股市轟炸机队长 personal page - To The Moon

股市轟炸机队长

股市轟炸机队长

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股市轟炸机队长

2022-01-27

$云顶新加坡(G13.SI)$Looking forward to 5.8-6.5

股市轟炸机队长

2022-01-25

$Sea Ltd(SE)$Round 2 tonight

股市轟炸机队长

2021-04-03

✌?

Twenty Years of Public Offering of Fund

股市轟炸机队长

2021-12-30

$Grab Holdings(GRAB)$I use gojek more than grab now.

股市轟炸机队长

2021-12-23

Happy 2022

股市轟炸机队长

2021-07-21

Positive is good ??

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股市轟炸机队长

2020-12-30

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later"}],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":9090138922,"gmtCreate":1643111013030,"gmtModify":1676533775076,"author":{"id":"3567575098485843","authorId":"3567575098485843","name":"股市轟炸机队长","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1ec92b2a3335762e71e118cc8d1b3753","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"idStr":"3567575098485843","authorIdStr":"3567575098485843"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"<a href=\"https://ttm.financial/S/SE\">$Sea Ltd(SE)$</a>Round 2 tonight&nbsp;","listText":"<a href=\"https://ttm.financial/S/SE\">$Sea Ltd(SE)$</a>Round 2 tonight&nbsp;","text":"$Sea Ltd(SE)$Round 2 tonight","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":6,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/9090138922","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":5194,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":9003085648,"gmtCreate":1640825968115,"gmtModify":1676533545086,"author":{"id":"3567575098485843","authorId":"3567575098485843","name":"股市轟炸机队长","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1ec92b2a3335762e71e118cc8d1b3753","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"idStr":"3567575098485843","authorIdStr":"3567575098485843"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"<a href=\"https://ttm.financial/S/GRAB\">$Grab Holdings(GRAB)$</a>I use gojek more than grab now.","listText":"<a href=\"https://ttm.financial/S/GRAB\">$Grab Holdings(GRAB)$</a>I use gojek more than grab now.","text":"$Grab Holdings(GRAB)$I use gojek more than grab now.","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":5,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/9003085648","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":3142,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":9000509413,"gmtCreate":1640224231777,"gmtModify":1676533509126,"author":{"id":"3567575098485843","authorId":"3567575098485843","name":"股市轟炸机队长","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1ec92b2a3335762e71e118cc8d1b3753","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"idStr":"3567575098485843","authorIdStr":"3567575098485843"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"Happy 2022","listText":"Happy 2022","text":"Happy 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??","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":2,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/176095531","repostId":"1198517210","repostType":4,"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":3588,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":340207090,"gmtCreate":1617413974910,"gmtModify":1704699492258,"author":{"id":"3567575098485843","authorId":"3567575098485843","name":"股市轟炸机队长","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1ec92b2a3335762e71e118cc8d1b3753","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"idStr":"3567575098485843","authorIdStr":"3567575098485843"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"✌?","listText":"✌?","text":"✌?","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":3,"commentSize":2,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/340207090","repostId":"2124759854","repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"2124759854","kind":"highlight","pubTimestamp":1617411600,"share":"https://ttm.financial/m/news/2124759854?lang=en_US&edition=fundamental","pubTime":"2021-04-03 09:00","market":"us","language":"zh","title":"Twenty Years of Public Offering of Fund","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=2124759854","media":"小鲜传","summary":"净值与价格的故事仍将继续","content":"<p><b>Passionate Years</b></p><p>In 1986, the then<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/601398\">ICBC</a>Subordinate Shanghai Trust and Investment Company established a securities business department to start stock trading. In 1988, the People's Bank of China approved the pilot trading of treasury bills in several cities. In 1990, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges opened one after another. In 1992, Shenzhen, Shenyang, Dalian, Wuhan and other places set up mutual funds. In August 1993, Zibo Fund from Shandong was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, becoming the first listed fund in China. Subsequently, many funds were listed and traded in various places. The net issuance value of Zibo Fund is 1 yuan, and the closing price on the day of listing is 5 yuan. In 2000, Zibo Fund was restructured and merged into Fund Hanbo. During the existence of the fund, the highest transaction price reached 12.39 yuan, and the lowest price was 1.6 yuan. Prices are consistently well above net worth. In the eyes of today's investors, such a \"record\" is inevitable to hide their faces and laugh: people were really stupid and had more money back then. But is history really that simple? I'm afraid not really either.</p><p>Zibo Fund is directly approved by the Head Office of the People's Bank of China, and mainly invests in the equity of township enterprises and related service industries in Zibo area. This part of investment is not less than 60% of the net value of the fund. At the same time, you can invest in all kinds of bonds and listed company stocks, and this part of the investment is no more than 40% of the net value of the fund.</p><p>It can be seen that this Zibo fund is not the securities investment fund we usually understand now, but a mix of securities and industrial investment funds. Moreover, in the legal sense, it is obviously not established by contract, but an independent legal person approved by the central bank. Or we can simply say that it is actually a listed company mainly engaged in investment holding.</p><p>If you look at its valuation in that light, it's easy to understand. In 1993, China's economy overheated across the board. The year-on-year growth rate of CPI was 14.7%, and the growth rate of fixed asset investment was 45.3%. The pursuit of investment opportunities has reached a frenetic level. The ultra-high premium of Zibo Fund is the micro reflection of this macro background.</p><p>In the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Luo Guanzhong arranged a line for Zhang Jiao, the leader of the Yellow Turban Uprising: The most rare thing is the hearts of the people. Today, the hearts of the people have been smooth, if we don't take advantage of the situation to take the world, it is a pity. For Zibo Fund, the situation it faces is not far from that of Zhang Jiao. If the market gives me a valuation of 10 times PB, then I can double my net worth by issuing 10% more share capital. The money raised can easily get double-digit returns no matter where it is placed, even in Treasury bills with value-preservation subsidies. If the share capital is diluted by 10% and the profit doubles, isn't the performance explosive?</p><p><b>If the performance growth is enough to maintain a high valuation, or even push the valuation level to rise further, then it will form a cycle of high valuation, high financing and high growth. And this process is exactly what Soros calls reflexivity.</b></p><p>Unfortunately, from its listing in 1993 to its restructuring in 2000, the regulatory authorities never gave Zibo Fund such an opportunity. Only in 1995, several listed funds, including Zibo Fund, experienced a brief hype. The reason is that it is rumored that the Fund Management Law will be promulgated in that year, and small-cap funds may be expanded. And the expansion of recruitment is the key to driving the reflexive process. So do you say that the market at that time was just \"people are stupid and have more money\"?</p><p>However, the legendary Fund Management Law has always disappeared. It was not until 1997 that the CSRC promulgated the Interim Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment Funds. In 2003, the Securities Investment Fund Law was approved by the National People's Congress and officially became a national law. Please note that compared with the rumors in 1995, the name of the law finally passed includes four more words \"securities investment\".</p><p><b>China's securities investment funds finally choose the contractual legal system.</b>The fund company is the manager. The shares issued by the fund are beneficiary certificates, and the holders of the fund shares are customers. All these arrangements seem to be natural today. In fact, besides this, there is a legal system of corporate funds.</p><p>A corporate fund itself is a legal person, which can issue shares, and the fund manager and investors jointly hold its shares. Many of the industrial investment funds we can see today are corporate funds. In China, there are probably no corporate securities investment funds. However, in the United States, there are also many corporate securities investment funds.</p><p>From the perspective of reflexivity, contractual funds are not reflexive. Because when customers subscribe for fund shares, they only use net value as the price. That is to say, only the stocks, bonds and cash held by the fund are priced, and the brand, reputation and historical performance of the fund itself, as well as the investment and research team, front and back offices, intangible assets and other resources of the fund company are not priced. Whether they add value or destroy it, they are ignored.</p><p>Therefore, in theory, contractual funds can't be issued at a high premium, and it is impossible to expand a large amount of capital with a small share capital, so the reflexive process can't be realized. Corporate funds are likely to be reflexive. For example, some industrial investment funds listed on the New Third Board achieved ultra-high premium issuance of about 10 times PB in 2014 and 15, and their net assets doubled.</p><p>For example, Silicon Valley Paradise had a share capital of 1.375 billion and a net asset of 3.37 billion in mid-2015. After the issuance, the share capital only increased to 1.477 billion, but the net assets doubled to 6.89 billion.</p><p>Another example is Zhongke Investment Promotion, with a share capital of 1.182 billion and net assets of 1.92 billion at the end of 2014. After the issuance, the share capital only increased to 1.8 billion, but the net assets surged to 14.6 billion.</p><p>You know, the general enterprise has to have a cycle of several months or even years from financing, production to generating benefits. However, many financial assets are invested and immediately begin to calculate the income. Therefore, if it were not for the stock market crash in the second half of 2015 and the market situation took a sharp turn for the worse, the performance outbreak of these companies would be almost a matter of iron plate. A classic reflexive process can be described as a shortfall.</p><p>For investors, when you participate in contractual funds, the relationship between you and the fund company is always the relationship between customers and managers. All the returns of the fund to you are reflected only in the net value of stocks, bonds and other assets. This fund and all other developments in the fund company have nothing to do with you. The fund company wants to recruit new customers, and it has nothing to do with you, an old customer.</p><p>However, in corporate funds, investors and fund companies are a team partnership that jointly starts a business and conquers the world. In addition to the net book value, investors can also enjoy the profits and losses brought by the fund company's \"competition in the Central Plains\". If a new investor wants to come in, it must get the majority approval of the original shareholders, and the price will certainly not be cheap. In today's industrial investment, the share price of round C generally can't be lower than that of round B, and the price of round D can't be lower than that of round C. This kind of first-come, first-served \"courtesy\" has almost become a rule.</p><p>We usually watch movies and TV series, and we hate others'\"spoilers\". Because if you know the ending in advance, you will not be able to fully substitute into the previous plot, which will affect the appreciation effect. When we study history, we also want to exclude the impact of spoilers. If at the turn of the century, China finally chose the corporate legal system. Then in 1993, it was quite reasonable to buy the earliest fund companies at a high premium.</p><p>In fact, in high-tech venture capital, card-slot investment is very common. For example, I am optimistic about a certain subdivision, but I can't see the technical route and competitive landscape clearly, so I will vote for all the best three or five companies on the market.<b>Moreover, the price at this time is not measured according to the immediate financial data, but inferred backwards according to the future industry prospects.</b>Because no matter which one gets bigger, I can be an old shareholder and collect the \"buying money\" paid by the latecomers.</p><p>In 2012, when Wang Yawei, a star fund manager, left Huaxia Fund, he calculated such an account with reporters. He has been a Public Offering of Fund manager for 14 years, from Fund Xinghua to Huaxia Market Selection. If dividends are reinvested, 1 yuan can be turned into 28 yuan in almost 14 years. This return is already pretty amazing. However, when Huaxia Fund itself was established in 1998, its registered capital was only 70 million. By the time of the equity transfer in 2012, the overall valuation was 16 billion yuan, plus dividends of up to 4 billion yuan during the period, and the return of rights restoration was more than 200 times. Therefore, in the same 14 years, the value growth of the fund company itself far exceeds the performance growth of the best funds in the whole market.</p><p>Whether the people who speculated on Zibo Fund ever had such a big dream is now untestable. Zibo Fund is like an abandoned road sign. What it points to is a \"parallel time and space\" completely different from the present world.</p><p><b>Second, attacked by both sides</b></p><p>In 1998, the Shanghai Composite Index fell by 3.97%. Behind this moderate figure is the stormy sea of macroeconomy and surrounding markets. In 1997, the baht began to depreciate. After entering 1998, the financial crisis swept Asia, Russia's Treasury Bond defaulted, and global stock markets plummeted.</p><p>Among the major markets in the world that year, Hong Kong stocks were under the greatest pressure. Because Hong Kong's economic fundamentals are highly correlated with East Asia, the legal tender value of the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the US dollar. If the Hong Kong dollar can depreciate, then the price of Hong Kong dollar-denominated stocks can get some support. Therefore, despite the Hong Kong government's direct entry into the market and strong intervention, by August 1998, the Hang Seng Index was still nearly halved.</p><p>During this period, the trend of A shares was calm. However, the regulators have long been worried, and the pressure is even greater than in Hong Kong. On the one hand, the state has promised that the yuan will not depreciate. On the other hand, at that time, the overall P/E of A shares was as high as 40 times, and only 5% of individual stocks had a P/E of less than 20 times. Moreover, bookmakers are rampant, speculative and speculative, and a large number of retail investors are addicted to it. Once foreign predators break in, the consequences are unimaginable.</p><p>The concept of bookmaker has been far from A shares for many years. The so-called bookmaker in those days refers to a person or capital group. They controlled the vast majority of circulating shares of listed companies, and then they could control the rise and fall of stock prices at will by turning their left hand over their right hand. Then in the next day or days, whether the stock price will rise or fall will become the bottom set by the bookmaker, and retail investors will guess this mystery, just like the pressure size in the casino.</p><p>If the dealer manipulates skillfully, the banker game can last for a long time. However, once they failed, the result was also very tragic. In 2003, the Delong Department collapsed, and they were the banker<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/000633\">Alloy Investments</a>The trend of a 95% plunge is as follows:</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/237422e025b1ec69079e44fc95daa788\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"457\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>Under this background, the \"Old Ten\" Public Offering of Fund Management Company came out. At this time, the fund can be described as being ordered in danger. Their mission has always been two. On the one hand, we should introduce new investment styles to the market. Prove that you can make money without sitting on the banker, thus improving the market pricing efficiency. On the other hand, we should also educate investors. It proves that diversified investment and long-term investment are better than short-term speculation, thus changing investors' risk appetite.</p><p>Based on these two considerations, from 1998 to 2001, most of the newly issued funds had two characteristics. First, the scale is particularly large, either 2 billion or 3 billion. Even if this scale is looked at more than ten years later, it is considerable. And the 3 billion of that year is no more than the 3 billion of today. You know, in 1998, China's GDP was less than 10% of 2020, and the M2 money supply was less than 5% of 2020. The second is long-term closure, and the closure period is unified to 15 years. I bought it when I was babbling, and I was already a college student when I came out. This design is quite a test of investors' patience. Later, many \"old funds\" issued before 1998, like Fund Zibo, were also transformed into such large-scale and long-term closed \"new funds\".</p><p>The issuance of the new fund was warmly welcomed by shareholders. The five funds issued in 1998, with a scale of 2 billion each, totaling 10 billion, attracted a total of 536.6 billion subscription funds, with an average winning rate of less than 2%. The unsuccessful funds were transferred to the secondary market and vigorously pursued, making the premium of the new fund as high as more than 100%. Its fanaticism is no different from the \"old fund\".</p><p>However, the plate of the new fund is too big after all, and the issuance speed is gradually accelerating. In 1999, the issuance size of new funds increased from 2 billion to 3 billion each. The hot money on the floor soon couldn't support it. A premium turns into a parity, and a parity turns into a discount.</p><p>The following chart shows the changing trend of the discount and premium of listed closed-end funds and the total size of the fund industry from 1998 to 2015. Among them, the fund data excludes the samples that are listed for less than 60 days and have a duration of less than one year. The total scale of the fund industry only counts stock and hybrid funds, and it is displayed on the logarithmic axis.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f139ba9aa73b2889cacf2f6806d3c1b2\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"523\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>As can be seen from the above chart, with the large-scale issuance of new funds, the premium rate of closed-end funds quickly plunged and turned into a discount. Throughout 2000 plus the first three quarters of 2001, no new funds were issued. The base closure premium rate gradually turned positive.</p><p>In September, 2001, the open-end fund came out, the fund issuance was accelerated again, and the base closing premium rate was all the way down to about-30%. After 2008, the scale of the fund industry tended to be stable, and the base closure premium rate also rose to about-10% and stabilized again until the last base closure expired in 2016. In 2001,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/CHN\">China Fund</a>The development route of the industry has once again made a strategic choice, from closed-end funds to open-end funds. Why do you make this change? The most common explanation is that open-end funds allow Christians to vote with their feet, contributing to the survival of the fittest in the fund industry. This statement seems grandiose and cannot be refuted.<b>In fact, just like the vast majority of investors have no ability to choose stocks, there is no evidence that as a group, Christians have the ability to \"choose the base\".</b></p><p>In May, 2020, the author made statistics on all stock-type and partial stock-type open-end funds of A shares, and examined the scale changes after their issuance. The results showed that the median change in size was-30.5% after half a year and-47% after one year.</p><p>Why use the median? Because a small fund grows by 1000%, it is easy to skew the average. So for sample sets that are intrinsically very different, we usually look at the median. We can probably understand it in this way. The people of open-end funds run off one third in half a year and half a year, which is the most common situation.</p><p>I think the above results are enough to show that the discount of the base closure is not because the Christians are dissatisfied with their performance, but because of the deep-rooted short-term speculation habit. Holding it for a while, it always has to go. If you shut him down and don't let him redeem it, then he'd rather sell it at a discount in the secondary market.</p><p>What's more interesting is that in the above statistics, if we only look at those funds with a net worth of less than 1 yuan, their median size change after half a year is-22.8%, and their median size change after one year is-35.8%. In other words, after losing money, the Christians are unwilling to leave. Another symmetrical phenomenon is that many star funds are reluctant to accept the \"market reward\" and are afraid of expanding. For example, Wang Yawei's Huaxia Market Selection, although it is an open-end fund, has not been open for subscription for a long time, only for redemption. The above two phenomena add up to \"survival of the inferior\", which is completely the opposite of the popular explanation.</p><p><b>When the fund industry was developed, the slogan shouted was that \"expert financial management\" was better than retail investors. Unexpectedly, now experts have to cater to the short-term preferences of retail investors.</b>Isn't that putting the cart before the horse? Many new fund managers have to face tremendous marketing pressure from the beginning of their careers, and there is no opportunity to exercise a long-term vision. Even firmly bullish stocks have to cut at the bottom under redemption pressure. Therefore, the author believes that the shift from closed to open is a bad thing rather than a good thing for the growth of the investment research team, at least the loss is greater than the profit.</p><p>However, in the specific market environment at the turn of the century, these losses are probably a necessary price. Because the fund industry has always been attacked by both sides, it has to face both the market and customers. If necessary, only if you compromise with the customer can you better concentrate on dealing with the market.</p><p>From a micro point of view, no matter what method a fund company adopts, it must first increase the scale of the industry and solve the problem of food and clothing, and then it can calmly cultivate its own investment and research talent echelon. From a macro point of view, if the fund industry does not have a certain capital scale, it is impossible to form a discourse system of institutional investors in the market, and it is impossible to improve market efficiency.</p><p>By today's standards, so many fund managers in the market may not all know about value investment. However, there are at least double ten constraints (individual stocks account for no more than 10% of the net value of the fund, and the share capital held by the fund does not exceed 10%), coupled with a series of standardized management measures such as quarterly report disclosure, bank custody, and so on. It is definitely impossible to control, wash and violently make bankers like in the 1990s. At that time, it was already commendable to be able to achieve \"standardized operation\".</p><p>In fact, for many years, the regulators have not given up their efforts to \"resurrect\" closed-end funds. They use all kinds of sweetness to persuade investors in exchange for giving up the habit of short-term speculation. This also leads to another koan, which we will describe later.</p><p><b>Third, the mystery of discount premium</b></p><p>After 2001, the secondary market price of closed-end funds has been significantly lower than its net value for a long time. This may be the first market phenomenon in the history of A shares that can attract strong attention from academics. Today, dozens of papers discussing this phenomenon can be easily searched on CNKI.</p><p>According to academic norms, a literature review is required before research. However, this review by scholars has grafted the situation in China after 2001 to the experience of the United States and Britain. After all, there are just some English papers that are easy to find. As far as I can see, none of the articles mention the long, substantially above net worth history of \"old fund\" prices in China in the 1990s. Even after the restructuring in 1998, there is no article to review the V-shaped trend of new funds from premium to discount and then to premium.</p><p><b>So the question of the relationship between price and net worth becomes \"why closed-end funds always trade at a discount\". A concrete historical phenomenon becomes a matter of logic.</b>So what's the answer? Those papers in the United States are nothing more than looking for reasons in fees, accounting, and taxes. But these specific reasons simply do not exist in China. Therefore, we had to end with \"no conclusion\" or simply \"irrational market\".</p><p>In fact, if I want to say it, the answer is four words:<b>Oversupply</b>。 As simple as that, if the fund industry develops slowly and doesn't issue so many products, the base closure is likely to continue to trade at parity or even premium as it did before 2001.</p><p>The scale of a base closure is billions, and the daily transaction is only tens of millions, and the average turnover rate is below 1%. Can this 1% represent all Christians? Imagine how the commission price would be distributed if we required all holders to place a sell order? Maybe 10% will hang around the market price, 20% will hang between the market price and the net worth, 60% will hang around the net worth, and 10% will probably hang at a position much higher than the net worth. Of course, the above numbers are my intuitive guess, but this distribution relationship is probably not unreasonable.</p><p>A similar problem is the relationship between dividends and buybacks. Both are the means by which listed companies distribute cash. How they affect the stock price, academics don't know how many papers have published to discuss it. In fact, we can also think of it this way. If all shareholders are required to put up selling orders, then only a few percent or even a few thousandths of the entrustments will hang around the current price, and most other selling orders will hang at a position obviously higher or even far higher than the current price. In other words, the daily turnover rate of a stock is 5%, which only means that 5% of holding shareholders agree with the market price. Another 95% of shareholders' minds are valued above the current price, otherwise they would have chosen to sell.</p><p>Therefore, the effect of dividends is that the sun shines, and there is only one ex-right effect on the stock price.<b>Repurchase, on the other hand, eliminates the relatively least optimistic part of all shareholders in a targeted way. So buybacks have a strong effect of distorting the stock price upward.</b>I think this concise logic is more convincing than the frighteningly complex mathematical models.</p><p>The above is to explain discount transactions from the spatial dimension, and it is not difficult to understand from the temporal dimension. Many industries have experienced widespread losses or even industry-wide losses. Steel and coal in 2016 is the loss of the whole industry. What does that mean? This only means that some players should quit. If everyone holds up, they will continue to lose money. Fortunately, China has supply-side structural reform. The shipping industry is a fully international industry, and it has been losing money since 2008 until today.</p><p>Therefore, the base closure is generally discounted, including that most mutual funds in the United States can't outperform the index, which all shows that there are too many players, but there are still stupid money to support them. It is likely that this is a periodic phenomenon rather than a logical problem. The essential reason is that since 1980s, the global stock market has been in a long-term bull market, and has not experienced the full adjustment of 1930s and 1970s.</p><p>Since 1998, when he was appointed in crisis, China's fund industry has been mature. Having hardly experienced the blue ocean stage of natural accumulation, he entered the Red Sea directly according to the government's strategic plan. This is very similar to photovoltaic, wind power and other industries. That is to say, the competition within the industry is very fierce, even tragic. However, the overall output value has risen very quickly, and the systemic importance of the industry has increased dramatically.</p><p>China's fund industry began to develop from 0 in 1998. By 2007, nearly 30% of the circulating market value of A shares was controlled by fund companies. Note that more exciting than the 30% ratio is the momentum that has gone from 0 to 30% in less than a decade. It seems that 40%, 50%, 60% are all within reach.</p><p>As a result, some people in the head fund companies began to think about it. They feel that it is boring to just be a financial investor. They should be active investors and participate in the company's business decision-making. As far as Carl in the United States<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/IKAN\">Icahn</a>Like Baoneng and Anbang in previous years. In short, the time of bookmakers is long gone, and value investing is only the foundation. Under the new conditions, the gameplay has to be upgraded again.</p><p>The mood is completely understandable. After all, a company, whether you hold 3% or 30% of the shares, the enthusiasm, expectation and sense of responsibility will be completely different. Therefore, the overall atmosphere of the fund industry in those years was not inferior to the highlight moments of Internet giants. I think back to that period of green years, still can't help but surge in my heart. That feeling is similar to: The world is yours and ours, but at the end of the day it is ours.</p><p>Unfortunately, things are impermanent, and fate plays with people. At the beginning of 2020, the percentage of circulating market value of A shares controlled by fund companies was less than 7%. The dream of active investors can only be mapped to another parallel time and space.</p><p>From the perspective of the whole society, the investment research team of a fund company is only dozens of people. If they just bought and sold stocks, it wouldn't matter if the amount reached tens or hundreds of billions. However, if they can command dozens or hundreds of listed companies, even if it is just a few words for their interests, things will be much more complicated.</p><p>In the Great Recession of 2008, Wall Street has been widely criticized for taking too much of its public resources. This was even more evident during the Covid crisis in March 2020. It is not enough for the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates by 1 point at a time, it must be reduced to 0. It is not enough to buy Treasury Bond alone, but also to buy junk bonds. The government's various deficit plans are increased by 3 points or 5 points. If these policies are not enough, the stock market will lie underground and \"die\" for you to see. When the sugar was enough, it rolled over and sat up again, and it was still full of energy. If Wall Street does not have a strong willpower, it is obviously impossible to play such an effective game with the authorities if it is as scattered as Chinese investors, and it will shine brightly if it is given some sunshine.</p><p><b>Does China really want a Wall Street of its own? I am afraid I want it and I don't want it.</b></p><p><b>The first pot of gold</b></p><p>The author once talked with old colleagues in the Public Offering of Fund industry: There are so many investment schools in the market, and most fund managers start from scratch, and they are a blank sheet of paper before entering the industry. What are the factors that determine their style? Chen Yangfan of Mammoth Assets said: At first, everyone was randomly groping until they made the first pot of gold in their lives. And how they earned the first pot of gold, their style is basically what it is. I agree with this statement.</p><p>The \"new fund\" issued from 1998 to 2001, later known as the closed-end fund. It is the first pot of gold for many old investors and old people. Simply put, during the entire duration of Sealed Base, you can buy it casually with your eyes closed, and you can basically make money in the end. Of course, there is a window period where you can lose money when you buy it. But it is short, and it is not easy to choose it. And as long as you buy before the big bull market in 2007, you must make a big profit in the end.</p><p>From the end of 2004 to the end of 2012, the average return for closed-end funds was 540%, while the average return for open-end funds was 236% and the average return for individual stocks was 141%. The average return of closed-end funds can outperform all open-end funds except Huaxia Market Select, and can also outperform more than 93% of individual stocks.</p><p>Why are there such amazing results?<b>There are mainly two reasons, one is the high discount, and the other is the big market.</b></p><p>In 2004, the fund industry reluctantly climbed to the scale of 200 billion yuan, and it was almost completely unable to sprint to 300 billion yuan. Fan Yonghong, the first general manager of Huaxia Fund, recalled in Evergreen Fund that only 2 million copies were raised on the first day of issuance of Huaxia Market Selection, which was later Fengshen. The sales staff of Huaxia Fund even had to compete with people in the channel, \"a glass of wine for 1 million funds\". According to the general sales rebate, the number of 1 million seems to be not small. However, you should know that the subscription of 1 million Public Offering of Fund will first run away a large piece in a short time, and then the remaining part can only generate a management fee of 1.5% every year. After removing all kinds of costs, the actual benefit is likely to be negative.</p><p>In this severe oversupply market, the secondary market price of the base closure is well below its net value, with an average discount of 28%. However, if you only focus on these 28 points, it seems unattractive to spread it over the next few or more years to slowly recover. This is indeed the case. Until 2014, the average discount of base closure was more than 10 points. In ten years, the discount rate has only recovered by 18 points, which is less than 2% annualized.</p><p>However, once the high discount is superimposed on the big market, the situation will completely change. The same is to buy an asset worth 3 yuan with 2 yuan in cash. You can call it a discount rate of 33% or you can call it a leverage ratio of 1.5x. The discount rate becomes leverage!</p><p><b>Therefore, the ultra-high return of base closure is actually the result of the superposition of two factors. First, the high discount caused by the rapid development of the fund industry from 2001 to 04, and second, the magnificent bull market in 2006 and 07.</b></p><p>Of course, like other investment opportunities, if you want to bargain against the market, you have to overcome several scary \"ghost stories\". For example, at that time, it was rumored in the market that the closed-end foundation of the same company transferred benefits to the open-end fund. But as we have shown earlier, most Christians simply do not have the ability to choose their foundations. At the risk of violating laws and regulations, the fund manager finally gave his colleagues 2 points of income. As a result, the Christians didn't know it at all, and even ran more instead. Why the trouble?</p><p>Others worry that fund managers with closed bases will operate chaotically and deliberately lose money. Which is even more ridiculous. First of all, deliberately losing money is not good for either the fund company or the fund manager. What's more, under the efficient market assumption, the difficulty of deliberately losing money is the same as \"deliberately\" making money. If you buy junk stocks exclusively, you may make more money instead.</p><p>There used to be a joke that if the forecast accuracy of strategy analysts can be 70%, they can get an annual salary of 1 million. If the accuracy rate drops to 50%, then he's worthless. But if the accuracy rate drops further to 5%, then he should be worth 5 million a year. Why is it? Because positive indicators and negative indicators are of the same value, you just have to listen to them in reverse. The key is that the accuracy rate should deviate from 50%. The more you bias, the better. It doesn't matter where you bias.</p><p>As mentioned earlier, after the closure of the base in 2001, the regulators were unwilling to completely give up the position of closed-end funds. However, the habit of short-term speculation by retail investors is stubborn, and open-end funds have established their mainstream position. At this time, if we continue to issue classic closed-end funds, there is a high probability that we will face the problem of discount when listed. In theory, holders can just hold themselves without looking at the market price. However, the reality is that the floating loss of market price has brought a great negative impact on fund sales. So regulators handed the issue over to fund companies to design innovative closed-end funds to attract investors.</p><p>In September 2007, Dacheng Preferred went public. It is the first innovative closed-end fund in the A-share market. Its innovations are mainly two: First, it sets performance reward, and the commission ratio is 10% above the water level. Second, the re-opening clause is set. If the discount exceeds 20% for 50 consecutive trading days, it will be changed from closed-end fund to open-end fund.</p><p>When Dacheng was first listed, the market was looking forward to the magic of performance reward, hoping that it could mobilize the enthusiasm of the investment and research team of the fund company and create star achievements. However, from the results, the performance of the fund is not ideal, so after a short premium, it quickly transferred to a discount transaction, and the discount range even exceeded the classic base closure.</p><p>The second innovative closed-end fund in the A-share market is called Ruifu Enterprising, and it has two innovations: First, it has designed a more complicated leverage mechanism. The leverage ratio is roughly around 2x. Second, the reopening clause is also set. If the discount exceeds 30% for 60 consecutive trading days, it will be reopened.</p><p>From its listing in 2007 to its expiration in 2012, Redford Enterprising has a duration of 5 years, basically realizing continuous premium trading, with an average premium rate of about 20%. For this alone, it is obvious that it is more successful than Dacheng Preferred. The reason seems to be simply attributed to the fact that retail investors love leverage more than they expect for active management.</p><p>In April 2010, CICC opened stock index futures, and the leverage ratio can easily reach more than 5 times. The aggressive premium rate of Redford subsequently declined significantly, and even discounted for a time. In 2012, Furui aggressively renewed the contract, and the leverage ratio returned from more than 3 times to 2 times. The market interest was weaker, and the price dropped rapidly until the discount rate was close to 20%.</p><p>It can be seen that A-share retail investors like short speculation first and leverage second. As for the trust in expert financial management, if it exists, it will rank third at most. In 2018, Xingquan, managed by Xie Zhiyu of Xingquan Fund, was suitably issued, with a daily sales of 30 billion yuan, which can be called an explosion. The fund was closed for the first year, and as a result, it was still discounted by 6% once it was listed. It opened after a year, and the holding share ran off half as \"conventional\". It can be seen that it is difficult for star fund managers to escape this strange cycle.</p><p><b>V. Graded Fund</b></p><p>According to the original idea, the regulators want to establish a gentleman's agreement with retail investors. The regulatory authorities put forward the two characteristics of \"performance\" and \"leverage\" in exchange for retail investors accepting the condition of \"closure\". But now that the gentleman's agreement can't be done, wouldn't it be beautiful to simply graft the \"leverage\" into the open-end fund and directly scale it?</p><p>The basic principles of this kind of open-end funds with leverage function are mostly divided into AB levels. The money of the two levels is invested together, and all losses and profits are borne by Grade B, while Grade A only takes fixed income. So they are collectively called tiered funds.</p><p>Overseas, leveraged funds are generally only leveraged and have no priority. Or, they all use virtual priorities. The functions corresponding to the priority are realized by investment banks or derivatives markets. The advantage of this is that the scale of the priority can be scaled at any time.</p><p>For example, 2x leveraged funds. If investors put in 100 million yuan, the fund company will borrow another 100 million yuan to allocate funds to it. Then today the market fell 5%, investors took a loss of 10 million, and the principal dropped to 90 million. Near the close of the day, the fund company will reduce the allocation amount to 90 million, so that the leverage of the fund will still be twice. If the market rises tomorrow, it will be adjusted back. Therefore, this allocation amount has to be adjusted every trading day.</p><p>From the perspective of investment varieties, the priority funds in overseas leveraged funds are actually a piece of fat. The safety is high, the profitability is good, and the best of both worlds. The only downside is that it has to be \"come and go\" and unstable.</p><p>Our A-share graded fund is equivalent to taking out this fat and distributing it to other interested Christians to enjoy. The price of this, of course, is that the size of the priority can only be adjusted under some predetermined special circumstances, and it is impossible to close and zoom once a day.</p><p>This kind of innovation, the intention is not bad. However, in the specific market environment, problems arise. The first crisis of graded funds occurred on May 20th, 2014. The protagonist is Yinhua Ruijin, which is a B-level, that is, a leveraged fund. It is passive in investment, pegged to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index. Therefore, the rise and fall of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index completely determines its net value. In terms of sales, it is very successful. It has been on the market for 4 years, from 1 billion to more than 10 billion. But the problem lies in the scale.</p><p>Due to the continuous decline of the market from 2011 to 2014, coupled with the continuous payment of priority interest, the net value of Yinhua Ruijin has reached the vicinity of the warehouse line. In other words, if it falls again, it may affect the security of priority funds. Therefore, once the exposure line is reached, the product will be partially closed.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/338c1c17b086c4274475aeedc22f6172\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"464\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>As we have explained earlier, during the previous decline, the priority scale of graded funds will not be gradually adjusted. Therefore, once partial liquidation occurs, the potential one-time selling amount will be as high as more than 10 billion. At this time, the average daily turnover of the whole Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index is only more than 10 billion. Once the exposure event occurs, it is tantamount to a heavy hammer for the already tired market.</p><p>Moreover, because Yinhua Ruijin is a passive fund pegged to the index, the fund manager has no right to actively adjust the position. As long as the index falls below the corresponding point, Yinhua Ruijin is completely certain.</p><p>As a result, a miracle happened. At 9: 38 a.m. on May 20th, 2014, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index obviously fell below the warehouse line of Yinhua Ruijin, and then it was immediately pulled up in a straight line. Moreover, this tiny golden needle actually became the historical bottom of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index, and it has never fallen below since then. The picture below is the time-sharing record I left in that year:</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0483c2453de1675c635e63d0ceb881a0\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"448\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>Where this mysterious power came from is still an unsolved mystery. Maybe because this incident came close in the end, there were almost no waves in the industry or outside.</p><p>Two levels of AB of graded funds have their own net worth and price respectively. However, because they cannot be purchased and redeemed separately, they may appear at a large discount or premium, respectively. However, A and B together, as a complete open-end fund, can be purchased and redeemed. So the sum of prices of A and B cannot deviate significantly from the sum of net worth.</p><p>For example, both A and B have a net value of 1. At this time, the price of A can be 1.2, then the price of B is 0.8, or the price of A is 0.7, then the price of B is 1.3. In summary, the prices of the two can deviate from the net worth separately, but the sum of the two must be stable. Otherwise, there will be arbitrage opportunities.</p><p>Due to the love of retail investors for leverage, there are still quite a lot of arbitrage opportunities where graded funds have a premium. But the vast majority of such opportunities are \"visible and intangible\". Theoretically it holds, but it can't be implemented operationally. There are four main reasons:</p><p>First and foremost,<b>The vast majority of graded funds cannot be purchased and redeemed in real time.</b>If you observe a premium on T day, subscribe before the close of the day. The fund company confirms the share on T +1. On T +2, the fund share is reflected in the brokerage system, and you have to make a spin-off order, and you can sell A and B respectively on T +3. At this time, is the premium still there? Generally speaking, it's gone. If it's still there, the arbitrage is a success. So this problem is also related to the stability of the premium level.</p><p>Number two, is<b>The price of the A-Class is volatile. Because A-rated investors usually think of it as a long-term bond.</b>They think about the problem like this: I invest 100 yuan today, and the annual interest rate is 6%, so the interest for 10 years is 60 yuan, the interest for 20 years is 120 yuan, and the interest for 30 years is 180 yuan... So if the interest rate changes by 1%, it will have a great impact on them. However, the price change of 1% for Class A does not affect them much. Of course, institutional investors will be more elaborate. But the trading volume of Class A is too small, there is no liquidity, and institutions rarely participate.</p><p>Number three, that is,<b>Premium levels for Class B are also volatile. When there is no trend in the market, retail investors generally regard Class B as an artifact of oversold rebound.</b>That is to say, when the market plummets, Grade B often has a premium. After two or three days, this premium generally disappears whether the rebound occurs or not.</p><p>Number four, that is,<b>The subscription rate of graded funds can be as high as 1% to 1.5%, which greatly increases the cost of arbitrage transactions.</b></p><p>However, in the bull market of 2014 and 15, the above situation has undergone major changes, and the premium arbitrage of graded funds has become easier to realize.</p><p>First of all,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/601688\">Huatai Securities</a>The \"blind demolition\" business was launched, and other securities companies followed suit. The so-called blind demolition means that the fund company confirms the share on T +1, and it has not been reflected to the brokerage, so you will directly give the spin-off instruction to the brokerage. In this way, on T +2, the brokerage directly enters the split A and B into the system, and you can trade immediately. This technological innovation has greatly reduced the uncertainty of premium arbitrage.</p><p>Second, the price of Class A has stabilized. Since the second half of 2014, the central bank has continuously cut RRR and interest rates, and many insurance companies and fixed-income products have to go to the securities market to find income. Institutional investors are more rational, and soon stabilized the price of Class A in a small range, and stopped fluctuating randomly.</p><p>Third, the premium level of Grade B has also stabilized. This principle is the simplest, but it is also the most crucial: the bull market is coming, with great pride and a premium all the way.</p><p>Article 4, the subscription fee is usually calculated as a percentage, but the highest grade has an upper limit of 1,000 yuan, so for funds of more than 5 million yuan, the fee no longer constitutes a limit. Why did it constitute a restriction before? Because of the poor liquidity in the past, the amount of money invested in an arbitrage was too large, and I was afraid that it would not come out. In the bull market, liquidity has improved greatly, and the whole funds can go directly.</p><p>From the end of 2014 to mid-2015, funds focused on premium arbitrage of graded funds yielded about 2 to 3 times. This performance is stronger than most Public Offering of Funds, but it is not too exaggerated. However, its advantage is that \"don't hang the string without seeing the devil\", move when there is a signal, stop when there is no signal, and there is no problem of hesitation to cut meat. So the fruits of the bull market are preserved. Most public and private placements experienced severe pullback/retracement in the subsequent stock market crash.</p><p>So after the market peaks, are there any investment opportunities for graded funds? In fact, there are also, that is, to observe which B-levels will be exposed, and then buy the corresponding A-levels.</p><p>As we said earlier, in May 2014, the broader market experienced a close call potential crisis. At that time, it was a giant fund of Yinhua Ruijin, with a potential sell-off of about 10 billion yuan. However, during the stock market crash, the situation became several giant funds, plus dozens of small and medium-sized funds, tens of billions of potential selling, and it continued to burst out in a concentrated time period.</p><p>On August 24th, 2015, GEM B exploded, causing a sell-off of about 4.5 billion yuan. On August 27th, Securities B was exposed, causing a sell-off of about 7.5 billion yuan. On August 28th, state-owned enterprises changed their positions to B, causing a sell-off of about 13 billion...</p><p>Because the terms, shares and net value information of Public Offering of Fund are public, under what circumstances these foundations are exposed to positions and how big the potential selling is, these key information are also public. Then, if you expect that a certain fund will be exposed, the most rational decision is to short-sell related stocks first, one is to hedge, and the other is to induce its exposure. Wait until the fund closes its position, and then buy it back from the low point. Facts have also repeatedly proved that every giant graded fund with exposure has smashed a pit in the market, and the liquidation plate is always cut at the lowest point.</p><p>The above characteristics are extremely unfavorable to Class B, while the corresponding benefit is Class A. The specific calculation is more complicated, so I will skip it here. If you are interested, you can consult the prospectus of relevant funds and other materials.</p><p>The fact that the graded fund \"passively smashed the market\" in the stock market crash has caused widespread criticism inside and outside the industry. In 2018, the CSRC issued the New Regulations on Asset Management, requiring all graded funds to be fully transformed. However, until early 2020, a large number of graded funds were still trading. However, I believe that even if graded funds really disappear, there will be newer varieties in the future.</p><p>The net worth vs. price story will continue.</p><p>Author: Ding Chang</p>","source":"lsy1617412441808","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Twenty Years of Public Offering of Fund</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nTwenty Years of Public Offering of Fund\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">小鲜传</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-04-03 09:00</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><b>Passionate Years</b></p><p>In 1986, the then<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/601398\">ICBC</a>Subordinate Shanghai Trust and Investment Company established a securities business department to start stock trading. In 1988, the People's Bank of China approved the pilot trading of treasury bills in several cities. In 1990, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges opened one after another. In 1992, Shenzhen, Shenyang, Dalian, Wuhan and other places set up mutual funds. In August 1993, Zibo Fund from Shandong was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, becoming the first listed fund in China. Subsequently, many funds were listed and traded in various places. The net issuance value of Zibo Fund is 1 yuan, and the closing price on the day of listing is 5 yuan. In 2000, Zibo Fund was restructured and merged into Fund Hanbo. During the existence of the fund, the highest transaction price reached 12.39 yuan, and the lowest price was 1.6 yuan. Prices are consistently well above net worth. In the eyes of today's investors, such a \"record\" is inevitable to hide their faces and laugh: people were really stupid and had more money back then. But is history really that simple? I'm afraid not really either.</p><p>Zibo Fund is directly approved by the Head Office of the People's Bank of China, and mainly invests in the equity of township enterprises and related service industries in Zibo area. This part of investment is not less than 60% of the net value of the fund. At the same time, you can invest in all kinds of bonds and listed company stocks, and this part of the investment is no more than 40% of the net value of the fund.</p><p>It can be seen that this Zibo fund is not the securities investment fund we usually understand now, but a mix of securities and industrial investment funds. Moreover, in the legal sense, it is obviously not established by contract, but an independent legal person approved by the central bank. Or we can simply say that it is actually a listed company mainly engaged in investment holding.</p><p>If you look at its valuation in that light, it's easy to understand. In 1993, China's economy overheated across the board. The year-on-year growth rate of CPI was 14.7%, and the growth rate of fixed asset investment was 45.3%. The pursuit of investment opportunities has reached a frenetic level. The ultra-high premium of Zibo Fund is the micro reflection of this macro background.</p><p>In the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Luo Guanzhong arranged a line for Zhang Jiao, the leader of the Yellow Turban Uprising: The most rare thing is the hearts of the people. Today, the hearts of the people have been smooth, if we don't take advantage of the situation to take the world, it is a pity. For Zibo Fund, the situation it faces is not far from that of Zhang Jiao. If the market gives me a valuation of 10 times PB, then I can double my net worth by issuing 10% more share capital. The money raised can easily get double-digit returns no matter where it is placed, even in Treasury bills with value-preservation subsidies. If the share capital is diluted by 10% and the profit doubles, isn't the performance explosive?</p><p><b>If the performance growth is enough to maintain a high valuation, or even push the valuation level to rise further, then it will form a cycle of high valuation, high financing and high growth. And this process is exactly what Soros calls reflexivity.</b></p><p>Unfortunately, from its listing in 1993 to its restructuring in 2000, the regulatory authorities never gave Zibo Fund such an opportunity. Only in 1995, several listed funds, including Zibo Fund, experienced a brief hype. The reason is that it is rumored that the Fund Management Law will be promulgated in that year, and small-cap funds may be expanded. And the expansion of recruitment is the key to driving the reflexive process. So do you say that the market at that time was just \"people are stupid and have more money\"?</p><p>However, the legendary Fund Management Law has always disappeared. It was not until 1997 that the CSRC promulgated the Interim Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment Funds. In 2003, the Securities Investment Fund Law was approved by the National People's Congress and officially became a national law. Please note that compared with the rumors in 1995, the name of the law finally passed includes four more words \"securities investment\".</p><p><b>China's securities investment funds finally choose the contractual legal system.</b>The fund company is the manager. The shares issued by the fund are beneficiary certificates, and the holders of the fund shares are customers. All these arrangements seem to be natural today. In fact, besides this, there is a legal system of corporate funds.</p><p>A corporate fund itself is a legal person, which can issue shares, and the fund manager and investors jointly hold its shares. Many of the industrial investment funds we can see today are corporate funds. In China, there are probably no corporate securities investment funds. However, in the United States, there are also many corporate securities investment funds.</p><p>From the perspective of reflexivity, contractual funds are not reflexive. Because when customers subscribe for fund shares, they only use net value as the price. That is to say, only the stocks, bonds and cash held by the fund are priced, and the brand, reputation and historical performance of the fund itself, as well as the investment and research team, front and back offices, intangible assets and other resources of the fund company are not priced. Whether they add value or destroy it, they are ignored.</p><p>Therefore, in theory, contractual funds can't be issued at a high premium, and it is impossible to expand a large amount of capital with a small share capital, so the reflexive process can't be realized. Corporate funds are likely to be reflexive. For example, some industrial investment funds listed on the New Third Board achieved ultra-high premium issuance of about 10 times PB in 2014 and 15, and their net assets doubled.</p><p>For example, Silicon Valley Paradise had a share capital of 1.375 billion and a net asset of 3.37 billion in mid-2015. After the issuance, the share capital only increased to 1.477 billion, but the net assets doubled to 6.89 billion.</p><p>Another example is Zhongke Investment Promotion, with a share capital of 1.182 billion and net assets of 1.92 billion at the end of 2014. After the issuance, the share capital only increased to 1.8 billion, but the net assets surged to 14.6 billion.</p><p>You know, the general enterprise has to have a cycle of several months or even years from financing, production to generating benefits. However, many financial assets are invested and immediately begin to calculate the income. Therefore, if it were not for the stock market crash in the second half of 2015 and the market situation took a sharp turn for the worse, the performance outbreak of these companies would be almost a matter of iron plate. A classic reflexive process can be described as a shortfall.</p><p>For investors, when you participate in contractual funds, the relationship between you and the fund company is always the relationship between customers and managers. All the returns of the fund to you are reflected only in the net value of stocks, bonds and other assets. This fund and all other developments in the fund company have nothing to do with you. The fund company wants to recruit new customers, and it has nothing to do with you, an old customer.</p><p>However, in corporate funds, investors and fund companies are a team partnership that jointly starts a business and conquers the world. In addition to the net book value, investors can also enjoy the profits and losses brought by the fund company's \"competition in the Central Plains\". If a new investor wants to come in, it must get the majority approval of the original shareholders, and the price will certainly not be cheap. In today's industrial investment, the share price of round C generally can't be lower than that of round B, and the price of round D can't be lower than that of round C. This kind of first-come, first-served \"courtesy\" has almost become a rule.</p><p>We usually watch movies and TV series, and we hate others'\"spoilers\". Because if you know the ending in advance, you will not be able to fully substitute into the previous plot, which will affect the appreciation effect. When we study history, we also want to exclude the impact of spoilers. If at the turn of the century, China finally chose the corporate legal system. Then in 1993, it was quite reasonable to buy the earliest fund companies at a high premium.</p><p>In fact, in high-tech venture capital, card-slot investment is very common. For example, I am optimistic about a certain subdivision, but I can't see the technical route and competitive landscape clearly, so I will vote for all the best three or five companies on the market.<b>Moreover, the price at this time is not measured according to the immediate financial data, but inferred backwards according to the future industry prospects.</b>Because no matter which one gets bigger, I can be an old shareholder and collect the \"buying money\" paid by the latecomers.</p><p>In 2012, when Wang Yawei, a star fund manager, left Huaxia Fund, he calculated such an account with reporters. He has been a Public Offering of Fund manager for 14 years, from Fund Xinghua to Huaxia Market Selection. If dividends are reinvested, 1 yuan can be turned into 28 yuan in almost 14 years. This return is already pretty amazing. However, when Huaxia Fund itself was established in 1998, its registered capital was only 70 million. By the time of the equity transfer in 2012, the overall valuation was 16 billion yuan, plus dividends of up to 4 billion yuan during the period, and the return of rights restoration was more than 200 times. Therefore, in the same 14 years, the value growth of the fund company itself far exceeds the performance growth of the best funds in the whole market.</p><p>Whether the people who speculated on Zibo Fund ever had such a big dream is now untestable. Zibo Fund is like an abandoned road sign. What it points to is a \"parallel time and space\" completely different from the present world.</p><p><b>Second, attacked by both sides</b></p><p>In 1998, the Shanghai Composite Index fell by 3.97%. Behind this moderate figure is the stormy sea of macroeconomy and surrounding markets. In 1997, the baht began to depreciate. After entering 1998, the financial crisis swept Asia, Russia's Treasury Bond defaulted, and global stock markets plummeted.</p><p>Among the major markets in the world that year, Hong Kong stocks were under the greatest pressure. Because Hong Kong's economic fundamentals are highly correlated with East Asia, the legal tender value of the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the US dollar. If the Hong Kong dollar can depreciate, then the price of Hong Kong dollar-denominated stocks can get some support. Therefore, despite the Hong Kong government's direct entry into the market and strong intervention, by August 1998, the Hang Seng Index was still nearly halved.</p><p>During this period, the trend of A shares was calm. However, the regulators have long been worried, and the pressure is even greater than in Hong Kong. On the one hand, the state has promised that the yuan will not depreciate. On the other hand, at that time, the overall P/E of A shares was as high as 40 times, and only 5% of individual stocks had a P/E of less than 20 times. Moreover, bookmakers are rampant, speculative and speculative, and a large number of retail investors are addicted to it. Once foreign predators break in, the consequences are unimaginable.</p><p>The concept of bookmaker has been far from A shares for many years. The so-called bookmaker in those days refers to a person or capital group. They controlled the vast majority of circulating shares of listed companies, and then they could control the rise and fall of stock prices at will by turning their left hand over their right hand. Then in the next day or days, whether the stock price will rise or fall will become the bottom set by the bookmaker, and retail investors will guess this mystery, just like the pressure size in the casino.</p><p>If the dealer manipulates skillfully, the banker game can last for a long time. However, once they failed, the result was also very tragic. In 2003, the Delong Department collapsed, and they were the banker<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/000633\">Alloy Investments</a>The trend of a 95% plunge is as follows:</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/237422e025b1ec69079e44fc95daa788\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"457\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>Under this background, the \"Old Ten\" Public Offering of Fund Management Company came out. At this time, the fund can be described as being ordered in danger. Their mission has always been two. On the one hand, we should introduce new investment styles to the market. Prove that you can make money without sitting on the banker, thus improving the market pricing efficiency. On the other hand, we should also educate investors. It proves that diversified investment and long-term investment are better than short-term speculation, thus changing investors' risk appetite.</p><p>Based on these two considerations, from 1998 to 2001, most of the newly issued funds had two characteristics. First, the scale is particularly large, either 2 billion or 3 billion. Even if this scale is looked at more than ten years later, it is considerable. And the 3 billion of that year is no more than the 3 billion of today. You know, in 1998, China's GDP was less than 10% of 2020, and the M2 money supply was less than 5% of 2020. The second is long-term closure, and the closure period is unified to 15 years. I bought it when I was babbling, and I was already a college student when I came out. This design is quite a test of investors' patience. Later, many \"old funds\" issued before 1998, like Fund Zibo, were also transformed into such large-scale and long-term closed \"new funds\".</p><p>The issuance of the new fund was warmly welcomed by shareholders. The five funds issued in 1998, with a scale of 2 billion each, totaling 10 billion, attracted a total of 536.6 billion subscription funds, with an average winning rate of less than 2%. The unsuccessful funds were transferred to the secondary market and vigorously pursued, making the premium of the new fund as high as more than 100%. Its fanaticism is no different from the \"old fund\".</p><p>However, the plate of the new fund is too big after all, and the issuance speed is gradually accelerating. In 1999, the issuance size of new funds increased from 2 billion to 3 billion each. The hot money on the floor soon couldn't support it. A premium turns into a parity, and a parity turns into a discount.</p><p>The following chart shows the changing trend of the discount and premium of listed closed-end funds and the total size of the fund industry from 1998 to 2015. Among them, the fund data excludes the samples that are listed for less than 60 days and have a duration of less than one year. The total scale of the fund industry only counts stock and hybrid funds, and it is displayed on the logarithmic axis.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f139ba9aa73b2889cacf2f6806d3c1b2\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"523\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>As can be seen from the above chart, with the large-scale issuance of new funds, the premium rate of closed-end funds quickly plunged and turned into a discount. Throughout 2000 plus the first three quarters of 2001, no new funds were issued. The base closure premium rate gradually turned positive.</p><p>In September, 2001, the open-end fund came out, the fund issuance was accelerated again, and the base closing premium rate was all the way down to about-30%. After 2008, the scale of the fund industry tended to be stable, and the base closure premium rate also rose to about-10% and stabilized again until the last base closure expired in 2016. In 2001,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/CHN\">China Fund</a>The development route of the industry has once again made a strategic choice, from closed-end funds to open-end funds. Why do you make this change? The most common explanation is that open-end funds allow Christians to vote with their feet, contributing to the survival of the fittest in the fund industry. This statement seems grandiose and cannot be refuted.<b>In fact, just like the vast majority of investors have no ability to choose stocks, there is no evidence that as a group, Christians have the ability to \"choose the base\".</b></p><p>In May, 2020, the author made statistics on all stock-type and partial stock-type open-end funds of A shares, and examined the scale changes after their issuance. The results showed that the median change in size was-30.5% after half a year and-47% after one year.</p><p>Why use the median? Because a small fund grows by 1000%, it is easy to skew the average. So for sample sets that are intrinsically very different, we usually look at the median. We can probably understand it in this way. The people of open-end funds run off one third in half a year and half a year, which is the most common situation.</p><p>I think the above results are enough to show that the discount of the base closure is not because the Christians are dissatisfied with their performance, but because of the deep-rooted short-term speculation habit. Holding it for a while, it always has to go. If you shut him down and don't let him redeem it, then he'd rather sell it at a discount in the secondary market.</p><p>What's more interesting is that in the above statistics, if we only look at those funds with a net worth of less than 1 yuan, their median size change after half a year is-22.8%, and their median size change after one year is-35.8%. In other words, after losing money, the Christians are unwilling to leave. Another symmetrical phenomenon is that many star funds are reluctant to accept the \"market reward\" and are afraid of expanding. For example, Wang Yawei's Huaxia Market Selection, although it is an open-end fund, has not been open for subscription for a long time, only for redemption. The above two phenomena add up to \"survival of the inferior\", which is completely the opposite of the popular explanation.</p><p><b>When the fund industry was developed, the slogan shouted was that \"expert financial management\" was better than retail investors. Unexpectedly, now experts have to cater to the short-term preferences of retail investors.</b>Isn't that putting the cart before the horse? Many new fund managers have to face tremendous marketing pressure from the beginning of their careers, and there is no opportunity to exercise a long-term vision. Even firmly bullish stocks have to cut at the bottom under redemption pressure. Therefore, the author believes that the shift from closed to open is a bad thing rather than a good thing for the growth of the investment research team, at least the loss is greater than the profit.</p><p>However, in the specific market environment at the turn of the century, these losses are probably a necessary price. Because the fund industry has always been attacked by both sides, it has to face both the market and customers. If necessary, only if you compromise with the customer can you better concentrate on dealing with the market.</p><p>From a micro point of view, no matter what method a fund company adopts, it must first increase the scale of the industry and solve the problem of food and clothing, and then it can calmly cultivate its own investment and research talent echelon. From a macro point of view, if the fund industry does not have a certain capital scale, it is impossible to form a discourse system of institutional investors in the market, and it is impossible to improve market efficiency.</p><p>By today's standards, so many fund managers in the market may not all know about value investment. However, there are at least double ten constraints (individual stocks account for no more than 10% of the net value of the fund, and the share capital held by the fund does not exceed 10%), coupled with a series of standardized management measures such as quarterly report disclosure, bank custody, and so on. It is definitely impossible to control, wash and violently make bankers like in the 1990s. At that time, it was already commendable to be able to achieve \"standardized operation\".</p><p>In fact, for many years, the regulators have not given up their efforts to \"resurrect\" closed-end funds. They use all kinds of sweetness to persuade investors in exchange for giving up the habit of short-term speculation. This also leads to another koan, which we will describe later.</p><p><b>Third, the mystery of discount premium</b></p><p>After 2001, the secondary market price of closed-end funds has been significantly lower than its net value for a long time. This may be the first market phenomenon in the history of A shares that can attract strong attention from academics. Today, dozens of papers discussing this phenomenon can be easily searched on CNKI.</p><p>According to academic norms, a literature review is required before research. However, this review by scholars has grafted the situation in China after 2001 to the experience of the United States and Britain. After all, there are just some English papers that are easy to find. As far as I can see, none of the articles mention the long, substantially above net worth history of \"old fund\" prices in China in the 1990s. Even after the restructuring in 1998, there is no article to review the V-shaped trend of new funds from premium to discount and then to premium.</p><p><b>So the question of the relationship between price and net worth becomes \"why closed-end funds always trade at a discount\". A concrete historical phenomenon becomes a matter of logic.</b>So what's the answer? Those papers in the United States are nothing more than looking for reasons in fees, accounting, and taxes. But these specific reasons simply do not exist in China. Therefore, we had to end with \"no conclusion\" or simply \"irrational market\".</p><p>In fact, if I want to say it, the answer is four words:<b>Oversupply</b>。 As simple as that, if the fund industry develops slowly and doesn't issue so many products, the base closure is likely to continue to trade at parity or even premium as it did before 2001.</p><p>The scale of a base closure is billions, and the daily transaction is only tens of millions, and the average turnover rate is below 1%. Can this 1% represent all Christians? Imagine how the commission price would be distributed if we required all holders to place a sell order? Maybe 10% will hang around the market price, 20% will hang between the market price and the net worth, 60% will hang around the net worth, and 10% will probably hang at a position much higher than the net worth. Of course, the above numbers are my intuitive guess, but this distribution relationship is probably not unreasonable.</p><p>A similar problem is the relationship between dividends and buybacks. Both are the means by which listed companies distribute cash. How they affect the stock price, academics don't know how many papers have published to discuss it. In fact, we can also think of it this way. If all shareholders are required to put up selling orders, then only a few percent or even a few thousandths of the entrustments will hang around the current price, and most other selling orders will hang at a position obviously higher or even far higher than the current price. In other words, the daily turnover rate of a stock is 5%, which only means that 5% of holding shareholders agree with the market price. Another 95% of shareholders' minds are valued above the current price, otherwise they would have chosen to sell.</p><p>Therefore, the effect of dividends is that the sun shines, and there is only one ex-right effect on the stock price.<b>Repurchase, on the other hand, eliminates the relatively least optimistic part of all shareholders in a targeted way. So buybacks have a strong effect of distorting the stock price upward.</b>I think this concise logic is more convincing than the frighteningly complex mathematical models.</p><p>The above is to explain discount transactions from the spatial dimension, and it is not difficult to understand from the temporal dimension. Many industries have experienced widespread losses or even industry-wide losses. Steel and coal in 2016 is the loss of the whole industry. What does that mean? This only means that some players should quit. If everyone holds up, they will continue to lose money. Fortunately, China has supply-side structural reform. The shipping industry is a fully international industry, and it has been losing money since 2008 until today.</p><p>Therefore, the base closure is generally discounted, including that most mutual funds in the United States can't outperform the index, which all shows that there are too many players, but there are still stupid money to support them. It is likely that this is a periodic phenomenon rather than a logical problem. The essential reason is that since 1980s, the global stock market has been in a long-term bull market, and has not experienced the full adjustment of 1930s and 1970s.</p><p>Since 1998, when he was appointed in crisis, China's fund industry has been mature. Having hardly experienced the blue ocean stage of natural accumulation, he entered the Red Sea directly according to the government's strategic plan. This is very similar to photovoltaic, wind power and other industries. That is to say, the competition within the industry is very fierce, even tragic. However, the overall output value has risen very quickly, and the systemic importance of the industry has increased dramatically.</p><p>China's fund industry began to develop from 0 in 1998. By 2007, nearly 30% of the circulating market value of A shares was controlled by fund companies. Note that more exciting than the 30% ratio is the momentum that has gone from 0 to 30% in less than a decade. It seems that 40%, 50%, 60% are all within reach.</p><p>As a result, some people in the head fund companies began to think about it. They feel that it is boring to just be a financial investor. They should be active investors and participate in the company's business decision-making. As far as Carl in the United States<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/IKAN\">Icahn</a>Like Baoneng and Anbang in previous years. In short, the time of bookmakers is long gone, and value investing is only the foundation. Under the new conditions, the gameplay has to be upgraded again.</p><p>The mood is completely understandable. After all, a company, whether you hold 3% or 30% of the shares, the enthusiasm, expectation and sense of responsibility will be completely different. Therefore, the overall atmosphere of the fund industry in those years was not inferior to the highlight moments of Internet giants. I think back to that period of green years, still can't help but surge in my heart. That feeling is similar to: The world is yours and ours, but at the end of the day it is ours.</p><p>Unfortunately, things are impermanent, and fate plays with people. At the beginning of 2020, the percentage of circulating market value of A shares controlled by fund companies was less than 7%. The dream of active investors can only be mapped to another parallel time and space.</p><p>From the perspective of the whole society, the investment research team of a fund company is only dozens of people. If they just bought and sold stocks, it wouldn't matter if the amount reached tens or hundreds of billions. However, if they can command dozens or hundreds of listed companies, even if it is just a few words for their interests, things will be much more complicated.</p><p>In the Great Recession of 2008, Wall Street has been widely criticized for taking too much of its public resources. This was even more evident during the Covid crisis in March 2020. It is not enough for the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates by 1 point at a time, it must be reduced to 0. It is not enough to buy Treasury Bond alone, but also to buy junk bonds. The government's various deficit plans are increased by 3 points or 5 points. If these policies are not enough, the stock market will lie underground and \"die\" for you to see. When the sugar was enough, it rolled over and sat up again, and it was still full of energy. If Wall Street does not have a strong willpower, it is obviously impossible to play such an effective game with the authorities if it is as scattered as Chinese investors, and it will shine brightly if it is given some sunshine.</p><p><b>Does China really want a Wall Street of its own? I am afraid I want it and I don't want it.</b></p><p><b>The first pot of gold</b></p><p>The author once talked with old colleagues in the Public Offering of Fund industry: There are so many investment schools in the market, and most fund managers start from scratch, and they are a blank sheet of paper before entering the industry. What are the factors that determine their style? Chen Yangfan of Mammoth Assets said: At first, everyone was randomly groping until they made the first pot of gold in their lives. And how they earned the first pot of gold, their style is basically what it is. I agree with this statement.</p><p>The \"new fund\" issued from 1998 to 2001, later known as the closed-end fund. It is the first pot of gold for many old investors and old people. Simply put, during the entire duration of Sealed Base, you can buy it casually with your eyes closed, and you can basically make money in the end. Of course, there is a window period where you can lose money when you buy it. But it is short, and it is not easy to choose it. And as long as you buy before the big bull market in 2007, you must make a big profit in the end.</p><p>From the end of 2004 to the end of 2012, the average return for closed-end funds was 540%, while the average return for open-end funds was 236% and the average return for individual stocks was 141%. The average return of closed-end funds can outperform all open-end funds except Huaxia Market Select, and can also outperform more than 93% of individual stocks.</p><p>Why are there such amazing results?<b>There are mainly two reasons, one is the high discount, and the other is the big market.</b></p><p>In 2004, the fund industry reluctantly climbed to the scale of 200 billion yuan, and it was almost completely unable to sprint to 300 billion yuan. Fan Yonghong, the first general manager of Huaxia Fund, recalled in Evergreen Fund that only 2 million copies were raised on the first day of issuance of Huaxia Market Selection, which was later Fengshen. The sales staff of Huaxia Fund even had to compete with people in the channel, \"a glass of wine for 1 million funds\". According to the general sales rebate, the number of 1 million seems to be not small. However, you should know that the subscription of 1 million Public Offering of Fund will first run away a large piece in a short time, and then the remaining part can only generate a management fee of 1.5% every year. After removing all kinds of costs, the actual benefit is likely to be negative.</p><p>In this severe oversupply market, the secondary market price of the base closure is well below its net value, with an average discount of 28%. However, if you only focus on these 28 points, it seems unattractive to spread it over the next few or more years to slowly recover. This is indeed the case. Until 2014, the average discount of base closure was more than 10 points. In ten years, the discount rate has only recovered by 18 points, which is less than 2% annualized.</p><p>However, once the high discount is superimposed on the big market, the situation will completely change. The same is to buy an asset worth 3 yuan with 2 yuan in cash. You can call it a discount rate of 33% or you can call it a leverage ratio of 1.5x. The discount rate becomes leverage!</p><p><b>Therefore, the ultra-high return of base closure is actually the result of the superposition of two factors. First, the high discount caused by the rapid development of the fund industry from 2001 to 04, and second, the magnificent bull market in 2006 and 07.</b></p><p>Of course, like other investment opportunities, if you want to bargain against the market, you have to overcome several scary \"ghost stories\". For example, at that time, it was rumored in the market that the closed-end foundation of the same company transferred benefits to the open-end fund. But as we have shown earlier, most Christians simply do not have the ability to choose their foundations. At the risk of violating laws and regulations, the fund manager finally gave his colleagues 2 points of income. As a result, the Christians didn't know it at all, and even ran more instead. Why the trouble?</p><p>Others worry that fund managers with closed bases will operate chaotically and deliberately lose money. Which is even more ridiculous. First of all, deliberately losing money is not good for either the fund company or the fund manager. What's more, under the efficient market assumption, the difficulty of deliberately losing money is the same as \"deliberately\" making money. If you buy junk stocks exclusively, you may make more money instead.</p><p>There used to be a joke that if the forecast accuracy of strategy analysts can be 70%, they can get an annual salary of 1 million. If the accuracy rate drops to 50%, then he's worthless. But if the accuracy rate drops further to 5%, then he should be worth 5 million a year. Why is it? Because positive indicators and negative indicators are of the same value, you just have to listen to them in reverse. The key is that the accuracy rate should deviate from 50%. The more you bias, the better. It doesn't matter where you bias.</p><p>As mentioned earlier, after the closure of the base in 2001, the regulators were unwilling to completely give up the position of closed-end funds. However, the habit of short-term speculation by retail investors is stubborn, and open-end funds have established their mainstream position. At this time, if we continue to issue classic closed-end funds, there is a high probability that we will face the problem of discount when listed. In theory, holders can just hold themselves without looking at the market price. However, the reality is that the floating loss of market price has brought a great negative impact on fund sales. So regulators handed the issue over to fund companies to design innovative closed-end funds to attract investors.</p><p>In September 2007, Dacheng Preferred went public. It is the first innovative closed-end fund in the A-share market. Its innovations are mainly two: First, it sets performance reward, and the commission ratio is 10% above the water level. Second, the re-opening clause is set. If the discount exceeds 20% for 50 consecutive trading days, it will be changed from closed-end fund to open-end fund.</p><p>When Dacheng was first listed, the market was looking forward to the magic of performance reward, hoping that it could mobilize the enthusiasm of the investment and research team of the fund company and create star achievements. However, from the results, the performance of the fund is not ideal, so after a short premium, it quickly transferred to a discount transaction, and the discount range even exceeded the classic base closure.</p><p>The second innovative closed-end fund in the A-share market is called Ruifu Enterprising, and it has two innovations: First, it has designed a more complicated leverage mechanism. The leverage ratio is roughly around 2x. Second, the reopening clause is also set. If the discount exceeds 30% for 60 consecutive trading days, it will be reopened.</p><p>From its listing in 2007 to its expiration in 2012, Redford Enterprising has a duration of 5 years, basically realizing continuous premium trading, with an average premium rate of about 20%. For this alone, it is obvious that it is more successful than Dacheng Preferred. The reason seems to be simply attributed to the fact that retail investors love leverage more than they expect for active management.</p><p>In April 2010, CICC opened stock index futures, and the leverage ratio can easily reach more than 5 times. The aggressive premium rate of Redford subsequently declined significantly, and even discounted for a time. In 2012, Furui aggressively renewed the contract, and the leverage ratio returned from more than 3 times to 2 times. The market interest was weaker, and the price dropped rapidly until the discount rate was close to 20%.</p><p>It can be seen that A-share retail investors like short speculation first and leverage second. As for the trust in expert financial management, if it exists, it will rank third at most. In 2018, Xingquan, managed by Xie Zhiyu of Xingquan Fund, was suitably issued, with a daily sales of 30 billion yuan, which can be called an explosion. The fund was closed for the first year, and as a result, it was still discounted by 6% once it was listed. It opened after a year, and the holding share ran off half as \"conventional\". It can be seen that it is difficult for star fund managers to escape this strange cycle.</p><p><b>V. Graded Fund</b></p><p>According to the original idea, the regulators want to establish a gentleman's agreement with retail investors. The regulatory authorities put forward the two characteristics of \"performance\" and \"leverage\" in exchange for retail investors accepting the condition of \"closure\". But now that the gentleman's agreement can't be done, wouldn't it be beautiful to simply graft the \"leverage\" into the open-end fund and directly scale it?</p><p>The basic principles of this kind of open-end funds with leverage function are mostly divided into AB levels. The money of the two levels is invested together, and all losses and profits are borne by Grade B, while Grade A only takes fixed income. So they are collectively called tiered funds.</p><p>Overseas, leveraged funds are generally only leveraged and have no priority. Or, they all use virtual priorities. The functions corresponding to the priority are realized by investment banks or derivatives markets. The advantage of this is that the scale of the priority can be scaled at any time.</p><p>For example, 2x leveraged funds. If investors put in 100 million yuan, the fund company will borrow another 100 million yuan to allocate funds to it. Then today the market fell 5%, investors took a loss of 10 million, and the principal dropped to 90 million. Near the close of the day, the fund company will reduce the allocation amount to 90 million, so that the leverage of the fund will still be twice. If the market rises tomorrow, it will be adjusted back. Therefore, this allocation amount has to be adjusted every trading day.</p><p>From the perspective of investment varieties, the priority funds in overseas leveraged funds are actually a piece of fat. The safety is high, the profitability is good, and the best of both worlds. The only downside is that it has to be \"come and go\" and unstable.</p><p>Our A-share graded fund is equivalent to taking out this fat and distributing it to other interested Christians to enjoy. The price of this, of course, is that the size of the priority can only be adjusted under some predetermined special circumstances, and it is impossible to close and zoom once a day.</p><p>This kind of innovation, the intention is not bad. However, in the specific market environment, problems arise. The first crisis of graded funds occurred on May 20th, 2014. The protagonist is Yinhua Ruijin, which is a B-level, that is, a leveraged fund. It is passive in investment, pegged to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index. Therefore, the rise and fall of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index completely determines its net value. In terms of sales, it is very successful. It has been on the market for 4 years, from 1 billion to more than 10 billion. But the problem lies in the scale.</p><p>Due to the continuous decline of the market from 2011 to 2014, coupled with the continuous payment of priority interest, the net value of Yinhua Ruijin has reached the vicinity of the warehouse line. In other words, if it falls again, it may affect the security of priority funds. Therefore, once the exposure line is reached, the product will be partially closed.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/338c1c17b086c4274475aeedc22f6172\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"464\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>As we have explained earlier, during the previous decline, the priority scale of graded funds will not be gradually adjusted. Therefore, once partial liquidation occurs, the potential one-time selling amount will be as high as more than 10 billion. At this time, the average daily turnover of the whole Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index is only more than 10 billion. Once the exposure event occurs, it is tantamount to a heavy hammer for the already tired market.</p><p>Moreover, because Yinhua Ruijin is a passive fund pegged to the index, the fund manager has no right to actively adjust the position. As long as the index falls below the corresponding point, Yinhua Ruijin is completely certain.</p><p>As a result, a miracle happened. At 9: 38 a.m. on May 20th, 2014, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index obviously fell below the warehouse line of Yinhua Ruijin, and then it was immediately pulled up in a straight line. Moreover, this tiny golden needle actually became the historical bottom of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index, and it has never fallen below since then. The picture below is the time-sharing record I left in that year:</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0483c2453de1675c635e63d0ceb881a0\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"448\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>Where this mysterious power came from is still an unsolved mystery. Maybe because this incident came close in the end, there were almost no waves in the industry or outside.</p><p>Two levels of AB of graded funds have their own net worth and price respectively. However, because they cannot be purchased and redeemed separately, they may appear at a large discount or premium, respectively. However, A and B together, as a complete open-end fund, can be purchased and redeemed. So the sum of prices of A and B cannot deviate significantly from the sum of net worth.</p><p>For example, both A and B have a net value of 1. At this time, the price of A can be 1.2, then the price of B is 0.8, or the price of A is 0.7, then the price of B is 1.3. In summary, the prices of the two can deviate from the net worth separately, but the sum of the two must be stable. Otherwise, there will be arbitrage opportunities.</p><p>Due to the love of retail investors for leverage, there are still quite a lot of arbitrage opportunities where graded funds have a premium. But the vast majority of such opportunities are \"visible and intangible\". Theoretically it holds, but it can't be implemented operationally. There are four main reasons:</p><p>First and foremost,<b>The vast majority of graded funds cannot be purchased and redeemed in real time.</b>If you observe a premium on T day, subscribe before the close of the day. The fund company confirms the share on T +1. On T +2, the fund share is reflected in the brokerage system, and you have to make a spin-off order, and you can sell A and B respectively on T +3. At this time, is the premium still there? Generally speaking, it's gone. If it's still there, the arbitrage is a success. So this problem is also related to the stability of the premium level.</p><p>Number two, is<b>The price of the A-Class is volatile. Because A-rated investors usually think of it as a long-term bond.</b>They think about the problem like this: I invest 100 yuan today, and the annual interest rate is 6%, so the interest for 10 years is 60 yuan, the interest for 20 years is 120 yuan, and the interest for 30 years is 180 yuan... So if the interest rate changes by 1%, it will have a great impact on them. However, the price change of 1% for Class A does not affect them much. Of course, institutional investors will be more elaborate. But the trading volume of Class A is too small, there is no liquidity, and institutions rarely participate.</p><p>Number three, that is,<b>Premium levels for Class B are also volatile. When there is no trend in the market, retail investors generally regard Class B as an artifact of oversold rebound.</b>That is to say, when the market plummets, Grade B often has a premium. After two or three days, this premium generally disappears whether the rebound occurs or not.</p><p>Number four, that is,<b>The subscription rate of graded funds can be as high as 1% to 1.5%, which greatly increases the cost of arbitrage transactions.</b></p><p>However, in the bull market of 2014 and 15, the above situation has undergone major changes, and the premium arbitrage of graded funds has become easier to realize.</p><p>First of all,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/601688\">Huatai Securities</a>The \"blind demolition\" business was launched, and other securities companies followed suit. The so-called blind demolition means that the fund company confirms the share on T +1, and it has not been reflected to the brokerage, so you will directly give the spin-off instruction to the brokerage. In this way, on T +2, the brokerage directly enters the split A and B into the system, and you can trade immediately. This technological innovation has greatly reduced the uncertainty of premium arbitrage.</p><p>Second, the price of Class A has stabilized. Since the second half of 2014, the central bank has continuously cut RRR and interest rates, and many insurance companies and fixed-income products have to go to the securities market to find income. Institutional investors are more rational, and soon stabilized the price of Class A in a small range, and stopped fluctuating randomly.</p><p>Third, the premium level of Grade B has also stabilized. This principle is the simplest, but it is also the most crucial: the bull market is coming, with great pride and a premium all the way.</p><p>Article 4, the subscription fee is usually calculated as a percentage, but the highest grade has an upper limit of 1,000 yuan, so for funds of more than 5 million yuan, the fee no longer constitutes a limit. Why did it constitute a restriction before? Because of the poor liquidity in the past, the amount of money invested in an arbitrage was too large, and I was afraid that it would not come out. In the bull market, liquidity has improved greatly, and the whole funds can go directly.</p><p>From the end of 2014 to mid-2015, funds focused on premium arbitrage of graded funds yielded about 2 to 3 times. This performance is stronger than most Public Offering of Funds, but it is not too exaggerated. However, its advantage is that \"don't hang the string without seeing the devil\", move when there is a signal, stop when there is no signal, and there is no problem of hesitation to cut meat. So the fruits of the bull market are preserved. Most public and private placements experienced severe pullback/retracement in the subsequent stock market crash.</p><p>So after the market peaks, are there any investment opportunities for graded funds? In fact, there are also, that is, to observe which B-levels will be exposed, and then buy the corresponding A-levels.</p><p>As we said earlier, in May 2014, the broader market experienced a close call potential crisis. At that time, it was a giant fund of Yinhua Ruijin, with a potential sell-off of about 10 billion yuan. However, during the stock market crash, the situation became several giant funds, plus dozens of small and medium-sized funds, tens of billions of potential selling, and it continued to burst out in a concentrated time period.</p><p>On August 24th, 2015, GEM B exploded, causing a sell-off of about 4.5 billion yuan. On August 27th, Securities B was exposed, causing a sell-off of about 7.5 billion yuan. On August 28th, state-owned enterprises changed their positions to B, causing a sell-off of about 13 billion...</p><p>Because the terms, shares and net value information of Public Offering of Fund are public, under what circumstances these foundations are exposed to positions and how big the potential selling is, these key information are also public. Then, if you expect that a certain fund will be exposed, the most rational decision is to short-sell related stocks first, one is to hedge, and the other is to induce its exposure. Wait until the fund closes its position, and then buy it back from the low point. Facts have also repeatedly proved that every giant graded fund with exposure has smashed a pit in the market, and the liquidation plate is always cut at the lowest point.</p><p>The above characteristics are extremely unfavorable to Class B, while the corresponding benefit is Class A. The specific calculation is more complicated, so I will skip it here. If you are interested, you can consult the prospectus of relevant funds and other materials.</p><p>The fact that the graded fund \"passively smashed the market\" in the stock market crash has caused widespread criticism inside and outside the industry. In 2018, the CSRC issued the New Regulations on Asset Management, requiring all graded funds to be fully transformed. However, until early 2020, a large number of graded funds were still trading. However, I believe that even if graded funds really disappear, there will be newer varieties in the future.</p><p>The net worth vs. price story will continue.</p><p>Author: Ding Chang</p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> source：<a href=\"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/m395rIc6dylcNhPzb2rxPQ\">小鲜传</a></p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/de92023587fed32587f80a2f2769d655","relate_stocks":{},"source_url":"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/m395rIc6dylcNhPzb2rxPQ","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"2124759854","content_text":"一、激情岁月\n\n 1986年，当时的工商银行下属上海信托投资公司成立证券业务部，开办股票交易。1988年，人民银行批准在多个城市试点国库券交易。1990年，沪深交易所相继开业。1992年，深圳、沈阳、大连、武汉等地纷纷设立共同基金。1993年8月，来自山东的淄博基金在上交所挂牌，成为中国第一只上市基金。随后各地又有不少基金上市交易。淄博基金发行净值1元，上市当天收盘价5元。2000年，淄博基金改制，并入基金汉博。该基金在存续期间的成交价最高达到12.39元，最低价也有1.6元。价格始终远远高于净值。\n\n如此“纪录”在今天的投资者看来，难免掩面哂笑：当年真是人傻钱多啊。可是历史果真如此简单吗？恐怕亦不尽然。\n淄博基金由人民银行总行直接批准设立，主要投资于淄博地区的乡镇企业和相关服务产业股权，这部分投资不少于基金净值的60%。同时可以投资各类债券和上市公司股票，这部分投资不多于基金净值的40%。\n由此可见，这个淄博基金并非我们现在通常理解的证券投资基金，而是一个证券和产业投资基金的混合体。而且从法律意义上看，它显然不是依据契约成立的，而是由央行批准成立的独立法人。或者我们可以干脆说，它实际上就是一个主营投资控股的上市公司。\n如果从这个角度来看它的估值，那就容易理解了。1993年，中国经济全面过热。CPI同比增速14.7%，固定资产投资增速45.3%。人们对于投资机会的追求达到了狂热的程度。淄博基金的超高溢价，正是这一宏观背景的微观反映。\n在《三国演义》中，罗贯中给黄巾起义的领袖张角安排了一段台词：至难得者，民心也。今民心已顺，若不乘势取天下，诚为可惜。对淄博基金来说，它所面对的形势跟当年张角相去不远。假如市场给了我10倍PB的估值，那么我只要增发10%的股本，就可以把净资产翻一倍。融到的这笔钱，无论放在哪里，哪怕是放在保值补贴的国库券里，都可以轻松拿到两位数的回报。股本摊薄10%，而利润翻番，业绩岂不是爆发式增长？\n如果业绩增长足以维持高估值，甚至推动估值水平进一步高涨，那么它就形成了一个高估值、高融资、高增长的循环。而这个过程，正是索罗斯所说的反身性。\n只可惜，从1993年上市到2000年改制，监管层始终没有给淄博基金这样的机会。只是在1995年，包括淄博基金在内的几家上市基金经历过一次短暂的炒作。起因是传言《基金管理法》要在当年出台，小盘基金可能进行扩募。而扩募，正是驱动反身性过程的关键。所以你说当时的市场只是“人傻、钱多”么？\n不过传说中的《基金管理法》始终不见踪影。直到1997年，证监会才颁布了《证券投资基金管理暂行办法》。2003年，《证券投资基金法》经过人大批准，正式成为国家法律。请注意，相比1995年的传言，最终通过的法律名称中多了“证券投资”4个字。\n中国的证券投资基金，最终选择了契约型的法律体系。基金公司是管理人。基金发行的份额是受益凭证，基金份额的持有者是客户。这一切安排，在今天看来似乎是天经地义的。其实在此之外，还有一种公司型基金的法律体系。\n公司型基金本身是法人，可以发行股票，基金管理人和投资者共同持有它的股票。今天我们可以见到的许多产业投资基金就是公司型基金。在中国，公司型的证券投资基金大概没有。但是在美国，公司型的证券投资基金也是不少的。\n从反身性的角度来说，契约型基金是没有反身性的。因为客户认购基金份额时，只以净值作价。也就是说，只有基金持有的股票、债券、现金才计价，这个基金本身的品牌、声誉、历史业绩，基金公司方面的投研团队、前后台、无形资产等资源投入统统不计价。也不论它们是增加了价值还是毁灭了价值，一概忽略不计。\n因此，契约型基金理论上不可能出现高溢价发行，不可能实现以较小股本扩充大量资本，所以反身性过程也就无法实现。公司型基金则是有可能实现反身性的。比如在新三板上市的一些产业投资基金，它们在2014、15年实现了10倍PB左右的超高溢价发行，净资产成倍增长。\n比如硅谷天堂，2015年中期股本13.75亿，净资产33.7亿。增发后，股本只增加到14.77亿，净资产却倍增至68.9亿。\n再比如中科招商，2014年底股本11.82亿，净资产19.2亿。增发后，股本只增加到18亿，净资产却激增至146亿。\n要知道，一般企业从融资、投产到产生效益，得有一个数月乃至数年的周期。然而很多金融资产是投入进去立即开始计算收益的。所以如果不是2015年下半年发生股灾，市场行情急转直下，这些公司的业绩爆发几乎是铁板定钉的事情。一次经典的反身性过程，可谓功亏一篑。\n对于投资者来说，参与契约型基金，你跟基金公司之间永远是客户与管理人的关系。基金对你的所有回报，仅仅体现在股票、债券等资产的净值上面。这个基金以及基金公司的一切其他发展都与你无关。基金公司要招募新客户，也与你这个老客户无关。\n但是在公司型基金中，投资者与基金公司是共同创业打天下的团队伙伴关系。除了账面净值之外，投资者还可以享受到基金公司“逐鹿中原”带来的损益。如果有新的投资者想要进来，就必须得到原有股东的多数同意，价格当然也不会便宜。在今天的产业投资中，C轮的入股价格一般不能低于B轮，D轮的价格不能低于C轮，这种先来后到的“礼遇”几乎已经成为行规了。\n我们平时看电影、电视剧，都会讨厌别人“剧透”。因为如果提前知道了结局，会导致你无法充分代入前续剧情，影响欣赏效果。我们研究历史，同样要排除剧透的影响。假如在世纪之交，中国最终选择了公司型的法律体系。那么在1993年，高溢价买入最早的一批基金公司，就具有相当的合理性。\n事实上，在高科技创业投资中，卡位式投资是很普遍的。比如我看好某一个细分领域，但是技术路线和竞争格局看不清楚，那么我就把市面上最好的3家或者5家公司全都投一遍。而且这时候的价格，不是按照眼前的财务数据来测算的，而是按照未来的行业前景倒推出来的。因为无论哪一家做大了，我都可以作为老股东，坐收后来者上缴的“买路钱”。\n2012年，明星基金经理王亚伟离开华夏基金时，跟记者算了这样一笔账。他担任公募基金经理14年，从基金兴华到华夏大盘精选。如果分红再投资的话，差不多14年时间可以把1块钱变成28块钱。这个回报已经相当惊人。但是华夏基金本身在1998年成立的时候，注册资本只有0.7亿。而到2012年股权转让时，整体估值是160亿，外加期间还有高达40亿元的分红，复权收益在200倍以上。所以同样是14年，基金公司本身的价值增长要远远超过全市场最优秀的基金的业绩增长。\n当年炒作淄博基金的人们，是否曾经抱有如此远大的梦想，如今已不可考。淄博基金就像是一块废弃的路标。它所指向的，是一片与当今世界完全不同的“平行时空”。\n二、腹背受敌\n1998年，上证指数下跌3.97%。在这个温和的数字背后，却是宏观经济和周边市场的惊涛骇浪。1997年，泰铢开始贬值。进入1998年之后，金融危机席卷亚洲，俄罗斯国债违约，全球股市暴跌。\n在当年的全球主要市场中，承压最大的是港股。因为香港的经济基本面与东亚地区高度关联，但是港币的法定币值却与美元挂钩。假如港币可以贬值，那么以港币计价的股票价格多少可以得到一些支撑。因此，虽然香港政府直接入市，强力干预，但是跌至1998年8月，恒生指数仍然近乎腰斩。\n在此期间，A股的走势波澜不惊。可是监管层却早已忧心忡忡，压力更甚于香港。一方面，国家已经承诺人民币不贬值。另一方面，当时A股的整体市盈率却高达40倍，只有5%的个股市盈率在20倍以内。而且庄家横行，投机炒作，大量散户沉迷其中。一旦外资大鳄破门而入，后果不堪设想。\n庄家这个概念，已经远离A股很多年了。当年的所谓庄家，是指一个人或者资金集团，他们控制了上市公司绝大多数的流通股份，然后再通过左手倒右手，就可以随意控制股价的涨跌。那么在未来一天或几天，股价将会上涨还是下跌，就成了庄家设置的底，而散户则去猜这个谜，就像赌场中的压大小一样。\n庄家如果操纵得巧妙，做庄游戏可以持续很久。可是一旦玩砸了，结果也是非常惨烈的。2003年德隆系崩盘，他们做庄的合金投资暴跌95%的走势如下图：\n\n就在这样的时代背景下，“老十家”公募基金管理公司问世了。此时的基金，可谓临危受命。它们的使命从来都有两条。一方面，要为市场引入新的投资风格。证明不坐庄也可以赚钱，进而提高市场定价效率。另一方面，也要教育投资者。证明分散投资、长期投资胜于短炒，进而改变投资者的风险偏好。\n基于这两点考虑，从1998年到2001年，新发的基金大都具有两个特点。一是规模特别大，不是20亿就是30亿。这个规模即使放到十几年后来看，也算是相当可观了。而且当年的30亿可不比今天的30亿。要知道，1998年中国的GDP还不到2020年的10%，M2货币供应量还不到2020年的5%。二是长期封闭，封闭期统一为15年。牙牙学语时买进去，出来已经是大学生了。这个设计相当考验投资者的耐心。后来，许多1998年以前发行的，像基金淄博那样的“老基金”也都改制成了这样超大规模、长期封闭的“新基金”。\n新基金的发行得到了股民的热烈欢迎。1998年发行的5只基金，规模每支20亿，总计100亿，共吸引认购资金5366亿，平均中签率不到2%。未中签资金转入二级市场大力追捧，使得新基金的溢价高达100%以上。其狂热程度与“老基金”并无二致。\n不过新基金的盘子毕竟太大，发行速度也逐渐加快。1999年，新基金的发行规模更从每支20亿上升到30亿。场内游资很快就支撑不住了。溢价转为平价，平价再转为折价。\n下图显示了从1998年到2015年，上市的封闭式基金折溢价与基金行业总规模的变化趋势。其中基金数据剔除了上市不满60天以及存续期不满1年的样本，基金行业总规模只统计股票型和混合型基金，并以对数坐标轴显示。\n\n从上图可以看出，随着新基金大规模发行，封闭式基金的溢价率迅速跳水并转入折价。整个2000年加上2001年前3季度，没有新基金发行。封基溢价率又逐渐转正。\n2001年9月，开放式基金问世，基金发行再次提速，封基溢价率一路探低至-30%左右启稳。2008年之后，基金行业规模趋于稳定，封基溢价率也回升到-10%左右再次稳定，直至2016年最后一支封基到期。2001年，中国基金行业的发展路线再次做出战略抉择，从封闭式基金转向开放式基金。为什么要做这个变化呢？最常见的解释是，开放式基金允许基民用脚投票，有助于实现基金行业的优胜劣汰。这个说法看似冠冕堂皇，无法反驳。事实上，就像绝大多数股民没有选股能力一样，没有任何证据显示，作为一个群体，基民有“择基”能力。\n2020年5月，笔者对A股所有的股票型和偏股型开放式基金进行了统计，考查它们发行之后的规模变化。结果显示，半年后规模变化的中位数是-30.5%，一年后规模变化的中位数是-47%。\n为什么要用中位数呢？因为一个小基金增长1000%，很容易就把平均数给带偏了。所以对于内在差异很大的样本集合，我们通常看中位数。我们大概可以这样理解，开放式基金的基民，半年跑掉三分之一，一年跑掉一半，这是最常见的情况。\n我想，上述结果足以说明，封基的交易折价，并非是因为基民对它们的业绩不满意，而是因为根深蒂固的短炒习惯。持有了一阵子，总是要走的。假如你封闭了不让他赎回，那么他就宁可在二级市场上折价抛出。\n更有趣的是，在上述统计中，如果我们只看那些净值低于1元的基金，则它们半年后的规模变化中位数是-22.8%，一年后的规模变化中位数是-35.8%。也就是说，亏钱了，基民反而不愿意走了。与之对称的另一个现象是，许多明星基金很不情愿接受“市场的奖赏”，害怕扩大规模。典型如王亚伟的华夏大盘精选，虽然身为开放式基金，却长期不开放申购，只开放赎回。上述两个现象加起来，就是“劣胜优汰”，与流行的解释完全相反。\n当初发展基金行业，喊出来的口号就是“专家理财”胜于散户。没想到，现在专家反而要去迎合散户的短期偏好。这不是本末倒置吗？许多新任基金经理，从职业生涯一开始就要面对巨大的营销压力，根本没机会去锻炼长远眼光。即使是坚定看好的股票，在赎回压力下也不得不割在底部。因此笔者认为，从封闭式转向开放式，仅对投研团队的成长而言，是坏事而非好事，至少是损失大于收益。\n不过具体到世纪之交的市场环境，这些损失恐怕又是必要的代价。因为基金行业从来就是腹背受敌，既要面对市场，又要面对客户。在必要情况下，只有对客户妥协了，才能更好地集中精力对付市场。\n从微观上说，一家基金公司，无论采取什么方式，首先要把行业规模做上去，解决了温饱问题，然后才能从容地培养自己的投资、研究人才梯队。从宏观上说，基金行业如果没有一定的资金规模，在市场上就不可能形成机构投资者的话语体系，也就谈不上提高市场效率。\n以今天的标准看，市场上那么多基金经理，也未必个个都懂得价值投资。但是至少有双十约束（个股占基金净值不超过10%，基金持有股本不超过10%），再加上季报披露，银行托管，等一系列规范化管理手段，想要像1990年代那样控盘、洗盘、暴力做庄肯定是不行了。而在当年，能够做到“规范操作”这一点就已经难能可贵了。\n其实多年以来，监管层一直没有放弃“复活”封闭式基金的努力。他们用各种甜头去说服投资者，换取他们放弃短炒习惯。由此还引出了另一桩公案，我们放在后文讲述。\n三、折溢价之谜\n2001年之后，封闭式基金的二级市场价格长期、明显低于其净值。这可能是A股历史上第一个能够引起学术界强烈关注的市场现象。今天在中国知网上，可以轻松搜索到数十篇当年讨论这一现象的论文。\n按照学术规范，研究之前需要先做文献回顾。可是学者们这一回顾，就把中国2001年之后的情况，给嫁接到美国和英国的经验上去了。毕竟容易查到的英文论文就是那么一些。据我所见，没有一篇文章提到了中国在1990年代“老基金”价格长期、大幅高于净值的历史。甚至连1998年改制之后，新基金从溢价到折价再到溢价的V型走势，也同样没有一篇文章对此进行回顾。\n于是价格与净值的关系问题，变成了“为什么封闭式基金总是折价交易”。一个具体的历史现象变成了一个逻辑问题。那么答案是什么呢？美国的那些论文，无非是从费用、会计和税收上去找原因。可是这些具体原因在中国根本不存在。于是，只好以“没有结论”，或者干脆以“市场非理性”收场。\n其实要我说，答案就4个字：供过于求。就这么简单，假如基金行业发展得慢一点，不要发那么多产品，封基就很有可能继续像2001年之前那样，平价甚至溢价交易。\n一支封基的规模数十亿，每天成交不过几千万，平均换手率在1%以下。这1%的人能够代表全体基民吗？想象一下，假如我们要求所有持有人都必须挂出一个卖单，委托价格会怎么分布呢？可能有10%的人会挂在市场价附近，20%的人会挂在市场价与净值之间，60%会挂在净值附近，还有10%大概会挂在远高于净值的位置上。当然，以上数字是我全凭直觉猜的，但是这样的分布关系大概不无道理。\n类似的问题还有分红和回购的关系。这两者都是上市公司分配现金的手段，它们对股价的影响如何，学术界不知道发了多少篇论文来讨论。其实我们也可以这样想，假如要求所有股东必须挂出卖单，那么大概只有百分之几甚至千分之几的委托会挂在现价附近，其他绝大多数卖单都会挂在明显高于，甚至远远高于现价的位置上。换句话说，一支股票日换手率5%，只能说明有5%的持股股东认同市场价。另外95%的股东心里的估值是高于现价的，否则他们就选择卖出了。\n因此，分红的效果是阳光普照，对股价只有一个除权的效果。而回购则是定向地消灭了全体股东中相对最不看好的那一部分。所以回购具有强烈的向上扭曲股价的效果。我觉得，相比于复杂得吓人的数学模型，这个简洁的逻辑更有说服力。\n以上是从空间维度上来解释折价交易，从时间维度上也不难理解。很多行业都出现过普遍亏损甚至全行业亏损的局面。2016年的钢铁煤炭就是全行业亏损。这说明什么呢？这只说明应当有玩家退出，如果大家都硬挺着不退，那就继续亏。还好中国有供给侧结构性改革。航运业是完全国际化的行业，它从2008年一直亏损到今天。\n所以封基普遍折价，包括美国的共同基金大多不能跑赢指数，这都说明玩家太多了，但还有股傻钱支持着他们。这很可能是周期现象而非逻辑问题。本质原因还是1980年代以来，全球股市一直处于长期牛市当中，没有经历过1930、1970年代那样的充分调整。\n从1998年临危受命开始，中国的基金行业一直是被催熟的。几乎没有经历过自然积累的蓝海阶段，直接就按照政府的战略规划进入红海。这一点，与光伏、风电等行业非常类似。也就是说，行业内部竞争非常激烈，甚至可以说是惨烈。但是整体产值上得非常快，行业的系统重要性急剧提高。\n中国基金行业1998年从0开始发展，到2007年，已经有将近30%的A股流通市值被控制在基金公司名下。请注意，比30%这个比例更激动人心的，是不到十年时间从0冲到30%的这个势头，似乎40%、50%、60%都在唾手可得的范围之内。\n于是，头部基金公司中的一部分人，就开始浮想联翩了。他们觉得，光做财务投资者没意思，要做积极投资者，参与公司经营决策。远如美国的卡尔伊坎，近如前些年的宝能、安邦。总之，庄家的时代已经远去，价值投资也只是基础。在新的条件下，玩法还要再升级。\n这种心情是完全可以理解的。毕竟一个公司，你持股3%还是30%，投入的热情、期待和责任感都会截然不同。所以那几年基金行业的整体气氛，一点儿不逊色于互联网巨头的高光时刻。至今我回想起那段青葱岁月，仍不免心潮澎湃。那种感觉类似于：这个世界是你们的，也是我们的，但归根结蒂是我们的。\n只可惜，世事无常，造化弄人。2020年初，基金公司控制的A股流通市值比例还不到7%。积极投资者的梦想，只能被映射到另一个平行时空去了。\n从全社会来看，一家基金公司的投研团队不过区区数十人。如果他们只是买卖股票的话，金额达到几百亿、几千亿也都没有什么。可是如果他们能够指掌几十家、几百家上市公司，哪怕只是为它们的利益代言几句，事情都会复杂很多。\n在2008年的大衰退中，华尔街占用了太多的公共资源，这一点已经广受诟病。在2020年3月的新冠危机中，这一点更是表现得淋漓尽致。美联储一次降息1个点还不行，必须降到0，光买国债还不行，还要买垃圾债，政府的各种赤字计划更是3个点、5个点地往上加，这些政策不给足，股市就躺在地下“死”给你看。等糖给够了，它又翻身坐起来了，而且还精神百倍。如果华尔街没有坚强的意志力，像中国股民这样一盘散沙，给点阳光就灿烂，显然是不可能与当局进行如此有效的博弈。\n中国真的想要一条自己的华尔街吗？恐怕是既想，又不想。\n四、第一桶金\n笔者曾跟公募基金行业的老同事们聊起：市场上的投资流派那么多，而基金经理大多是白手起家，入行之前都是一张白纸。到底是什么因素决定了他们的风格呢？猛犸资产的陈扬帆说：一开始大家都是随机摸索，直到他们赚到了人生中的第一桶金。而这第一桶金是怎么赚到的，他们的风格基本就是什么样了。对此说法，我深以为然。\n1998到2001年发行的“新基金”，后来称为封闭式基金。它就是很多老股民、老基民的第一桶金。简单地说，封基这个品种，在它的整个存续期间，你可以闭着眼睛随便买，拿到最后基本上都能赚钱。当然，买了能亏钱的窗口期是存在的。但是很短，要选到也不容易。而且你只要是在2007年大牛市之前买入，那么最后一定是大赚特赚。\n从2004年底到2012年底，封闭式基金的平均回报是540%，而开放式基金的平均回报是236%，个股的平均回报是141%。封闭式基金的平均回报可以跑赢除华夏大盘精选之外的所有开放式基金，也可以跑赢93%以上的个股。\n为什么会有如此惊人的结果呢？主要是两方面的原因，一是高折价，二是大行情。\n2004年，基金行业勉为其难地攀上了2000亿规模，几乎已经完全无力再向3000亿冲刺了。华夏基金的首任总经理范勇宏在《基金常青》中回忆到，后来封神的华夏大盘精选，发行首日只募集了200万份。华夏基金的销售人员甚至不得不跟渠道的人拼酒，“一杯酒换100万基金”。按照一般的销售返点来理解，100万这个数字似乎不小。可是要知道，100万的公募基金认购，首先短期内就会跑掉一大块，然后剩下的部分每年只能产生1.5%的管理费，去除各种成本之后，实际效益很可能是负数。\n在这种严重供过于求的市况下，封基的二级市场交易价格远远低于其净值，平均折价达到28%。可是如果你眼睛只盯着这28个点，把它分摊到未来几年十几年里去慢慢回复，似乎也没什么吸引力。事实也确实如此，直到2014年，封基的平均折价还有10个点以上。十年时间，折价率只回复了18个点，年化不到2%。\n可是一旦高折价叠加大行情，那情况就完全改观了。同样是用2块钱现金买入价值3块钱的资产。你可以称它为33%的折价率，也可以称之为1.5倍的杠杆率。折价率变成了杠杆率！\n所以封基的超高回报，其实是两个因素叠加的结果。一是2001到04年基金行业超速发展导致的高折价，二是2006、07年波澜壮阔的大牛市。\n当然，跟其他投资机会一样，想要逆市抄底，总得克服几个吓人的“鬼故事”。比如说，当时市场风传，同一个公司的封闭式基金会向开放式基金做利益输送。可是我们前面已经证明了，大多数基民根本就没有择基能力。基金经理冒着违规违法的风险，好不容易给同事送了2个点的收益，结果基民们根本不知道，甚至反而跑得更多了。何苦来哉？\n还有人担心封基的基金经理会乱操作，故意亏钱。这就更可笑了。首先，故意亏钱对基金公司和基金经理都没有好处。更何况，在有效市场假设下，故意亏钱的难度和“故意”赚钱是一样的。你去专买垃圾股，很可能反而赚得更多。\n以前有一个玩笑话，说是策略分析师的预测准确率能有70%，就可以拿100万年薪。如果准确率下降到50%，那他就一文不值了。可是如果准确率进一步下降到5%，那么他就应该价值年薪500万。为什么呢？因为正向指标和反向指标的价值是一样的，你只要反过来听就可以了。关键是准确率要偏离50%，偏得越多越好，往哪里偏倒不重要。\n前文说到，2001年封基停发之后，监管层并不愿意完全放弃封闭式基金这块阵地。可是散户短炒的习惯很顽固，开放式基金也已经确立了主流地位。此时如果继续发行经典型的封闭式基金，大概率又会面临上市即折价的问题。理论上说，持有人可以不看市场价格，只管自己持有。但现实情况是，市价浮亏给基金销售带来了极大的负面影响。于是监管层把这个问题交给基金公司，让它们设计一些创新型封闭式基金来吸引投资者。\n2007年9月，大成优选上市。它是A股市场第一只创新型封闭式基金。它的创新主要是两条：一是设置了业绩报酬，提成比例是水位线以上10%。二是设置了转开放条款，如果连续50个交易日折价超过20%，就从封闭式基金转为开放式基金。\n大成优选刚刚上市时，市场对业绩报酬的魔力非常期待，希望它能够调动基金公司投研团队的积极性，创造出明星佳绩。但是从结果上看，基金业绩并不理想，所以在短暂溢价之后，很快就转入折价交易，折价幅度甚至超过了经典型封基。\nA股市场的第二只创新型封闭式基金叫做瑞福进取，它的创新也有两条：一是设计了一个比较复杂的杠杆机制。杠杆比率大致在2倍左右。二是同样设置了转开放条款，如果连续60个交易日折价超过30%，则转开放。\n瑞福进取从2007年上市到2012年到期，存续期5年，基本上实现了持续溢价交易，平均溢价率在20%左右。仅就这一点而言，显然它比大成优选成功。其中原因，似乎可以简单归结为散户对杠杆喜爱，超过了对主动管理的期待。\n2010年4月，中金所开放股指期货，杠杆比率可以轻松达到5倍以上。瑞福进取的溢价率随之明显下滑，甚至一度出现折价。2012年，福瑞进取按合同续期，杠杆率从3倍多回归到2倍，市场兴趣更淡，价格迅速走低，直到折价率接近20%才企稳。\n由此可见，A股散户第一喜欢短炒，第二喜欢杠杆。至于对专家理财的信任么，如果存在的话，也顶多排第三。2018年，兴全基金的谢治宇管理的兴全合宜发行，一日售磬300亿，堪称爆款。该基金首年封闭，结果一上市照样折价6%。一年后开放，持有份额按“惯例”跑掉一半。可见明星基金经理也难以逃脱这个怪圈。\n五、分级基金\n按照原本的思路，监管层是想跟散户建立一个君子协定。监管层拿出“业绩”和“杠杆”这两个特性，换取散户接受“封闭”这个条件。可是现在君子协定眼见得做不成了，干脆把“杠杆”嫁接到开放式基金上去，直接做规模，岂不美哉？\n这一类具有杠杆功能的开放式基金，基本原理大都是分成AB两级。两级的钱放到一起投资，亏了赚了都由B级承担，A级只拿固定收益。所以它们统称为分级基金。\n在海外，杠杆基金一般只有杠杆级，没有优先级。或者说，它们都使用虚拟的优先级。与优先级相应的功能，都是由投行或者衍生品市场来实现的。这样做的好处是优先级的规模可以随时缩放。\n比如说2倍杠杆基金。投资者放1个亿进来，基金公司就再去借1个亿给它配资。然后今天市场跌了5%，投资者承担0.1亿损失，本金下降到0.9亿。当天临近收盘时，基金公司就要把配资金额也缩减到0.9亿，这样一来，基金的杠杆就仍然保持2倍。明天市场要是涨了，就再调回去。所以这个配资金额，每个交易日都要调整一次。\n从投资品种的角度看，海外杠杆基金中的优先资金其实是一块肥肉。安全性又高，收益性又好，两全其美。唯一坏处就是必须“招之即来，挥之即去”，不稳定。\n我们A股的分级基金呢，就等于是把这块肥肉拿出来，分给其他有兴趣的基民们去享用。当然，这么做的代价就是，优先级的规模只能在一些事先规定好的特殊情况下才进行调整，不可能每天收盘缩放一次。\n这种创新，本意不坏。但是放到具体的市场环境中，就出现问题了。分级基金的第一次危机发生在2014年5月20日，主角叫做银华锐进，是一只B级，也就是杠杆级基金。它在投资上是被动的，盯住深证100指数。所以深证100指数的涨跌就完全决定了它的净值。从销售上说，它是非常成功的，上市4年，从10亿规模做到100多亿。可是问题就出在这规模上。\n由于2011到2014年市场连续下跌，再加上不断支付优先级的利息，银华锐进的净值已经到了暴仓线附近。也就是说，假如再跌的话，就可能要影响优先级的资金安全了。所以一旦达到暴仓线，产品就要部分平仓。\n\n我们前面已经解释过，在此之前的下跌过程中，分级基金的优先级规模是不会逐步调整的。所以一旦发生部分平仓，潜在的一次性抛盘金额将高达100多亿。而此时整个深证100指数的日均成交金额也不过100多亿。一旦暴仓事件发生，对于本已疲惫的市场，无异于一次重锤。\n而且由于银华锐进是盯住指数的被动基金，所以基金经理无权主动调整仓位，只要指数跌破相应点位，银华锐进暴仓就是完全确定的事情。\n结果奇迹发生了。2014年5月20日上午9点38分，深证100指数明显跌破了银华锐进的暴仓线，然后立刻就被直线拉起。而且这个细小的金针，居然成了深证100指数的历史大底，从此之后再也没有跌破过。下图是我当年留下的分时记录：\n\n这股神秘力量来自何方，至今仍是未解之谜。可能是因为这件事最终有惊无险，所以无论在业内还是业外，几乎都没有产生什么波澜。\n分级基金的AB两级，分别有自己的净值和价格。但是因为它们不能单独申购赎回，所以它们可能分别出现很大的折价或溢价。但是A和B加在一起，作为一份完整的开放式基金，又是可以申购赎回的。所以A和B的价格之和不能大幅偏离净值之和。\n举例来说，A和B的净值都是1。此时A的价格可以是1.2，那么B的价格就是0.8，或者A的价格是0.7，那么B的价格就是1.3。总之，两者的价格可以分别偏离净值，但是两者之和必须是稳定的。否则就会产生套利机会。\n由于散户对于杠杆的热爱，分级基金出现溢价的套利机会还是挺多的。但是这种机会绝大多数都是“看得见，摸不着”。理论上成立，但是操作上不能实现。原因主要有4条：\n首先一条最重要的，绝大多数分级基金不能实时申购赎回。假如你T日观察到溢价，当天收盘前申购。T+1日基金公司确认份额。T+2日基金份额反映到券商系统，你还要下一个分拆指令，T+3日才能分别卖出A和B。这时候，溢价还在吗？一般来说是不在了。如果还在，套利就成功了。所以这个问题还跟溢价水平的稳定性有关。\n第二条，就是A级的价格不稳定。因为A级的投资者通常是把它当成长期债券来看的。他们是这样考虑问题的：我今天投入100元，年利率6%，那么10年利息60元，20年利息120元，30年利息180元……所以如果利率变动1%，对他们的影响很大。但是A级的价格变动1%，对他们的影响并不大。当然，机构投资者会算得精细一些。但是A级的交易量太小，没有流动性，机构很少参与。\n第三条，就是B级的溢价水平也不稳定。当市场没有趋势性行情的时候，散户一般将B级视为超跌反弹的神器。也就是说，市场急跌的时候，B级往往出现溢价。两三天后，无论反弹出现与否，这个溢价一般都会消失。\n第四条，就是分级基金的申购费率最高可达1%到1.5%，极大地提高了套利交易的成本。\n可是在2014、15年的牛市中，以上情况发生了重大变化，分级基金的溢价套利又变得容易实现了。\n首先是华泰证券推出了“盲拆”业务，其他证券公司陆续跟进。所谓盲拆，就是T+1日基金公司确认份额，还没有反映到券商，你就直接对券商下分拆指令。这样T+2日券商直接把分拆完的A和B录入系统，你就可以立即交易了。这项技术创新，极大地缩小了溢价套利的不确定性。\n第二条，A级的价格稳定了。从2014年下半年开始，央行连续降准降息，许多保险公司和固收产品不得不跑到证券市场内部来找收益。机构投资者比较理性，很快就把A级的价格稳定在一个很小的区间内，不再胡乱波动了。\n第三条，B级的溢价水平也稳定了。这条道理最简单，但是也最关键：牛市来了，豪情万丈，一路溢价。\n第四条，申购费通常按百分比计算，但是最高一档却有1000元的金额上限，所以对于500万以上的资金来说，费用也不再构成限制了。为什么以前构成限制呢？因为以前流动性差，一次套利投入的资金量太大了，怕出不来。而在牛市中，流动性大幅改善了，整装资金可以直接上。\n从2014年底到2015年中，专注于分级基金溢价套利的资金，收益率大约在2到3倍之间。这个业绩强于大多数公募基金，但是也不算太夸张。不过它的好处是“不见鬼子不挂弦”，有信号就动，没信号就停，不存在犹豫割肉的问题。所以牛市的成果得以保留。而大多数公募和私募都在后来的股灾中经历了严重回撤。\n那么在市场见顶之后，分级基金还有什么投资机会吗？其实也是有的，那就是观察哪些B级将要暴仓了，然后买入与它们对应的A级。\n我们前面说过，2014年5月，大盘经历了一次千钧一发的潜在危机。当时是银华锐进一支巨型基金，100亿左右的潜在抛盘。可是到股灾期间，情况变成了好几支巨型基金，外加几十支中小基金，数百亿的潜在抛盘，而且还在一个集中的时间段内连续爆出。\n2015年8月24日，创业板B暴仓，引发抛盘约45亿。8月27日，证券B暴仓，引发抛盘约75亿。8月28日，国企改B暴仓，引发抛盘约130亿……\n因为公募基金的条款、份额和净值信息都是公开的，所以这些基金会在什么情况下暴仓，潜在的抛盘有多大，这些关键信息也都等于是公开的。那么如果你预计到某支基金将要暴仓，最理性的决策就是抢先抛空相关股票，一是避险，二是诱发其暴仓。等到基金执行平仓之后，再从低点买回来。事实也反复证明，每支暴仓的巨型分级基金，都在市场上砸了一个坑，平仓盘总是割在最低点。\n上述特点对B级是极为不利的，而与之对应的则是A级得利。具体计算比较复杂，这里就略过了。有兴趣的可以查阅相关基金的招募说明书等资料。\n分级基金在股灾中“被动砸盘”的事实，引起了业界内外的广泛批评。2018年，证监会发布《资管新规》要求所有分级基金全部转型。然而直到2020年初，大批分级基金仍在交易。不过我相信，即使分级基金真的消失了，将来也还会有更新的品种问世。\n净值与价格的故事仍将继续。\n本文作者：丁昶","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":4144,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":333648479,"gmtCreate":1609258572191,"gmtModify":1704978165313,"author":{"id":"3567575098485843","authorId":"3567575098485843","name":"股市轟炸机队长","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1ec92b2a3335762e71e118cc8d1b3753","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"idStr":"3567575098485843","authorIdStr":"3567575098485843"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"Great ariticle, would you like to share it?","listText":"Great ariticle, would you like to share it?","text":"Great ariticle, would you like to share it?","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/333648479","repostId":"2095257967","repostType":2,"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":3201,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0}],"hots":[{"id":9090706306,"gmtCreate":1643256200480,"gmtModify":1676533791399,"author":{"id":"3567575098485843","authorId":"3567575098485843","name":"股市轟炸机队长","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1ec92b2a3335762e71e118cc8d1b3753","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3567575098485843","idStr":"3567575098485843"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"<a href=\"https://ttm.financial/S/G13.SI\">$云顶新加坡(G13.SI)$</a>Looking forward to 5.8-6.5","listText":"<a href=\"https://ttm.financial/S/G13.SI\">$云顶新加坡(G13.SI)$</a>Looking forward to 5.8-6.5","text":"$云顶新加坡(G13.SI)$Looking forward to 5.8-6.5","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":4,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/9090706306","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":4360,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[{"author":{"id":"3580625969745490","authorId":"3580625969745490","name":"Traderopedia","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/49aa77ad0af13cd80f20edbad1234522","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":1,"authorIdStr":"3580625969745490","idStr":"3580625969745490"},"content":"u wait long long.. maybe 109 years later","text":"u wait long long.. maybe 109 years later","html":"u wait long long.. maybe 109 years later"}],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":9090138922,"gmtCreate":1643111013030,"gmtModify":1676533775076,"author":{"id":"3567575098485843","authorId":"3567575098485843","name":"股市轟炸机队长","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1ec92b2a3335762e71e118cc8d1b3753","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3567575098485843","idStr":"3567575098485843"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"<a href=\"https://ttm.financial/S/SE\">$Sea Ltd(SE)$</a>Round 2 tonight&nbsp;","listText":"<a href=\"https://ttm.financial/S/SE\">$Sea Ltd(SE)$</a>Round 2 tonight&nbsp;","text":"$Sea Ltd(SE)$Round 2 tonight","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":6,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/9090138922","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":5194,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":340207090,"gmtCreate":1617413974910,"gmtModify":1704699492258,"author":{"id":"3567575098485843","authorId":"3567575098485843","name":"股市轟炸机队长","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1ec92b2a3335762e71e118cc8d1b3753","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3567575098485843","idStr":"3567575098485843"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"✌?","listText":"✌?","text":"✌?","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":3,"commentSize":2,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/340207090","repostId":"2124759854","repostType":4,"repost":{"id":"2124759854","kind":"highlight","pubTimestamp":1617411600,"share":"https://ttm.financial/m/news/2124759854?lang=en_US&edition=fundamental","pubTime":"2021-04-03 09:00","market":"us","language":"zh","title":"Twenty Years of Public Offering of Fund","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=2124759854","media":"小鲜传","summary":"净值与价格的故事仍将继续","content":"<p><b>Passionate Years</b></p><p>In 1986, the then<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/601398\">ICBC</a>Subordinate Shanghai Trust and Investment Company established a securities business department to start stock trading. In 1988, the People's Bank of China approved the pilot trading of treasury bills in several cities. In 1990, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges opened one after another. In 1992, Shenzhen, Shenyang, Dalian, Wuhan and other places set up mutual funds. In August 1993, Zibo Fund from Shandong was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, becoming the first listed fund in China. Subsequently, many funds were listed and traded in various places. The net issuance value of Zibo Fund is 1 yuan, and the closing price on the day of listing is 5 yuan. In 2000, Zibo Fund was restructured and merged into Fund Hanbo. During the existence of the fund, the highest transaction price reached 12.39 yuan, and the lowest price was 1.6 yuan. Prices are consistently well above net worth. In the eyes of today's investors, such a \"record\" is inevitable to hide their faces and laugh: people were really stupid and had more money back then. But is history really that simple? I'm afraid not really either.</p><p>Zibo Fund is directly approved by the Head Office of the People's Bank of China, and mainly invests in the equity of township enterprises and related service industries in Zibo area. This part of investment is not less than 60% of the net value of the fund. At the same time, you can invest in all kinds of bonds and listed company stocks, and this part of the investment is no more than 40% of the net value of the fund.</p><p>It can be seen that this Zibo fund is not the securities investment fund we usually understand now, but a mix of securities and industrial investment funds. Moreover, in the legal sense, it is obviously not established by contract, but an independent legal person approved by the central bank. Or we can simply say that it is actually a listed company mainly engaged in investment holding.</p><p>If you look at its valuation in that light, it's easy to understand. In 1993, China's economy overheated across the board. The year-on-year growth rate of CPI was 14.7%, and the growth rate of fixed asset investment was 45.3%. The pursuit of investment opportunities has reached a frenetic level. The ultra-high premium of Zibo Fund is the micro reflection of this macro background.</p><p>In the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Luo Guanzhong arranged a line for Zhang Jiao, the leader of the Yellow Turban Uprising: The most rare thing is the hearts of the people. Today, the hearts of the people have been smooth, if we don't take advantage of the situation to take the world, it is a pity. For Zibo Fund, the situation it faces is not far from that of Zhang Jiao. If the market gives me a valuation of 10 times PB, then I can double my net worth by issuing 10% more share capital. The money raised can easily get double-digit returns no matter where it is placed, even in Treasury bills with value-preservation subsidies. If the share capital is diluted by 10% and the profit doubles, isn't the performance explosive?</p><p><b>If the performance growth is enough to maintain a high valuation, or even push the valuation level to rise further, then it will form a cycle of high valuation, high financing and high growth. And this process is exactly what Soros calls reflexivity.</b></p><p>Unfortunately, from its listing in 1993 to its restructuring in 2000, the regulatory authorities never gave Zibo Fund such an opportunity. Only in 1995, several listed funds, including Zibo Fund, experienced a brief hype. The reason is that it is rumored that the Fund Management Law will be promulgated in that year, and small-cap funds may be expanded. And the expansion of recruitment is the key to driving the reflexive process. So do you say that the market at that time was just \"people are stupid and have more money\"?</p><p>However, the legendary Fund Management Law has always disappeared. It was not until 1997 that the CSRC promulgated the Interim Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment Funds. In 2003, the Securities Investment Fund Law was approved by the National People's Congress and officially became a national law. Please note that compared with the rumors in 1995, the name of the law finally passed includes four more words \"securities investment\".</p><p><b>China's securities investment funds finally choose the contractual legal system.</b>The fund company is the manager. The shares issued by the fund are beneficiary certificates, and the holders of the fund shares are customers. All these arrangements seem to be natural today. In fact, besides this, there is a legal system of corporate funds.</p><p>A corporate fund itself is a legal person, which can issue shares, and the fund manager and investors jointly hold its shares. Many of the industrial investment funds we can see today are corporate funds. In China, there are probably no corporate securities investment funds. However, in the United States, there are also many corporate securities investment funds.</p><p>From the perspective of reflexivity, contractual funds are not reflexive. Because when customers subscribe for fund shares, they only use net value as the price. That is to say, only the stocks, bonds and cash held by the fund are priced, and the brand, reputation and historical performance of the fund itself, as well as the investment and research team, front and back offices, intangible assets and other resources of the fund company are not priced. Whether they add value or destroy it, they are ignored.</p><p>Therefore, in theory, contractual funds can't be issued at a high premium, and it is impossible to expand a large amount of capital with a small share capital, so the reflexive process can't be realized. Corporate funds are likely to be reflexive. For example, some industrial investment funds listed on the New Third Board achieved ultra-high premium issuance of about 10 times PB in 2014 and 15, and their net assets doubled.</p><p>For example, Silicon Valley Paradise had a share capital of 1.375 billion and a net asset of 3.37 billion in mid-2015. After the issuance, the share capital only increased to 1.477 billion, but the net assets doubled to 6.89 billion.</p><p>Another example is Zhongke Investment Promotion, with a share capital of 1.182 billion and net assets of 1.92 billion at the end of 2014. After the issuance, the share capital only increased to 1.8 billion, but the net assets surged to 14.6 billion.</p><p>You know, the general enterprise has to have a cycle of several months or even years from financing, production to generating benefits. However, many financial assets are invested and immediately begin to calculate the income. Therefore, if it were not for the stock market crash in the second half of 2015 and the market situation took a sharp turn for the worse, the performance outbreak of these companies would be almost a matter of iron plate. A classic reflexive process can be described as a shortfall.</p><p>For investors, when you participate in contractual funds, the relationship between you and the fund company is always the relationship between customers and managers. All the returns of the fund to you are reflected only in the net value of stocks, bonds and other assets. This fund and all other developments in the fund company have nothing to do with you. The fund company wants to recruit new customers, and it has nothing to do with you, an old customer.</p><p>However, in corporate funds, investors and fund companies are a team partnership that jointly starts a business and conquers the world. In addition to the net book value, investors can also enjoy the profits and losses brought by the fund company's \"competition in the Central Plains\". If a new investor wants to come in, it must get the majority approval of the original shareholders, and the price will certainly not be cheap. In today's industrial investment, the share price of round C generally can't be lower than that of round B, and the price of round D can't be lower than that of round C. This kind of first-come, first-served \"courtesy\" has almost become a rule.</p><p>We usually watch movies and TV series, and we hate others'\"spoilers\". Because if you know the ending in advance, you will not be able to fully substitute into the previous plot, which will affect the appreciation effect. When we study history, we also want to exclude the impact of spoilers. If at the turn of the century, China finally chose the corporate legal system. Then in 1993, it was quite reasonable to buy the earliest fund companies at a high premium.</p><p>In fact, in high-tech venture capital, card-slot investment is very common. For example, I am optimistic about a certain subdivision, but I can't see the technical route and competitive landscape clearly, so I will vote for all the best three or five companies on the market.<b>Moreover, the price at this time is not measured according to the immediate financial data, but inferred backwards according to the future industry prospects.</b>Because no matter which one gets bigger, I can be an old shareholder and collect the \"buying money\" paid by the latecomers.</p><p>In 2012, when Wang Yawei, a star fund manager, left Huaxia Fund, he calculated such an account with reporters. He has been a Public Offering of Fund manager for 14 years, from Fund Xinghua to Huaxia Market Selection. If dividends are reinvested, 1 yuan can be turned into 28 yuan in almost 14 years. This return is already pretty amazing. However, when Huaxia Fund itself was established in 1998, its registered capital was only 70 million. By the time of the equity transfer in 2012, the overall valuation was 16 billion yuan, plus dividends of up to 4 billion yuan during the period, and the return of rights restoration was more than 200 times. Therefore, in the same 14 years, the value growth of the fund company itself far exceeds the performance growth of the best funds in the whole market.</p><p>Whether the people who speculated on Zibo Fund ever had such a big dream is now untestable. Zibo Fund is like an abandoned road sign. What it points to is a \"parallel time and space\" completely different from the present world.</p><p><b>Second, attacked by both sides</b></p><p>In 1998, the Shanghai Composite Index fell by 3.97%. Behind this moderate figure is the stormy sea of macroeconomy and surrounding markets. In 1997, the baht began to depreciate. After entering 1998, the financial crisis swept Asia, Russia's Treasury Bond defaulted, and global stock markets plummeted.</p><p>Among the major markets in the world that year, Hong Kong stocks were under the greatest pressure. Because Hong Kong's economic fundamentals are highly correlated with East Asia, the legal tender value of the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the US dollar. If the Hong Kong dollar can depreciate, then the price of Hong Kong dollar-denominated stocks can get some support. Therefore, despite the Hong Kong government's direct entry into the market and strong intervention, by August 1998, the Hang Seng Index was still nearly halved.</p><p>During this period, the trend of A shares was calm. However, the regulators have long been worried, and the pressure is even greater than in Hong Kong. On the one hand, the state has promised that the yuan will not depreciate. On the other hand, at that time, the overall P/E of A shares was as high as 40 times, and only 5% of individual stocks had a P/E of less than 20 times. Moreover, bookmakers are rampant, speculative and speculative, and a large number of retail investors are addicted to it. Once foreign predators break in, the consequences are unimaginable.</p><p>The concept of bookmaker has been far from A shares for many years. The so-called bookmaker in those days refers to a person or capital group. They controlled the vast majority of circulating shares of listed companies, and then they could control the rise and fall of stock prices at will by turning their left hand over their right hand. Then in the next day or days, whether the stock price will rise or fall will become the bottom set by the bookmaker, and retail investors will guess this mystery, just like the pressure size in the casino.</p><p>If the dealer manipulates skillfully, the banker game can last for a long time. However, once they failed, the result was also very tragic. In 2003, the Delong Department collapsed, and they were the banker<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/000633\">Alloy Investments</a>The trend of a 95% plunge is as follows:</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/237422e025b1ec69079e44fc95daa788\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"457\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>Under this background, the \"Old Ten\" Public Offering of Fund Management Company came out. At this time, the fund can be described as being ordered in danger. Their mission has always been two. On the one hand, we should introduce new investment styles to the market. Prove that you can make money without sitting on the banker, thus improving the market pricing efficiency. On the other hand, we should also educate investors. It proves that diversified investment and long-term investment are better than short-term speculation, thus changing investors' risk appetite.</p><p>Based on these two considerations, from 1998 to 2001, most of the newly issued funds had two characteristics. First, the scale is particularly large, either 2 billion or 3 billion. Even if this scale is looked at more than ten years later, it is considerable. And the 3 billion of that year is no more than the 3 billion of today. You know, in 1998, China's GDP was less than 10% of 2020, and the M2 money supply was less than 5% of 2020. The second is long-term closure, and the closure period is unified to 15 years. I bought it when I was babbling, and I was already a college student when I came out. This design is quite a test of investors' patience. Later, many \"old funds\" issued before 1998, like Fund Zibo, were also transformed into such large-scale and long-term closed \"new funds\".</p><p>The issuance of the new fund was warmly welcomed by shareholders. The five funds issued in 1998, with a scale of 2 billion each, totaling 10 billion, attracted a total of 536.6 billion subscription funds, with an average winning rate of less than 2%. The unsuccessful funds were transferred to the secondary market and vigorously pursued, making the premium of the new fund as high as more than 100%. Its fanaticism is no different from the \"old fund\".</p><p>However, the plate of the new fund is too big after all, and the issuance speed is gradually accelerating. In 1999, the issuance size of new funds increased from 2 billion to 3 billion each. The hot money on the floor soon couldn't support it. A premium turns into a parity, and a parity turns into a discount.</p><p>The following chart shows the changing trend of the discount and premium of listed closed-end funds and the total size of the fund industry from 1998 to 2015. Among them, the fund data excludes the samples that are listed for less than 60 days and have a duration of less than one year. The total scale of the fund industry only counts stock and hybrid funds, and it is displayed on the logarithmic axis.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f139ba9aa73b2889cacf2f6806d3c1b2\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"523\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>As can be seen from the above chart, with the large-scale issuance of new funds, the premium rate of closed-end funds quickly plunged and turned into a discount. Throughout 2000 plus the first three quarters of 2001, no new funds were issued. The base closure premium rate gradually turned positive.</p><p>In September, 2001, the open-end fund came out, the fund issuance was accelerated again, and the base closing premium rate was all the way down to about-30%. After 2008, the scale of the fund industry tended to be stable, and the base closure premium rate also rose to about-10% and stabilized again until the last base closure expired in 2016. In 2001,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/CHN\">China Fund</a>The development route of the industry has once again made a strategic choice, from closed-end funds to open-end funds. Why do you make this change? The most common explanation is that open-end funds allow Christians to vote with their feet, contributing to the survival of the fittest in the fund industry. This statement seems grandiose and cannot be refuted.<b>In fact, just like the vast majority of investors have no ability to choose stocks, there is no evidence that as a group, Christians have the ability to \"choose the base\".</b></p><p>In May, 2020, the author made statistics on all stock-type and partial stock-type open-end funds of A shares, and examined the scale changes after their issuance. The results showed that the median change in size was-30.5% after half a year and-47% after one year.</p><p>Why use the median? Because a small fund grows by 1000%, it is easy to skew the average. So for sample sets that are intrinsically very different, we usually look at the median. We can probably understand it in this way. The people of open-end funds run off one third in half a year and half a year, which is the most common situation.</p><p>I think the above results are enough to show that the discount of the base closure is not because the Christians are dissatisfied with their performance, but because of the deep-rooted short-term speculation habit. Holding it for a while, it always has to go. If you shut him down and don't let him redeem it, then he'd rather sell it at a discount in the secondary market.</p><p>What's more interesting is that in the above statistics, if we only look at those funds with a net worth of less than 1 yuan, their median size change after half a year is-22.8%, and their median size change after one year is-35.8%. In other words, after losing money, the Christians are unwilling to leave. Another symmetrical phenomenon is that many star funds are reluctant to accept the \"market reward\" and are afraid of expanding. For example, Wang Yawei's Huaxia Market Selection, although it is an open-end fund, has not been open for subscription for a long time, only for redemption. The above two phenomena add up to \"survival of the inferior\", which is completely the opposite of the popular explanation.</p><p><b>When the fund industry was developed, the slogan shouted was that \"expert financial management\" was better than retail investors. Unexpectedly, now experts have to cater to the short-term preferences of retail investors.</b>Isn't that putting the cart before the horse? Many new fund managers have to face tremendous marketing pressure from the beginning of their careers, and there is no opportunity to exercise a long-term vision. Even firmly bullish stocks have to cut at the bottom under redemption pressure. Therefore, the author believes that the shift from closed to open is a bad thing rather than a good thing for the growth of the investment research team, at least the loss is greater than the profit.</p><p>However, in the specific market environment at the turn of the century, these losses are probably a necessary price. Because the fund industry has always been attacked by both sides, it has to face both the market and customers. If necessary, only if you compromise with the customer can you better concentrate on dealing with the market.</p><p>From a micro point of view, no matter what method a fund company adopts, it must first increase the scale of the industry and solve the problem of food and clothing, and then it can calmly cultivate its own investment and research talent echelon. From a macro point of view, if the fund industry does not have a certain capital scale, it is impossible to form a discourse system of institutional investors in the market, and it is impossible to improve market efficiency.</p><p>By today's standards, so many fund managers in the market may not all know about value investment. However, there are at least double ten constraints (individual stocks account for no more than 10% of the net value of the fund, and the share capital held by the fund does not exceed 10%), coupled with a series of standardized management measures such as quarterly report disclosure, bank custody, and so on. It is definitely impossible to control, wash and violently make bankers like in the 1990s. At that time, it was already commendable to be able to achieve \"standardized operation\".</p><p>In fact, for many years, the regulators have not given up their efforts to \"resurrect\" closed-end funds. They use all kinds of sweetness to persuade investors in exchange for giving up the habit of short-term speculation. This also leads to another koan, which we will describe later.</p><p><b>Third, the mystery of discount premium</b></p><p>After 2001, the secondary market price of closed-end funds has been significantly lower than its net value for a long time. This may be the first market phenomenon in the history of A shares that can attract strong attention from academics. Today, dozens of papers discussing this phenomenon can be easily searched on CNKI.</p><p>According to academic norms, a literature review is required before research. However, this review by scholars has grafted the situation in China after 2001 to the experience of the United States and Britain. After all, there are just some English papers that are easy to find. As far as I can see, none of the articles mention the long, substantially above net worth history of \"old fund\" prices in China in the 1990s. Even after the restructuring in 1998, there is no article to review the V-shaped trend of new funds from premium to discount and then to premium.</p><p><b>So the question of the relationship between price and net worth becomes \"why closed-end funds always trade at a discount\". A concrete historical phenomenon becomes a matter of logic.</b>So what's the answer? Those papers in the United States are nothing more than looking for reasons in fees, accounting, and taxes. But these specific reasons simply do not exist in China. Therefore, we had to end with \"no conclusion\" or simply \"irrational market\".</p><p>In fact, if I want to say it, the answer is four words:<b>Oversupply</b>。 As simple as that, if the fund industry develops slowly and doesn't issue so many products, the base closure is likely to continue to trade at parity or even premium as it did before 2001.</p><p>The scale of a base closure is billions, and the daily transaction is only tens of millions, and the average turnover rate is below 1%. Can this 1% represent all Christians? Imagine how the commission price would be distributed if we required all holders to place a sell order? Maybe 10% will hang around the market price, 20% will hang between the market price and the net worth, 60% will hang around the net worth, and 10% will probably hang at a position much higher than the net worth. Of course, the above numbers are my intuitive guess, but this distribution relationship is probably not unreasonable.</p><p>A similar problem is the relationship between dividends and buybacks. Both are the means by which listed companies distribute cash. How they affect the stock price, academics don't know how many papers have published to discuss it. In fact, we can also think of it this way. If all shareholders are required to put up selling orders, then only a few percent or even a few thousandths of the entrustments will hang around the current price, and most other selling orders will hang at a position obviously higher or even far higher than the current price. In other words, the daily turnover rate of a stock is 5%, which only means that 5% of holding shareholders agree with the market price. Another 95% of shareholders' minds are valued above the current price, otherwise they would have chosen to sell.</p><p>Therefore, the effect of dividends is that the sun shines, and there is only one ex-right effect on the stock price.<b>Repurchase, on the other hand, eliminates the relatively least optimistic part of all shareholders in a targeted way. So buybacks have a strong effect of distorting the stock price upward.</b>I think this concise logic is more convincing than the frighteningly complex mathematical models.</p><p>The above is to explain discount transactions from the spatial dimension, and it is not difficult to understand from the temporal dimension. Many industries have experienced widespread losses or even industry-wide losses. Steel and coal in 2016 is the loss of the whole industry. What does that mean? This only means that some players should quit. If everyone holds up, they will continue to lose money. Fortunately, China has supply-side structural reform. The shipping industry is a fully international industry, and it has been losing money since 2008 until today.</p><p>Therefore, the base closure is generally discounted, including that most mutual funds in the United States can't outperform the index, which all shows that there are too many players, but there are still stupid money to support them. It is likely that this is a periodic phenomenon rather than a logical problem. The essential reason is that since 1980s, the global stock market has been in a long-term bull market, and has not experienced the full adjustment of 1930s and 1970s.</p><p>Since 1998, when he was appointed in crisis, China's fund industry has been mature. Having hardly experienced the blue ocean stage of natural accumulation, he entered the Red Sea directly according to the government's strategic plan. This is very similar to photovoltaic, wind power and other industries. That is to say, the competition within the industry is very fierce, even tragic. However, the overall output value has risen very quickly, and the systemic importance of the industry has increased dramatically.</p><p>China's fund industry began to develop from 0 in 1998. By 2007, nearly 30% of the circulating market value of A shares was controlled by fund companies. Note that more exciting than the 30% ratio is the momentum that has gone from 0 to 30% in less than a decade. It seems that 40%, 50%, 60% are all within reach.</p><p>As a result, some people in the head fund companies began to think about it. They feel that it is boring to just be a financial investor. They should be active investors and participate in the company's business decision-making. As far as Carl in the United States<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/IKAN\">Icahn</a>Like Baoneng and Anbang in previous years. In short, the time of bookmakers is long gone, and value investing is only the foundation. Under the new conditions, the gameplay has to be upgraded again.</p><p>The mood is completely understandable. After all, a company, whether you hold 3% or 30% of the shares, the enthusiasm, expectation and sense of responsibility will be completely different. Therefore, the overall atmosphere of the fund industry in those years was not inferior to the highlight moments of Internet giants. I think back to that period of green years, still can't help but surge in my heart. That feeling is similar to: The world is yours and ours, but at the end of the day it is ours.</p><p>Unfortunately, things are impermanent, and fate plays with people. At the beginning of 2020, the percentage of circulating market value of A shares controlled by fund companies was less than 7%. The dream of active investors can only be mapped to another parallel time and space.</p><p>From the perspective of the whole society, the investment research team of a fund company is only dozens of people. If they just bought and sold stocks, it wouldn't matter if the amount reached tens or hundreds of billions. However, if they can command dozens or hundreds of listed companies, even if it is just a few words for their interests, things will be much more complicated.</p><p>In the Great Recession of 2008, Wall Street has been widely criticized for taking too much of its public resources. This was even more evident during the Covid crisis in March 2020. It is not enough for the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates by 1 point at a time, it must be reduced to 0. It is not enough to buy Treasury Bond alone, but also to buy junk bonds. The government's various deficit plans are increased by 3 points or 5 points. If these policies are not enough, the stock market will lie underground and \"die\" for you to see. When the sugar was enough, it rolled over and sat up again, and it was still full of energy. If Wall Street does not have a strong willpower, it is obviously impossible to play such an effective game with the authorities if it is as scattered as Chinese investors, and it will shine brightly if it is given some sunshine.</p><p><b>Does China really want a Wall Street of its own? I am afraid I want it and I don't want it.</b></p><p><b>The first pot of gold</b></p><p>The author once talked with old colleagues in the Public Offering of Fund industry: There are so many investment schools in the market, and most fund managers start from scratch, and they are a blank sheet of paper before entering the industry. What are the factors that determine their style? Chen Yangfan of Mammoth Assets said: At first, everyone was randomly groping until they made the first pot of gold in their lives. And how they earned the first pot of gold, their style is basically what it is. I agree with this statement.</p><p>The \"new fund\" issued from 1998 to 2001, later known as the closed-end fund. It is the first pot of gold for many old investors and old people. Simply put, during the entire duration of Sealed Base, you can buy it casually with your eyes closed, and you can basically make money in the end. Of course, there is a window period where you can lose money when you buy it. But it is short, and it is not easy to choose it. And as long as you buy before the big bull market in 2007, you must make a big profit in the end.</p><p>From the end of 2004 to the end of 2012, the average return for closed-end funds was 540%, while the average return for open-end funds was 236% and the average return for individual stocks was 141%. The average return of closed-end funds can outperform all open-end funds except Huaxia Market Select, and can also outperform more than 93% of individual stocks.</p><p>Why are there such amazing results?<b>There are mainly two reasons, one is the high discount, and the other is the big market.</b></p><p>In 2004, the fund industry reluctantly climbed to the scale of 200 billion yuan, and it was almost completely unable to sprint to 300 billion yuan. Fan Yonghong, the first general manager of Huaxia Fund, recalled in Evergreen Fund that only 2 million copies were raised on the first day of issuance of Huaxia Market Selection, which was later Fengshen. The sales staff of Huaxia Fund even had to compete with people in the channel, \"a glass of wine for 1 million funds\". According to the general sales rebate, the number of 1 million seems to be not small. However, you should know that the subscription of 1 million Public Offering of Fund will first run away a large piece in a short time, and then the remaining part can only generate a management fee of 1.5% every year. After removing all kinds of costs, the actual benefit is likely to be negative.</p><p>In this severe oversupply market, the secondary market price of the base closure is well below its net value, with an average discount of 28%. However, if you only focus on these 28 points, it seems unattractive to spread it over the next few or more years to slowly recover. This is indeed the case. Until 2014, the average discount of base closure was more than 10 points. In ten years, the discount rate has only recovered by 18 points, which is less than 2% annualized.</p><p>However, once the high discount is superimposed on the big market, the situation will completely change. The same is to buy an asset worth 3 yuan with 2 yuan in cash. You can call it a discount rate of 33% or you can call it a leverage ratio of 1.5x. The discount rate becomes leverage!</p><p><b>Therefore, the ultra-high return of base closure is actually the result of the superposition of two factors. First, the high discount caused by the rapid development of the fund industry from 2001 to 04, and second, the magnificent bull market in 2006 and 07.</b></p><p>Of course, like other investment opportunities, if you want to bargain against the market, you have to overcome several scary \"ghost stories\". For example, at that time, it was rumored in the market that the closed-end foundation of the same company transferred benefits to the open-end fund. But as we have shown earlier, most Christians simply do not have the ability to choose their foundations. At the risk of violating laws and regulations, the fund manager finally gave his colleagues 2 points of income. As a result, the Christians didn't know it at all, and even ran more instead. Why the trouble?</p><p>Others worry that fund managers with closed bases will operate chaotically and deliberately lose money. Which is even more ridiculous. First of all, deliberately losing money is not good for either the fund company or the fund manager. What's more, under the efficient market assumption, the difficulty of deliberately losing money is the same as \"deliberately\" making money. If you buy junk stocks exclusively, you may make more money instead.</p><p>There used to be a joke that if the forecast accuracy of strategy analysts can be 70%, they can get an annual salary of 1 million. If the accuracy rate drops to 50%, then he's worthless. But if the accuracy rate drops further to 5%, then he should be worth 5 million a year. Why is it? Because positive indicators and negative indicators are of the same value, you just have to listen to them in reverse. The key is that the accuracy rate should deviate from 50%. The more you bias, the better. It doesn't matter where you bias.</p><p>As mentioned earlier, after the closure of the base in 2001, the regulators were unwilling to completely give up the position of closed-end funds. However, the habit of short-term speculation by retail investors is stubborn, and open-end funds have established their mainstream position. At this time, if we continue to issue classic closed-end funds, there is a high probability that we will face the problem of discount when listed. In theory, holders can just hold themselves without looking at the market price. However, the reality is that the floating loss of market price has brought a great negative impact on fund sales. So regulators handed the issue over to fund companies to design innovative closed-end funds to attract investors.</p><p>In September 2007, Dacheng Preferred went public. It is the first innovative closed-end fund in the A-share market. Its innovations are mainly two: First, it sets performance reward, and the commission ratio is 10% above the water level. Second, the re-opening clause is set. If the discount exceeds 20% for 50 consecutive trading days, it will be changed from closed-end fund to open-end fund.</p><p>When Dacheng was first listed, the market was looking forward to the magic of performance reward, hoping that it could mobilize the enthusiasm of the investment and research team of the fund company and create star achievements. However, from the results, the performance of the fund is not ideal, so after a short premium, it quickly transferred to a discount transaction, and the discount range even exceeded the classic base closure.</p><p>The second innovative closed-end fund in the A-share market is called Ruifu Enterprising, and it has two innovations: First, it has designed a more complicated leverage mechanism. The leverage ratio is roughly around 2x. Second, the reopening clause is also set. If the discount exceeds 30% for 60 consecutive trading days, it will be reopened.</p><p>From its listing in 2007 to its expiration in 2012, Redford Enterprising has a duration of 5 years, basically realizing continuous premium trading, with an average premium rate of about 20%. For this alone, it is obvious that it is more successful than Dacheng Preferred. The reason seems to be simply attributed to the fact that retail investors love leverage more than they expect for active management.</p><p>In April 2010, CICC opened stock index futures, and the leverage ratio can easily reach more than 5 times. The aggressive premium rate of Redford subsequently declined significantly, and even discounted for a time. In 2012, Furui aggressively renewed the contract, and the leverage ratio returned from more than 3 times to 2 times. The market interest was weaker, and the price dropped rapidly until the discount rate was close to 20%.</p><p>It can be seen that A-share retail investors like short speculation first and leverage second. As for the trust in expert financial management, if it exists, it will rank third at most. In 2018, Xingquan, managed by Xie Zhiyu of Xingquan Fund, was suitably issued, with a daily sales of 30 billion yuan, which can be called an explosion. The fund was closed for the first year, and as a result, it was still discounted by 6% once it was listed. It opened after a year, and the holding share ran off half as \"conventional\". It can be seen that it is difficult for star fund managers to escape this strange cycle.</p><p><b>V. Graded Fund</b></p><p>According to the original idea, the regulators want to establish a gentleman's agreement with retail investors. The regulatory authorities put forward the two characteristics of \"performance\" and \"leverage\" in exchange for retail investors accepting the condition of \"closure\". But now that the gentleman's agreement can't be done, wouldn't it be beautiful to simply graft the \"leverage\" into the open-end fund and directly scale it?</p><p>The basic principles of this kind of open-end funds with leverage function are mostly divided into AB levels. The money of the two levels is invested together, and all losses and profits are borne by Grade B, while Grade A only takes fixed income. So they are collectively called tiered funds.</p><p>Overseas, leveraged funds are generally only leveraged and have no priority. Or, they all use virtual priorities. The functions corresponding to the priority are realized by investment banks or derivatives markets. The advantage of this is that the scale of the priority can be scaled at any time.</p><p>For example, 2x leveraged funds. If investors put in 100 million yuan, the fund company will borrow another 100 million yuan to allocate funds to it. Then today the market fell 5%, investors took a loss of 10 million, and the principal dropped to 90 million. Near the close of the day, the fund company will reduce the allocation amount to 90 million, so that the leverage of the fund will still be twice. If the market rises tomorrow, it will be adjusted back. Therefore, this allocation amount has to be adjusted every trading day.</p><p>From the perspective of investment varieties, the priority funds in overseas leveraged funds are actually a piece of fat. The safety is high, the profitability is good, and the best of both worlds. The only downside is that it has to be \"come and go\" and unstable.</p><p>Our A-share graded fund is equivalent to taking out this fat and distributing it to other interested Christians to enjoy. The price of this, of course, is that the size of the priority can only be adjusted under some predetermined special circumstances, and it is impossible to close and zoom once a day.</p><p>This kind of innovation, the intention is not bad. However, in the specific market environment, problems arise. The first crisis of graded funds occurred on May 20th, 2014. The protagonist is Yinhua Ruijin, which is a B-level, that is, a leveraged fund. It is passive in investment, pegged to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index. Therefore, the rise and fall of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index completely determines its net value. In terms of sales, it is very successful. It has been on the market for 4 years, from 1 billion to more than 10 billion. But the problem lies in the scale.</p><p>Due to the continuous decline of the market from 2011 to 2014, coupled with the continuous payment of priority interest, the net value of Yinhua Ruijin has reached the vicinity of the warehouse line. In other words, if it falls again, it may affect the security of priority funds. Therefore, once the exposure line is reached, the product will be partially closed.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/338c1c17b086c4274475aeedc22f6172\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"464\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>As we have explained earlier, during the previous decline, the priority scale of graded funds will not be gradually adjusted. Therefore, once partial liquidation occurs, the potential one-time selling amount will be as high as more than 10 billion. At this time, the average daily turnover of the whole Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index is only more than 10 billion. Once the exposure event occurs, it is tantamount to a heavy hammer for the already tired market.</p><p>Moreover, because Yinhua Ruijin is a passive fund pegged to the index, the fund manager has no right to actively adjust the position. As long as the index falls below the corresponding point, Yinhua Ruijin is completely certain.</p><p>As a result, a miracle happened. At 9: 38 a.m. on May 20th, 2014, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index obviously fell below the warehouse line of Yinhua Ruijin, and then it was immediately pulled up in a straight line. Moreover, this tiny golden needle actually became the historical bottom of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index, and it has never fallen below since then. The picture below is the time-sharing record I left in that year:</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0483c2453de1675c635e63d0ceb881a0\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"448\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>Where this mysterious power came from is still an unsolved mystery. Maybe because this incident came close in the end, there were almost no waves in the industry or outside.</p><p>Two levels of AB of graded funds have their own net worth and price respectively. However, because they cannot be purchased and redeemed separately, they may appear at a large discount or premium, respectively. However, A and B together, as a complete open-end fund, can be purchased and redeemed. So the sum of prices of A and B cannot deviate significantly from the sum of net worth.</p><p>For example, both A and B have a net value of 1. At this time, the price of A can be 1.2, then the price of B is 0.8, or the price of A is 0.7, then the price of B is 1.3. In summary, the prices of the two can deviate from the net worth separately, but the sum of the two must be stable. Otherwise, there will be arbitrage opportunities.</p><p>Due to the love of retail investors for leverage, there are still quite a lot of arbitrage opportunities where graded funds have a premium. But the vast majority of such opportunities are \"visible and intangible\". Theoretically it holds, but it can't be implemented operationally. There are four main reasons:</p><p>First and foremost,<b>The vast majority of graded funds cannot be purchased and redeemed in real time.</b>If you observe a premium on T day, subscribe before the close of the day. The fund company confirms the share on T +1. On T +2, the fund share is reflected in the brokerage system, and you have to make a spin-off order, and you can sell A and B respectively on T +3. At this time, is the premium still there? Generally speaking, it's gone. If it's still there, the arbitrage is a success. So this problem is also related to the stability of the premium level.</p><p>Number two, is<b>The price of the A-Class is volatile. Because A-rated investors usually think of it as a long-term bond.</b>They think about the problem like this: I invest 100 yuan today, and the annual interest rate is 6%, so the interest for 10 years is 60 yuan, the interest for 20 years is 120 yuan, and the interest for 30 years is 180 yuan... So if the interest rate changes by 1%, it will have a great impact on them. However, the price change of 1% for Class A does not affect them much. Of course, institutional investors will be more elaborate. But the trading volume of Class A is too small, there is no liquidity, and institutions rarely participate.</p><p>Number three, that is,<b>Premium levels for Class B are also volatile. When there is no trend in the market, retail investors generally regard Class B as an artifact of oversold rebound.</b>That is to say, when the market plummets, Grade B often has a premium. After two or three days, this premium generally disappears whether the rebound occurs or not.</p><p>Number four, that is,<b>The subscription rate of graded funds can be as high as 1% to 1.5%, which greatly increases the cost of arbitrage transactions.</b></p><p>However, in the bull market of 2014 and 15, the above situation has undergone major changes, and the premium arbitrage of graded funds has become easier to realize.</p><p>First of all,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/601688\">Huatai Securities</a>The \"blind demolition\" business was launched, and other securities companies followed suit. The so-called blind demolition means that the fund company confirms the share on T +1, and it has not been reflected to the brokerage, so you will directly give the spin-off instruction to the brokerage. In this way, on T +2, the brokerage directly enters the split A and B into the system, and you can trade immediately. This technological innovation has greatly reduced the uncertainty of premium arbitrage.</p><p>Second, the price of Class A has stabilized. Since the second half of 2014, the central bank has continuously cut RRR and interest rates, and many insurance companies and fixed-income products have to go to the securities market to find income. Institutional investors are more rational, and soon stabilized the price of Class A in a small range, and stopped fluctuating randomly.</p><p>Third, the premium level of Grade B has also stabilized. This principle is the simplest, but it is also the most crucial: the bull market is coming, with great pride and a premium all the way.</p><p>Article 4, the subscription fee is usually calculated as a percentage, but the highest grade has an upper limit of 1,000 yuan, so for funds of more than 5 million yuan, the fee no longer constitutes a limit. Why did it constitute a restriction before? Because of the poor liquidity in the past, the amount of money invested in an arbitrage was too large, and I was afraid that it would not come out. In the bull market, liquidity has improved greatly, and the whole funds can go directly.</p><p>From the end of 2014 to mid-2015, funds focused on premium arbitrage of graded funds yielded about 2 to 3 times. This performance is stronger than most Public Offering of Funds, but it is not too exaggerated. However, its advantage is that \"don't hang the string without seeing the devil\", move when there is a signal, stop when there is no signal, and there is no problem of hesitation to cut meat. So the fruits of the bull market are preserved. Most public and private placements experienced severe pullback/retracement in the subsequent stock market crash.</p><p>So after the market peaks, are there any investment opportunities for graded funds? In fact, there are also, that is, to observe which B-levels will be exposed, and then buy the corresponding A-levels.</p><p>As we said earlier, in May 2014, the broader market experienced a close call potential crisis. At that time, it was a giant fund of Yinhua Ruijin, with a potential sell-off of about 10 billion yuan. However, during the stock market crash, the situation became several giant funds, plus dozens of small and medium-sized funds, tens of billions of potential selling, and it continued to burst out in a concentrated time period.</p><p>On August 24th, 2015, GEM B exploded, causing a sell-off of about 4.5 billion yuan. On August 27th, Securities B was exposed, causing a sell-off of about 7.5 billion yuan. On August 28th, state-owned enterprises changed their positions to B, causing a sell-off of about 13 billion...</p><p>Because the terms, shares and net value information of Public Offering of Fund are public, under what circumstances these foundations are exposed to positions and how big the potential selling is, these key information are also public. Then, if you expect that a certain fund will be exposed, the most rational decision is to short-sell related stocks first, one is to hedge, and the other is to induce its exposure. Wait until the fund closes its position, and then buy it back from the low point. Facts have also repeatedly proved that every giant graded fund with exposure has smashed a pit in the market, and the liquidation plate is always cut at the lowest point.</p><p>The above characteristics are extremely unfavorable to Class B, while the corresponding benefit is Class A. The specific calculation is more complicated, so I will skip it here. If you are interested, you can consult the prospectus of relevant funds and other materials.</p><p>The fact that the graded fund \"passively smashed the market\" in the stock market crash has caused widespread criticism inside and outside the industry. In 2018, the CSRC issued the New Regulations on Asset Management, requiring all graded funds to be fully transformed. However, until early 2020, a large number of graded funds were still trading. However, I believe that even if graded funds really disappear, there will be newer varieties in the future.</p><p>The net worth vs. price story will continue.</p><p>Author: Ding Chang</p>","source":"lsy1617412441808","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Twenty Years of Public Offering of Fund</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nTwenty Years of Public Offering of Fund\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<p class=\"head\">\n<strong class=\"h-name small\">小鲜传</strong><span class=\"h-time small\">2021-04-03 09:00</span>\n</p>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><b>Passionate Years</b></p><p>In 1986, the then<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/601398\">ICBC</a>Subordinate Shanghai Trust and Investment Company established a securities business department to start stock trading. In 1988, the People's Bank of China approved the pilot trading of treasury bills in several cities. In 1990, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges opened one after another. In 1992, Shenzhen, Shenyang, Dalian, Wuhan and other places set up mutual funds. In August 1993, Zibo Fund from Shandong was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, becoming the first listed fund in China. Subsequently, many funds were listed and traded in various places. The net issuance value of Zibo Fund is 1 yuan, and the closing price on the day of listing is 5 yuan. In 2000, Zibo Fund was restructured and merged into Fund Hanbo. During the existence of the fund, the highest transaction price reached 12.39 yuan, and the lowest price was 1.6 yuan. Prices are consistently well above net worth. In the eyes of today's investors, such a \"record\" is inevitable to hide their faces and laugh: people were really stupid and had more money back then. But is history really that simple? I'm afraid not really either.</p><p>Zibo Fund is directly approved by the Head Office of the People's Bank of China, and mainly invests in the equity of township enterprises and related service industries in Zibo area. This part of investment is not less than 60% of the net value of the fund. At the same time, you can invest in all kinds of bonds and listed company stocks, and this part of the investment is no more than 40% of the net value of the fund.</p><p>It can be seen that this Zibo fund is not the securities investment fund we usually understand now, but a mix of securities and industrial investment funds. Moreover, in the legal sense, it is obviously not established by contract, but an independent legal person approved by the central bank. Or we can simply say that it is actually a listed company mainly engaged in investment holding.</p><p>If you look at its valuation in that light, it's easy to understand. In 1993, China's economy overheated across the board. The year-on-year growth rate of CPI was 14.7%, and the growth rate of fixed asset investment was 45.3%. The pursuit of investment opportunities has reached a frenetic level. The ultra-high premium of Zibo Fund is the micro reflection of this macro background.</p><p>In the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Luo Guanzhong arranged a line for Zhang Jiao, the leader of the Yellow Turban Uprising: The most rare thing is the hearts of the people. Today, the hearts of the people have been smooth, if we don't take advantage of the situation to take the world, it is a pity. For Zibo Fund, the situation it faces is not far from that of Zhang Jiao. If the market gives me a valuation of 10 times PB, then I can double my net worth by issuing 10% more share capital. The money raised can easily get double-digit returns no matter where it is placed, even in Treasury bills with value-preservation subsidies. If the share capital is diluted by 10% and the profit doubles, isn't the performance explosive?</p><p><b>If the performance growth is enough to maintain a high valuation, or even push the valuation level to rise further, then it will form a cycle of high valuation, high financing and high growth. And this process is exactly what Soros calls reflexivity.</b></p><p>Unfortunately, from its listing in 1993 to its restructuring in 2000, the regulatory authorities never gave Zibo Fund such an opportunity. Only in 1995, several listed funds, including Zibo Fund, experienced a brief hype. The reason is that it is rumored that the Fund Management Law will be promulgated in that year, and small-cap funds may be expanded. And the expansion of recruitment is the key to driving the reflexive process. So do you say that the market at that time was just \"people are stupid and have more money\"?</p><p>However, the legendary Fund Management Law has always disappeared. It was not until 1997 that the CSRC promulgated the Interim Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment Funds. In 2003, the Securities Investment Fund Law was approved by the National People's Congress and officially became a national law. Please note that compared with the rumors in 1995, the name of the law finally passed includes four more words \"securities investment\".</p><p><b>China's securities investment funds finally choose the contractual legal system.</b>The fund company is the manager. The shares issued by the fund are beneficiary certificates, and the holders of the fund shares are customers. All these arrangements seem to be natural today. In fact, besides this, there is a legal system of corporate funds.</p><p>A corporate fund itself is a legal person, which can issue shares, and the fund manager and investors jointly hold its shares. Many of the industrial investment funds we can see today are corporate funds. In China, there are probably no corporate securities investment funds. However, in the United States, there are also many corporate securities investment funds.</p><p>From the perspective of reflexivity, contractual funds are not reflexive. Because when customers subscribe for fund shares, they only use net value as the price. That is to say, only the stocks, bonds and cash held by the fund are priced, and the brand, reputation and historical performance of the fund itself, as well as the investment and research team, front and back offices, intangible assets and other resources of the fund company are not priced. Whether they add value or destroy it, they are ignored.</p><p>Therefore, in theory, contractual funds can't be issued at a high premium, and it is impossible to expand a large amount of capital with a small share capital, so the reflexive process can't be realized. Corporate funds are likely to be reflexive. For example, some industrial investment funds listed on the New Third Board achieved ultra-high premium issuance of about 10 times PB in 2014 and 15, and their net assets doubled.</p><p>For example, Silicon Valley Paradise had a share capital of 1.375 billion and a net asset of 3.37 billion in mid-2015. After the issuance, the share capital only increased to 1.477 billion, but the net assets doubled to 6.89 billion.</p><p>Another example is Zhongke Investment Promotion, with a share capital of 1.182 billion and net assets of 1.92 billion at the end of 2014. After the issuance, the share capital only increased to 1.8 billion, but the net assets surged to 14.6 billion.</p><p>You know, the general enterprise has to have a cycle of several months or even years from financing, production to generating benefits. However, many financial assets are invested and immediately begin to calculate the income. Therefore, if it were not for the stock market crash in the second half of 2015 and the market situation took a sharp turn for the worse, the performance outbreak of these companies would be almost a matter of iron plate. A classic reflexive process can be described as a shortfall.</p><p>For investors, when you participate in contractual funds, the relationship between you and the fund company is always the relationship between customers and managers. All the returns of the fund to you are reflected only in the net value of stocks, bonds and other assets. This fund and all other developments in the fund company have nothing to do with you. The fund company wants to recruit new customers, and it has nothing to do with you, an old customer.</p><p>However, in corporate funds, investors and fund companies are a team partnership that jointly starts a business and conquers the world. In addition to the net book value, investors can also enjoy the profits and losses brought by the fund company's \"competition in the Central Plains\". If a new investor wants to come in, it must get the majority approval of the original shareholders, and the price will certainly not be cheap. In today's industrial investment, the share price of round C generally can't be lower than that of round B, and the price of round D can't be lower than that of round C. This kind of first-come, first-served \"courtesy\" has almost become a rule.</p><p>We usually watch movies and TV series, and we hate others'\"spoilers\". Because if you know the ending in advance, you will not be able to fully substitute into the previous plot, which will affect the appreciation effect. When we study history, we also want to exclude the impact of spoilers. If at the turn of the century, China finally chose the corporate legal system. Then in 1993, it was quite reasonable to buy the earliest fund companies at a high premium.</p><p>In fact, in high-tech venture capital, card-slot investment is very common. For example, I am optimistic about a certain subdivision, but I can't see the technical route and competitive landscape clearly, so I will vote for all the best three or five companies on the market.<b>Moreover, the price at this time is not measured according to the immediate financial data, but inferred backwards according to the future industry prospects.</b>Because no matter which one gets bigger, I can be an old shareholder and collect the \"buying money\" paid by the latecomers.</p><p>In 2012, when Wang Yawei, a star fund manager, left Huaxia Fund, he calculated such an account with reporters. He has been a Public Offering of Fund manager for 14 years, from Fund Xinghua to Huaxia Market Selection. If dividends are reinvested, 1 yuan can be turned into 28 yuan in almost 14 years. This return is already pretty amazing. However, when Huaxia Fund itself was established in 1998, its registered capital was only 70 million. By the time of the equity transfer in 2012, the overall valuation was 16 billion yuan, plus dividends of up to 4 billion yuan during the period, and the return of rights restoration was more than 200 times. Therefore, in the same 14 years, the value growth of the fund company itself far exceeds the performance growth of the best funds in the whole market.</p><p>Whether the people who speculated on Zibo Fund ever had such a big dream is now untestable. Zibo Fund is like an abandoned road sign. What it points to is a \"parallel time and space\" completely different from the present world.</p><p><b>Second, attacked by both sides</b></p><p>In 1998, the Shanghai Composite Index fell by 3.97%. Behind this moderate figure is the stormy sea of macroeconomy and surrounding markets. In 1997, the baht began to depreciate. After entering 1998, the financial crisis swept Asia, Russia's Treasury Bond defaulted, and global stock markets plummeted.</p><p>Among the major markets in the world that year, Hong Kong stocks were under the greatest pressure. Because Hong Kong's economic fundamentals are highly correlated with East Asia, the legal tender value of the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the US dollar. If the Hong Kong dollar can depreciate, then the price of Hong Kong dollar-denominated stocks can get some support. Therefore, despite the Hong Kong government's direct entry into the market and strong intervention, by August 1998, the Hang Seng Index was still nearly halved.</p><p>During this period, the trend of A shares was calm. However, the regulators have long been worried, and the pressure is even greater than in Hong Kong. On the one hand, the state has promised that the yuan will not depreciate. On the other hand, at that time, the overall P/E of A shares was as high as 40 times, and only 5% of individual stocks had a P/E of less than 20 times. Moreover, bookmakers are rampant, speculative and speculative, and a large number of retail investors are addicted to it. Once foreign predators break in, the consequences are unimaginable.</p><p>The concept of bookmaker has been far from A shares for many years. The so-called bookmaker in those days refers to a person or capital group. They controlled the vast majority of circulating shares of listed companies, and then they could control the rise and fall of stock prices at will by turning their left hand over their right hand. Then in the next day or days, whether the stock price will rise or fall will become the bottom set by the bookmaker, and retail investors will guess this mystery, just like the pressure size in the casino.</p><p>If the dealer manipulates skillfully, the banker game can last for a long time. However, once they failed, the result was also very tragic. In 2003, the Delong Department collapsed, and they were the banker<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/000633\">Alloy Investments</a>The trend of a 95% plunge is as follows:</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/237422e025b1ec69079e44fc95daa788\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"457\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>Under this background, the \"Old Ten\" Public Offering of Fund Management Company came out. At this time, the fund can be described as being ordered in danger. Their mission has always been two. On the one hand, we should introduce new investment styles to the market. Prove that you can make money without sitting on the banker, thus improving the market pricing efficiency. On the other hand, we should also educate investors. It proves that diversified investment and long-term investment are better than short-term speculation, thus changing investors' risk appetite.</p><p>Based on these two considerations, from 1998 to 2001, most of the newly issued funds had two characteristics. First, the scale is particularly large, either 2 billion or 3 billion. Even if this scale is looked at more than ten years later, it is considerable. And the 3 billion of that year is no more than the 3 billion of today. You know, in 1998, China's GDP was less than 10% of 2020, and the M2 money supply was less than 5% of 2020. The second is long-term closure, and the closure period is unified to 15 years. I bought it when I was babbling, and I was already a college student when I came out. This design is quite a test of investors' patience. Later, many \"old funds\" issued before 1998, like Fund Zibo, were also transformed into such large-scale and long-term closed \"new funds\".</p><p>The issuance of the new fund was warmly welcomed by shareholders. The five funds issued in 1998, with a scale of 2 billion each, totaling 10 billion, attracted a total of 536.6 billion subscription funds, with an average winning rate of less than 2%. The unsuccessful funds were transferred to the secondary market and vigorously pursued, making the premium of the new fund as high as more than 100%. Its fanaticism is no different from the \"old fund\".</p><p>However, the plate of the new fund is too big after all, and the issuance speed is gradually accelerating. In 1999, the issuance size of new funds increased from 2 billion to 3 billion each. The hot money on the floor soon couldn't support it. A premium turns into a parity, and a parity turns into a discount.</p><p>The following chart shows the changing trend of the discount and premium of listed closed-end funds and the total size of the fund industry from 1998 to 2015. Among them, the fund data excludes the samples that are listed for less than 60 days and have a duration of less than one year. The total scale of the fund industry only counts stock and hybrid funds, and it is displayed on the logarithmic axis.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f139ba9aa73b2889cacf2f6806d3c1b2\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"523\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>As can be seen from the above chart, with the large-scale issuance of new funds, the premium rate of closed-end funds quickly plunged and turned into a discount. Throughout 2000 plus the first three quarters of 2001, no new funds were issued. The base closure premium rate gradually turned positive.</p><p>In September, 2001, the open-end fund came out, the fund issuance was accelerated again, and the base closing premium rate was all the way down to about-30%. After 2008, the scale of the fund industry tended to be stable, and the base closure premium rate also rose to about-10% and stabilized again until the last base closure expired in 2016. In 2001,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/CHN\">China Fund</a>The development route of the industry has once again made a strategic choice, from closed-end funds to open-end funds. Why do you make this change? The most common explanation is that open-end funds allow Christians to vote with their feet, contributing to the survival of the fittest in the fund industry. This statement seems grandiose and cannot be refuted.<b>In fact, just like the vast majority of investors have no ability to choose stocks, there is no evidence that as a group, Christians have the ability to \"choose the base\".</b></p><p>In May, 2020, the author made statistics on all stock-type and partial stock-type open-end funds of A shares, and examined the scale changes after their issuance. The results showed that the median change in size was-30.5% after half a year and-47% after one year.</p><p>Why use the median? Because a small fund grows by 1000%, it is easy to skew the average. So for sample sets that are intrinsically very different, we usually look at the median. We can probably understand it in this way. The people of open-end funds run off one third in half a year and half a year, which is the most common situation.</p><p>I think the above results are enough to show that the discount of the base closure is not because the Christians are dissatisfied with their performance, but because of the deep-rooted short-term speculation habit. Holding it for a while, it always has to go. If you shut him down and don't let him redeem it, then he'd rather sell it at a discount in the secondary market.</p><p>What's more interesting is that in the above statistics, if we only look at those funds with a net worth of less than 1 yuan, their median size change after half a year is-22.8%, and their median size change after one year is-35.8%. In other words, after losing money, the Christians are unwilling to leave. Another symmetrical phenomenon is that many star funds are reluctant to accept the \"market reward\" and are afraid of expanding. For example, Wang Yawei's Huaxia Market Selection, although it is an open-end fund, has not been open for subscription for a long time, only for redemption. The above two phenomena add up to \"survival of the inferior\", which is completely the opposite of the popular explanation.</p><p><b>When the fund industry was developed, the slogan shouted was that \"expert financial management\" was better than retail investors. Unexpectedly, now experts have to cater to the short-term preferences of retail investors.</b>Isn't that putting the cart before the horse? Many new fund managers have to face tremendous marketing pressure from the beginning of their careers, and there is no opportunity to exercise a long-term vision. Even firmly bullish stocks have to cut at the bottom under redemption pressure. Therefore, the author believes that the shift from closed to open is a bad thing rather than a good thing for the growth of the investment research team, at least the loss is greater than the profit.</p><p>However, in the specific market environment at the turn of the century, these losses are probably a necessary price. Because the fund industry has always been attacked by both sides, it has to face both the market and customers. If necessary, only if you compromise with the customer can you better concentrate on dealing with the market.</p><p>From a micro point of view, no matter what method a fund company adopts, it must first increase the scale of the industry and solve the problem of food and clothing, and then it can calmly cultivate its own investment and research talent echelon. From a macro point of view, if the fund industry does not have a certain capital scale, it is impossible to form a discourse system of institutional investors in the market, and it is impossible to improve market efficiency.</p><p>By today's standards, so many fund managers in the market may not all know about value investment. However, there are at least double ten constraints (individual stocks account for no more than 10% of the net value of the fund, and the share capital held by the fund does not exceed 10%), coupled with a series of standardized management measures such as quarterly report disclosure, bank custody, and so on. It is definitely impossible to control, wash and violently make bankers like in the 1990s. At that time, it was already commendable to be able to achieve \"standardized operation\".</p><p>In fact, for many years, the regulators have not given up their efforts to \"resurrect\" closed-end funds. They use all kinds of sweetness to persuade investors in exchange for giving up the habit of short-term speculation. This also leads to another koan, which we will describe later.</p><p><b>Third, the mystery of discount premium</b></p><p>After 2001, the secondary market price of closed-end funds has been significantly lower than its net value for a long time. This may be the first market phenomenon in the history of A shares that can attract strong attention from academics. Today, dozens of papers discussing this phenomenon can be easily searched on CNKI.</p><p>According to academic norms, a literature review is required before research. However, this review by scholars has grafted the situation in China after 2001 to the experience of the United States and Britain. After all, there are just some English papers that are easy to find. As far as I can see, none of the articles mention the long, substantially above net worth history of \"old fund\" prices in China in the 1990s. Even after the restructuring in 1998, there is no article to review the V-shaped trend of new funds from premium to discount and then to premium.</p><p><b>So the question of the relationship between price and net worth becomes \"why closed-end funds always trade at a discount\". A concrete historical phenomenon becomes a matter of logic.</b>So what's the answer? Those papers in the United States are nothing more than looking for reasons in fees, accounting, and taxes. But these specific reasons simply do not exist in China. Therefore, we had to end with \"no conclusion\" or simply \"irrational market\".</p><p>In fact, if I want to say it, the answer is four words:<b>Oversupply</b>。 As simple as that, if the fund industry develops slowly and doesn't issue so many products, the base closure is likely to continue to trade at parity or even premium as it did before 2001.</p><p>The scale of a base closure is billions, and the daily transaction is only tens of millions, and the average turnover rate is below 1%. Can this 1% represent all Christians? Imagine how the commission price would be distributed if we required all holders to place a sell order? Maybe 10% will hang around the market price, 20% will hang between the market price and the net worth, 60% will hang around the net worth, and 10% will probably hang at a position much higher than the net worth. Of course, the above numbers are my intuitive guess, but this distribution relationship is probably not unreasonable.</p><p>A similar problem is the relationship between dividends and buybacks. Both are the means by which listed companies distribute cash. How they affect the stock price, academics don't know how many papers have published to discuss it. In fact, we can also think of it this way. If all shareholders are required to put up selling orders, then only a few percent or even a few thousandths of the entrustments will hang around the current price, and most other selling orders will hang at a position obviously higher or even far higher than the current price. In other words, the daily turnover rate of a stock is 5%, which only means that 5% of holding shareholders agree with the market price. Another 95% of shareholders' minds are valued above the current price, otherwise they would have chosen to sell.</p><p>Therefore, the effect of dividends is that the sun shines, and there is only one ex-right effect on the stock price.<b>Repurchase, on the other hand, eliminates the relatively least optimistic part of all shareholders in a targeted way. So buybacks have a strong effect of distorting the stock price upward.</b>I think this concise logic is more convincing than the frighteningly complex mathematical models.</p><p>The above is to explain discount transactions from the spatial dimension, and it is not difficult to understand from the temporal dimension. Many industries have experienced widespread losses or even industry-wide losses. Steel and coal in 2016 is the loss of the whole industry. What does that mean? This only means that some players should quit. If everyone holds up, they will continue to lose money. Fortunately, China has supply-side structural reform. The shipping industry is a fully international industry, and it has been losing money since 2008 until today.</p><p>Therefore, the base closure is generally discounted, including that most mutual funds in the United States can't outperform the index, which all shows that there are too many players, but there are still stupid money to support them. It is likely that this is a periodic phenomenon rather than a logical problem. The essential reason is that since 1980s, the global stock market has been in a long-term bull market, and has not experienced the full adjustment of 1930s and 1970s.</p><p>Since 1998, when he was appointed in crisis, China's fund industry has been mature. Having hardly experienced the blue ocean stage of natural accumulation, he entered the Red Sea directly according to the government's strategic plan. This is very similar to photovoltaic, wind power and other industries. That is to say, the competition within the industry is very fierce, even tragic. However, the overall output value has risen very quickly, and the systemic importance of the industry has increased dramatically.</p><p>China's fund industry began to develop from 0 in 1998. By 2007, nearly 30% of the circulating market value of A shares was controlled by fund companies. Note that more exciting than the 30% ratio is the momentum that has gone from 0 to 30% in less than a decade. It seems that 40%, 50%, 60% are all within reach.</p><p>As a result, some people in the head fund companies began to think about it. They feel that it is boring to just be a financial investor. They should be active investors and participate in the company's business decision-making. As far as Carl in the United States<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/IKAN\">Icahn</a>Like Baoneng and Anbang in previous years. In short, the time of bookmakers is long gone, and value investing is only the foundation. Under the new conditions, the gameplay has to be upgraded again.</p><p>The mood is completely understandable. After all, a company, whether you hold 3% or 30% of the shares, the enthusiasm, expectation and sense of responsibility will be completely different. Therefore, the overall atmosphere of the fund industry in those years was not inferior to the highlight moments of Internet giants. I think back to that period of green years, still can't help but surge in my heart. That feeling is similar to: The world is yours and ours, but at the end of the day it is ours.</p><p>Unfortunately, things are impermanent, and fate plays with people. At the beginning of 2020, the percentage of circulating market value of A shares controlled by fund companies was less than 7%. The dream of active investors can only be mapped to another parallel time and space.</p><p>From the perspective of the whole society, the investment research team of a fund company is only dozens of people. If they just bought and sold stocks, it wouldn't matter if the amount reached tens or hundreds of billions. However, if they can command dozens or hundreds of listed companies, even if it is just a few words for their interests, things will be much more complicated.</p><p>In the Great Recession of 2008, Wall Street has been widely criticized for taking too much of its public resources. This was even more evident during the Covid crisis in March 2020. It is not enough for the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates by 1 point at a time, it must be reduced to 0. It is not enough to buy Treasury Bond alone, but also to buy junk bonds. The government's various deficit plans are increased by 3 points or 5 points. If these policies are not enough, the stock market will lie underground and \"die\" for you to see. When the sugar was enough, it rolled over and sat up again, and it was still full of energy. If Wall Street does not have a strong willpower, it is obviously impossible to play such an effective game with the authorities if it is as scattered as Chinese investors, and it will shine brightly if it is given some sunshine.</p><p><b>Does China really want a Wall Street of its own? I am afraid I want it and I don't want it.</b></p><p><b>The first pot of gold</b></p><p>The author once talked with old colleagues in the Public Offering of Fund industry: There are so many investment schools in the market, and most fund managers start from scratch, and they are a blank sheet of paper before entering the industry. What are the factors that determine their style? Chen Yangfan of Mammoth Assets said: At first, everyone was randomly groping until they made the first pot of gold in their lives. And how they earned the first pot of gold, their style is basically what it is. I agree with this statement.</p><p>The \"new fund\" issued from 1998 to 2001, later known as the closed-end fund. It is the first pot of gold for many old investors and old people. Simply put, during the entire duration of Sealed Base, you can buy it casually with your eyes closed, and you can basically make money in the end. Of course, there is a window period where you can lose money when you buy it. But it is short, and it is not easy to choose it. And as long as you buy before the big bull market in 2007, you must make a big profit in the end.</p><p>From the end of 2004 to the end of 2012, the average return for closed-end funds was 540%, while the average return for open-end funds was 236% and the average return for individual stocks was 141%. The average return of closed-end funds can outperform all open-end funds except Huaxia Market Select, and can also outperform more than 93% of individual stocks.</p><p>Why are there such amazing results?<b>There are mainly two reasons, one is the high discount, and the other is the big market.</b></p><p>In 2004, the fund industry reluctantly climbed to the scale of 200 billion yuan, and it was almost completely unable to sprint to 300 billion yuan. Fan Yonghong, the first general manager of Huaxia Fund, recalled in Evergreen Fund that only 2 million copies were raised on the first day of issuance of Huaxia Market Selection, which was later Fengshen. The sales staff of Huaxia Fund even had to compete with people in the channel, \"a glass of wine for 1 million funds\". According to the general sales rebate, the number of 1 million seems to be not small. However, you should know that the subscription of 1 million Public Offering of Fund will first run away a large piece in a short time, and then the remaining part can only generate a management fee of 1.5% every year. After removing all kinds of costs, the actual benefit is likely to be negative.</p><p>In this severe oversupply market, the secondary market price of the base closure is well below its net value, with an average discount of 28%. However, if you only focus on these 28 points, it seems unattractive to spread it over the next few or more years to slowly recover. This is indeed the case. Until 2014, the average discount of base closure was more than 10 points. In ten years, the discount rate has only recovered by 18 points, which is less than 2% annualized.</p><p>However, once the high discount is superimposed on the big market, the situation will completely change. The same is to buy an asset worth 3 yuan with 2 yuan in cash. You can call it a discount rate of 33% or you can call it a leverage ratio of 1.5x. The discount rate becomes leverage!</p><p><b>Therefore, the ultra-high return of base closure is actually the result of the superposition of two factors. First, the high discount caused by the rapid development of the fund industry from 2001 to 04, and second, the magnificent bull market in 2006 and 07.</b></p><p>Of course, like other investment opportunities, if you want to bargain against the market, you have to overcome several scary \"ghost stories\". For example, at that time, it was rumored in the market that the closed-end foundation of the same company transferred benefits to the open-end fund. But as we have shown earlier, most Christians simply do not have the ability to choose their foundations. At the risk of violating laws and regulations, the fund manager finally gave his colleagues 2 points of income. As a result, the Christians didn't know it at all, and even ran more instead. Why the trouble?</p><p>Others worry that fund managers with closed bases will operate chaotically and deliberately lose money. Which is even more ridiculous. First of all, deliberately losing money is not good for either the fund company or the fund manager. What's more, under the efficient market assumption, the difficulty of deliberately losing money is the same as \"deliberately\" making money. If you buy junk stocks exclusively, you may make more money instead.</p><p>There used to be a joke that if the forecast accuracy of strategy analysts can be 70%, they can get an annual salary of 1 million. If the accuracy rate drops to 50%, then he's worthless. But if the accuracy rate drops further to 5%, then he should be worth 5 million a year. Why is it? Because positive indicators and negative indicators are of the same value, you just have to listen to them in reverse. The key is that the accuracy rate should deviate from 50%. The more you bias, the better. It doesn't matter where you bias.</p><p>As mentioned earlier, after the closure of the base in 2001, the regulators were unwilling to completely give up the position of closed-end funds. However, the habit of short-term speculation by retail investors is stubborn, and open-end funds have established their mainstream position. At this time, if we continue to issue classic closed-end funds, there is a high probability that we will face the problem of discount when listed. In theory, holders can just hold themselves without looking at the market price. However, the reality is that the floating loss of market price has brought a great negative impact on fund sales. So regulators handed the issue over to fund companies to design innovative closed-end funds to attract investors.</p><p>In September 2007, Dacheng Preferred went public. It is the first innovative closed-end fund in the A-share market. Its innovations are mainly two: First, it sets performance reward, and the commission ratio is 10% above the water level. Second, the re-opening clause is set. If the discount exceeds 20% for 50 consecutive trading days, it will be changed from closed-end fund to open-end fund.</p><p>When Dacheng was first listed, the market was looking forward to the magic of performance reward, hoping that it could mobilize the enthusiasm of the investment and research team of the fund company and create star achievements. However, from the results, the performance of the fund is not ideal, so after a short premium, it quickly transferred to a discount transaction, and the discount range even exceeded the classic base closure.</p><p>The second innovative closed-end fund in the A-share market is called Ruifu Enterprising, and it has two innovations: First, it has designed a more complicated leverage mechanism. The leverage ratio is roughly around 2x. Second, the reopening clause is also set. If the discount exceeds 30% for 60 consecutive trading days, it will be reopened.</p><p>From its listing in 2007 to its expiration in 2012, Redford Enterprising has a duration of 5 years, basically realizing continuous premium trading, with an average premium rate of about 20%. For this alone, it is obvious that it is more successful than Dacheng Preferred. The reason seems to be simply attributed to the fact that retail investors love leverage more than they expect for active management.</p><p>In April 2010, CICC opened stock index futures, and the leverage ratio can easily reach more than 5 times. The aggressive premium rate of Redford subsequently declined significantly, and even discounted for a time. In 2012, Furui aggressively renewed the contract, and the leverage ratio returned from more than 3 times to 2 times. The market interest was weaker, and the price dropped rapidly until the discount rate was close to 20%.</p><p>It can be seen that A-share retail investors like short speculation first and leverage second. As for the trust in expert financial management, if it exists, it will rank third at most. In 2018, Xingquan, managed by Xie Zhiyu of Xingquan Fund, was suitably issued, with a daily sales of 30 billion yuan, which can be called an explosion. The fund was closed for the first year, and as a result, it was still discounted by 6% once it was listed. It opened after a year, and the holding share ran off half as \"conventional\". It can be seen that it is difficult for star fund managers to escape this strange cycle.</p><p><b>V. Graded Fund</b></p><p>According to the original idea, the regulators want to establish a gentleman's agreement with retail investors. The regulatory authorities put forward the two characteristics of \"performance\" and \"leverage\" in exchange for retail investors accepting the condition of \"closure\". But now that the gentleman's agreement can't be done, wouldn't it be beautiful to simply graft the \"leverage\" into the open-end fund and directly scale it?</p><p>The basic principles of this kind of open-end funds with leverage function are mostly divided into AB levels. The money of the two levels is invested together, and all losses and profits are borne by Grade B, while Grade A only takes fixed income. So they are collectively called tiered funds.</p><p>Overseas, leveraged funds are generally only leveraged and have no priority. Or, they all use virtual priorities. The functions corresponding to the priority are realized by investment banks or derivatives markets. The advantage of this is that the scale of the priority can be scaled at any time.</p><p>For example, 2x leveraged funds. If investors put in 100 million yuan, the fund company will borrow another 100 million yuan to allocate funds to it. Then today the market fell 5%, investors took a loss of 10 million, and the principal dropped to 90 million. Near the close of the day, the fund company will reduce the allocation amount to 90 million, so that the leverage of the fund will still be twice. If the market rises tomorrow, it will be adjusted back. Therefore, this allocation amount has to be adjusted every trading day.</p><p>From the perspective of investment varieties, the priority funds in overseas leveraged funds are actually a piece of fat. The safety is high, the profitability is good, and the best of both worlds. The only downside is that it has to be \"come and go\" and unstable.</p><p>Our A-share graded fund is equivalent to taking out this fat and distributing it to other interested Christians to enjoy. The price of this, of course, is that the size of the priority can only be adjusted under some predetermined special circumstances, and it is impossible to close and zoom once a day.</p><p>This kind of innovation, the intention is not bad. However, in the specific market environment, problems arise. The first crisis of graded funds occurred on May 20th, 2014. The protagonist is Yinhua Ruijin, which is a B-level, that is, a leveraged fund. It is passive in investment, pegged to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index. Therefore, the rise and fall of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index completely determines its net value. In terms of sales, it is very successful. It has been on the market for 4 years, from 1 billion to more than 10 billion. But the problem lies in the scale.</p><p>Due to the continuous decline of the market from 2011 to 2014, coupled with the continuous payment of priority interest, the net value of Yinhua Ruijin has reached the vicinity of the warehouse line. In other words, if it falls again, it may affect the security of priority funds. Therefore, once the exposure line is reached, the product will be partially closed.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/338c1c17b086c4274475aeedc22f6172\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"464\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>As we have explained earlier, during the previous decline, the priority scale of graded funds will not be gradually adjusted. Therefore, once partial liquidation occurs, the potential one-time selling amount will be as high as more than 10 billion. At this time, the average daily turnover of the whole Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index is only more than 10 billion. Once the exposure event occurs, it is tantamount to a heavy hammer for the already tired market.</p><p>Moreover, because Yinhua Ruijin is a passive fund pegged to the index, the fund manager has no right to actively adjust the position. As long as the index falls below the corresponding point, Yinhua Ruijin is completely certain.</p><p>As a result, a miracle happened. At 9: 38 a.m. on May 20th, 2014, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index obviously fell below the warehouse line of Yinhua Ruijin, and then it was immediately pulled up in a straight line. Moreover, this tiny golden needle actually became the historical bottom of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index, and it has never fallen below since then. The picture below is the time-sharing record I left in that year:</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0483c2453de1675c635e63d0ceb881a0\" tg-width=\"1000\" tg-height=\"448\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"></p><p>Where this mysterious power came from is still an unsolved mystery. Maybe because this incident came close in the end, there were almost no waves in the industry or outside.</p><p>Two levels of AB of graded funds have their own net worth and price respectively. However, because they cannot be purchased and redeemed separately, they may appear at a large discount or premium, respectively. However, A and B together, as a complete open-end fund, can be purchased and redeemed. So the sum of prices of A and B cannot deviate significantly from the sum of net worth.</p><p>For example, both A and B have a net value of 1. At this time, the price of A can be 1.2, then the price of B is 0.8, or the price of A is 0.7, then the price of B is 1.3. In summary, the prices of the two can deviate from the net worth separately, but the sum of the two must be stable. Otherwise, there will be arbitrage opportunities.</p><p>Due to the love of retail investors for leverage, there are still quite a lot of arbitrage opportunities where graded funds have a premium. But the vast majority of such opportunities are \"visible and intangible\". Theoretically it holds, but it can't be implemented operationally. There are four main reasons:</p><p>First and foremost,<b>The vast majority of graded funds cannot be purchased and redeemed in real time.</b>If you observe a premium on T day, subscribe before the close of the day. The fund company confirms the share on T +1. On T +2, the fund share is reflected in the brokerage system, and you have to make a spin-off order, and you can sell A and B respectively on T +3. At this time, is the premium still there? Generally speaking, it's gone. If it's still there, the arbitrage is a success. So this problem is also related to the stability of the premium level.</p><p>Number two, is<b>The price of the A-Class is volatile. Because A-rated investors usually think of it as a long-term bond.</b>They think about the problem like this: I invest 100 yuan today, and the annual interest rate is 6%, so the interest for 10 years is 60 yuan, the interest for 20 years is 120 yuan, and the interest for 30 years is 180 yuan... So if the interest rate changes by 1%, it will have a great impact on them. However, the price change of 1% for Class A does not affect them much. Of course, institutional investors will be more elaborate. But the trading volume of Class A is too small, there is no liquidity, and institutions rarely participate.</p><p>Number three, that is,<b>Premium levels for Class B are also volatile. When there is no trend in the market, retail investors generally regard Class B as an artifact of oversold rebound.</b>That is to say, when the market plummets, Grade B often has a premium. After two or three days, this premium generally disappears whether the rebound occurs or not.</p><p>Number four, that is,<b>The subscription rate of graded funds can be as high as 1% to 1.5%, which greatly increases the cost of arbitrage transactions.</b></p><p>However, in the bull market of 2014 and 15, the above situation has undergone major changes, and the premium arbitrage of graded funds has become easier to realize.</p><p>First of all,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/601688\">Huatai Securities</a>The \"blind demolition\" business was launched, and other securities companies followed suit. The so-called blind demolition means that the fund company confirms the share on T +1, and it has not been reflected to the brokerage, so you will directly give the spin-off instruction to the brokerage. In this way, on T +2, the brokerage directly enters the split A and B into the system, and you can trade immediately. This technological innovation has greatly reduced the uncertainty of premium arbitrage.</p><p>Second, the price of Class A has stabilized. Since the second half of 2014, the central bank has continuously cut RRR and interest rates, and many insurance companies and fixed-income products have to go to the securities market to find income. Institutional investors are more rational, and soon stabilized the price of Class A in a small range, and stopped fluctuating randomly.</p><p>Third, the premium level of Grade B has also stabilized. This principle is the simplest, but it is also the most crucial: the bull market is coming, with great pride and a premium all the way.</p><p>Article 4, the subscription fee is usually calculated as a percentage, but the highest grade has an upper limit of 1,000 yuan, so for funds of more than 5 million yuan, the fee no longer constitutes a limit. Why did it constitute a restriction before? Because of the poor liquidity in the past, the amount of money invested in an arbitrage was too large, and I was afraid that it would not come out. In the bull market, liquidity has improved greatly, and the whole funds can go directly.</p><p>From the end of 2014 to mid-2015, funds focused on premium arbitrage of graded funds yielded about 2 to 3 times. This performance is stronger than most Public Offering of Funds, but it is not too exaggerated. However, its advantage is that \"don't hang the string without seeing the devil\", move when there is a signal, stop when there is no signal, and there is no problem of hesitation to cut meat. So the fruits of the bull market are preserved. Most public and private placements experienced severe pullback/retracement in the subsequent stock market crash.</p><p>So after the market peaks, are there any investment opportunities for graded funds? In fact, there are also, that is, to observe which B-levels will be exposed, and then buy the corresponding A-levels.</p><p>As we said earlier, in May 2014, the broader market experienced a close call potential crisis. At that time, it was a giant fund of Yinhua Ruijin, with a potential sell-off of about 10 billion yuan. However, during the stock market crash, the situation became several giant funds, plus dozens of small and medium-sized funds, tens of billions of potential selling, and it continued to burst out in a concentrated time period.</p><p>On August 24th, 2015, GEM B exploded, causing a sell-off of about 4.5 billion yuan. On August 27th, Securities B was exposed, causing a sell-off of about 7.5 billion yuan. On August 28th, state-owned enterprises changed their positions to B, causing a sell-off of about 13 billion...</p><p>Because the terms, shares and net value information of Public Offering of Fund are public, under what circumstances these foundations are exposed to positions and how big the potential selling is, these key information are also public. Then, if you expect that a certain fund will be exposed, the most rational decision is to short-sell related stocks first, one is to hedge, and the other is to induce its exposure. Wait until the fund closes its position, and then buy it back from the low point. Facts have also repeatedly proved that every giant graded fund with exposure has smashed a pit in the market, and the liquidation plate is always cut at the lowest point.</p><p>The above characteristics are extremely unfavorable to Class B, while the corresponding benefit is Class A. The specific calculation is more complicated, so I will skip it here. If you are interested, you can consult the prospectus of relevant funds and other materials.</p><p>The fact that the graded fund \"passively smashed the market\" in the stock market crash has caused widespread criticism inside and outside the industry. In 2018, the CSRC issued the New Regulations on Asset Management, requiring all graded funds to be fully transformed. However, until early 2020, a large number of graded funds were still trading. However, I believe that even if graded funds really disappear, there will be newer varieties in the future.</p><p>The net worth vs. price story will continue.</p><p>Author: Ding Chang</p>\n<div class=\"bt-text\">\n\n\n<p> source：<a href=\"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/m395rIc6dylcNhPzb2rxPQ\">小鲜传</a></p>\n\n\n</div>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/de92023587fed32587f80a2f2769d655","relate_stocks":{},"source_url":"https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/m395rIc6dylcNhPzb2rxPQ","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"2124759854","content_text":"一、激情岁月\n\n 1986年，当时的工商银行下属上海信托投资公司成立证券业务部，开办股票交易。1988年，人民银行批准在多个城市试点国库券交易。1990年，沪深交易所相继开业。1992年，深圳、沈阳、大连、武汉等地纷纷设立共同基金。1993年8月，来自山东的淄博基金在上交所挂牌，成为中国第一只上市基金。随后各地又有不少基金上市交易。淄博基金发行净值1元，上市当天收盘价5元。2000年，淄博基金改制，并入基金汉博。该基金在存续期间的成交价最高达到12.39元，最低价也有1.6元。价格始终远远高于净值。\n\n如此“纪录”在今天的投资者看来，难免掩面哂笑：当年真是人傻钱多啊。可是历史果真如此简单吗？恐怕亦不尽然。\n淄博基金由人民银行总行直接批准设立，主要投资于淄博地区的乡镇企业和相关服务产业股权，这部分投资不少于基金净值的60%。同时可以投资各类债券和上市公司股票，这部分投资不多于基金净值的40%。\n由此可见，这个淄博基金并非我们现在通常理解的证券投资基金，而是一个证券和产业投资基金的混合体。而且从法律意义上看，它显然不是依据契约成立的，而是由央行批准成立的独立法人。或者我们可以干脆说，它实际上就是一个主营投资控股的上市公司。\n如果从这个角度来看它的估值，那就容易理解了。1993年，中国经济全面过热。CPI同比增速14.7%，固定资产投资增速45.3%。人们对于投资机会的追求达到了狂热的程度。淄博基金的超高溢价，正是这一宏观背景的微观反映。\n在《三国演义》中，罗贯中给黄巾起义的领袖张角安排了一段台词：至难得者，民心也。今民心已顺，若不乘势取天下，诚为可惜。对淄博基金来说，它所面对的形势跟当年张角相去不远。假如市场给了我10倍PB的估值，那么我只要增发10%的股本，就可以把净资产翻一倍。融到的这笔钱，无论放在哪里，哪怕是放在保值补贴的国库券里，都可以轻松拿到两位数的回报。股本摊薄10%，而利润翻番，业绩岂不是爆发式增长？\n如果业绩增长足以维持高估值，甚至推动估值水平进一步高涨，那么它就形成了一个高估值、高融资、高增长的循环。而这个过程，正是索罗斯所说的反身性。\n只可惜，从1993年上市到2000年改制，监管层始终没有给淄博基金这样的机会。只是在1995年，包括淄博基金在内的几家上市基金经历过一次短暂的炒作。起因是传言《基金管理法》要在当年出台，小盘基金可能进行扩募。而扩募，正是驱动反身性过程的关键。所以你说当时的市场只是“人傻、钱多”么？\n不过传说中的《基金管理法》始终不见踪影。直到1997年，证监会才颁布了《证券投资基金管理暂行办法》。2003年，《证券投资基金法》经过人大批准，正式成为国家法律。请注意，相比1995年的传言，最终通过的法律名称中多了“证券投资”4个字。\n中国的证券投资基金，最终选择了契约型的法律体系。基金公司是管理人。基金发行的份额是受益凭证，基金份额的持有者是客户。这一切安排，在今天看来似乎是天经地义的。其实在此之外，还有一种公司型基金的法律体系。\n公司型基金本身是法人，可以发行股票，基金管理人和投资者共同持有它的股票。今天我们可以见到的许多产业投资基金就是公司型基金。在中国，公司型的证券投资基金大概没有。但是在美国，公司型的证券投资基金也是不少的。\n从反身性的角度来说，契约型基金是没有反身性的。因为客户认购基金份额时，只以净值作价。也就是说，只有基金持有的股票、债券、现金才计价，这个基金本身的品牌、声誉、历史业绩，基金公司方面的投研团队、前后台、无形资产等资源投入统统不计价。也不论它们是增加了价值还是毁灭了价值，一概忽略不计。\n因此，契约型基金理论上不可能出现高溢价发行，不可能实现以较小股本扩充大量资本，所以反身性过程也就无法实现。公司型基金则是有可能实现反身性的。比如在新三板上市的一些产业投资基金，它们在2014、15年实现了10倍PB左右的超高溢价发行，净资产成倍增长。\n比如硅谷天堂，2015年中期股本13.75亿，净资产33.7亿。增发后，股本只增加到14.77亿，净资产却倍增至68.9亿。\n再比如中科招商，2014年底股本11.82亿，净资产19.2亿。增发后，股本只增加到18亿，净资产却激增至146亿。\n要知道，一般企业从融资、投产到产生效益，得有一个数月乃至数年的周期。然而很多金融资产是投入进去立即开始计算收益的。所以如果不是2015年下半年发生股灾，市场行情急转直下，这些公司的业绩爆发几乎是铁板定钉的事情。一次经典的反身性过程，可谓功亏一篑。\n对于投资者来说，参与契约型基金，你跟基金公司之间永远是客户与管理人的关系。基金对你的所有回报，仅仅体现在股票、债券等资产的净值上面。这个基金以及基金公司的一切其他发展都与你无关。基金公司要招募新客户，也与你这个老客户无关。\n但是在公司型基金中，投资者与基金公司是共同创业打天下的团队伙伴关系。除了账面净值之外，投资者还可以享受到基金公司“逐鹿中原”带来的损益。如果有新的投资者想要进来，就必须得到原有股东的多数同意，价格当然也不会便宜。在今天的产业投资中，C轮的入股价格一般不能低于B轮，D轮的价格不能低于C轮，这种先来后到的“礼遇”几乎已经成为行规了。\n我们平时看电影、电视剧，都会讨厌别人“剧透”。因为如果提前知道了结局，会导致你无法充分代入前续剧情，影响欣赏效果。我们研究历史，同样要排除剧透的影响。假如在世纪之交，中国最终选择了公司型的法律体系。那么在1993年，高溢价买入最早的一批基金公司，就具有相当的合理性。\n事实上，在高科技创业投资中，卡位式投资是很普遍的。比如我看好某一个细分领域，但是技术路线和竞争格局看不清楚，那么我就把市面上最好的3家或者5家公司全都投一遍。而且这时候的价格，不是按照眼前的财务数据来测算的，而是按照未来的行业前景倒推出来的。因为无论哪一家做大了，我都可以作为老股东，坐收后来者上缴的“买路钱”。\n2012年，明星基金经理王亚伟离开华夏基金时，跟记者算了这样一笔账。他担任公募基金经理14年，从基金兴华到华夏大盘精选。如果分红再投资的话，差不多14年时间可以把1块钱变成28块钱。这个回报已经相当惊人。但是华夏基金本身在1998年成立的时候，注册资本只有0.7亿。而到2012年股权转让时，整体估值是160亿，外加期间还有高达40亿元的分红，复权收益在200倍以上。所以同样是14年，基金公司本身的价值增长要远远超过全市场最优秀的基金的业绩增长。\n当年炒作淄博基金的人们，是否曾经抱有如此远大的梦想，如今已不可考。淄博基金就像是一块废弃的路标。它所指向的，是一片与当今世界完全不同的“平行时空”。\n二、腹背受敌\n1998年，上证指数下跌3.97%。在这个温和的数字背后，却是宏观经济和周边市场的惊涛骇浪。1997年，泰铢开始贬值。进入1998年之后，金融危机席卷亚洲，俄罗斯国债违约，全球股市暴跌。\n在当年的全球主要市场中，承压最大的是港股。因为香港的经济基本面与东亚地区高度关联，但是港币的法定币值却与美元挂钩。假如港币可以贬值，那么以港币计价的股票价格多少可以得到一些支撑。因此，虽然香港政府直接入市，强力干预，但是跌至1998年8月，恒生指数仍然近乎腰斩。\n在此期间，A股的走势波澜不惊。可是监管层却早已忧心忡忡，压力更甚于香港。一方面，国家已经承诺人民币不贬值。另一方面，当时A股的整体市盈率却高达40倍，只有5%的个股市盈率在20倍以内。而且庄家横行，投机炒作，大量散户沉迷其中。一旦外资大鳄破门而入，后果不堪设想。\n庄家这个概念，已经远离A股很多年了。当年的所谓庄家，是指一个人或者资金集团，他们控制了上市公司绝大多数的流通股份，然后再通过左手倒右手，就可以随意控制股价的涨跌。那么在未来一天或几天，股价将会上涨还是下跌，就成了庄家设置的底，而散户则去猜这个谜，就像赌场中的压大小一样。\n庄家如果操纵得巧妙，做庄游戏可以持续很久。可是一旦玩砸了，结果也是非常惨烈的。2003年德隆系崩盘，他们做庄的合金投资暴跌95%的走势如下图：\n\n就在这样的时代背景下，“老十家”公募基金管理公司问世了。此时的基金，可谓临危受命。它们的使命从来都有两条。一方面，要为市场引入新的投资风格。证明不坐庄也可以赚钱，进而提高市场定价效率。另一方面，也要教育投资者。证明分散投资、长期投资胜于短炒，进而改变投资者的风险偏好。\n基于这两点考虑，从1998年到2001年，新发的基金大都具有两个特点。一是规模特别大，不是20亿就是30亿。这个规模即使放到十几年后来看，也算是相当可观了。而且当年的30亿可不比今天的30亿。要知道，1998年中国的GDP还不到2020年的10%，M2货币供应量还不到2020年的5%。二是长期封闭，封闭期统一为15年。牙牙学语时买进去，出来已经是大学生了。这个设计相当考验投资者的耐心。后来，许多1998年以前发行的，像基金淄博那样的“老基金”也都改制成了这样超大规模、长期封闭的“新基金”。\n新基金的发行得到了股民的热烈欢迎。1998年发行的5只基金，规模每支20亿，总计100亿，共吸引认购资金5366亿，平均中签率不到2%。未中签资金转入二级市场大力追捧，使得新基金的溢价高达100%以上。其狂热程度与“老基金”并无二致。\n不过新基金的盘子毕竟太大，发行速度也逐渐加快。1999年，新基金的发行规模更从每支20亿上升到30亿。场内游资很快就支撑不住了。溢价转为平价，平价再转为折价。\n下图显示了从1998年到2015年，上市的封闭式基金折溢价与基金行业总规模的变化趋势。其中基金数据剔除了上市不满60天以及存续期不满1年的样本，基金行业总规模只统计股票型和混合型基金，并以对数坐标轴显示。\n\n从上图可以看出，随着新基金大规模发行，封闭式基金的溢价率迅速跳水并转入折价。整个2000年加上2001年前3季度，没有新基金发行。封基溢价率又逐渐转正。\n2001年9月，开放式基金问世，基金发行再次提速，封基溢价率一路探低至-30%左右启稳。2008年之后，基金行业规模趋于稳定，封基溢价率也回升到-10%左右再次稳定，直至2016年最后一支封基到期。2001年，中国基金行业的发展路线再次做出战略抉择，从封闭式基金转向开放式基金。为什么要做这个变化呢？最常见的解释是，开放式基金允许基民用脚投票，有助于实现基金行业的优胜劣汰。这个说法看似冠冕堂皇，无法反驳。事实上，就像绝大多数股民没有选股能力一样，没有任何证据显示，作为一个群体，基民有“择基”能力。\n2020年5月，笔者对A股所有的股票型和偏股型开放式基金进行了统计，考查它们发行之后的规模变化。结果显示，半年后规模变化的中位数是-30.5%，一年后规模变化的中位数是-47%。\n为什么要用中位数呢？因为一个小基金增长1000%，很容易就把平均数给带偏了。所以对于内在差异很大的样本集合，我们通常看中位数。我们大概可以这样理解，开放式基金的基民，半年跑掉三分之一，一年跑掉一半，这是最常见的情况。\n我想，上述结果足以说明，封基的交易折价，并非是因为基民对它们的业绩不满意，而是因为根深蒂固的短炒习惯。持有了一阵子，总是要走的。假如你封闭了不让他赎回，那么他就宁可在二级市场上折价抛出。\n更有趣的是，在上述统计中，如果我们只看那些净值低于1元的基金，则它们半年后的规模变化中位数是-22.8%，一年后的规模变化中位数是-35.8%。也就是说，亏钱了，基民反而不愿意走了。与之对称的另一个现象是，许多明星基金很不情愿接受“市场的奖赏”，害怕扩大规模。典型如王亚伟的华夏大盘精选，虽然身为开放式基金，却长期不开放申购，只开放赎回。上述两个现象加起来，就是“劣胜优汰”，与流行的解释完全相反。\n当初发展基金行业，喊出来的口号就是“专家理财”胜于散户。没想到，现在专家反而要去迎合散户的短期偏好。这不是本末倒置吗？许多新任基金经理，从职业生涯一开始就要面对巨大的营销压力，根本没机会去锻炼长远眼光。即使是坚定看好的股票，在赎回压力下也不得不割在底部。因此笔者认为，从封闭式转向开放式，仅对投研团队的成长而言，是坏事而非好事，至少是损失大于收益。\n不过具体到世纪之交的市场环境，这些损失恐怕又是必要的代价。因为基金行业从来就是腹背受敌，既要面对市场，又要面对客户。在必要情况下，只有对客户妥协了，才能更好地集中精力对付市场。\n从微观上说，一家基金公司，无论采取什么方式，首先要把行业规模做上去，解决了温饱问题，然后才能从容地培养自己的投资、研究人才梯队。从宏观上说，基金行业如果没有一定的资金规模，在市场上就不可能形成机构投资者的话语体系，也就谈不上提高市场效率。\n以今天的标准看，市场上那么多基金经理，也未必个个都懂得价值投资。但是至少有双十约束（个股占基金净值不超过10%，基金持有股本不超过10%），再加上季报披露，银行托管，等一系列规范化管理手段，想要像1990年代那样控盘、洗盘、暴力做庄肯定是不行了。而在当年，能够做到“规范操作”这一点就已经难能可贵了。\n其实多年以来，监管层一直没有放弃“复活”封闭式基金的努力。他们用各种甜头去说服投资者，换取他们放弃短炒习惯。由此还引出了另一桩公案，我们放在后文讲述。\n三、折溢价之谜\n2001年之后，封闭式基金的二级市场价格长期、明显低于其净值。这可能是A股历史上第一个能够引起学术界强烈关注的市场现象。今天在中国知网上，可以轻松搜索到数十篇当年讨论这一现象的论文。\n按照学术规范，研究之前需要先做文献回顾。可是学者们这一回顾，就把中国2001年之后的情况，给嫁接到美国和英国的经验上去了。毕竟容易查到的英文论文就是那么一些。据我所见，没有一篇文章提到了中国在1990年代“老基金”价格长期、大幅高于净值的历史。甚至连1998年改制之后，新基金从溢价到折价再到溢价的V型走势，也同样没有一篇文章对此进行回顾。\n于是价格与净值的关系问题，变成了“为什么封闭式基金总是折价交易”。一个具体的历史现象变成了一个逻辑问题。那么答案是什么呢？美国的那些论文，无非是从费用、会计和税收上去找原因。可是这些具体原因在中国根本不存在。于是，只好以“没有结论”，或者干脆以“市场非理性”收场。\n其实要我说，答案就4个字：供过于求。就这么简单，假如基金行业发展得慢一点，不要发那么多产品，封基就很有可能继续像2001年之前那样，平价甚至溢价交易。\n一支封基的规模数十亿，每天成交不过几千万，平均换手率在1%以下。这1%的人能够代表全体基民吗？想象一下，假如我们要求所有持有人都必须挂出一个卖单，委托价格会怎么分布呢？可能有10%的人会挂在市场价附近，20%的人会挂在市场价与净值之间，60%会挂在净值附近，还有10%大概会挂在远高于净值的位置上。当然，以上数字是我全凭直觉猜的，但是这样的分布关系大概不无道理。\n类似的问题还有分红和回购的关系。这两者都是上市公司分配现金的手段，它们对股价的影响如何，学术界不知道发了多少篇论文来讨论。其实我们也可以这样想，假如要求所有股东必须挂出卖单，那么大概只有百分之几甚至千分之几的委托会挂在现价附近，其他绝大多数卖单都会挂在明显高于，甚至远远高于现价的位置上。换句话说，一支股票日换手率5%，只能说明有5%的持股股东认同市场价。另外95%的股东心里的估值是高于现价的，否则他们就选择卖出了。\n因此，分红的效果是阳光普照，对股价只有一个除权的效果。而回购则是定向地消灭了全体股东中相对最不看好的那一部分。所以回购具有强烈的向上扭曲股价的效果。我觉得，相比于复杂得吓人的数学模型，这个简洁的逻辑更有说服力。\n以上是从空间维度上来解释折价交易，从时间维度上也不难理解。很多行业都出现过普遍亏损甚至全行业亏损的局面。2016年的钢铁煤炭就是全行业亏损。这说明什么呢？这只说明应当有玩家退出，如果大家都硬挺着不退，那就继续亏。还好中国有供给侧结构性改革。航运业是完全国际化的行业，它从2008年一直亏损到今天。\n所以封基普遍折价，包括美国的共同基金大多不能跑赢指数，这都说明玩家太多了，但还有股傻钱支持着他们。这很可能是周期现象而非逻辑问题。本质原因还是1980年代以来，全球股市一直处于长期牛市当中，没有经历过1930、1970年代那样的充分调整。\n从1998年临危受命开始，中国的基金行业一直是被催熟的。几乎没有经历过自然积累的蓝海阶段，直接就按照政府的战略规划进入红海。这一点，与光伏、风电等行业非常类似。也就是说，行业内部竞争非常激烈，甚至可以说是惨烈。但是整体产值上得非常快，行业的系统重要性急剧提高。\n中国基金行业1998年从0开始发展，到2007年，已经有将近30%的A股流通市值被控制在基金公司名下。请注意，比30%这个比例更激动人心的，是不到十年时间从0冲到30%的这个势头，似乎40%、50%、60%都在唾手可得的范围之内。\n于是，头部基金公司中的一部分人，就开始浮想联翩了。他们觉得，光做财务投资者没意思，要做积极投资者，参与公司经营决策。远如美国的卡尔伊坎，近如前些年的宝能、安邦。总之，庄家的时代已经远去，价值投资也只是基础。在新的条件下，玩法还要再升级。\n这种心情是完全可以理解的。毕竟一个公司，你持股3%还是30%，投入的热情、期待和责任感都会截然不同。所以那几年基金行业的整体气氛，一点儿不逊色于互联网巨头的高光时刻。至今我回想起那段青葱岁月，仍不免心潮澎湃。那种感觉类似于：这个世界是你们的，也是我们的，但归根结蒂是我们的。\n只可惜，世事无常，造化弄人。2020年初，基金公司控制的A股流通市值比例还不到7%。积极投资者的梦想，只能被映射到另一个平行时空去了。\n从全社会来看，一家基金公司的投研团队不过区区数十人。如果他们只是买卖股票的话，金额达到几百亿、几千亿也都没有什么。可是如果他们能够指掌几十家、几百家上市公司，哪怕只是为它们的利益代言几句，事情都会复杂很多。\n在2008年的大衰退中，华尔街占用了太多的公共资源，这一点已经广受诟病。在2020年3月的新冠危机中，这一点更是表现得淋漓尽致。美联储一次降息1个点还不行，必须降到0，光买国债还不行，还要买垃圾债，政府的各种赤字计划更是3个点、5个点地往上加，这些政策不给足，股市就躺在地下“死”给你看。等糖给够了，它又翻身坐起来了，而且还精神百倍。如果华尔街没有坚强的意志力，像中国股民这样一盘散沙，给点阳光就灿烂，显然是不可能与当局进行如此有效的博弈。\n中国真的想要一条自己的华尔街吗？恐怕是既想，又不想。\n四、第一桶金\n笔者曾跟公募基金行业的老同事们聊起：市场上的投资流派那么多，而基金经理大多是白手起家，入行之前都是一张白纸。到底是什么因素决定了他们的风格呢？猛犸资产的陈扬帆说：一开始大家都是随机摸索，直到他们赚到了人生中的第一桶金。而这第一桶金是怎么赚到的，他们的风格基本就是什么样了。对此说法，我深以为然。\n1998到2001年发行的“新基金”，后来称为封闭式基金。它就是很多老股民、老基民的第一桶金。简单地说，封基这个品种，在它的整个存续期间，你可以闭着眼睛随便买，拿到最后基本上都能赚钱。当然，买了能亏钱的窗口期是存在的。但是很短，要选到也不容易。而且你只要是在2007年大牛市之前买入，那么最后一定是大赚特赚。\n从2004年底到2012年底，封闭式基金的平均回报是540%，而开放式基金的平均回报是236%，个股的平均回报是141%。封闭式基金的平均回报可以跑赢除华夏大盘精选之外的所有开放式基金，也可以跑赢93%以上的个股。\n为什么会有如此惊人的结果呢？主要是两方面的原因，一是高折价，二是大行情。\n2004年，基金行业勉为其难地攀上了2000亿规模，几乎已经完全无力再向3000亿冲刺了。华夏基金的首任总经理范勇宏在《基金常青》中回忆到，后来封神的华夏大盘精选，发行首日只募集了200万份。华夏基金的销售人员甚至不得不跟渠道的人拼酒，“一杯酒换100万基金”。按照一般的销售返点来理解，100万这个数字似乎不小。可是要知道，100万的公募基金认购，首先短期内就会跑掉一大块，然后剩下的部分每年只能产生1.5%的管理费，去除各种成本之后，实际效益很可能是负数。\n在这种严重供过于求的市况下，封基的二级市场交易价格远远低于其净值，平均折价达到28%。可是如果你眼睛只盯着这28个点，把它分摊到未来几年十几年里去慢慢回复，似乎也没什么吸引力。事实也确实如此，直到2014年，封基的平均折价还有10个点以上。十年时间，折价率只回复了18个点，年化不到2%。\n可是一旦高折价叠加大行情，那情况就完全改观了。同样是用2块钱现金买入价值3块钱的资产。你可以称它为33%的折价率，也可以称之为1.5倍的杠杆率。折价率变成了杠杆率！\n所以封基的超高回报，其实是两个因素叠加的结果。一是2001到04年基金行业超速发展导致的高折价，二是2006、07年波澜壮阔的大牛市。\n当然，跟其他投资机会一样，想要逆市抄底，总得克服几个吓人的“鬼故事”。比如说，当时市场风传，同一个公司的封闭式基金会向开放式基金做利益输送。可是我们前面已经证明了，大多数基民根本就没有择基能力。基金经理冒着违规违法的风险，好不容易给同事送了2个点的收益，结果基民们根本不知道，甚至反而跑得更多了。何苦来哉？\n还有人担心封基的基金经理会乱操作，故意亏钱。这就更可笑了。首先，故意亏钱对基金公司和基金经理都没有好处。更何况，在有效市场假设下，故意亏钱的难度和“故意”赚钱是一样的。你去专买垃圾股，很可能反而赚得更多。\n以前有一个玩笑话，说是策略分析师的预测准确率能有70%，就可以拿100万年薪。如果准确率下降到50%，那他就一文不值了。可是如果准确率进一步下降到5%，那么他就应该价值年薪500万。为什么呢？因为正向指标和反向指标的价值是一样的，你只要反过来听就可以了。关键是准确率要偏离50%，偏得越多越好，往哪里偏倒不重要。\n前文说到，2001年封基停发之后，监管层并不愿意完全放弃封闭式基金这块阵地。可是散户短炒的习惯很顽固，开放式基金也已经确立了主流地位。此时如果继续发行经典型的封闭式基金，大概率又会面临上市即折价的问题。理论上说，持有人可以不看市场价格，只管自己持有。但现实情况是，市价浮亏给基金销售带来了极大的负面影响。于是监管层把这个问题交给基金公司，让它们设计一些创新型封闭式基金来吸引投资者。\n2007年9月，大成优选上市。它是A股市场第一只创新型封闭式基金。它的创新主要是两条：一是设置了业绩报酬，提成比例是水位线以上10%。二是设置了转开放条款，如果连续50个交易日折价超过20%，就从封闭式基金转为开放式基金。\n大成优选刚刚上市时，市场对业绩报酬的魔力非常期待，希望它能够调动基金公司投研团队的积极性，创造出明星佳绩。但是从结果上看，基金业绩并不理想，所以在短暂溢价之后，很快就转入折价交易，折价幅度甚至超过了经典型封基。\nA股市场的第二只创新型封闭式基金叫做瑞福进取，它的创新也有两条：一是设计了一个比较复杂的杠杆机制。杠杆比率大致在2倍左右。二是同样设置了转开放条款，如果连续60个交易日折价超过30%，则转开放。\n瑞福进取从2007年上市到2012年到期，存续期5年，基本上实现了持续溢价交易，平均溢价率在20%左右。仅就这一点而言，显然它比大成优选成功。其中原因，似乎可以简单归结为散户对杠杆喜爱，超过了对主动管理的期待。\n2010年4月，中金所开放股指期货，杠杆比率可以轻松达到5倍以上。瑞福进取的溢价率随之明显下滑，甚至一度出现折价。2012年，福瑞进取按合同续期，杠杆率从3倍多回归到2倍，市场兴趣更淡，价格迅速走低，直到折价率接近20%才企稳。\n由此可见，A股散户第一喜欢短炒，第二喜欢杠杆。至于对专家理财的信任么，如果存在的话，也顶多排第三。2018年，兴全基金的谢治宇管理的兴全合宜发行，一日售磬300亿，堪称爆款。该基金首年封闭，结果一上市照样折价6%。一年后开放，持有份额按“惯例”跑掉一半。可见明星基金经理也难以逃脱这个怪圈。\n五、分级基金\n按照原本的思路，监管层是想跟散户建立一个君子协定。监管层拿出“业绩”和“杠杆”这两个特性，换取散户接受“封闭”这个条件。可是现在君子协定眼见得做不成了，干脆把“杠杆”嫁接到开放式基金上去，直接做规模，岂不美哉？\n这一类具有杠杆功能的开放式基金，基本原理大都是分成AB两级。两级的钱放到一起投资，亏了赚了都由B级承担，A级只拿固定收益。所以它们统称为分级基金。\n在海外，杠杆基金一般只有杠杆级，没有优先级。或者说，它们都使用虚拟的优先级。与优先级相应的功能，都是由投行或者衍生品市场来实现的。这样做的好处是优先级的规模可以随时缩放。\n比如说2倍杠杆基金。投资者放1个亿进来，基金公司就再去借1个亿给它配资。然后今天市场跌了5%，投资者承担0.1亿损失，本金下降到0.9亿。当天临近收盘时，基金公司就要把配资金额也缩减到0.9亿，这样一来，基金的杠杆就仍然保持2倍。明天市场要是涨了，就再调回去。所以这个配资金额，每个交易日都要调整一次。\n从投资品种的角度看，海外杠杆基金中的优先资金其实是一块肥肉。安全性又高，收益性又好，两全其美。唯一坏处就是必须“招之即来，挥之即去”，不稳定。\n我们A股的分级基金呢，就等于是把这块肥肉拿出来，分给其他有兴趣的基民们去享用。当然，这么做的代价就是，优先级的规模只能在一些事先规定好的特殊情况下才进行调整，不可能每天收盘缩放一次。\n这种创新，本意不坏。但是放到具体的市场环境中，就出现问题了。分级基金的第一次危机发生在2014年5月20日，主角叫做银华锐进，是一只B级，也就是杠杆级基金。它在投资上是被动的，盯住深证100指数。所以深证100指数的涨跌就完全决定了它的净值。从销售上说，它是非常成功的，上市4年，从10亿规模做到100多亿。可是问题就出在这规模上。\n由于2011到2014年市场连续下跌，再加上不断支付优先级的利息，银华锐进的净值已经到了暴仓线附近。也就是说，假如再跌的话，就可能要影响优先级的资金安全了。所以一旦达到暴仓线，产品就要部分平仓。\n\n我们前面已经解释过，在此之前的下跌过程中，分级基金的优先级规模是不会逐步调整的。所以一旦发生部分平仓，潜在的一次性抛盘金额将高达100多亿。而此时整个深证100指数的日均成交金额也不过100多亿。一旦暴仓事件发生，对于本已疲惫的市场，无异于一次重锤。\n而且由于银华锐进是盯住指数的被动基金，所以基金经理无权主动调整仓位，只要指数跌破相应点位，银华锐进暴仓就是完全确定的事情。\n结果奇迹发生了。2014年5月20日上午9点38分，深证100指数明显跌破了银华锐进的暴仓线，然后立刻就被直线拉起。而且这个细小的金针，居然成了深证100指数的历史大底，从此之后再也没有跌破过。下图是我当年留下的分时记录：\n\n这股神秘力量来自何方，至今仍是未解之谜。可能是因为这件事最终有惊无险，所以无论在业内还是业外，几乎都没有产生什么波澜。\n分级基金的AB两级，分别有自己的净值和价格。但是因为它们不能单独申购赎回，所以它们可能分别出现很大的折价或溢价。但是A和B加在一起，作为一份完整的开放式基金，又是可以申购赎回的。所以A和B的价格之和不能大幅偏离净值之和。\n举例来说，A和B的净值都是1。此时A的价格可以是1.2，那么B的价格就是0.8，或者A的价格是0.7，那么B的价格就是1.3。总之，两者的价格可以分别偏离净值，但是两者之和必须是稳定的。否则就会产生套利机会。\n由于散户对于杠杆的热爱，分级基金出现溢价的套利机会还是挺多的。但是这种机会绝大多数都是“看得见，摸不着”。理论上成立，但是操作上不能实现。原因主要有4条：\n首先一条最重要的，绝大多数分级基金不能实时申购赎回。假如你T日观察到溢价，当天收盘前申购。T+1日基金公司确认份额。T+2日基金份额反映到券商系统，你还要下一个分拆指令，T+3日才能分别卖出A和B。这时候，溢价还在吗？一般来说是不在了。如果还在，套利就成功了。所以这个问题还跟溢价水平的稳定性有关。\n第二条，就是A级的价格不稳定。因为A级的投资者通常是把它当成长期债券来看的。他们是这样考虑问题的：我今天投入100元，年利率6%，那么10年利息60元，20年利息120元，30年利息180元……所以如果利率变动1%，对他们的影响很大。但是A级的价格变动1%，对他们的影响并不大。当然，机构投资者会算得精细一些。但是A级的交易量太小，没有流动性，机构很少参与。\n第三条，就是B级的溢价水平也不稳定。当市场没有趋势性行情的时候，散户一般将B级视为超跌反弹的神器。也就是说，市场急跌的时候，B级往往出现溢价。两三天后，无论反弹出现与否，这个溢价一般都会消失。\n第四条，就是分级基金的申购费率最高可达1%到1.5%，极大地提高了套利交易的成本。\n可是在2014、15年的牛市中，以上情况发生了重大变化，分级基金的溢价套利又变得容易实现了。\n首先是华泰证券推出了“盲拆”业务，其他证券公司陆续跟进。所谓盲拆，就是T+1日基金公司确认份额，还没有反映到券商，你就直接对券商下分拆指令。这样T+2日券商直接把分拆完的A和B录入系统，你就可以立即交易了。这项技术创新，极大地缩小了溢价套利的不确定性。\n第二条，A级的价格稳定了。从2014年下半年开始，央行连续降准降息，许多保险公司和固收产品不得不跑到证券市场内部来找收益。机构投资者比较理性，很快就把A级的价格稳定在一个很小的区间内，不再胡乱波动了。\n第三条，B级的溢价水平也稳定了。这条道理最简单，但是也最关键：牛市来了，豪情万丈，一路溢价。\n第四条，申购费通常按百分比计算，但是最高一档却有1000元的金额上限，所以对于500万以上的资金来说，费用也不再构成限制了。为什么以前构成限制呢？因为以前流动性差，一次套利投入的资金量太大了，怕出不来。而在牛市中，流动性大幅改善了，整装资金可以直接上。\n从2014年底到2015年中，专注于分级基金溢价套利的资金，收益率大约在2到3倍之间。这个业绩强于大多数公募基金，但是也不算太夸张。不过它的好处是“不见鬼子不挂弦”，有信号就动，没信号就停，不存在犹豫割肉的问题。所以牛市的成果得以保留。而大多数公募和私募都在后来的股灾中经历了严重回撤。\n那么在市场见顶之后，分级基金还有什么投资机会吗？其实也是有的，那就是观察哪些B级将要暴仓了，然后买入与它们对应的A级。\n我们前面说过，2014年5月，大盘经历了一次千钧一发的潜在危机。当时是银华锐进一支巨型基金，100亿左右的潜在抛盘。可是到股灾期间，情况变成了好几支巨型基金，外加几十支中小基金，数百亿的潜在抛盘，而且还在一个集中的时间段内连续爆出。\n2015年8月24日，创业板B暴仓，引发抛盘约45亿。8月27日，证券B暴仓，引发抛盘约75亿。8月28日，国企改B暴仓，引发抛盘约130亿……\n因为公募基金的条款、份额和净值信息都是公开的，所以这些基金会在什么情况下暴仓，潜在的抛盘有多大，这些关键信息也都等于是公开的。那么如果你预计到某支基金将要暴仓，最理性的决策就是抢先抛空相关股票，一是避险，二是诱发其暴仓。等到基金执行平仓之后，再从低点买回来。事实也反复证明，每支暴仓的巨型分级基金，都在市场上砸了一个坑，平仓盘总是割在最低点。\n上述特点对B级是极为不利的，而与之对应的则是A级得利。具体计算比较复杂，这里就略过了。有兴趣的可以查阅相关基金的招募说明书等资料。\n分级基金在股灾中“被动砸盘”的事实，引起了业界内外的广泛批评。2018年，证监会发布《资管新规》要求所有分级基金全部转型。然而直到2020年初，大批分级基金仍在交易。不过我相信，即使分级基金真的消失了，将来也还会有更新的品种问世。\n净值与价格的故事仍将继续。\n本文作者：丁昶","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":4144,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":9003085648,"gmtCreate":1640825968115,"gmtModify":1676533545086,"author":{"id":"3567575098485843","authorId":"3567575098485843","name":"股市轟炸机队长","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1ec92b2a3335762e71e118cc8d1b3753","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3567575098485843","idStr":"3567575098485843"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"<a href=\"https://ttm.financial/S/GRAB\">$Grab Holdings(GRAB)$</a>I use gojek more than grab now.","listText":"<a href=\"https://ttm.financial/S/GRAB\">$Grab Holdings(GRAB)$</a>I use gojek more than grab now.","text":"$Grab Holdings(GRAB)$I use gojek more than grab now.","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":5,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/9003085648","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":3142,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":9000509413,"gmtCreate":1640224231777,"gmtModify":1676533509126,"author":{"id":"3567575098485843","authorId":"3567575098485843","name":"股市轟炸机队长","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1ec92b2a3335762e71e118cc8d1b3753","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3567575098485843","idStr":"3567575098485843"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"Happy 2022","listText":"Happy 2022","text":"Happy 2022","images":[{"img":"https://static.itradeup.com/news/6c31f11b954b6dfbae4d1348688f78ed","width":"1125","height":"1476"}],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":3,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/9000509413","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":4329,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":1,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":176095531,"gmtCreate":1626843473623,"gmtModify":1703766265143,"author":{"id":"3567575098485843","authorId":"3567575098485843","name":"股市轟炸机队长","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/1ec92b2a3335762e71e118cc8d1b3753","crmLevel":11,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3567575098485843","idStr":"3567575098485843"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"Positive is good ??&nbsp;","listText":"Positive is good ??&nbsp;","text":"Positive is good 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