation\" period, resulting in relatively unsmooth wage-price transmission; 2. Compared with that time, the global collaborative production model reduced product costs and the bargaining power of American workers; 3. Compared with that time, the Federal Reserve implemented a (average) inflation targeting system, with inflation controlling as an important task. Based on these three differences, we believe in the above report that it is unlikely that this inflation will repeat the mistakes of the 1970s. Based on the marginal changes in the past few months, we find that the differences between the first two points are weakening. Although trade unions are still relatively weak, the \"great turnover\" in the United States and the continued widening gap between labor supply and demand have significantly improved employees' bargaining power and strengthened the price-wage inflation spiral. In addition, the global supply chain is still severely hindered, greatly reducing production efficiency and increasing product and labor costs. We can hope that millions of people in the United States will quickly return to the labor market, that the global supply chain will be repaired smoothly in the short term, and that the above-mentioned supply shocks will be short-lived, but these factors are beyond the control of policies. We believe that the only thing the policy can do at present is to stick to and vigorously implement the third difference: bold action, pre-emptive strike, control inflation as the only task, and once again establish the credibility of controlling inflation.</p><p>To sum up, the \"Great Inflation\" in the United States in the 1960s and 1980s was mainly the result of the combined effect of multiple supply shocks and \"double-wide\" fiscal and monetary effects. Based on the current situation, the \"good luck\" that has rarely had serious supply shocks since the \"Great Detente\" period and the \"good policies\" that are relatively easy to implement may be becoming history. We won't go into details about the former. As for the latter, since the global outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, a series of factors such as the evolving mutant strains, the increasingly fragile global industrial chain, and the rising government debt have caused the global economic recovery to continue to encounter challenges.</p><p>Specifically, the difficulty of macro policy may come from three aspects. First, when monetary policy is loose for a long time and supply shocks reappear, it is more difficult for policymakers to judge the inflation outlook. This can be seen from the inflation data in the United States that has repeatedly exceeded expectations since last year and the \"sharp turn\" made by the Federal Reserve at the end of last year. Second, from a cyclical perspective, regardless of rate hike or shrinking balance sheet, the Federal Reserve hopes to suppress demand to control inflation. How to balance inflation and growth is full of challenges: monetary tightening is not enough, and inflation cannot be controlled; If the currency tightens too much, the risk of economic recession will increase. Third, in the medium and long term, the space for monetary policy is limited. After the epidemic, U.S. government debt hit a record high. Under the macro policy paradigm where fiscal policy is relatively dominant, monetary policy may be constrained. Even if it is not for the consideration of directly reducing government financing costs, excessive rise in interest rates will make the economy's high debt unsustainable, which may directly lead to economic growth in trouble. Therefore, low interest rates, high inflation and high government debt will reinforce each other, and the space for monetary policy and fiscal policy will shrink [7].</p><p>In the face of the increasing risk of the Fed's unexpected tightening, how to deploy major asset classes? See How the Fed's Accelerated Tightening Is Affecting Asset Prices.</p><p>In the face of a high inflation environment and intensified macro fluctuations, how to do a good job in macro hedging? Please see \"One of the Global Asset Classes: Macro Logic, Rotation System and Supply Shock\".</p><p>4. Investors' ten questions and answers about the Federal Reserve's monetary tightening:</p><p>1. Q: Will the Federal Reserve be wary of economic slowdown or financial market turmoil?</p><p>A: We don't think it will look good at the moment, depending on whether inflation eases significantly. The \"Fed put option\" was born during the \"Great Easing\" period of low inflation and low volatility. Inflation is basically not an issue that the market and the Fed need to worry too much about. Therefore, the monetary policy goal is relatively single and the policy is easy to implement. Over the past three decades or so, even though inflation has occasionally overheated periods, inflation was only an economic problem at that time, and the Federal Reserve made a trade-off between inflation and employment to solve the problem of minimizing economic costs and volatility. However, at present, in the face of inflation risks that have not been seen in 40 years, inflation has risen to a political and social issue, and controlling inflation has become a top priority for the Biden administration. In the context of the current tightest labor market in decades, it can be said that inflation is forced to become the Fed's most concerned target at the moment.</p><p>2. Q: What are the conditions or triggers for the slowdown of monetary tightening?</p><p>A: We believe that the wage growth rate has cooled down significantly, thus breaking the wage-price inflation spiral. The slowdown in energy price growth will help inflation fall, especially as energy and food prices have now been transmitted to core inflation. To be sure, it will be difficult for the Fed to abandon its rapid tightening strategy at a time when inflationary pressures are unlikely to ease significantly in the coming months.</p><p>3. Q: With the marginal weakening of demand, if supply continues to push up inflation, will monetary policy be effective?</p><p>Answer: It is true that supply is an important reason for pushing up inflation in the United States (widening labor supply and demand gap, supply chain bottlenecks, energy metals and other supply shocks), but the impact of demand is very large. Assuming an extreme scenario, the Federal Reserve completely extinguishes demand through monetary tightening, and inflation will naturally slow down sharply. So the Fed needs to find a delicate balance.</p><p>4. Q: Are there any other inflation control policies besides monetary policy?</p><p>A: The Biden administration released strategic oil reserves at the end of last year, but it was basically ineffective in suppressing oil prices. The Biden administration wanted U.S. shale oil companies and OPEC countries such as Saudi Arabia to accelerate production increases, but failed. As for lowering or abolishing tariffs, it may help alleviate the inflationary pressure of goods, but it cannot fundamentally solve the problem.</p><p>5. Q: Will the interest burden of U.S. Treasury Bond become a constraint on rate hike's shrinking balance sheet?</p><p>A: We don't think anytime soon. According to our calculations, the US Treasury yields curve still has a lot of room for upside. Specifically, even if the ten-year interest rate rises to 3.0% this year and remains at that level for the next few years, the ratio of U.S. bond interest payments can remain relatively stable. In fact, for the interest burden, the stock bonds issued at lower interest rates in the past were \"ballast stones\".</p><p>6. Q: How long is the time lag for monetary policy to be transmitted to the real economy? The relationship between inflation and rate hike?</p><p>A: According to the official general equilibrium model of the Federal Reserve, we estimate that the time lag is about 6-12 months. Therefore, in order to control inflation, monetary tightening should be done sooner rather than later. According to the empirical experience of the Taylor Rule, every time inflation rises by one percentage point, it often takes rate hike 1.5 percentage points to control inflation back to the initial level. Therefore, we think the Fed needs to act boldly.</p><p>7. Q: Some indicators of inflation expectations show that expectations are slowing down. Can it be interpreted as inflation will slow down?</p><p>Answer: The ten-year breakeven inflation rate (breakeven rate) has declined since its high point in November last year, which has something to do with the Federal Reserve's \"big turn\" in November. However, breakeven is not a good indicator to measure inflation expectations. It is traded (so there is a tendency to misjudge and mark-to-market). Since liquidity is far inferior to ordinary Treasury Bond, its liquidity premium is large. It distorts the market's truer reflection of future inflation expectations to a large extent. Especially since the epidemic, the Federal Reserve's massive QE has significantly lowered its interest rates, causing its implied inflation expectations to further deviate from their due level.</p><p>While the University of Michigan survey inflation expectations have slowed down in the past month or two, and New York Fed inflation expectations are peaking, this does not reflect the likely future inflation path. When inflation is low, inflation expectations tend to be better anchored, giving the market the illusion that inflation expectations lead actual inflation (such as the lack of a \"great easing\" period of supply shocks). However, when inflation is high, especially in the context of many uncertainties caused by multiple supply shocks, inflation expectations are likely to be the result of actual inflation, not the other way around. A Federal Reserve working paper reflects on the role of inflation expectations [8].</p><p>8. Q: The interest rate derivatives market is already fully priced. Can the Fed be more aggressive than market expectations?</p><p>A: First of all, even though the market expects the Fed rate hike for the remaining seven meetings this year, it does not expect several meetings to increase 50bp at a time (except for the March meeting). Moreover, for shrinking balance sheet, where long-term interest rates and financial conditions are more important, it is difficult for the market to predict its way, strength and rhythm through asset prices.</p><p>Secondly, we believe that this market pricing or market expectations may not be as important as in previous rate hike cycles. Since the \"Great Easing\", especially after the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve has repeatedly lagged behind the market curve, so market pricing is of great significance for us to judge the policy path of the Federal Reserve. To some extent, the market curve hints at the \"upper limit\" of the Fed curve. This time, however, it's different: While the Fed lags significantly behind the inflation curve, it has repeatedly led the market curve since the middle of last year. Market expectations and pricing are constantly following the judgment and pace of the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Reserve is constantly adjusting to follow the pace of inflation. When the market curve lags behind the Fed (and we expect it still will in the coming months), its reference will also be discounted.</p><p>9. Q: How does the Fed's tightening affect commodities?</p><p>A: Historically, bulk has been sensitive to dollar liquidity. But this time may be different. In the short term, we expect oil, gold and copper to remain strong, accompanied by upside risks. Demand, supply, anti-inflation attributes and the situation between Russia and Ukraine may intensify the risk of further rises in oil and gas. There are three downwind factors and one headwind factor for gold this year: (1) Under high inflation or even quasi-stagflation, the value of gold allocation is highlighted; (2). This year's safe-haven demand is stronger than last year's (geopolitical risks superimposed on Fed tightening risks); (3) The diversion effect of digital currency on gold has been significantly weakened (it was obvious last year that digital currency was under significant pressure this year under the tightening of the Federal Reserve); (4) The upward trend of real interest rates limits the upside of gold. Finally, with continued demand support, superimposed on historically low inventories of industrial metals such as copper, slight supply disturbances will bring greater price fluctuations.</p><p>10. Q: Did U.S. stocks rebound after the first rate hike in March?</p><p>A: We don't think it is necessarily. It depends on the evolution of inflation. This first rate hike does not mean that the boots have completely landed. If the rate hike at the March interest rate meeting is 25 basis points, investors who are firmly bullish on inflation may believe that 25 basis points are not enough to have a significant effect on curbing inflation, thereby increasing the risk of out-of-control inflation, and selling risky assets, especially the Nasdaq. If a rate hike is 50 basis points, investors with a \"moderate\" or \"temporary\" view of inflation will panic sell risky assets amid a rate hike not seen in the past two decades. In either case, we believe that the high volatility of the stock market may continue after the interest rate meeting in March.</p><p></body></html></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> source：<a href=\"https://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/c/2022-02-21/doc-imcwiwss2030746.shtml\">中金点睛</a></p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/3d57ddcf22f19d3a7fd29a1d33461f97","relate_stocks":{"BK4534":"瑞士信贷持仓",".DJI":"道琼斯","BK4504":"桥水持仓","BK4559":"巴菲特持仓","SPY":"标普500ETF",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite","BK4550":"红杉资本持仓"},"source_url":"https://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/c/2022-02-21/doc-imcwiwss2030746.shtml","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"2213603512","content_text":"摘要：虽然美国通胀已经创四十年来的新高，但市场对美国通胀的持续性仍有分歧。那么，到底如何看待本轮美国通胀背后的逻辑与走势？去年前三季度当美联储和市场坚称通胀是暂时的时候，我们坚定看多美国通胀；去年底当市场判断美联储可能存在“虚张声势”和“联储看跌期权”时，我们提示市场低估了美联储抗通胀的决心以及宏观波动将因此加剧；虽然美国通胀已经创四十年来的新高，但市场对美国通胀的持续性仍有分歧。那么，到底如何看待本轮美国通胀背后的逻辑与走势？在本文中，我们将再次评估此时和“大通胀”时期的相似与差异，从过去几个月的边际变化中，试图找出未来通胀可能的演变及美联储可能的应对。通过对比两个时期的货币财政政策环境和供需失衡的情况，我们发现相似之处仍似曾相识，而差异之处则有收敛趋势。我们认为只有美联储大胆行动、前置紧缩，方可避免重蹈70年代的覆辙。去年前三季度当美联储和市场坚称通胀是暂时的时候，我们坚定看多美国通胀；去年底当市场判断美联储可能存在“虚张声势”和“联储看跌期权”时，我们提示市场低估了美联储抗通胀的决心以及宏观波动将因此加剧；虽然美国通胀已经创四十年来的新高，但市场对美国通胀的持续性仍有分歧。那么，到底如何看待本轮美国通胀背后的逻辑与走势？美国通胀屡超预期，1月份CPI同比增长7.5%，创1982年以来的四十年新高。实际上，美国CPI同比增速自去年5月突破5%以来，几乎每月都在以超预期的节奏持续创历史新高，创新高的时间窗口在越拉越长。我们曾在去年10月《“大通胀”对当下的启示》一文中剖析美国1960-1980年代“大通胀”时期的宏观、政策和国际环境，指出此时与彼时的三点相似，因此本轮通胀可能会持续时间较长。同时，两段时期亦存在三点差异，因此重现1970年代双位数通胀的概率也较低。在本文中，我们将再次评估此时和彼时的相似与差异，从过去几个月的边际变化中，试图找出未来通胀可能的演变及美联储可能的应对。通过对比两个时期的货币财政政策环境和供需失衡的情况，我们发现相似之处仍似曾相识，而差异之处则有收敛趋势。我们认为只有美联储大胆行动、前置紧缩，方可避免重蹈70年代的覆辙。最后，针对投资者关于美联储加息缩表关心的十个问题，我们进行解答。美国通胀屡超预期，1月份CPI同比增长7.5%，创1982年以来的四十年新高。实际上，美国CPI同比增速自去年5月突破5%以来，几乎每月都在以超预期的节奏持续创历史新高，创新高的时间窗口在越拉越长。我们曾在去年10月《“大通胀”对当下的启示》一文中剖析美国1960-1980年代“大通胀”时期的宏观、政策和国际环境，指出此时与彼时的三点相似，因此本轮通胀可能会持续时间较长。同时，两段时期亦存在三点差异，因此重现1970年代双位数通胀的概率也较低。在本文中，我们将再次评估此时和彼时的相似与差异，从过去几个月的边际变化中，试图找出未来通胀可能的演变及美联储可能的应对。通过对比两个时期的货币财政政策环境和供需失衡的情况，我们发现相似之处仍似曾相识，而差异之处则有收敛趋势。我们认为只有美联储大胆行动、前置紧缩，方可避免重蹈70年代的覆辙。最后，针对投资者关于美联储加息缩表关心的十个问题，我们进行解答。一、政策环境：财政相对主导，联储屡屡误判首先，我们认为货币财政双宽松是推动通胀及其中枢持续高企的根本力量。疫情以来的货币和财政宽松程度远超“大通胀”初期（1965年-1970年），为高通胀埋下后患。无论主动支持还是被动为之，客观来看，疫情以来美国货币政策对财政政策的配合程度达到二战以来之最[1]，财政政策相对主导了宏观政策范式。从货币供应量来看，1965年一季度年至1970年四季度M2同比增速均值为6.6%，而2020年一季度至2021年四季度M2同比增速均值高达18.0%，远超历史上任一时期。总量之外，M2的结构更值得注意，其中财政“放水”贡献了一半以上的力量[2]，践行了“直升机撒钱”。此外，美联储QE客观上支撑了疫情以来史无前例的政府债务发行，2020年以来美国的公共债务占GDP的比例维持在超过120%的历史高位，美联储持有的国债比例也超过20%，创历史新高。根据价格水平的财政决定理论（FTPL），大规模财政扩张推动政府债务上升、货币政策较高的配合度、对未来财政赤字可能进一步扩大的预期等均将推升通胀。往前看，虽然货币和财政将将边际紧缩，但从存量角度，相较于历史，货币和财政在较长时间内仍显宽松。其次，“大通胀”时期美联储起初对通胀压力的低估与不作为是后期通胀失控的重要原因。在“大通胀”初期（1965年-1970年），时任美联储主席的麦克切斯尼·马丁低估了通胀压力的持续性，十分重视促进充分就业。即使在就业率已低于4%的情况下，美联储依旧在1967年6月与1969年7月两次降息，进一步加剧通胀压力。虽然后来马丁已意识到其错误的货币政策将使美国面对前所未有的高通胀压力，但其继任阿瑟·伯恩斯并未重视通胀问题。伯恩斯认为高企的通货膨胀率是食品和能源等不稳定的“特殊因素”导致的，这是与货币政策无关的“噪音”[3]，核心通胀这个新的“温度计”也由此而诞生。而不久之后这个新的“温度计”也全线飙红，通胀彻底失控。在伯恩斯错误的判断与多重供给冲击的影响下，美国进入长期“滞胀”。1979年，沃尔克受命出任美联储主席开启超常规的货币紧缩政策以对抗通货膨胀问题，联邦基金利率一度提升至20%。尽管沃尔克成功制服了高通胀，但也使美国陷入了20世纪30年代后最严重的经济萧条时期。反观当下，似乎能看到“大通胀”时期初期美联储的影子。在2021年美国通胀问题初现时，美联储多次强调通胀是“暂时的”，但随后屡超预期的通胀数据和美联储不断上修的通胀预期表明，疫情后宏观经济面临的不确定性加剧使得政策制定和执行面临“大缓和”时期以来前所未有的艰难挑战。倘若此次美联储不更加及时、果断和有力地直面通胀，或将再次成为通胀失控的推手。二、供需失衡：供给约束难言缓和，长期隐忧日益浮现首先来看供给冲击导致的供应短缺。美国经济在70年代接连遭受了多重供给冲击，“尼克松冲击”、以及石油危机和粮食危机导致的能源和食品价格飙升是推升通胀的重要供给侧因素[4]。当前，能源、谷物以及工业金属等市场的供给压力亦不容忽视。►第一，石油生产国的地缘冲突风险，加剧能源价格压力。20世纪70年代爆发的“两次石油危机”使国际原油价格在十年间累计上涨约32倍，成为美国大通胀的重要因素之一。其中，第一次与第二次石油危机的诱因分别为第四次中东战争与伊朗伊斯兰革命。回顾发生于1973年10月的第四次中东战争，战后，以阿拉伯国家为首的石油生产国以石油为武器，分别通过“提价、减产、禁运、断供”等制裁美国等支持以色列的国家，进而诱发“第一次石油危机”[5]。而当前俄乌边境局势紧张，背后则是俄罗斯与北约国家正在进行的地缘政治博弈。虽然目前俄乌局势边际缓解，然而风险并未解除。据中金大宗组测算，若俄罗斯原油出口受到波及，全年油价可能面临30美元/桶的供应溢价。此外，1月OPEC+增产幅度放缓、利比亚因管道维护而减产叠加疫情引致的供应链瓶颈问题，可能强化供应风险对全球能源成本和大宗商品价格的影响。►第二，全球粮食供给压力加剧。回顾“大通胀”期间，1972年爆发厄尔尼诺事件，极端天气导致全球范围内粮食紧缺情况恶化，并引发后续的1972-1974年世界性粮食危机。粮食价格的上涨也进一步推升物价普遍上涨，使得美国通胀进一步失控。当下，全球粮食存在一定风险。过去两年，受极端天气与自然灾害影响，全球粮食产量面临减产风险。此外，除全球气候影响外，目前全球粮食供给还受以下因素影响：（1）新冠疫情对粮食生产的直接影响。疫情导致的劳动力短缺和供应链受阻使得食品行业生产承压，产出大幅下降。2021年全球粮价上涨逾40%。（2）地缘政治风险。俄乌同为全球重要的谷物供给国与出口国，俄乌局势不确定性加剧市场对粮食供给的担忧。（3）全球化肥杀虫剂等产品价格飙升。供应链持续中断导致全球化肥价格在过去18个月中上涨约2倍，进而可能会抑制未来一年全球农作物产量。►第三，大宗商品市场部分重要商品库存正处历史低点，供应风险加剧。全球大宗商品市场中工业金属以及部分农产品等重要原材料库存正处于历史低位，使得价格对轻微扰动非常敏感。目前，全球工业金属紧张的供给形势受多重因素交织影响：地缘政治风险、全球经济复苏致使需求激增叠加疫情致使的供应链瓶颈，以及传统行业长期投资不足等。其中，乌克兰作为工业金属重要出口国，俄乌局势不确定性加剧相关金属价格波动，助推短期期货价格与现货溢价。叠加全球需求增加、供应链瓶颈恢复受限等因素，全球供应链中工业金属库存迅速消耗。供给稳定性下降加之库存告急等短期警报的拉响加剧相关商品价格上涨风险。除短期因素以外，影响工业金属库存的中长期因素也进一步凸显。近十年来，传统行业回报率低迷、全球碳中和政策与ESG投资概念兴起等制约资本流向传统行业，导致传统行业长期投资不足，其中对油气等化石燃料行业与传统冶炼行业影响更为明显。传统行业投资不足与基础设施老化使供给能力迅速下降，继而成为能源成本飙升、重要大宗商品供应短缺的重要因素，致使价格中枢易升难降。具体来看，新经济转型增速（先进制造业、新型能源等）不及预期难以填补日益增大的供给缺口。能源成本的上升以及碳排放的限制迫使中国、欧洲等地区大量有色金属冶炼厂降低产量。疫情爆发后，各国封锁政策使得全球运输能力下降、库存大幅消耗。随着疫情后各国经济逐渐进入复苏，需求大幅上升，库存见底进而放大供给缺口，使得传统经济欠投资的问题凸显。叠加疫后可能开启的全球新一轮资本开支周期，未来几年相关工业金属价格中枢恐趋势上行。其次，除了上述三方面的直接供给冲击，供应链瓶颈问题短期内或难言显著起色。近半年来，美国洛杉矶港和长滩港拥堵问题成为全球供应链中断的重要因素。由于堆场拥堵、进口滞留与劳动力短缺，2022年2月的数据显示，洛杉矶港船舶等待时间为25-35天，长滩港船舶等待时间为38-42天[6]。同时，加拿大卡车司机罢工抗议进一步阻碍美国关键边境运输。罢工抗议活动使美加最繁忙的贸易通道“大使桥”被堵塞，该桥承载了超1/4美加贸易总量，对美国供应链产生严重影响，例如部分汽车制造商与食品供应商因关键零部件或原材料的断供已面临停产。美国供应链持续中断，极可能导致供需失衡进一步扩大，加剧通胀压力。三、前路冷峻：通胀螺旋确立，联储退无可退在《“大通胀”对当下的启示》中，我们指出此时和彼时存在三点差异：1．目前工会组织规模远小于“大通胀”时期，导致工资-物价传导较为不顺畅；2．相较于彼时，全球协同生产模式降低了产品成本和美国工人的议价能力；3．相较于彼时，美联储实行（平均）通胀目标制，以控通胀为重要任务。基于这三点差异，我们在上面报告中认为这次通胀重蹈70年代覆辙的可能性不大。基于过去几个月的边际变化，我们发现前两点差异正在弱化。虽然工会仍较弱势，但美国“大离职”及其劳动力供需缺口持续扩大显著提升了员工的议价能力，强化了物价-工资的通胀螺旋。此外，全球供应链仍严重受阻，很大程度上降低了生产效率，提高产品和人工成本。我们可以美好地期望美国几百万人迅速回归劳动力市场，也可以期望全球供应链短期内顺利修复，更可以期望上述的各种供给冲击昙花一现，然而这些因素政策都无法控制。我们认为政策目前唯一能做的就是坚守并强力贯彻第三点差异：大胆行动、先发制人、以控通胀为唯一任务，再次树立控通胀的信誉。总结来看，美国60-80年代的“大通胀”主要是多重供给冲击和“双宽”的财政货币共同作用的结果。而立足当前，“大缓和”时期以来鲜有较为严重供给冲击的“好运气”、和因此而相对易于执行的“好政策”可能都在成为历史。前者我们不再赘述，至于后者，新冠疫情在全球爆发以来，不断进化的变异毒株、脆弱性渐显的全球产业链、与日高企的政府债务等一系列因素使得全球经济复苏持续遇到挑战。具体而言，宏观政策难度可能来源于三个方面，一是在货币政策长期宽松、供给冲击再现的情形下，政策制定者对通胀前景的判断更为困难。这从去年以来美国屡超预期的通胀数据和美联储于去年底的“急转弯”中可见一斑。二是从周期角度来看，无论加息还是缩表，美联储都是寄希望于打压需求来控通胀，如何平衡通胀与增长充满挑战：货币收紧不够，通胀控不下来；货币收紧过头，经济衰退风险将提高。三是中长期来看，货币政策的空间受限。疫情后美国政府债务创历史新高，在财政政策相对主导的宏观政策范式下，货币政策可能受到掣肘。即使不是出于直接降低政府融资成本的考虑，利率上升过多会使得经济体的高债务不可持续，进而可能直接导致经济增长陷入困境，因而低利率、高通胀与政府高债务会互相加强，货币政策与财政政策的空间缩水[7]。面对美联储超预期紧缩风险加剧，大类资产如何布局？请参见《联储加速紧缩，如何影响资产价格》。面对高通胀环境以及宏观波动加剧，如何做好宏观对冲？请参见《全球大类资产之一：宏观逻辑、轮动体系和供给冲击》。四、投资者关于美联储货币紧缩的十问十答：1． 问：美联储是否会因为经济放缓或金融市场动荡而投鼠忌器？答：我们认为目前看不大会，取决于通胀是否明显缓解。“美联储看跌期权”诞生于低通胀、低波动的“大缓和”期间，通胀基本不是市场和美联储需要过多担忧的问题，因此货币政策目标相对单一、政策较易执行。过去三十多年，即使通胀偶有过热时期，但彼时通胀仅是经济问题，进而美联储在通胀和就业之间做出权衡来解决经济成本和波动最小化的问题。然而当下，面对四十年不遇的通胀风险，通胀已经上升为政治问题、社会问题，控通胀对于拜登政府已成为重中之重。在目前劳动力市场处于几十年最紧的背景下，可以说，通胀被迫成为美联储当下最关注的目标。2． 问：货币紧缩进程放缓的条件或者触发因素？答：我们认为是工资增速显著降温进而打破工资-物价通胀螺旋。能源价格增速放缓有助于通胀回落，尤其在能源食品价格目前已传导至核心通胀的情况下。可以肯定的是，在未来几个月通胀压力难见明显缓解之际，美联储很难以放弃快速紧缩策略。3． 问：伴随需求边际减弱，如果供给继续推升通胀，货币政策是否有效？答：诚然供给是推升美国通胀的重要原因（劳动力供需缺口走阔、供应链瓶颈、能源金属等供给冲击），但需求的影响非常大。假设一个极端情形，美联储通过货币紧缩把需求彻底浇灭，通胀自然也随之大幅放缓。因此美联储需要找到一个微妙的平衡。4． 问：货币政策之外，有无其它控通胀政策？答：去年底拜登政府释放战略油储，但对打压油价基本无效。拜登政府希望美国页岩油公司和沙特等欧佩克国家加速增产，但未果。至于降低或者撤销关税，或许有助于缓解物品通胀压力，但不能从根本上解决问题。5． 问：美国国债利息负担是否会成为加息缩表的掣肘？答：我们认为短期内不会。根据我们的测算，美债利率曲线仍有较大上行空间。具体来说，即使今年十年期利率上升至3.0%，并且未来几年保持该水平，美债利息支付比例仍可保持相对稳定。实际上，对于利息负担，过去在较低利率水平发行的存量债是“压舱石”。6． 问：货币政策传导到实体经济的时滞一般多久？通胀与加息的关系？答：根据美联储官方一般均衡模型，我们测算时滞约为6-12个月。因此为了控通胀，货币紧缩宜早不宜迟。根据泰勒规则实证经验，每面对一个百分点的通胀上行，往往需要加息1.5个百分点将通胀控回到初始水平。因此，我们认为美联储需要大胆行动。7． 问：通胀预期的一些指标显示预期正在放缓，是否可以解读为通胀将放缓？答：十年期盈亏平衡通胀率（breakeven rate）自去年11月高点以来趋势下降，与美联储11月“大转向”有一定关系。然而，breakeven并不是较好的衡量通胀预期的指标，它是交易出来的（因此存在误判和mark-to-market的倾向），由于流动性远逊于普通国债，因此其流动性溢价很大程度上扭曲了市场对未来通胀预期的较真实反映。尤其疫情以来美联储天量QE显著压低其利率，使其暗示的通胀预期进一步偏离应有之水平。虽然过去一两个月密歇根大学调查通胀预期上升速度放缓，纽约联储通胀预期正在筑顶，但这并不能反映未来可能的通胀路径。当通胀较低时，通胀预期往往较好锚定，给市场以错觉通胀预期引领实际的通胀（比如缺少供给冲击的“大缓和”时期）。然而，通胀较高时，尤其在多重供给冲击带来诸多不确定性的背景下，通胀预期很可能是实际通胀的结果，而非反过来。美联储一篇工作论文反思了通胀预期的作用[8]。8． 问：利率衍生品市场已经很充分定价了，美联储还能比市场预期更激进么？答：首先，即使市场预计今年剩下的7次会议联储加息，但并未预计有几次会议一次加50bp（除了3月会议）。况且，对长端利率和金融条件更为重要的缩表，市场是很难通过资产价格来预计其方式、力度和节奏。其次，我们认为这次市场定价或者市场预期可能没有之前的加息周期中那么重要。“大缓和”以来，尤其金融危机之后，美联储屡屡滞后于市场曲线，因此市场定价对我们判断美联储政策路径有重要意义。一定程度上讲，市场曲线暗示了美联储曲线的“上限”。然而这一次不一样：虽然美联储严重滞后于通胀曲线，但自去年中期以来却屡屡引领市场曲线。市场预期和定价在不断追随美联储的判断和步伐，而美联储不断调整以追随通胀的步伐。当市场曲线落后于美联储时（我们预计未来几个月仍会），其参考意义也将有所折扣。9． 问：联储紧缩如何影响大宗商品？答：历史上，大宗对美元流动性比较敏感。但这次可能不一样，短期内我们预计油金铜仍将坚挺，伴有上行风险。需求、供给、抗通胀属性和俄乌局势恐将使油气进一步上涨风险加剧。黄金今年三个顺风因素，一个逆风因素：（1）．高通胀甚至类滞胀下，黄金配置价值凸显；（2）．今年避险需求强于去年（地缘政治风险叠加联储紧缩风险）；（3）．数字货币对黄金的分流效果显著弱化（去年很明显，今年在联储紧缩下数字货币显著承压）；（4）．实际利率趋势上行限制黄金上涨空间。最后，持续需求支撑，叠加铜等工业金属历史低位库存，轻微供给扰动将带来较大价格波动。10．问：3月首次加息后美股是否趋势反弹？答：我们认为不一定，取决于通胀演变，这次首次加息并不代表靴子完全落地。如果3月议息会议加息25个基点，坚定看多通胀的投资者可能认为25个基点不足以对抑制通胀产生明显效果，进而通胀失控风险加剧，而抛售风险资产尤其纳指。如果加息50个基点，对通胀持“温和”或“暂时”观点的投资者将在过去二十多年不遇的加息幅度下恐慌性抛售风险资产。无论哪种情况，我们认为股市高波动率在3月议息会以后恐将延续。","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"ZNmain":0.9,"ZFmain":0.9,"GCmain":0.6,"UBmain":0.9,"ZBmain":0.9,"MGCmain":0.9,"ZTmain":0.9,".IXIC":0.6,".DJI":0.6,"TNmain":0.9,"SPY":0.6}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":2194,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":9092367013,"gmtCreate":1644539690360,"gmtModify":1676533938501,"author":{"id":"4103111140760420","authorId":"4103111140760420","name":"goh63","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0495fffaedb295d4de28a966d5a78a49","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"4103111140760420","idStr":"4103111140760420"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"🎃","listText":"🎃","text":"🎃","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/9092367013","repostId":"1148471486","repostType":4,"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":649,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0}],"hots":[{"id":9097252282,"gmtCreate":1645488458809,"gmtModify":1676534031720,"author":{"id":"4103111140760420","authorId":"4103111140760420","name":"goh63","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0495fffaedb295d4de28a966d5a78a49","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"4103111140760420","idStr":"4103111140760420"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"🤨","listText":"🤨","text":"🤨","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/9097252282","repostId":"2213603512","repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"2213603512","kind":"highlight","pubTimestamp":1645409576,"share":"https://ttm.financial/m/news/2213603512?lang=en_US&edition=fundamental","pubTime":"2022-02-21 10:12","market":"us","language":"zh","title":"US inflation, a bit of the 70s flavor","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=2213603512","media":"中金点睛","summary":"摘要：虽然美国通胀已经创四十年来的新高，但市场对美国通胀的持续性仍有分歧。那么，到底如何看待本轮美国通胀背后的逻辑与走势？去年前三季度当美联储和市场坚称通胀是暂时的时候，我们坚定看多美国通胀；去年底当","content":"<p><html><head></head><body>Abstract: Although U.S. inflation has hit a new high in 40 years, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation? In the first three quarters of last year, when the Fed and the market insisted that inflation was temporary, we were firmly bullish on U.S. inflation; At the end of last year, when the market judged that the Fed might have \"bluffing\" and \"Fed put options\", we suggested that the market underestimated the Fed's determination to fight inflation and that macro fluctuations would intensify as a result; Although U.S. inflation has hit a four-decade high, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation? In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and the \"Great Inflation\" period, trying to find out the possible evolution of future inflation and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>In the first three quarters of last year, when the Fed and the market insisted that inflation was temporary, we were firmly bullish on U.S. inflation; At the end of last year, when the market judged that the Fed might have \"bluffing\" and \"Fed put options\", we suggested that the market underestimated the Fed's determination to fight inflation and that macro fluctuations would intensify as a result; Although U.S. inflation has hit a four-decade high, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation?</p><p>U.S. inflation has repeatedly exceeded expectations. In January, the CPI increased by 7.5% year-on-year, a 40-year high since 1982. In fact, since the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. CPI exceeded 5% in May last year, it has continued to hit record highs at an unexpected pace almost every month, and the time window for new highs is getting longer and longer. In the article \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\" in October last year, we analyzed the macro, policy and international environment during the \"Great Inflation\" period in the United States from 1960s to 1980s, and pointed out that the three points at this time were similar to those at that time. Therefore, this round of inflation may last longer. At the same time, there are three differences between the two periods, so the probability of repeating double-digit inflation in the 1970s is also low.</p><p>In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and then, trying to find out the possible evolution of inflation in the future and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>Finally, we will answer ten questions that investors are concerned about rate hike shrinking balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.</p><p>U.S. inflation has repeatedly exceeded expectations. In January, the CPI increased by 7.5% year-on-year, a 40-year high since 1982. In fact, since the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. CPI exceeded 5% in May last year, it has continued to hit record highs at an unexpected pace almost every month, and the time window for new highs is getting longer and longer. In the article \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\" in October last year, we analyzed the macro, policy and international environment during the \"Great Inflation\" period in the United States from 1960s to 1980s, and pointed out that the three points at this time were similar to those at that time. Therefore, this round of inflation may last longer. At the same time, there are three differences between the two periods, so the probability of repeating double-digit inflation in the 1970s is also low.</p><p>In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and then, trying to find out the possible evolution of inflation in the future and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>Finally, we will answer ten questions that investors are concerned about rate hike shrinking balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.</p><p>1. Policy environment: Finance is relatively dominant, and the Fed has repeatedly misjudged</p><p>First of all, we believe that double monetary and fiscal easing is the fundamental force driving inflation and its center to remain high. The degree of monetary and fiscal easing since the epidemic has far exceeded that in the early stage of the \"Great Inflation\" (1965-1970), laying the foundation for high inflation. Regardless of active support or passive support, objectively speaking, since the epidemic, the degree of coordination between U.S. monetary policy and fiscal policy has reached the highest level since World War II [1], and fiscal policy has relatively dominated the macro policy paradigm. From the perspective of money supply, the average year-on-year growth rate of M2 from the first quarter of 1965 to the fourth quarter of 1970 was 6.6%, while the average year-on-year growth rate of M2 from the first quarter of 2020 to the fourth quarter of 2021 was as high as 18.0%, far exceeding any previous year in history period. In addition to the total amount, the structure of M2 is more noteworthy, in which the financial \"water release\" contributes more than half of the strength [2], and \"helicopter money\" is practiced. In addition, the Fed's QE has objectively supported the unprecedented issuance of government debt since the epidemic. Since 2020, the ratio of public debt to GDP in the United States has remained at a historical high of more than 120%, and the proportion of Treasury Bond held by the Fed has also exceeded 20%, a record high. According to the Fiscal Determination Theory of Price Level (FTPL), large-scale fiscal expansion will push up government debt, a high degree of coordination of monetary policy, and expectations that future fiscal deficits may further expand will all push up inflation. Looking ahead, although monetary and fiscal policies will tighten marginally, from the perspective of stock, compared with history, monetary and fiscal policies will still be loose for a long time.</p><p>Secondly, during the \"Great Inflation\" period, the Federal Reserve's initial underestimation and inaction of inflationary pressures were important reasons for the out-of-control inflation in the later period. In the early days of the \"Great Inflation\" (1965-1970), McChesney Martin, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, underestimated the persistence of inflationary pressures and attached great importance to promoting full employment. Even when the employment rate was below 4%, the Federal Reserve still cut interest rates twice in June 1967 and July 1969, further exacerbating inflationary pressures. Although Martin later realized that his wrong monetary policy would make the United States face unprecedented high inflationary pressure, his successor Arthur Burns did not pay attention to inflation. Burns believes that the high inflation rate is caused by unstable \"special factors\" such as food and energy, which is a \"noise\" unrelated to monetary policy [3], and the new \"thermometer\" of core inflation is also born. Soon after, this new \"thermometer\" also soared across the board, and inflation was completely out of control. Under the influence of Burns' wrong judgment and multiple supply shocks, the United States entered a long-term \"stagflation.\" In 1979, Volcker was appointed as the chairman of the Federal Reserve to start an extraordinary monetary tightening policy to fight inflation, and the Federal Funds rate once rose to 20%. Although Volcker succeeded in subduing high inflation, it also plunged the United States into the worst economic depression since the 1930s. Looking back at the present, it seems that we can see the shadow of the Federal Reserve in the early days of the \"Great Inflation\" period. At the beginning of the U.S. inflation problem in 2021, the Federal Reserve repeatedly emphasized that inflation is \"temporary.\" However, subsequent inflation data that repeatedly exceeded expectations and the Fed's continuously revised inflation expectations showed that the uncertainty facing the macro economy after the epidemic has intensified. Policy formulation and implementation are facing unprecedented difficult challenges since the \"Great Detente\" period. If the Federal Reserve does not face inflation more timely, decisively and forcefully this time, it may once again become the driving force behind out-of-control inflation.</p><p>2. Imbalance between supply and demand: Supply constraints are hard to ease, and long-term worries are increasingly emerging</p><p>First, let's look at the supply shortage caused by supply shocks. The U.S. economy suffered multiple supply shocks in succession in the 1970s. The \"Nixon shock\" and the soaring energy and food prices caused by the oil crisis and food crisis were important supply-side factors driving up inflation [4]. At present, the supply pressure of energy, grain and industrial metal markets cannot be ignored.</p><p>► First, the risk of geopolitical conflicts in oil-producing countries has exacerbated the pressure on energy prices. The \"two oil crises\" that broke out in the 1970s caused the international crude oil price to rise by about 32 times in ten years, becoming one of the important factors of the great inflation in the United States. Among them, the causes of the first and second oil crises were the Fourth Middle East War and the Islamic Revolution in Iran respectively. Looking back at the Fourth Middle East War that occurred in October 1973, after the war, oil producers led by Arab countries used oil as a weapon to sanction the United States and other countries supporting Israel through \"price increases, production reductions, embargoes, and supply cuts\", thus triggering the \"first oil crisis\" [5]. The current tense situation on the Russia-Ukraine border is behind the ongoing geopolitical game between Russia and NATO countries. Although the current situation between Russia and Ukraine has eased marginally, the risks have not been lifted. According to calculations by CICC Bulk Group, if Russian crude oil exports are affected, oil prices may face a supply premium of US $30/barrel throughout the year. In addition, the slowdown in OPEC + production increases in January, Libya's production cuts due to pipeline maintenance and supply chain bottlenecks caused by the epidemic may strengthen the impact of supply risks on global energy costs and commodity prices.</p><p>► Second, the pressure on global food supply has intensified. Looking back at the \"Great Inflation\" period, the El Niñ o event broke out in 1972. Extreme weather worsened the global food shortage and triggered the subsequent 1972-1974 global food crisis. The rise in food prices has further pushed up the general price increase, making inflation in the United States further out of control. At present, there are certain risks to global food. In the past two years, affected by extreme weather and natural disasters, global grain production has faced the risk of reducing production. In addition, in addition to the impact of global climate, the current global food supply is also affected by the following factors: (1) The direct impact of COVID-19 pandemic on food production. Labor shortages and supply chain disruptions caused by the epidemic have put pressure on the production of the food industry, resulting in a sharp drop in output. Global food prices rose by more than 40% in 2021. (2) Geopolitical risks. Russia and Ukraine are both important grain suppliers and exporters in the world. The uncertainty of the situation between Russia and Ukraine has intensified market concerns about grain supply. (3) Global prices of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and other products have soared. Continued supply chain disruptions have caused global fertilizer prices to rise roughly twice in the past 18 months, which in turn may dampen global crop production in the coming year.</p><p>► Third, the inventories of some important commodities in the commodity market are at historical lows, and supply risks have intensified. Industrial metals in the global commodity market and some<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/000061\">Agricultural products</a>Inventories of such important raw materials are at historically low levels, making prices very sensitive to minor disturbances. At present, the tight supply situation of global industrial metals is affected by multiple factors: geopolitical risks, surge in demand caused by global economic recovery and supply chain bottlenecks caused by the epidemic, and long-term underinvestment in traditional industries. Among them, Ukraine is an important exporter of industrial metals, and the uncertainty of the situation between Russia and Ukraine has intensified related metal price fluctuations, boosting short-term futures prices and spot premiums. Coupled with factors such as increased global demand and limited recovery from supply chain bottlenecks, industrial metal inventories in the global supply chain are rapidly consumed. The decline in supply stability and the sound of short-term alarms such as inventory shortages have exacerbated the risk of rising prices of related commodities.</p><p>In addition to short-term factors, medium and long-term factors affecting industrial metal inventories have also been further highlighted. In the past ten years, the sluggish return rate of traditional industries, the rise of global carbon neutrality policies and ESG investment concepts have restricted the flow of capital to traditional industries, resulting in long-term underinvestment in traditional industries, with a more obvious impact on fossil fuel industries such as oil and gas and traditional smelting industries. Insufficient investment in traditional industries and aging infrastructure have led to a rapid decline in supply capacity, which in turn has become an important factor in soaring energy costs and shortages of important commodities, making price centers easy to rise but difficult to fall. Specifically, the growth rate of new economic transformation (advanced manufacturing, new energy, etc.) is less than expected and it is difficult to fill the growing supply gap. Rising energy costs and restrictions on carbon emissions have forced a large number of non-ferrous metal smelters in China, Europe and other regions to reduce production. After the outbreak of the epidemic, the blockade policies of various countries reduced global transportation capacity and greatly depleted inventory. As the economies of various countries gradually recover after the epidemic, demand has risen sharply, and inventories have bottomed out, thus enlarging the supply gap, highlighting the problem of underinvestment in the traditional economy. Coupled with a new round of global capital expenditure cycle that may start after the epidemic, the price center of related industrial metals may trend upward in the next few years.</p><p>Secondly, in addition to the direct supply shocks in the above three aspects, the supply chain bottleneck problem may hardly improve significantly in the short term. In the past six months, congestion in the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach in the United States has become an important factor in the disruption of global supply chains. Due to yard congestion, import detention and labor shortages, data in February 2022 showed that the waiting time for ships at the Port of Los Angeles was 25-35 days and that at the Port of Long Beach was 38-42 days [6]. At the same time, Canadian truck drivers went on strike to further hinder key border transportation in the United States. Strike protests make the busiest in the United States and Canada<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/00536\">Tradelink</a>The \"Ambassador Bridge\" was blocked, which carried more than a quarter of the total trade volume between the United States and Canada, which had a serious impact on the U.S. supply chain. For example, some automobile manufacturers and food suppliers have faced production suspension due to the cut-off of key components or raw materials. The continued disruption of the U.S. supply chain is likely to further expand the imbalance between supply and demand and exacerbate inflationary pressures.</p><p>3. The road ahead is cold: the inflation spiral is established, and the Fed has no retreat</p><p>In \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\", we point out that there are three differences between this time and then: 1. The current scale of trade union organizations is much smaller than that during the \"Great Inflation\" period, resulting in relatively unsmooth wage-price transmission; 2. Compared with that time, the global collaborative production model reduced product costs and the bargaining power of American workers; 3. Compared with that time, the Federal Reserve implemented a (average) inflation targeting system, with inflation controlling as an important task. Based on these three differences, we believe in the above report that it is unlikely that this inflation will repeat the mistakes of the 1970s. Based on the marginal changes in the past few months, we find that the differences between the first two points are weakening. Although trade unions are still relatively weak, the \"great turnover\" in the United States and the continued widening gap between labor supply and demand have significantly improved employees' bargaining power and strengthened the price-wage inflation spiral. In addition, the global supply chain is still severely hindered, greatly reducing production efficiency and increasing product and labor costs. We can hope that millions of people in the United States will quickly return to the labor market, that the global supply chain will be repaired smoothly in the short term, and that the above-mentioned supply shocks will be short-lived, but these factors are beyond the control of policies. We believe that the only thing the policy can do at present is to stick to and vigorously implement the third difference: bold action, pre-emptive strike, control inflation as the only task, and once again establish the credibility of controlling inflation.</p><p>To sum up, the \"Great Inflation\" in the United States in the 1960s and 1980s was mainly the result of the combined effect of multiple supply shocks and \"double-wide\" fiscal and monetary effects. Based on the current situation, the \"good luck\" that has rarely had serious supply shocks since the \"Great Detente\" period and the \"good policies\" that are relatively easy to implement may be becoming history. We won't go into details about the former. As for the latter, since the global outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, a series of factors such as the evolving mutant strains, the increasingly fragile global industrial chain, and the rising government debt have caused the global economic recovery to continue to encounter challenges.</p><p>Specifically, the difficulty of macro policy may come from three aspects. First, when monetary policy is loose for a long time and supply shocks reappear, it is more difficult for policymakers to judge the inflation outlook. This can be seen from the inflation data in the United States that has repeatedly exceeded expectations since last year and the \"sharp turn\" made by the Federal Reserve at the end of last year. Second, from a cyclical perspective, regardless of rate hike or shrinking balance sheet, the Federal Reserve hopes to suppress demand to control inflation. How to balance inflation and growth is full of challenges: monetary tightening is not enough, and inflation cannot be controlled; If the currency tightens too much, the risk of economic recession will increase. Third, in the medium and long term, the space for monetary policy is limited. After the epidemic, U.S. government debt hit a record high. Under the macro policy paradigm where fiscal policy is relatively dominant, monetary policy may be constrained. Even if it is not for the consideration of directly reducing government financing costs, excessive rise in interest rates will make the economy's high debt unsustainable, which may directly lead to economic growth in trouble. Therefore, low interest rates, high inflation and high government debt will reinforce each other, and the space for monetary policy and fiscal policy will shrink [7].</p><p>In the face of the increasing risk of the Fed's unexpected tightening, how to deploy major asset classes? See How the Fed's Accelerated Tightening Is Affecting Asset Prices.</p><p>In the face of a high inflation environment and intensified macro fluctuations, how to do a good job in macro hedging? Please see \"One of the Global Asset Classes: Macro Logic, Rotation System and Supply Shock\".</p><p>4. Investors' ten questions and answers about the Federal Reserve's monetary tightening:</p><p>1. Q: Will the Federal Reserve be wary of economic slowdown or financial market turmoil?</p><p>A: We don't think it will look good at the moment, depending on whether inflation eases significantly. The \"Fed put option\" was born during the \"Great Easing\" period of low inflation and low volatility. Inflation is basically not an issue that the market and the Fed need to worry too much about. Therefore, the monetary policy goal is relatively single and the policy is easy to implement. Over the past three decades or so, even though inflation has occasionally overheated periods, inflation was only an economic problem at that time, and the Federal Reserve made a trade-off between inflation and employment to solve the problem of minimizing economic costs and volatility. However, at present, in the face of inflation risks that have not been seen in 40 years, inflation has risen to a political and social issue, and controlling inflation has become a top priority for the Biden administration. In the context of the current tightest labor market in decades, it can be said that inflation is forced to become the Fed's most concerned target at the moment.</p><p>2. Q: What are the conditions or triggers for the slowdown of monetary tightening?</p><p>A: We believe that the wage growth rate has cooled down significantly, thus breaking the wage-price inflation spiral. The slowdown in energy price growth will help inflation fall, especially as energy and food prices have now been transmitted to core inflation. To be sure, it will be difficult for the Fed to abandon its rapid tightening strategy at a time when inflationary pressures are unlikely to ease significantly in the coming months.</p><p>3. Q: With the marginal weakening of demand, if supply continues to push up inflation, will monetary policy be effective?</p><p>Answer: It is true that supply is an important reason for pushing up inflation in the United States (widening labor supply and demand gap, supply chain bottlenecks, energy metals and other supply shocks), but the impact of demand is very large. Assuming an extreme scenario, the Federal Reserve completely extinguishes demand through monetary tightening, and inflation will naturally slow down sharply. So the Fed needs to find a delicate balance.</p><p>4. Q: Are there any other inflation control policies besides monetary policy?</p><p>A: The Biden administration released strategic oil reserves at the end of last year, but it was basically ineffective in suppressing oil prices. The Biden administration wanted U.S. shale oil companies and OPEC countries such as Saudi Arabia to accelerate production increases, but failed. As for lowering or abolishing tariffs, it may help alleviate the inflationary pressure of goods, but it cannot fundamentally solve the problem.</p><p>5. Q: Will the interest burden of U.S. Treasury Bond become a constraint on rate hike's shrinking balance sheet?</p><p>A: We don't think anytime soon. According to our calculations, the US Treasury yields curve still has a lot of room for upside. Specifically, even if the ten-year interest rate rises to 3.0% this year and remains at that level for the next few years, the ratio of U.S. bond interest payments can remain relatively stable. In fact, for the interest burden, the stock bonds issued at lower interest rates in the past were \"ballast stones\".</p><p>6. Q: How long is the time lag for monetary policy to be transmitted to the real economy? The relationship between inflation and rate hike?</p><p>A: According to the official general equilibrium model of the Federal Reserve, we estimate that the time lag is about 6-12 months. Therefore, in order to control inflation, monetary tightening should be done sooner rather than later. According to the empirical experience of the Taylor Rule, every time inflation rises by one percentage point, it often takes rate hike 1.5 percentage points to control inflation back to the initial level. Therefore, we think the Fed needs to act boldly.</p><p>7. Q: Some indicators of inflation expectations show that expectations are slowing down. Can it be interpreted as inflation will slow down?</p><p>Answer: The ten-year breakeven inflation rate (breakeven rate) has declined since its high point in November last year, which has something to do with the Federal Reserve's \"big turn\" in November. However, breakeven is not a good indicator to measure inflation expectations. It is traded (so there is a tendency to misjudge and mark-to-market). Since liquidity is far inferior to ordinary Treasury Bond, its liquidity premium is large. It distorts the market's truer reflection of future inflation expectations to a large extent. Especially since the epidemic, the Federal Reserve's massive QE has significantly lowered its interest rates, causing its implied inflation expectations to further deviate from their due level.</p><p>While the University of Michigan survey inflation expectations have slowed down in the past month or two, and New York Fed inflation expectations are peaking, this does not reflect the likely future inflation path. When inflation is low, inflation expectations tend to be better anchored, giving the market the illusion that inflation expectations lead actual inflation (such as the lack of a \"great easing\" period of supply shocks). However, when inflation is high, especially in the context of many uncertainties caused by multiple supply shocks, inflation expectations are likely to be the result of actual inflation, not the other way around. A Federal Reserve working paper reflects on the role of inflation expectations [8].</p><p>8. Q: The interest rate derivatives market is already fully priced. Can the Fed be more aggressive than market expectations?</p><p>A: First of all, even though the market expects the Fed rate hike for the remaining seven meetings this year, it does not expect several meetings to increase 50bp at a time (except for the March meeting). Moreover, for shrinking balance sheet, where long-term interest rates and financial conditions are more important, it is difficult for the market to predict its way, strength and rhythm through asset prices.</p><p>Secondly, we believe that this market pricing or market expectations may not be as important as in previous rate hike cycles. Since the \"Great Easing\", especially after the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve has repeatedly lagged behind the market curve, so market pricing is of great significance for us to judge the policy path of the Federal Reserve. To some extent, the market curve hints at the \"upper limit\" of the Fed curve. This time, however, it's different: While the Fed lags significantly behind the inflation curve, it has repeatedly led the market curve since the middle of last year. Market expectations and pricing are constantly following the judgment and pace of the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Reserve is constantly adjusting to follow the pace of inflation. When the market curve lags behind the Fed (and we expect it still will in the coming months), its reference will also be discounted.</p><p>9. Q: How does the Fed's tightening affect commodities?</p><p>A: Historically, bulk has been sensitive to dollar liquidity. But this time may be different. In the short term, we expect oil, gold and copper to remain strong, accompanied by upside risks. Demand, supply, anti-inflation attributes and the situation between Russia and Ukraine may intensify the risk of further rises in oil and gas. There are three downwind factors and one headwind factor for gold this year: (1) Under high inflation or even quasi-stagflation, the value of gold allocation is highlighted; (2). This year's safe-haven demand is stronger than last year's (geopolitical risks superimposed on Fed tightening risks); (3) The diversion effect of digital currency on gold has been significantly weakened (it was obvious last year that digital currency was under significant pressure this year under the tightening of the Federal Reserve); (4) The upward trend of real interest rates limits the upside of gold. Finally, with continued demand support, superimposed on historically low inventories of industrial metals such as copper, slight supply disturbances will bring greater price fluctuations.</p><p>10. Q: Did U.S. stocks rebound after the first rate hike in March?</p><p>A: We don't think it is necessarily. It depends on the evolution of inflation. This first rate hike does not mean that the boots have completely landed. If the rate hike at the March interest rate meeting is 25 basis points, investors who are firmly bullish on inflation may believe that 25 basis points are not enough to have a significant effect on curbing inflation, thereby increasing the risk of out-of-control inflation, and selling risky assets, especially the Nasdaq. If a rate hike is 50 basis points, investors with a \"moderate\" or \"temporary\" view of inflation will panic sell risky assets amid a rate hike not seen in the past two decades. In either case, we believe that the high volatility of the stock market may continue after the interest rate meeting in March.</p><p></body></html></p>","source":"zjdj","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>US inflation, a bit of the 70s flavor</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nUS inflation, a bit of the 70s flavor\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">中金点睛</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2022-02-21 10:12</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><html><head></head><body>Abstract: Although U.S. inflation has hit a new high in 40 years, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation? In the first three quarters of last year, when the Fed and the market insisted that inflation was temporary, we were firmly bullish on U.S. inflation; At the end of last year, when the market judged that the Fed might have \"bluffing\" and \"Fed put options\", we suggested that the market underestimated the Fed's determination to fight inflation and that macro fluctuations would intensify as a result; Although U.S. inflation has hit a four-decade high, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation? In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and the \"Great Inflation\" period, trying to find out the possible evolution of future inflation and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>In the first three quarters of last year, when the Fed and the market insisted that inflation was temporary, we were firmly bullish on U.S. inflation; At the end of last year, when the market judged that the Fed might have \"bluffing\" and \"Fed put options\", we suggested that the market underestimated the Fed's determination to fight inflation and that macro fluctuations would intensify as a result; Although U.S. inflation has hit a four-decade high, the market is still divided on the persistence of U.S. inflation. So, how do you view the logic and trend behind this round of U.S. inflation?</p><p>U.S. inflation has repeatedly exceeded expectations. In January, the CPI increased by 7.5% year-on-year, a 40-year high since 1982. In fact, since the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. CPI exceeded 5% in May last year, it has continued to hit record highs at an unexpected pace almost every month, and the time window for new highs is getting longer and longer. In the article \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\" in October last year, we analyzed the macro, policy and international environment during the \"Great Inflation\" period in the United States from 1960s to 1980s, and pointed out that the three points at this time were similar to those at that time. Therefore, this round of inflation may last longer. At the same time, there are three differences between the two periods, so the probability of repeating double-digit inflation in the 1970s is also low.</p><p>In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and then, trying to find out the possible evolution of inflation in the future and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>Finally, we will answer ten questions that investors are concerned about rate hike shrinking balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.</p><p>U.S. inflation has repeatedly exceeded expectations. In January, the CPI increased by 7.5% year-on-year, a 40-year high since 1982. In fact, since the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. CPI exceeded 5% in May last year, it has continued to hit record highs at an unexpected pace almost every month, and the time window for new highs is getting longer and longer. In the article \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\" in October last year, we analyzed the macro, policy and international environment during the \"Great Inflation\" period in the United States from 1960s to 1980s, and pointed out that the three points at this time were similar to those at that time. Therefore, this round of inflation may last longer. At the same time, there are three differences between the two periods, so the probability of repeating double-digit inflation in the 1970s is also low.</p><p>In this article, we will re-evaluate the similarities and differences between this time and then, trying to find out the possible evolution of inflation in the future and the possible response of the Fed from the marginal changes in the past few months. By comparing the monetary and fiscal policy environment and the imbalance between supply and demand in the two periods, we find that the similarities are still familiar, while the differences tend to converge. We believe that only if the Federal Reserve acts boldly and tightens ahead of time can we avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1970s.</p><p>Finally, we will answer ten questions that investors are concerned about rate hike shrinking balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.</p><p>1. Policy environment: Finance is relatively dominant, and the Fed has repeatedly misjudged</p><p>First of all, we believe that double monetary and fiscal easing is the fundamental force driving inflation and its center to remain high. The degree of monetary and fiscal easing since the epidemic has far exceeded that in the early stage of the \"Great Inflation\" (1965-1970), laying the foundation for high inflation. Regardless of active support or passive support, objectively speaking, since the epidemic, the degree of coordination between U.S. monetary policy and fiscal policy has reached the highest level since World War II [1], and fiscal policy has relatively dominated the macro policy paradigm. From the perspective of money supply, the average year-on-year growth rate of M2 from the first quarter of 1965 to the fourth quarter of 1970 was 6.6%, while the average year-on-year growth rate of M2 from the first quarter of 2020 to the fourth quarter of 2021 was as high as 18.0%, far exceeding any previous year in history period. In addition to the total amount, the structure of M2 is more noteworthy, in which the financial \"water release\" contributes more than half of the strength [2], and \"helicopter money\" is practiced. In addition, the Fed's QE has objectively supported the unprecedented issuance of government debt since the epidemic. Since 2020, the ratio of public debt to GDP in the United States has remained at a historical high of more than 120%, and the proportion of Treasury Bond held by the Fed has also exceeded 20%, a record high. According to the Fiscal Determination Theory of Price Level (FTPL), large-scale fiscal expansion will push up government debt, a high degree of coordination of monetary policy, and expectations that future fiscal deficits may further expand will all push up inflation. Looking ahead, although monetary and fiscal policies will tighten marginally, from the perspective of stock, compared with history, monetary and fiscal policies will still be loose for a long time.</p><p>Secondly, during the \"Great Inflation\" period, the Federal Reserve's initial underestimation and inaction of inflationary pressures were important reasons for the out-of-control inflation in the later period. In the early days of the \"Great Inflation\" (1965-1970), McChesney Martin, then chairman of the Federal Reserve, underestimated the persistence of inflationary pressures and attached great importance to promoting full employment. Even when the employment rate was below 4%, the Federal Reserve still cut interest rates twice in June 1967 and July 1969, further exacerbating inflationary pressures. Although Martin later realized that his wrong monetary policy would make the United States face unprecedented high inflationary pressure, his successor Arthur Burns did not pay attention to inflation. Burns believes that the high inflation rate is caused by unstable \"special factors\" such as food and energy, which is a \"noise\" unrelated to monetary policy [3], and the new \"thermometer\" of core inflation is also born. Soon after, this new \"thermometer\" also soared across the board, and inflation was completely out of control. Under the influence of Burns' wrong judgment and multiple supply shocks, the United States entered a long-term \"stagflation.\" In 1979, Volcker was appointed as the chairman of the Federal Reserve to start an extraordinary monetary tightening policy to fight inflation, and the Federal Funds rate once rose to 20%. Although Volcker succeeded in subduing high inflation, it also plunged the United States into the worst economic depression since the 1930s. Looking back at the present, it seems that we can see the shadow of the Federal Reserve in the early days of the \"Great Inflation\" period. At the beginning of the U.S. inflation problem in 2021, the Federal Reserve repeatedly emphasized that inflation is \"temporary.\" However, subsequent inflation data that repeatedly exceeded expectations and the Fed's continuously revised inflation expectations showed that the uncertainty facing the macro economy after the epidemic has intensified. Policy formulation and implementation are facing unprecedented difficult challenges since the \"Great Detente\" period. If the Federal Reserve does not face inflation more timely, decisively and forcefully this time, it may once again become the driving force behind out-of-control inflation.</p><p>2. Imbalance between supply and demand: Supply constraints are hard to ease, and long-term worries are increasingly emerging</p><p>First, let's look at the supply shortage caused by supply shocks. The U.S. economy suffered multiple supply shocks in succession in the 1970s. The \"Nixon shock\" and the soaring energy and food prices caused by the oil crisis and food crisis were important supply-side factors driving up inflation [4]. At present, the supply pressure of energy, grain and industrial metal markets cannot be ignored.</p><p>► First, the risk of geopolitical conflicts in oil-producing countries has exacerbated the pressure on energy prices. The \"two oil crises\" that broke out in the 1970s caused the international crude oil price to rise by about 32 times in ten years, becoming one of the important factors of the great inflation in the United States. Among them, the causes of the first and second oil crises were the Fourth Middle East War and the Islamic Revolution in Iran respectively. Looking back at the Fourth Middle East War that occurred in October 1973, after the war, oil producers led by Arab countries used oil as a weapon to sanction the United States and other countries supporting Israel through \"price increases, production reductions, embargoes, and supply cuts\", thus triggering the \"first oil crisis\" [5]. The current tense situation on the Russia-Ukraine border is behind the ongoing geopolitical game between Russia and NATO countries. Although the current situation between Russia and Ukraine has eased marginally, the risks have not been lifted. According to calculations by CICC Bulk Group, if Russian crude oil exports are affected, oil prices may face a supply premium of US $30/barrel throughout the year. In addition, the slowdown in OPEC + production increases in January, Libya's production cuts due to pipeline maintenance and supply chain bottlenecks caused by the epidemic may strengthen the impact of supply risks on global energy costs and commodity prices.</p><p>► Second, the pressure on global food supply has intensified. Looking back at the \"Great Inflation\" period, the El Niñ o event broke out in 1972. Extreme weather worsened the global food shortage and triggered the subsequent 1972-1974 global food crisis. The rise in food prices has further pushed up the general price increase, making inflation in the United States further out of control. At present, there are certain risks to global food. In the past two years, affected by extreme weather and natural disasters, global grain production has faced the risk of reducing production. In addition, in addition to the impact of global climate, the current global food supply is also affected by the following factors: (1) The direct impact of COVID-19 pandemic on food production. Labor shortages and supply chain disruptions caused by the epidemic have put pressure on the production of the food industry, resulting in a sharp drop in output. Global food prices rose by more than 40% in 2021. (2) Geopolitical risks. Russia and Ukraine are both important grain suppliers and exporters in the world. The uncertainty of the situation between Russia and Ukraine has intensified market concerns about grain supply. (3) Global prices of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and other products have soared. Continued supply chain disruptions have caused global fertilizer prices to rise roughly twice in the past 18 months, which in turn may dampen global crop production in the coming year.</p><p>► Third, the inventories of some important commodities in the commodity market are at historical lows, and supply risks have intensified. Industrial metals in the global commodity market and some<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/000061\">Agricultural products</a>Inventories of such important raw materials are at historically low levels, making prices very sensitive to minor disturbances. At present, the tight supply situation of global industrial metals is affected by multiple factors: geopolitical risks, surge in demand caused by global economic recovery and supply chain bottlenecks caused by the epidemic, and long-term underinvestment in traditional industries. Among them, Ukraine is an important exporter of industrial metals, and the uncertainty of the situation between Russia and Ukraine has intensified related metal price fluctuations, boosting short-term futures prices and spot premiums. Coupled with factors such as increased global demand and limited recovery from supply chain bottlenecks, industrial metal inventories in the global supply chain are rapidly consumed. The decline in supply stability and the sound of short-term alarms such as inventory shortages have exacerbated the risk of rising prices of related commodities.</p><p>In addition to short-term factors, medium and long-term factors affecting industrial metal inventories have also been further highlighted. In the past ten years, the sluggish return rate of traditional industries, the rise of global carbon neutrality policies and ESG investment concepts have restricted the flow of capital to traditional industries, resulting in long-term underinvestment in traditional industries, with a more obvious impact on fossil fuel industries such as oil and gas and traditional smelting industries. Insufficient investment in traditional industries and aging infrastructure have led to a rapid decline in supply capacity, which in turn has become an important factor in soaring energy costs and shortages of important commodities, making price centers easy to rise but difficult to fall. Specifically, the growth rate of new economic transformation (advanced manufacturing, new energy, etc.) is less than expected and it is difficult to fill the growing supply gap. Rising energy costs and restrictions on carbon emissions have forced a large number of non-ferrous metal smelters in China, Europe and other regions to reduce production. After the outbreak of the epidemic, the blockade policies of various countries reduced global transportation capacity and greatly depleted inventory. As the economies of various countries gradually recover after the epidemic, demand has risen sharply, and inventories have bottomed out, thus enlarging the supply gap, highlighting the problem of underinvestment in the traditional economy. Coupled with a new round of global capital expenditure cycle that may start after the epidemic, the price center of related industrial metals may trend upward in the next few years.</p><p>Secondly, in addition to the direct supply shocks in the above three aspects, the supply chain bottleneck problem may hardly improve significantly in the short term. In the past six months, congestion in the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach in the United States has become an important factor in the disruption of global supply chains. Due to yard congestion, import detention and labor shortages, data in February 2022 showed that the waiting time for ships at the Port of Los Angeles was 25-35 days and that at the Port of Long Beach was 38-42 days [6]. At the same time, Canadian truck drivers went on strike to further hinder key border transportation in the United States. Strike protests make the busiest in the United States and Canada<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/00536\">Tradelink</a>The \"Ambassador Bridge\" was blocked, which carried more than a quarter of the total trade volume between the United States and Canada, which had a serious impact on the U.S. supply chain. For example, some automobile manufacturers and food suppliers have faced production suspension due to the cut-off of key components or raw materials. The continued disruption of the U.S. supply chain is likely to further expand the imbalance between supply and demand and exacerbate inflationary pressures.</p><p>3. The road ahead is cold: the inflation spiral is established, and the Fed has no retreat</p><p>In \"The Enlightenment of the\" Great Inflation \"to the Present\", we point out that there are three differences between this time and then: 1. The current scale of trade union organizations is much smaller than that during the \"Great Inflation\" period, resulting in relatively unsmooth wage-price transmission; 2. Compared with that time, the global collaborative production model reduced product costs and the bargaining power of American workers; 3. Compared with that time, the Federal Reserve implemented a (average) inflation targeting system, with inflation controlling as an important task. Based on these three differences, we believe in the above report that it is unlikely that this inflation will repeat the mistakes of the 1970s. Based on the marginal changes in the past few months, we find that the differences between the first two points are weakening. Although trade unions are still relatively weak, the \"great turnover\" in the United States and the continued widening gap between labor supply and demand have significantly improved employees' bargaining power and strengthened the price-wage inflation spiral. In addition, the global supply chain is still severely hindered, greatly reducing production efficiency and increasing product and labor costs. We can hope that millions of people in the United States will quickly return to the labor market, that the global supply chain will be repaired smoothly in the short term, and that the above-mentioned supply shocks will be short-lived, but these factors are beyond the control of policies. We believe that the only thing the policy can do at present is to stick to and vigorously implement the third difference: bold action, pre-emptive strike, control inflation as the only task, and once again establish the credibility of controlling inflation.</p><p>To sum up, the \"Great Inflation\" in the United States in the 1960s and 1980s was mainly the result of the combined effect of multiple supply shocks and \"double-wide\" fiscal and monetary effects. Based on the current situation, the \"good luck\" that has rarely had serious supply shocks since the \"Great Detente\" period and the \"good policies\" that are relatively easy to implement may be becoming history. We won't go into details about the former. As for the latter, since the global outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, a series of factors such as the evolving mutant strains, the increasingly fragile global industrial chain, and the rising government debt have caused the global economic recovery to continue to encounter challenges.</p><p>Specifically, the difficulty of macro policy may come from three aspects. First, when monetary policy is loose for a long time and supply shocks reappear, it is more difficult for policymakers to judge the inflation outlook. This can be seen from the inflation data in the United States that has repeatedly exceeded expectations since last year and the \"sharp turn\" made by the Federal Reserve at the end of last year. Second, from a cyclical perspective, regardless of rate hike or shrinking balance sheet, the Federal Reserve hopes to suppress demand to control inflation. How to balance inflation and growth is full of challenges: monetary tightening is not enough, and inflation cannot be controlled; If the currency tightens too much, the risk of economic recession will increase. Third, in the medium and long term, the space for monetary policy is limited. After the epidemic, U.S. government debt hit a record high. Under the macro policy paradigm where fiscal policy is relatively dominant, monetary policy may be constrained. Even if it is not for the consideration of directly reducing government financing costs, excessive rise in interest rates will make the economy's high debt unsustainable, which may directly lead to economic growth in trouble. Therefore, low interest rates, high inflation and high government debt will reinforce each other, and the space for monetary policy and fiscal policy will shrink [7].</p><p>In the face of the increasing risk of the Fed's unexpected tightening, how to deploy major asset classes? See How the Fed's Accelerated Tightening Is Affecting Asset Prices.</p><p>In the face of a high inflation environment and intensified macro fluctuations, how to do a good job in macro hedging? Please see \"One of the Global Asset Classes: Macro Logic, Rotation System and Supply Shock\".</p><p>4. Investors' ten questions and answers about the Federal Reserve's monetary tightening:</p><p>1. Q: Will the Federal Reserve be wary of economic slowdown or financial market turmoil?</p><p>A: We don't think it will look good at the moment, depending on whether inflation eases significantly. The \"Fed put option\" was born during the \"Great Easing\" period of low inflation and low volatility. Inflation is basically not an issue that the market and the Fed need to worry too much about. Therefore, the monetary policy goal is relatively single and the policy is easy to implement. Over the past three decades or so, even though inflation has occasionally overheated periods, inflation was only an economic problem at that time, and the Federal Reserve made a trade-off between inflation and employment to solve the problem of minimizing economic costs and volatility. However, at present, in the face of inflation risks that have not been seen in 40 years, inflation has risen to a political and social issue, and controlling inflation has become a top priority for the Biden administration. In the context of the current tightest labor market in decades, it can be said that inflation is forced to become the Fed's most concerned target at the moment.</p><p>2. Q: What are the conditions or triggers for the slowdown of monetary tightening?</p><p>A: We believe that the wage growth rate has cooled down significantly, thus breaking the wage-price inflation spiral. The slowdown in energy price growth will help inflation fall, especially as energy and food prices have now been transmitted to core inflation. To be sure, it will be difficult for the Fed to abandon its rapid tightening strategy at a time when inflationary pressures are unlikely to ease significantly in the coming months.</p><p>3. Q: With the marginal weakening of demand, if supply continues to push up inflation, will monetary policy be effective?</p><p>Answer: It is true that supply is an important reason for pushing up inflation in the United States (widening labor supply and demand gap, supply chain bottlenecks, energy metals and other supply shocks), but the impact of demand is very large. Assuming an extreme scenario, the Federal Reserve completely extinguishes demand through monetary tightening, and inflation will naturally slow down sharply. So the Fed needs to find a delicate balance.</p><p>4. Q: Are there any other inflation control policies besides monetary policy?</p><p>A: The Biden administration released strategic oil reserves at the end of last year, but it was basically ineffective in suppressing oil prices. The Biden administration wanted U.S. shale oil companies and OPEC countries such as Saudi Arabia to accelerate production increases, but failed. As for lowering or abolishing tariffs, it may help alleviate the inflationary pressure of goods, but it cannot fundamentally solve the problem.</p><p>5. Q: Will the interest burden of U.S. Treasury Bond become a constraint on rate hike's shrinking balance sheet?</p><p>A: We don't think anytime soon. According to our calculations, the US Treasury yields curve still has a lot of room for upside. Specifically, even if the ten-year interest rate rises to 3.0% this year and remains at that level for the next few years, the ratio of U.S. bond interest payments can remain relatively stable. In fact, for the interest burden, the stock bonds issued at lower interest rates in the past were \"ballast stones\".</p><p>6. Q: How long is the time lag for monetary policy to be transmitted to the real economy? The relationship between inflation and rate hike?</p><p>A: According to the official general equilibrium model of the Federal Reserve, we estimate that the time lag is about 6-12 months. Therefore, in order to control inflation, monetary tightening should be done sooner rather than later. According to the empirical experience of the Taylor Rule, every time inflation rises by one percentage point, it often takes rate hike 1.5 percentage points to control inflation back to the initial level. Therefore, we think the Fed needs to act boldly.</p><p>7. Q: Some indicators of inflation expectations show that expectations are slowing down. Can it be interpreted as inflation will slow down?</p><p>Answer: The ten-year breakeven inflation rate (breakeven rate) has declined since its high point in November last year, which has something to do with the Federal Reserve's \"big turn\" in November. However, breakeven is not a good indicator to measure inflation expectations. It is traded (so there is a tendency to misjudge and mark-to-market). Since liquidity is far inferior to ordinary Treasury Bond, its liquidity premium is large. It distorts the market's truer reflection of future inflation expectations to a large extent. Especially since the epidemic, the Federal Reserve's massive QE has significantly lowered its interest rates, causing its implied inflation expectations to further deviate from their due level.</p><p>While the University of Michigan survey inflation expectations have slowed down in the past month or two, and New York Fed inflation expectations are peaking, this does not reflect the likely future inflation path. When inflation is low, inflation expectations tend to be better anchored, giving the market the illusion that inflation expectations lead actual inflation (such as the lack of a \"great easing\" period of supply shocks). However, when inflation is high, especially in the context of many uncertainties caused by multiple supply shocks, inflation expectations are likely to be the result of actual inflation, not the other way around. A Federal Reserve working paper reflects on the role of inflation expectations [8].</p><p>8. Q: The interest rate derivatives market is already fully priced. Can the Fed be more aggressive than market expectations?</p><p>A: First of all, even though the market expects the Fed rate hike for the remaining seven meetings this year, it does not expect several meetings to increase 50bp at a time (except for the March meeting). Moreover, for shrinking balance sheet, where long-term interest rates and financial conditions are more important, it is difficult for the market to predict its way, strength and rhythm through asset prices.</p><p>Secondly, we believe that this market pricing or market expectations may not be as important as in previous rate hike cycles. Since the \"Great Easing\", especially after the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve has repeatedly lagged behind the market curve, so market pricing is of great significance for us to judge the policy path of the Federal Reserve. To some extent, the market curve hints at the \"upper limit\" of the Fed curve. This time, however, it's different: While the Fed lags significantly behind the inflation curve, it has repeatedly led the market curve since the middle of last year. Market expectations and pricing are constantly following the judgment and pace of the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Reserve is constantly adjusting to follow the pace of inflation. When the market curve lags behind the Fed (and we expect it still will in the coming months), its reference will also be discounted.</p><p>9. Q: How does the Fed's tightening affect commodities?</p><p>A: Historically, bulk has been sensitive to dollar liquidity. But this time may be different. In the short term, we expect oil, gold and copper to remain strong, accompanied by upside risks. Demand, supply, anti-inflation attributes and the situation between Russia and Ukraine may intensify the risk of further rises in oil and gas. There are three downwind factors and one headwind factor for gold this year: (1) Under high inflation or even quasi-stagflation, the value of gold allocation is highlighted; (2). This year's safe-haven demand is stronger than last year's (geopolitical risks superimposed on Fed tightening risks); (3) The diversion effect of digital currency on gold has been significantly weakened (it was obvious last year that digital currency was under significant pressure this year under the tightening of the Federal Reserve); (4) The upward trend of real interest rates limits the upside of gold. Finally, with continued demand support, superimposed on historically low inventories of industrial metals such as copper, slight supply disturbances will bring greater price fluctuations.</p><p>10. Q: Did U.S. stocks rebound after the first rate hike in March?</p><p>A: We don't think it is necessarily. It depends on the evolution of inflation. This first rate hike does not mean that the boots have completely landed. If the rate hike at the March interest rate meeting is 25 basis points, investors who are firmly bullish on inflation may believe that 25 basis points are not enough to have a significant effect on curbing inflation, thereby increasing the risk of out-of-control inflation, and selling risky assets, especially the Nasdaq. If a rate hike is 50 basis points, investors with a \"moderate\" or \"temporary\" view of inflation will panic sell risky assets amid a rate hike not seen in the past two decades. In either case, we believe that the high volatility of the stock market may continue after the interest rate meeting in March.</p><p></body></html></p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> source：<a href=\"https://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/c/2022-02-21/doc-imcwiwss2030746.shtml\">中金点睛</a></p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/3d57ddcf22f19d3a7fd29a1d33461f97","relate_stocks":{"BK4534":"瑞士信贷持仓",".DJI":"道琼斯","BK4504":"桥水持仓","BK4559":"巴菲特持仓","SPY":"标普500ETF",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite","BK4550":"红杉资本持仓"},"source_url":"https://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/c/2022-02-21/doc-imcwiwss2030746.shtml","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"2213603512","content_text":"摘要：虽然美国通胀已经创四十年来的新高，但市场对美国通胀的持续性仍有分歧。那么，到底如何看待本轮美国通胀背后的逻辑与走势？去年前三季度当美联储和市场坚称通胀是暂时的时候，我们坚定看多美国通胀；去年底当市场判断美联储可能存在“虚张声势”和“联储看跌期权”时，我们提示市场低估了美联储抗通胀的决心以及宏观波动将因此加剧；虽然美国通胀已经创四十年来的新高，但市场对美国通胀的持续性仍有分歧。那么，到底如何看待本轮美国通胀背后的逻辑与走势？在本文中，我们将再次评估此时和“大通胀”时期的相似与差异，从过去几个月的边际变化中，试图找出未来通胀可能的演变及美联储可能的应对。通过对比两个时期的货币财政政策环境和供需失衡的情况，我们发现相似之处仍似曾相识，而差异之处则有收敛趋势。我们认为只有美联储大胆行动、前置紧缩，方可避免重蹈70年代的覆辙。去年前三季度当美联储和市场坚称通胀是暂时的时候，我们坚定看多美国通胀；去年底当市场判断美联储可能存在“虚张声势”和“联储看跌期权”时，我们提示市场低估了美联储抗通胀的决心以及宏观波动将因此加剧；虽然美国通胀已经创四十年来的新高，但市场对美国通胀的持续性仍有分歧。那么，到底如何看待本轮美国通胀背后的逻辑与走势？美国通胀屡超预期，1月份CPI同比增长7.5%，创1982年以来的四十年新高。实际上，美国CPI同比增速自去年5月突破5%以来，几乎每月都在以超预期的节奏持续创历史新高，创新高的时间窗口在越拉越长。我们曾在去年10月《“大通胀”对当下的启示》一文中剖析美国1960-1980年代“大通胀”时期的宏观、政策和国际环境，指出此时与彼时的三点相似，因此本轮通胀可能会持续时间较长。同时，两段时期亦存在三点差异，因此重现1970年代双位数通胀的概率也较低。在本文中，我们将再次评估此时和彼时的相似与差异，从过去几个月的边际变化中，试图找出未来通胀可能的演变及美联储可能的应对。通过对比两个时期的货币财政政策环境和供需失衡的情况，我们发现相似之处仍似曾相识，而差异之处则有收敛趋势。我们认为只有美联储大胆行动、前置紧缩，方可避免重蹈70年代的覆辙。最后，针对投资者关于美联储加息缩表关心的十个问题，我们进行解答。美国通胀屡超预期，1月份CPI同比增长7.5%，创1982年以来的四十年新高。实际上，美国CPI同比增速自去年5月突破5%以来，几乎每月都在以超预期的节奏持续创历史新高，创新高的时间窗口在越拉越长。我们曾在去年10月《“大通胀”对当下的启示》一文中剖析美国1960-1980年代“大通胀”时期的宏观、政策和国际环境，指出此时与彼时的三点相似，因此本轮通胀可能会持续时间较长。同时，两段时期亦存在三点差异，因此重现1970年代双位数通胀的概率也较低。在本文中，我们将再次评估此时和彼时的相似与差异，从过去几个月的边际变化中，试图找出未来通胀可能的演变及美联储可能的应对。通过对比两个时期的货币财政政策环境和供需失衡的情况，我们发现相似之处仍似曾相识，而差异之处则有收敛趋势。我们认为只有美联储大胆行动、前置紧缩，方可避免重蹈70年代的覆辙。最后，针对投资者关于美联储加息缩表关心的十个问题，我们进行解答。一、政策环境：财政相对主导，联储屡屡误判首先，我们认为货币财政双宽松是推动通胀及其中枢持续高企的根本力量。疫情以来的货币和财政宽松程度远超“大通胀”初期（1965年-1970年），为高通胀埋下后患。无论主动支持还是被动为之，客观来看，疫情以来美国货币政策对财政政策的配合程度达到二战以来之最[1]，财政政策相对主导了宏观政策范式。从货币供应量来看，1965年一季度年至1970年四季度M2同比增速均值为6.6%，而2020年一季度至2021年四季度M2同比增速均值高达18.0%，远超历史上任一时期。总量之外，M2的结构更值得注意，其中财政“放水”贡献了一半以上的力量[2]，践行了“直升机撒钱”。此外，美联储QE客观上支撑了疫情以来史无前例的政府债务发行，2020年以来美国的公共债务占GDP的比例维持在超过120%的历史高位，美联储持有的国债比例也超过20%，创历史新高。根据价格水平的财政决定理论（FTPL），大规模财政扩张推动政府债务上升、货币政策较高的配合度、对未来财政赤字可能进一步扩大的预期等均将推升通胀。往前看，虽然货币和财政将将边际紧缩，但从存量角度，相较于历史，货币和财政在较长时间内仍显宽松。其次，“大通胀”时期美联储起初对通胀压力的低估与不作为是后期通胀失控的重要原因。在“大通胀”初期（1965年-1970年），时任美联储主席的麦克切斯尼·马丁低估了通胀压力的持续性，十分重视促进充分就业。即使在就业率已低于4%的情况下，美联储依旧在1967年6月与1969年7月两次降息，进一步加剧通胀压力。虽然后来马丁已意识到其错误的货币政策将使美国面对前所未有的高通胀压力，但其继任阿瑟·伯恩斯并未重视通胀问题。伯恩斯认为高企的通货膨胀率是食品和能源等不稳定的“特殊因素”导致的，这是与货币政策无关的“噪音”[3]，核心通胀这个新的“温度计”也由此而诞生。而不久之后这个新的“温度计”也全线飙红，通胀彻底失控。在伯恩斯错误的判断与多重供给冲击的影响下，美国进入长期“滞胀”。1979年，沃尔克受命出任美联储主席开启超常规的货币紧缩政策以对抗通货膨胀问题，联邦基金利率一度提升至20%。尽管沃尔克成功制服了高通胀，但也使美国陷入了20世纪30年代后最严重的经济萧条时期。反观当下，似乎能看到“大通胀”时期初期美联储的影子。在2021年美国通胀问题初现时，美联储多次强调通胀是“暂时的”，但随后屡超预期的通胀数据和美联储不断上修的通胀预期表明，疫情后宏观经济面临的不确定性加剧使得政策制定和执行面临“大缓和”时期以来前所未有的艰难挑战。倘若此次美联储不更加及时、果断和有力地直面通胀，或将再次成为通胀失控的推手。二、供需失衡：供给约束难言缓和，长期隐忧日益浮现首先来看供给冲击导致的供应短缺。美国经济在70年代接连遭受了多重供给冲击，“尼克松冲击”、以及石油危机和粮食危机导致的能源和食品价格飙升是推升通胀的重要供给侧因素[4]。当前，能源、谷物以及工业金属等市场的供给压力亦不容忽视。►第一，石油生产国的地缘冲突风险，加剧能源价格压力。20世纪70年代爆发的“两次石油危机”使国际原油价格在十年间累计上涨约32倍，成为美国大通胀的重要因素之一。其中，第一次与第二次石油危机的诱因分别为第四次中东战争与伊朗伊斯兰革命。回顾发生于1973年10月的第四次中东战争，战后，以阿拉伯国家为首的石油生产国以石油为武器，分别通过“提价、减产、禁运、断供”等制裁美国等支持以色列的国家，进而诱发“第一次石油危机”[5]。而当前俄乌边境局势紧张，背后则是俄罗斯与北约国家正在进行的地缘政治博弈。虽然目前俄乌局势边际缓解，然而风险并未解除。据中金大宗组测算，若俄罗斯原油出口受到波及，全年油价可能面临30美元/桶的供应溢价。此外，1月OPEC+增产幅度放缓、利比亚因管道维护而减产叠加疫情引致的供应链瓶颈问题，可能强化供应风险对全球能源成本和大宗商品价格的影响。►第二，全球粮食供给压力加剧。回顾“大通胀”期间，1972年爆发厄尔尼诺事件，极端天气导致全球范围内粮食紧缺情况恶化，并引发后续的1972-1974年世界性粮食危机。粮食价格的上涨也进一步推升物价普遍上涨，使得美国通胀进一步失控。当下，全球粮食存在一定风险。过去两年，受极端天气与自然灾害影响，全球粮食产量面临减产风险。此外，除全球气候影响外，目前全球粮食供给还受以下因素影响：（1）新冠疫情对粮食生产的直接影响。疫情导致的劳动力短缺和供应链受阻使得食品行业生产承压，产出大幅下降。2021年全球粮价上涨逾40%。（2）地缘政治风险。俄乌同为全球重要的谷物供给国与出口国，俄乌局势不确定性加剧市场对粮食供给的担忧。（3）全球化肥杀虫剂等产品价格飙升。供应链持续中断导致全球化肥价格在过去18个月中上涨约2倍，进而可能会抑制未来一年全球农作物产量。►第三，大宗商品市场部分重要商品库存正处历史低点，供应风险加剧。全球大宗商品市场中工业金属以及部分农产品等重要原材料库存正处于历史低位，使得价格对轻微扰动非常敏感。目前，全球工业金属紧张的供给形势受多重因素交织影响：地缘政治风险、全球经济复苏致使需求激增叠加疫情致使的供应链瓶颈，以及传统行业长期投资不足等。其中，乌克兰作为工业金属重要出口国，俄乌局势不确定性加剧相关金属价格波动，助推短期期货价格与现货溢价。叠加全球需求增加、供应链瓶颈恢复受限等因素，全球供应链中工业金属库存迅速消耗。供给稳定性下降加之库存告急等短期警报的拉响加剧相关商品价格上涨风险。除短期因素以外，影响工业金属库存的中长期因素也进一步凸显。近十年来，传统行业回报率低迷、全球碳中和政策与ESG投资概念兴起等制约资本流向传统行业，导致传统行业长期投资不足，其中对油气等化石燃料行业与传统冶炼行业影响更为明显。传统行业投资不足与基础设施老化使供给能力迅速下降，继而成为能源成本飙升、重要大宗商品供应短缺的重要因素，致使价格中枢易升难降。具体来看，新经济转型增速（先进制造业、新型能源等）不及预期难以填补日益增大的供给缺口。能源成本的上升以及碳排放的限制迫使中国、欧洲等地区大量有色金属冶炼厂降低产量。疫情爆发后，各国封锁政策使得全球运输能力下降、库存大幅消耗。随着疫情后各国经济逐渐进入复苏，需求大幅上升，库存见底进而放大供给缺口，使得传统经济欠投资的问题凸显。叠加疫后可能开启的全球新一轮资本开支周期，未来几年相关工业金属价格中枢恐趋势上行。其次，除了上述三方面的直接供给冲击，供应链瓶颈问题短期内或难言显著起色。近半年来，美国洛杉矶港和长滩港拥堵问题成为全球供应链中断的重要因素。由于堆场拥堵、进口滞留与劳动力短缺，2022年2月的数据显示，洛杉矶港船舶等待时间为25-35天，长滩港船舶等待时间为38-42天[6]。同时，加拿大卡车司机罢工抗议进一步阻碍美国关键边境运输。罢工抗议活动使美加最繁忙的贸易通道“大使桥”被堵塞，该桥承载了超1/4美加贸易总量，对美国供应链产生严重影响，例如部分汽车制造商与食品供应商因关键零部件或原材料的断供已面临停产。美国供应链持续中断，极可能导致供需失衡进一步扩大，加剧通胀压力。三、前路冷峻：通胀螺旋确立，联储退无可退在《“大通胀”对当下的启示》中，我们指出此时和彼时存在三点差异：1．目前工会组织规模远小于“大通胀”时期，导致工资-物价传导较为不顺畅；2．相较于彼时，全球协同生产模式降低了产品成本和美国工人的议价能力；3．相较于彼时，美联储实行（平均）通胀目标制，以控通胀为重要任务。基于这三点差异，我们在上面报告中认为这次通胀重蹈70年代覆辙的可能性不大。基于过去几个月的边际变化，我们发现前两点差异正在弱化。虽然工会仍较弱势，但美国“大离职”及其劳动力供需缺口持续扩大显著提升了员工的议价能力，强化了物价-工资的通胀螺旋。此外，全球供应链仍严重受阻，很大程度上降低了生产效率，提高产品和人工成本。我们可以美好地期望美国几百万人迅速回归劳动力市场，也可以期望全球供应链短期内顺利修复，更可以期望上述的各种供给冲击昙花一现，然而这些因素政策都无法控制。我们认为政策目前唯一能做的就是坚守并强力贯彻第三点差异：大胆行动、先发制人、以控通胀为唯一任务，再次树立控通胀的信誉。总结来看，美国60-80年代的“大通胀”主要是多重供给冲击和“双宽”的财政货币共同作用的结果。而立足当前，“大缓和”时期以来鲜有较为严重供给冲击的“好运气”、和因此而相对易于执行的“好政策”可能都在成为历史。前者我们不再赘述，至于后者，新冠疫情在全球爆发以来，不断进化的变异毒株、脆弱性渐显的全球产业链、与日高企的政府债务等一系列因素使得全球经济复苏持续遇到挑战。具体而言，宏观政策难度可能来源于三个方面，一是在货币政策长期宽松、供给冲击再现的情形下，政策制定者对通胀前景的判断更为困难。这从去年以来美国屡超预期的通胀数据和美联储于去年底的“急转弯”中可见一斑。二是从周期角度来看，无论加息还是缩表，美联储都是寄希望于打压需求来控通胀，如何平衡通胀与增长充满挑战：货币收紧不够，通胀控不下来；货币收紧过头，经济衰退风险将提高。三是中长期来看，货币政策的空间受限。疫情后美国政府债务创历史新高，在财政政策相对主导的宏观政策范式下，货币政策可能受到掣肘。即使不是出于直接降低政府融资成本的考虑，利率上升过多会使得经济体的高债务不可持续，进而可能直接导致经济增长陷入困境，因而低利率、高通胀与政府高债务会互相加强，货币政策与财政政策的空间缩水[7]。面对美联储超预期紧缩风险加剧，大类资产如何布局？请参见《联储加速紧缩，如何影响资产价格》。面对高通胀环境以及宏观波动加剧，如何做好宏观对冲？请参见《全球大类资产之一：宏观逻辑、轮动体系和供给冲击》。四、投资者关于美联储货币紧缩的十问十答：1． 问：美联储是否会因为经济放缓或金融市场动荡而投鼠忌器？答：我们认为目前看不大会，取决于通胀是否明显缓解。“美联储看跌期权”诞生于低通胀、低波动的“大缓和”期间，通胀基本不是市场和美联储需要过多担忧的问题，因此货币政策目标相对单一、政策较易执行。过去三十多年，即使通胀偶有过热时期，但彼时通胀仅是经济问题，进而美联储在通胀和就业之间做出权衡来解决经济成本和波动最小化的问题。然而当下，面对四十年不遇的通胀风险，通胀已经上升为政治问题、社会问题，控通胀对于拜登政府已成为重中之重。在目前劳动力市场处于几十年最紧的背景下，可以说，通胀被迫成为美联储当下最关注的目标。2． 问：货币紧缩进程放缓的条件或者触发因素？答：我们认为是工资增速显著降温进而打破工资-物价通胀螺旋。能源价格增速放缓有助于通胀回落，尤其在能源食品价格目前已传导至核心通胀的情况下。可以肯定的是，在未来几个月通胀压力难见明显缓解之际，美联储很难以放弃快速紧缩策略。3． 问：伴随需求边际减弱，如果供给继续推升通胀，货币政策是否有效？答：诚然供给是推升美国通胀的重要原因（劳动力供需缺口走阔、供应链瓶颈、能源金属等供给冲击），但需求的影响非常大。假设一个极端情形，美联储通过货币紧缩把需求彻底浇灭，通胀自然也随之大幅放缓。因此美联储需要找到一个微妙的平衡。4． 问：货币政策之外，有无其它控通胀政策？答：去年底拜登政府释放战略油储，但对打压油价基本无效。拜登政府希望美国页岩油公司和沙特等欧佩克国家加速增产，但未果。至于降低或者撤销关税，或许有助于缓解物品通胀压力，但不能从根本上解决问题。5． 问：美国国债利息负担是否会成为加息缩表的掣肘？答：我们认为短期内不会。根据我们的测算，美债利率曲线仍有较大上行空间。具体来说，即使今年十年期利率上升至3.0%，并且未来几年保持该水平，美债利息支付比例仍可保持相对稳定。实际上，对于利息负担，过去在较低利率水平发行的存量债是“压舱石”。6． 问：货币政策传导到实体经济的时滞一般多久？通胀与加息的关系？答：根据美联储官方一般均衡模型，我们测算时滞约为6-12个月。因此为了控通胀，货币紧缩宜早不宜迟。根据泰勒规则实证经验，每面对一个百分点的通胀上行，往往需要加息1.5个百分点将通胀控回到初始水平。因此，我们认为美联储需要大胆行动。7． 问：通胀预期的一些指标显示预期正在放缓，是否可以解读为通胀将放缓？答：十年期盈亏平衡通胀率（breakeven rate）自去年11月高点以来趋势下降，与美联储11月“大转向”有一定关系。然而，breakeven并不是较好的衡量通胀预期的指标，它是交易出来的（因此存在误判和mark-to-market的倾向），由于流动性远逊于普通国债，因此其流动性溢价很大程度上扭曲了市场对未来通胀预期的较真实反映。尤其疫情以来美联储天量QE显著压低其利率，使其暗示的通胀预期进一步偏离应有之水平。虽然过去一两个月密歇根大学调查通胀预期上升速度放缓，纽约联储通胀预期正在筑顶，但这并不能反映未来可能的通胀路径。当通胀较低时，通胀预期往往较好锚定，给市场以错觉通胀预期引领实际的通胀（比如缺少供给冲击的“大缓和”时期）。然而，通胀较高时，尤其在多重供给冲击带来诸多不确定性的背景下，通胀预期很可能是实际通胀的结果，而非反过来。美联储一篇工作论文反思了通胀预期的作用[8]。8． 问：利率衍生品市场已经很充分定价了，美联储还能比市场预期更激进么？答：首先，即使市场预计今年剩下的7次会议联储加息，但并未预计有几次会议一次加50bp（除了3月会议）。况且，对长端利率和金融条件更为重要的缩表，市场是很难通过资产价格来预计其方式、力度和节奏。其次，我们认为这次市场定价或者市场预期可能没有之前的加息周期中那么重要。“大缓和”以来，尤其金融危机之后，美联储屡屡滞后于市场曲线，因此市场定价对我们判断美联储政策路径有重要意义。一定程度上讲，市场曲线暗示了美联储曲线的“上限”。然而这一次不一样：虽然美联储严重滞后于通胀曲线，但自去年中期以来却屡屡引领市场曲线。市场预期和定价在不断追随美联储的判断和步伐，而美联储不断调整以追随通胀的步伐。当市场曲线落后于美联储时（我们预计未来几个月仍会），其参考意义也将有所折扣。9． 问：联储紧缩如何影响大宗商品？答：历史上，大宗对美元流动性比较敏感。但这次可能不一样，短期内我们预计油金铜仍将坚挺，伴有上行风险。需求、供给、抗通胀属性和俄乌局势恐将使油气进一步上涨风险加剧。黄金今年三个顺风因素，一个逆风因素：（1）．高通胀甚至类滞胀下，黄金配置价值凸显；（2）．今年避险需求强于去年（地缘政治风险叠加联储紧缩风险）；（3）．数字货币对黄金的分流效果显著弱化（去年很明显，今年在联储紧缩下数字货币显著承压）；（4）．实际利率趋势上行限制黄金上涨空间。最后，持续需求支撑，叠加铜等工业金属历史低位库存，轻微供给扰动将带来较大价格波动。10．问：3月首次加息后美股是否趋势反弹？答：我们认为不一定，取决于通胀演变，这次首次加息并不代表靴子完全落地。如果3月议息会议加息25个基点，坚定看多通胀的投资者可能认为25个基点不足以对抑制通胀产生明显效果，进而通胀失控风险加剧，而抛售风险资产尤其纳指。如果加息50个基点，对通胀持“温和”或“暂时”观点的投资者将在过去二十多年不遇的加息幅度下恐慌性抛售风险资产。无论哪种情况，我们认为股市高波动率在3月议息会以后恐将延续。","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"ZNmain":0.9,"ZFmain":0.9,"GCmain":0.6,"UBmain":0.9,"ZBmain":0.9,"MGCmain":0.9,"ZTmain":0.9,".IXIC":0.6,".DJI":0.6,"TNmain":0.9,"SPY":0.6}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":2194,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":9092367013,"gmtCreate":1644539690360,"gmtModify":1676533938501,"author":{"id":"4103111140760420","authorId":"4103111140760420","name":"goh63","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0495fffaedb295d4de28a966d5a78a49","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"4103111140760420","idStr":"4103111140760420"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"🎃","listText":"🎃","text":"🎃","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":1,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/9092367013","repostId":"1148471486","repostType":4,"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":649,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":9949319759,"gmtCreate":1678358095772,"gmtModify":1678358098811,"author":{"id":"4103111140760420","authorId":"4103111140760420","name":"goh63","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0495fffaedb295d4de28a966d5a78a49","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"4103111140760420","idStr":"4103111140760420"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"<a 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16:37","market":"us","language":"zh","title":"Rate hike 7 times this year, can the Fed do it?","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1181924326","media":"华尔街见闻","summary":"部分经济学家对美联储加息7次的预期表示怀疑，认为他们是否真的采取行动，是一个悬而未决的问题。美联储激进的加息计划，可能会在对抗通胀的同时使经济陷入衰退。周三，美联储将利率上调了25个基点，这是自201","content":"<p><html><head></head><body>Some economists doubt the Fed's expectation of seven rate hike, and think it is an open question whether they actually take action. The Fed's aggressive rate hike plan could plunge the economy into recession while fighting inflation.</p><p>On Wednesday, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates by 25 basis points in its first rate hike since 2018. At the same time, its forecasts show that Fed officials expect six more rate hike this year and three rate hike next year.</p><p>It's a radical rate hike campaign, but it also begs a question:<b>Can the Fed succeed without seriously damaging the economy?</b></p><p><b>\"The Fed is too aggressive\"</b></p><p>Some economists believe the Fed may not act as expected because it could hurt the economy.</p><p>According to CNBC, James Paulsen, chief investment strategist at Leuthold Group, said that even before the meeting, the bond market had priced in seven rate hike, but many economists had expected the Fed to only rate hike five to six times:</p><p>This has largely been priced in, but the bigger question for the market is whether or not we will see a recession. While economists didn't explicitly predict a recession, they did see a slowdown in economic growth and the outlook has become more uncertain since Russia's military action. The Ukraine crisis has also fueled inflation, as Russia is a major commodity producer, while the conflict and sanctions have raised doubts about the supply of oil, wheat and other key exports.</p><p>Simona Mocuta, chief analyst at State Street Global Advisors, made it clear:<b>\"I think the Fed has been too aggressive on that front.</b>How the economy will develop is highly uncertain. They may not materialize. But to be sure, the Fed has sent a very strong message.... I still doubt that there will be so many rate hike times. \"</p><p>Economists had expected the Federal Reserve to show a hawkish or aggressive attitude in its first rate hike. Many had argued that the Fed's decision-making was lagging because the Fed initially believed inflation was transitory, and that view has been going on for too long.</p><p>Mocuta said,<b>The Fed may rate hike several times first, but it should reconsider the path of rate hike and economic conditions in the third quarter.</b></p><p>If the Russia-Ukraine conflict improves, some pressures on inflation and supply chains will ease. Some of the supply chain pressures from the pandemic may also subside over time.</p><p>Drew Matus, chief market strategist at Metropolitan Investment Management, said:</p><p>What I'm saying is, they're sending the signals they need to send,<b>But whether they actually take action is an open question.</b>The data showed that the U.S. CPI jumped to a 40-year high of 7.9% in February and is expected to rise further in March.</p><p>The Fed expects core inflation to be 4.1% this year and fall to 2.6% next year after the rate hike. They also forecast GDP growth of 4% this year and falling to 2.2% by 2023. The unemployment rate is expected to fall to 3.5% and will remain at that level.</p><p>Matus believes: \"A lot of their predictions are meaningless... there are some loopholes in logic.\"</p><p>He pointed out,<b>One of the loopholes is that if the Fed does raise interest rates at the expected rate, it will not realize this economic forecast.</b></p><p>'They mean it'</p><p>But others do expect the Fed to continue its rate hike, with some Wall Streeters predicting seven rate hike this year.</p><p><a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BAC\">Bank of America</a>Mark Cabana, head of U.S. short-term interest rate strategy, said:</p><p>They mean it. They're really way behind the curve in terms of inflation. Those who think they can't do 7 rate hike, will face a severe blow. Diane Swonk, chief economist at Grant Thornton, believes the market should take the Fed's word for it:</p><p>We can't risk stagflation. They admit that they now expect inflation to persist longer, and that it's not just a problem for Ukraine. Seeing the market's reaction, they clearly don't believe it. This is a major shift in the outlook for the Fed's rate hike. They're doing it for a reason, and it's not just someone at the Fed.<b>This is a systemic move by the entire Fed, even by the most dovish Fed officials.</b>Swonk said the Fed's forecast for the unemployment rate may not be reasonable, but the Fed does want to cool inflation.</p><p>There are risks if Fed officials act as expected. She said:<b>\"When I simulated the scenario of seven rate hike, which is my forecast, I thought the average growth of the economy would stop at 1% in the second half of the year. This was a semi-hard landing.\"</b></p><p></body></html></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Rate hike 7 times this year, can the Fed do it?</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nRate hike 7 times this year, can the Fed do it?\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<a class=\"head\" href=\"https://laohu8.com/wemedia/1084101182\">\n\n<div class=\"h-thumb\" style=\"background-image:url(https://static.tigerbbs.com/66809d1f5c2e43e2bdf15820c6d6897e);background-size:cover;\"></div>\n\n<div class=\"h-content\">\n<p class=\"h-name\">华尔街见闻 </p>\n<p class=\"h-time smaller\">2022-03-17 16:37</p>\n</div>\n</a>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><html><head></head><body>Some economists doubt the Fed's expectation of seven rate hike, and think it is an open question whether they actually take action. The Fed's aggressive rate hike plan could plunge the economy into recession while fighting inflation.</p><p>On Wednesday, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates by 25 basis points in its first rate hike since 2018. At the same time, its forecasts show that Fed officials expect six more rate hike this year and three rate hike next year.</p><p>It's a radical rate hike campaign, but it also begs a question:<b>Can the Fed succeed without seriously damaging the economy?</b></p><p><b>\"The Fed is too aggressive\"</b></p><p>Some economists believe the Fed may not act as expected because it could hurt the economy.</p><p>According to CNBC, James Paulsen, chief investment strategist at Leuthold Group, said that even before the meeting, the bond market had priced in seven rate hike, but many economists had expected the Fed to only rate hike five to six times:</p><p>This has largely been priced in, but the bigger question for the market is whether or not we will see a recession. While economists didn't explicitly predict a recession, they did see a slowdown in economic growth and the outlook has become more uncertain since Russia's military action. The Ukraine crisis has also fueled inflation, as Russia is a major commodity producer, while the conflict and sanctions have raised doubts about the supply of oil, wheat and other key exports.</p><p>Simona Mocuta, chief analyst at State Street Global Advisors, made it clear:<b>\"I think the Fed has been too aggressive on that front.</b>How the economy will develop is highly uncertain. They may not materialize. But to be sure, the Fed has sent a very strong message.... I still doubt that there will be so many rate hike times. \"</p><p>Economists had expected the Federal Reserve to show a hawkish or aggressive attitude in its first rate hike. Many had argued that the Fed's decision-making was lagging because the Fed initially believed inflation was transitory, and that view has been going on for too long.</p><p>Mocuta said,<b>The Fed may rate hike several times first, but it should reconsider the path of rate hike and economic conditions in the third quarter.</b></p><p>If the Russia-Ukraine conflict improves, some pressures on inflation and supply chains will ease. Some of the supply chain pressures from the pandemic may also subside over time.</p><p>Drew Matus, chief market strategist at Metropolitan Investment Management, said:</p><p>What I'm saying is, they're sending the signals they need to send,<b>But whether they actually take action is an open question.</b>The data showed that the U.S. CPI jumped to a 40-year high of 7.9% in February and is expected to rise further in March.</p><p>The Fed expects core inflation to be 4.1% this year and fall to 2.6% next year after the rate hike. They also forecast GDP growth of 4% this year and falling to 2.2% by 2023. The unemployment rate is expected to fall to 3.5% and will remain at that level.</p><p>Matus believes: \"A lot of their predictions are meaningless... there are some loopholes in logic.\"</p><p>He pointed out,<b>One of the loopholes is that if the Fed does raise interest rates at the expected rate, it will not realize this economic forecast.</b></p><p>'They mean it'</p><p>But others do expect the Fed to continue its rate hike, with some Wall Streeters predicting seven rate hike this year.</p><p><a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BAC\">Bank of America</a>Mark Cabana, head of U.S. short-term interest rate strategy, said:</p><p>They mean it. They're really way behind the curve in terms of inflation. Those who think they can't do 7 rate hike, will face a severe blow. Diane Swonk, chief economist at Grant Thornton, believes the market should take the Fed's word for it:</p><p>We can't risk stagflation. They admit that they now expect inflation to persist longer, and that it's not just a problem for Ukraine. Seeing the market's reaction, they clearly don't believe it. This is a major shift in the outlook for the Fed's rate hike. They're doing it for a reason, and it's not just someone at the Fed.<b>This is a systemic move by the entire Fed, even by the most dovish Fed officials.</b>Swonk said the Fed's forecast for the unemployment rate may not be reasonable, but the Fed does want to cool inflation.</p><p>There are risks if Fed officials act as expected. She said:<b>\"When I simulated the scenario of seven rate hike, which is my forecast, I thought the average growth of the economy would stop at 1% in the second half of the year. This was a semi-hard landing.\"</b></p><p></body></html></p>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0f9e9a265cb0e7e8cb195039b2fe24a4","relate_stocks":{"513500":"标普500ETF","QLD":"2倍做多纳斯达克100指数ETF-ProShares","SH":"做空标普500-Proshares","DXD":"两倍做空道琼30指数ETF-ProShares","SPY":"标普500ETF","OEF":"标普100指数ETF-iShares","SDOW":"三倍做空道指30ETF-ProShares","TQQQ":"纳指三倍做多ETF","BK4534":"瑞士信贷持仓","DOG":"道指ETF-ProShares做空","QID":"两倍做空纳斯达克指数ETF-ProShares","SQQQ":"纳指三倍做空ETF","PSQ":"做空纳斯达克100指数ETF-ProShares","DJX":"1/100道琼斯","QQQ":"纳指100ETF","UDOW":"三倍做多道指30ETF-ProShares",".DJI":"道琼斯","SPXU":"三倍做空标普500ETF-ProShares",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite","OEX":"标普100"},"source_url":"","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1181924326","content_text":"部分经济学家对美联储加息7次的预期表示怀疑，认为他们是否真的采取行动，是一个悬而未决的问题。美联储激进的加息计划，可能会在对抗通胀的同时使经济陷入衰退。周三，美联储将利率上调了25个基点，这是自2018年以来的首次加息。与此同时，其预测显示，美联储官员预计今年将再加息6次，明年将加息3次。这是一场激进的加息运动，但也引出了一个问题：美联储能否在不严重损害经济的情况下取得成功？“美联储过于激进了”一些经济学家认为，美联储可能不会按预期行事，因为这可能会损害经济。据CNBC报道，Leuthold Group的首席投资策略师James Paulsen表示，甚至在会议之前，债券市场就已经消化了7次加息，但许多经济学家曾预计，美联储只会加息5到6次：这在很大程度上已经被消化，但市场面临的更大问题是，我们是否会看到经济衰退。虽然经济学家没有明确预测经济会衰退，但他们确实看到经济增长放缓，而且自从俄罗斯的军事行动以来，前景变得更加不明朗。乌克兰危机也加剧了通胀，因为俄罗斯是主要的大宗商品生产国，而冲突和制裁引发了人们对石油、小麦和其他主要出口产品供应的怀疑。道富环球顾问首席分析师Simona Mocuta明确表示：“我认为美联储在这方面过于激进了。经济如何发展是高度不确定的。它们可能不会实现。但可以肯定的是，美联储传递了一个非常强烈的信息. ...我仍然怀疑是否会有这么多的加息次数。”经济学家们曾预计，美联储在首次加息时，会表现出鹰派或激进的态度。许多人曾认为美联储的决策滞后，因为美联储最初认为通胀是暂时的，而这种观点已经持续了太久。Mocuta表示，美联储可能会先加息几次，但在第三季度时应重新考虑加息的路径和经济状况。如果俄乌冲突有所改善，通胀和供应链方面的一些压力将会缓解。随着时间的推移，疫情带来的一些供应链压力也可能消退。大都会投资管理公司首席市场策略师Drew Matus表示：我想说的是，他们在发出他们需要发出的信号，但他们是否真的采取行动，这是一个悬而未决的问题。数据显示，美国2月份CPI跃升至7.9%的40年新高，预计3月份还会进一步上升。美联储预计，今年的核心通胀率将为4.1%，加息后明年将降至2.6%。他们还预测今年GDP将增长4%，到2023年将降至2.2%。预计失业率将降至3.5%，并将维持在这一水平。Matus认为：“他们的很多预测都是没有意义的...在逻辑上有一些漏洞。”他指出，其中一个漏洞是，如果美联储真的按照预期的速度升息，将无法实现这一经济预测。“他们是认真的”但其他人确实预计美联储会继续加息，一些华尔街人士预测今年将加息7次。美国银行美国短期利率策略主管Mark Cabana表示：他们是认真的。他们在通胀方面真的远远落后于曲线。那些认为他们不能进行7次加息的人，将面临严重的打击。Grant Thornton的首席经济学家Diane Swonk认为，市场应该相信美联储的话：我们不能冒着滞胀的风险。他们承认，他们现在预计通胀会持续更长时间，而且这不仅仅是乌克兰的问题。看到市场的反应，他们显然不相信。这是美联储加息前景的重大转变。他们这么做是有原因的，不仅仅是美联储的某个人。这是整个美联储的系统性举措，即使是最鸽派的美联储官员也不例外。Swonk表示，美联储对失业率的预测可能不合理，但美联储确实希望给通胀降温。如果美联储官员按照预期的行动，就存在风险。她说：“当我模拟7次加息的情景时，也就是我的预测，我认为经济在下半年的平均增长将止步于1%。这是一次半硬着陆。”","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"513500":0.9,"SH":0.9,"QQQ":0.9,"TQQQ":0.9,"QID":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SQQQ":0.9,"DOG":0.9,"QLD":0.9,"OEF":0.9,"UDOW":0.9,"SPY":0.9,"SPXU":0.9,"PSQ":0.9,"DXD":0.9,"OEX":0.9,"SDOW":0.9,"DJX":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":2161,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0}],"lives":[]}
