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2022-10-02

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2022-10-02

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Rethink the "Great Stagflation" in the United States! Also on the enlightenment to the current asset price

2022-10-02

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The Federal Reserve gives a rare warning, the next "black swan" is approaching, what's going on?

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Also on the enlightenment to the current asset price","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1100486117","media":"钟正生经济分析","summary":"一、高通胀的复杂性。1970-80年代美国高通胀的成因是极为复杂的：首先，财政和货币刺激过度，初步推升通胀；然后，粗暴的价格管制与犹豫的货币政策，未能有效浇灭通胀；再者，以两次石油危机为代表的供给冲击","content":"<p><html><head></head><body><b>1. The complexity of high inflation.</b>The causes of high inflation in the United States from 1970s to 1980s were extremely complicated: first, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, rude price control and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively douse inflation; Furthermore, supply shocks represented by the two oil crises triggered cost-push inflation; Finally, the long-term overshoot inflation rate destabilizes inflation expectations, triggers a wage-price spiral, and deepens the obstinacy of inflation.</p><p><b>Second, the Fed's \"faults\" and \"merits\".</b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve was not resolute enough in tightening for many reasons: first, the Federal Reserve once believed that inflation was a \"non-monetary phenomenon\"; Second, the primary goal of the Federal Reserve at that time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability\"; Finally, the Fed's decision-making is also influenced by political factors. After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the concept of the \"monetary school\", regarded curbing inflation as its own responsibility, strengthened its rate hike and controlled the money supply. Since then, the Federal Reserve has been committed to stabilizing inflation expectations for a long time, reshaping its credibility.</p><p><b>3. \"Soft landing\" and \"hard landing\".</b>From 1970s to 1980s, there were four rounds of economic recessions in the United States, which can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82). The result of the combined effect of high inflation, high interest rates and supply shocks. However, the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are relatively harsh: first, the CPI inflation rate may need to fall in time in the early stage of the recession; Secondly, the Fed's rate hike cannot be too aggressive, and even needs to cut interest rates in time when a recession comes; Finally, if a new supply shock occurs, a \"hard landing\" may be more difficult to avoid.</p><p><b>4. Clues to asset prices.</b>In the 1970s and 1980s, inflation became the vane of the capital market. The U.S. CPI inflation rate has peaked three times in stages, and U.S. stocks have bottomed out in stages. But in this process, the market has a process of understanding and digesting the inflation situation and the logic of monetary policy. Over time, the U.S. bond market has traded less \"recession\" and more \"austerity.\" In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become the key clue of asset prices. After the end of the \"Great Stagflation\", safe-haven assets such as the US dollar still performed positively for a long time.</p><p><b>5. New enlightenment to the present.</b>First, the causes of this round of inflation in the United States have many similarities with those in the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited; Second, although the Federal Reserve has \"made mistakes\" in this round, it has taken the initiative in fighting inflation; Third, this round of U.S. economic recession is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of a \"hard landing\"; Fourthly, the price trend of this round of major asset classes may be strongly similar to that of 1970s and 1980s:<b>1）</b>U.S. stocks: Inflation is still the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment may not be too deep, and the rebound may wait for the recession to materialize.<b>2）</b>U.S. debt: Monetary policy is still the core influencing factor, and it may not fall back immediately when the recession materializes. It needs to wait until monetary policy clearly begins to relax.<b>3）</b>US dollar: The \"strong US dollar\" may last for a long time, and the US dollar may require US Treasury yields to fall back.</p><p><i>Risk warning: The U.S. economy is weaker than expected, there are new supply shocks, and non-U.S. financial risks are rising.</i></p><p>Since 2022, the U.S. CPI inflation rate once rose above 9%, real GDP has shrunk for two consecutive quarters, the (quasi-) stagflation characteristics of the economy have become more distinct, and the capital market has also experienced large fluctuations. Since the Jackson Hole meeting in late August, the Federal Reserve has repeatedly mentioned \"historical experience\" on various occasions, indicating that the current economic environment in the United States is very similar to that in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Federal Reserve will also fully learn from the response experience at that time and do something. Something is not done in order to help the United States overcome \"stagflation.\"</p><p>What is the current inflationary pressure in the United States? How will monetary policy respond? Can the U.S. economy still achieve a \"soft landing\"? When will the capital market usher in \"spring\"? In this report, with questions about the present, we review the inflation, monetary policy, economic growth and asset price performance during the \"Great Stagflation\" period in the United States from 1970s to 1980s, and try to understand the logic and laws, with a view to judging the U.S. economy, monetary policy and market trends in the future.</p><p><b>01. The complexity of high inflation</b></p><p><b>The causes of high inflation in the United States from 1970s to 1980s were extremely complicated: first, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, rude price control and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively douse inflation; Furthermore, supply shocks represented by the two oil crises triggered cost-push inflation; Finally, the long-term overshoot inflation rate destabilizes inflation expectations, triggers a wage-price spiral, and deepens the obstinacy of inflation.</b></p><p><b>From 1969 to 1982, the United States fell into a crisis of high inflation. The CPI inflation rate was generally higher than 5%, with the highest reaching 14.8%.</b>The year-on-year growth rate of CPI in the United States has risen rapidly at a rate of more than 3% since 1968. In March 1969, the CPI exceeded 5% year-on-year, and the 13-year era of \"high inflation\" began. From 1969 to 1982, there were three peaks in the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. CPI, with the peaks in January 1970 (6.2%), December 1974 (12.3%) and March 1980 (14.8%). In February 1982, the CPI fell below 5% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0135dfd0a18c15e058312be783380d12\" tg-width=\"1066\" tg-height=\"490\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1965 to 1970, blind fiscal and monetary expansion gave birth to higher inflation.</b>With the end of economic reconstruction after World War II and the rise of European and Asian economies, the economic growth momentum of the United States has weakened, but blind stimulation at the policy level has led to obvious overheating of the economy. From 1965 to 1970, the real GDP growth rate of the United States continued to be higher than the potential growth rate, and the output gap (the difference between real GDP and potential GDP) accounted for as much as 3-6% of potential GDP. In other words, 3-6 percentage points of the U.S. economic growth rate at that time were stimulated by policies. During this period, the natural unemployment rate in the United States was 5.6-5.9%, but the actual unemployment rate basically remained within 4%. At that time, the role of fiscal stimulus was stronger than that of money. The proportion of U.S. federal fiscal expenditure to GDP increased by 3.2 percentage points from 1966 to 68, and the deficit ratio expanded from 0.2% in 1965 to 2.8% in 1968. In 1968, the U.S. government began to worry about fiscal balance. Then President Johnson signed the \"Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968\" in June to supplement fiscal revenue by increasing taxes. The Federal Reserve \"technically cut interest rates\" in August of the same year to hedge against the impact of tax increases, adding to the overheating of the economy.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fb7621fa84eb213f441091515980951c\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"426\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1971 to 74, rough price controls turned \"short pain\" into \"long pain\".</b>In August 1971, the Nixon administration imposed a 90-day wage and price freeze. But in fact, the scope of price control continued to expand, and it was not until 1974 that the U.S. government completely canceled its intervention in prices. During this period, except for special circumstances, all price increases of goods and services need to be approved by the government. In mid-1972, the U.S. CPI inflation rate fell below 3%. This price control is regarded as a special case of comprehensive government intervention in prices in peacetime in American economic history, and it is also regarded as a failed attempt. This is because, while the price limit measures curbed the price increase, they also severely dampened the enthusiasm of production enterprises, resulting in insufficient supply of social commodities, and paving the way for the subsequent deterioration of inflation. In 1974, Nixon stepped down due to the Watergate Incident, and the new President Carter came to power, and the price control measures gradually failed. Slightly funny, both the Nixon and Carter administrations tried to control prices through verbal \"exhortation\". For example, when Carter first came to power, he encouraged people to buy \"bargains\": \"Dare to show off to others, choose bargains yourself, and be proud of them\". These admonitions are almost futile in controlling prices. The U.S. CPI inflation rate broke 5% again in April 1973, and has since reached a stage high of 12.3% in December 1974.</p><p><b>A food crisis and two oil crises in 1973 and 1979 demonstrated the destructive power of supply shocks on American prices.</b>In 1973, the grain harvest in the former Soviet Union failed due to bad weather, and then entered the international market to buy a large amount of grain, which triggered the most serious food crisis since World War II. At the end of 1973, the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. food CPI once rose above 20%. From October 1973 to March 1974, the first oil crisis broke out: the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, led by Saudi Arabia, announced an oil embargo on countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War, with the United States bearing the brunt. The average price of crude oil at the World Bank jumped from US $2.7/barrel in September 1973 to US $13/barrel in early 1974, an increase of nearly 500%. From March to September 1974, the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. energy CPI exceeded 30%. From the beginning of 1979 to the beginning of 1980, the second oil crisis broke out: the Islamic Revolution broke out in Iran, and then the \"Iran-Iraq War\" broke out between Iran and Iraq, which led to a sharp drop in global oil production. World Bank international oil prices rose from less than US $15/barrel in December 1978 to more than US $40/barrel in November 1979. In March 1980, the U.S. energy CPI peaked at 47.1% year-on-year, and the U.S. CPI immediately peaked at 14.8% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/368b46087ff151100ed782e7aa94b78d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1980, after the headline inflation rate in the United States continued to overshoot, inflation expectations got out of control. With the help of trade unions, a \"wage-price spiral\" gradually formed.</b>After the CPI inflation rate has been higher than 2% or even higher than 5% for many years, American residents have lost their original confidence in prices and inflation expectations have risen. At that time, both the Fed and the market had limited awareness and tracking of inflation expectations. The widely quoted University of Michigan survey and Cleveland Fed model expectations were only born around 1980. The earliest inflation expectation monitoring tool in the United States was The Livingston Survey, which was born in 1946, and summarized inflation forecasts from businesses, governments, banking, and academia. The survey shows that inflation expectations in the United States have gradually increased since 1970, especially after the two oil crises, and inflation expectations have also risen sharply with the headline inflation rate. The reverse impact of inflation expectations on prices is mainly transmitted through wages: workers demand wage increases, and then the spending power of residents and the cost pressure of enterprises rise, which at the same time contributes to price increases, that is, a \"wage-price spiral\" is formed.<b>In particular, in the 1970s, American trade unions were huge, and the transmission of wage demands was relatively smooth:</b>According to the data of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), at that time, trade union members in the United States accounted for nearly 30% of the total employees in the society, and there were as many as 200-400 strikes by more than 1,000 people every year (since 2000, this number has been less than 30 all the year round). From mid-1976 to mid-1978, the CPI inflation rate in the United States fell back to around 5-7%, but the average hourly wage of non-agricultural and non-managerial personnel in the United States increased by 6-8% year-on-year, which continued to be higher than the CPI inflation rate. The stickiness of wage increases prevented inflation from falling further and paved the way for a subsequent rebound in inflation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa062f9510e45fda47f5e682ec9ba17b\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"457\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1970 to 79, the Federal Reserve's policy response was relatively negative, continuing to \"lag behind the curve\" and failing to effectively curb inflation.</b>Before 1980, U.S. policy interest rates and inflation trends showed strong synchronization, reflecting that the Federal Reserve had been \"lagging behind the curve\" and \"catching up with the curve\" for a long time. In May 1969, the third month after the inflation rate exceeded 5%, the U.S. policy interest rate began to rise significantly and exceeded the inflation rate by more than 3 percentage points. After that, the inflation rate kept rising for about half a year before it began to fall. In the second half of 1973, while the inflation rate in the United States was still rising, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates due to economic pressure, and then the inflation rate accelerated. In 1978, the U.S. policy interest rate was basically the same as the inflation rate, and kept rising step by step. Until December 1978, the monthly federal funds rate rose above 10% and was 1 percentage point higher than the inflation rate, but soon the policy interest rate began to lag behind the inflation rate. Later, when the U.S. policy interest rate was significantly higher than the spot inflation rate, inflation dropped significantly, and the Federal Reserve took the initiative in curbing inflation: after 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker raised interest rates sharply to fight inflation; In mid-1981, the U.S. policy interest rate reached a peak of more than 19%. In October of the same year, the CPI fell both month-on-month and year-on-year; Since then, Federal Funds rate has continued to be 4-9 percentage points higher than the CPI inflation rate, and the inflation rate has continued to fall.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/707eeb51701422548c5e1b935b53479d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>02. The Federal Reserve's \"faults\" and \"merits\"</b></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve was not resolute enough in tightening due to insufficient understanding of the relationship between inflation and monetary policy, as well as the lack of independence of monetary policy. After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the concept of the \"monetary school\", regarded curbing inflation as its own responsibility, strengthened its rate hike and controlled the money supply. Since then, the Federal Reserve has been committed to stabilizing inflation expectations for a long time, reshaping its credibility.</b></p><p><b>2.1. Reasons for the Fed's hesitation</b></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve continued to \"lag behind the curve\" for many reasons.</b></p><p><b>First, the Federal Reserve once considered inflation a \"non-monetary phenomenon.\"</b>At that time, the Federal Reserve was divided on the causes of high inflation, and tended to believe that inflation was mainly caused by non-monetary factors, and then monetary policy chose to respond negatively. For example, in 1970, the Federal Reserve led by Burns believed that the power of trade unions triggered cost-push inflation, and then advocated the use of \"income policy\" regulation rather than tightening the money supply. It also fueled the wage and price freeze later imposed by the Nixon administration. In 1974, Burns also believed that \"improper fiscal discipline\" was the main cause of inflation.</p><p><b>Second, the Fed's primary goal at that time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability.\"</b>Before the 1970s, Keynesian ideas dominated the logic of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve focused on aggregate demand management and firmly believed in the existence of the Phillips curve (the negative correlation between unemployment rate and inflation). Therefore, the primary goal of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy is to achieve \"full employment\", hoping to maintain a low and stable unemployment rate. Then, when the unemployment rate rises, the balance of monetary policy is tilted more towards the job market. When \"stagnation\" and \"inflation\" occurred at the same time, the Federal Reserve once believed that inflation would not continue to worsen. For example, Miller's Federal Reserve in 1978-79 believed that monetary easing would not deepen inflation as long as the unemployment rate was above full employment levels (above 5.5%).</p><p><b>Finally, the Fed's decision-making is also influenced by political factors.</b>Burns, who served as chairman from 1970 to 1978, and Miller, who served from 1978 to 79, were both influenced by the then president and lacked independence, wavering in balancing the relationship between inflation and economic growth. In hindsight, the Fed's tolerance for inflation in the 1970s may be exactly what the rulers wanted to see: on the one hand, the rulers did not want the Fed to undermine economic growth and affect votes by curbing inflation; On the other hand, higher inflation is also regarded as a hidden tax means, because the increase of nominal wages increases the progression of the whole tax system, resulting in a sharp increase in fiscal revenue. Data show that the proportion of personal income tax in GDP in the United States increased significantly during the periods of high inflation in 1969-70, 1974 and 1979-83.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/85870c4ece63c7cae63758bc6db5a828\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"421\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2.2. The achievements of the Volcker era</b></p><p><b>After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the concept of the \"monetary school\" and took curbing inflation as its own responsibility. It firmly conducted rate hike and controlled the money supply. Although it \"created\" an economic recession, it finally defeated inflation.</b>In August, 1979, Volcker became the chairman of the Federal Reserve. He adopted the \"monetary school\" view represented by Friedman. The Federal Reserve led by him made it more clear that monetary policy was the core position of price stability, and incorporated the growth rate of money supply (M1) into the monetary policy goal, followed by a substantial rate hike, which made the Federal Funds rate higher than the CPI inflation rate, so as to achieve the goal of controlling money supply. In March 1980, Volcker carried out an ill-advised but short-lived experiment of credit control (the \"Special Credit Restriction Program\") in order to slow down the rate hike, but then restarted monetary policy tightening, and finally pushed Federal Funds rate to a peak of more than 20% in mid-1981. Although the sharp rate hike brought about the economic recession, it ultimately helped inflation fall.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7ab3004dd4948baa80533fe718adebaf\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"422\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In addition, in the era of Volcker and Greenspan, the Federal Reserve established a new \"nominal anchor\" to stabilize inflation expectations and reshape the credibility of the Federal Reserve. This is also an important background for U.S. prices to return to long-term stability in the future.</b>In the 1980s, after experiencing the \"great stagflation\", the original expectation of price stability suffered serious damage. Even in the Volcker era, when the Federal Reserve defined its money supply target and firmly raised interest rates, the credibility of monetary policy was still questioned. It is not clear to the public whether the Fed can maintain its focus on inflation for a long time and have the ability to influence medium and long-term price trends. Therefore, Volcker and his next Federal Reserve President Greenspan are more committed to reconstructing stable inflation expectations, making them the \"nominal anchor\" of monetary policy, and ultimately re-establishing the credibility of monetary policy.</p><p><b>This is a complicated and long process: Volcker's experience of defeating inflation was a good starting point, and then the Fed shifted from money supply targeting to \"hidden inflation targeting.\"</b>In practice, the Federal Reserve focuses on the \"growth gap\" and the \"inflation expectation gap\" at the same time. In fact, it sets policy interest rates through the Taylor Rule, pursues stable medium-and long-term inflation targets, and achieves stable economic growth. In terms of inflation expectation management, the Federal Reserve monitors inflation expectations through changes in bond yields, and at the same time strengthens communication with the capital market, which enhances the credibility of monetary policy and the stability of market expectations. The monetary policy framework after the Volcker era achieved long-term results in price stability, creating the later era of Great Moderation (1984-2007).</p><p><b>03. \"Soft landing\" and \"hard landing\"</b></p><p><b>From 1970s to 1980s, there were four rounds of economic recessions in the United States, which were the result of the combined effects of high inflation, high interest rates and supply shocks. High inflation has a direct inhibitory effect on consumption, and drives the Federal Reserve to rate hike and further curb investment. Therefore, the degree of recession depends on the severity of inflation and the response of monetary policy, and the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are relatively harsh.</b></p><p><b>3.1. The three major drivers of economic recession</b></p><p><b>According to the classification of the National Economic Research Bureau (NBER), the U.S. economy experienced four rounds of recessions from 1970s to 1980s:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>The first round was from January to November 1970 (11 months).</b>The real GDP of the United States fell from 3.2% in 1969 to 0.2% in 1970, but the economy hardly shrank. However, the unemployment rate in the United States rose significantly, from 3.5% in December 1969 to 6.1% in December 1970 (a stage high), and remained above 5% for the next 24 months.</p><p></li><li><b>The second round was from December 1973 to March 1975 (16 months).</b>The real GDP of the United States fell off a cliff from 5.6% year-on-year in 1973, and shrank year-on-year for five consecutive quarters, with the deepest quarterly year-on-year contraction reaching 2.3%. The unemployment rate in the United States has been higher than 7% for 31 consecutive months, rising from a low of 4.6% in October 1973 to 9.0% in May 1975, and then declining slowly.</p><p></li><li><b>The third round was from February to July 1980 (6 months).</b>The annualized rate of real GDP in the United States shrank sharply by 8% in the second quarter of 1980, but only by 0.8% year-on-year. During this period, the unemployment rate in the United States rose from 6.3% to 7.8%. In the second half of 1980, the U.S. economy immediately began to recover. In the fourth quarter, GDP rose sharply by 7.7% month-on-month, and the unemployment rate began to fall in August.</p><p></li><li><b>The fourth round was from August 1981 to November 1982 (16 months)</b>。 The real GDP of the United States has shrunk year-on-year for four consecutive quarters, with the deepest contraction of 2.6%. The unemployment rate in the United States began to rebound significantly from a stage low of 7.2% in August 1981, exceeded 8% in November of the same year, reached a peak of 10.8% in November 1982, and then slowly fell back, falling below 8% in February 1984.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/93377c7b4f0d061e8d18147cc001a54a\" tg-width=\"1061\" tg-height=\"483\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><b>One of the recession drivers: high inflation.</b>Comparing the economic and inflation trends at that time, the two showed a very close correlation:<b>The nodes at which the U.S. economic recession occurs all correspond to the time when the CPI inflation rate rises or peaks.</b>For example, when the CPI inflation rate peaked in 1970, it happened to be the beginning of the rebound in the unemployment rate and the economic recession; From 1973 to 75, this round of unemployment rate rebounded and the economy was recognized as a recession, both after the CPI inflation rate broke 8%; At the beginning of 1980, when the CPI inflation rate hit a very high level of more than 14%, the unemployment rate rebounded significantly and the economy began to decline.<b>If the inflation rate is still rising when the recession occurs, the U.S. economy will continue to decline; Only after the inflation rate dropped did the U.S. economy begin to recover.</b>For example, in late 1970, the U.S. economy did not begin to recover until inflation fell below 5%; In 1975, when the inflation rate peaked and fell for a quarter, the U.S. GDP growth rate turned positive quarter-on-quarter and the unemployment rate began to decline.</p><p><b>The direct impact of inflation on the economy is mainly reflected in consumption.</b>Compared with policy interest rates, the negative correlation between U.S. inflation rate and private consumption growth rate is more obvious. Especially in the 1980s, when the policy interest rate jumped sharply, the inflation rate had already fallen early, and private consumption also began to pick up at that time, indicating that the easing of inflation was obviously helpful to the recovery of consumption.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/157a3ac9e6b19301fad3ca7e2e88c069\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"419\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The second driver of recession: high interest rates.</b>Overall, the cooling effect of the Fed's rate hike on the economy at that time was obvious:<b>When the U.S. economy is overheating, rate hike's cooling effect on the economy can be described as immediate:</b>For example, in mid-1973, the U.S. manufacturing PMI exceeded 60, and the Federal Reserve rate hike quickly cooled the \"overheated\" economy.<b>When the U.S. economy itself is in a downturn or even recession, rate hike has deepened the economic contraction:</b>For example, in mid-1974, after the policy interest rate peaked, the downturn of the U.S. economy accelerated, and the U.S. GDP shrank sharply by 3.7% in the third quarter; From March to April 1980, after the monthly rate of federal funds reached a stage high of more than 17%, U.S. GDP shrank sharply by 8.0% in the second quarter of the same year.<b>On the contrary, interest rate cuts can help the economy recover:</b>In December 1970, when the policy interest rate fell below the inflation rate, the U.S. economy immediately recovered; In early 1975, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates and kept the policy rate nearly 5 percentage points below the inflation rate. The U.S. economy began to recover in the second quarter of 1975.<b>However, premature and immature interest rate cuts when inflation is not effectively controlled may end in \"repeated inflation + higher rate hike\", thus leading to a greater degree of recession or delaying the recovery that should have started earlier:</b>At the beginning of 1974, the Federal Reserve chose to cut interest rates, but as inflation continued to rise and the negative impact on the economy continued, the U.S. economy was still in recession; In May 1980, the monthly rate of federal funds had dropped to about 11% (supplemented by credit controls). In August, the U.S. economy temporarily left the recession range. However, since inflation repeatedly forced the Federal Reserve to choose greater rate hike, the U.S. economy fell into a new round of deeper recession in 1981.</p><p><b>The impact of interest rates on the economy is mainly reflected in investment.</b>Compared with inflation, the negative correlation between policy interest rate and private investment (lagging by one year) is more obvious. In the second half of 1980, the Federal Reserve briefly cut interest rates, and a year later, private investment in the United States rebounded significantly; In 1981, when the Federal Reserve resumed its sharp rate hike, the growth rate of private investment declined significantly a year later, but inflation also dropped significantly during this period, indicating that private investment is more sensitive to interest rate trends.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d940f253f486815be3e542cd6e173587\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The third driver of recession: supply shocks.</b>The food and oil crises of 1973 and 1979 caused many drags on U.S. economic growth, thus triggering economic recessions.<b>First,</b>As mentioned above, supply shocks have raised the CPI inflation rate, and rising consumer prices have suppressed aggregate demand. In particular,<b>Supply shocks have triggered higher energy consumption costs and crowded out other consumption.</b>After 1974, the proportion of consumption of energy products and services in private consumption in the United States increased from about 6% before the shock to 7-9%, and did not drop significantly until after 1985.<b>Second, the supply shock has increased the cost of U.S. oil imports, causing GDP to \"evaporate\".</b>The first oil crisis caused oil prices to rise by about $10/barrel. In 1974, the net oil imports of the United States were about 6 million barrels per day. We estimate that rising oil prices will drag down U.S. GDP by approximately US $21.9 billion by increasing net import costs, dragging down nominal GDP growth by 1.4 percentage points; Similarly, after the second oil crisis, the rising cost of net oil imports dragged down the nominal growth rate of US GDP in 1979 by 2.8 percentage points.<b>Third, the supply shock caused a shortage of raw materials, weakening the industrial production capacity of the United States.</b>After two rounds of supply shocks in the 1970s, the total industrial production index of the United States fell sharply year-on-year. Comparing the two shocks, it can be found that during the first shock, the CPI inflation rate in the United States was lower, while the PPI inflation rate was higher, and then the industrial production was hit deeper, which also reflected that the impact of supply shocks on economic output was more important. It is mainly manifested on the \"supply side\".</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/bbaa840667be8378540c48fd32436e79\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3.2. What does the degree of recession depend on</b></p><p><b>For the above four rounds of recession, according to the degree of GDP contraction and the duration of the recession, they can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82).</b></p><p><ul><li><b>1970 \"soft landing\"</b>The background is that inflationary pressures are relatively limited. At that time, the highest CPI inflation rate was only 6.2%, and then the Federal Reserve did not make a substantial rate hike, and the highest policy interest rate was only about 9%. Inflation is limited. On the one hand, it has not suffered from supply shocks, and on the other hand, it is also related to the price controls of the Nixon administration.</p><p></li><li><b>1980 \"soft landing\"</b>The background is that inflation peaked and fell, and the Federal Reserve cut interest rates in a timely manner. At that time, the U.S. CPI inflation rate once reached an all-time high of 14.8%, and the monthly federal funds rate once reached 17.6%. However, when the recession began, the Federal Reserve quickly cut interest rates, and the policy rate dropped sharply to around 9%, and the economy quickly began to recover.</p><p></li><li><b>1973-75 \"hard landing\"</b>The main reason is that under the supply shock, the inflation rate is still rising during the recession, and then the policy interest rate has to rise rapidly with inflation (even if the policy interest rate is not significantly higher than the inflation rate);</p><p></li><li><b>1981-82 \"hard landing\"</b>The background is that the Federal Reserve is eager to curb inflation, so it has taken very aggressive rate hike measures (Federal Funds rate once reached about 20%). Although the inflation rate soon began to decline, the policy interest rate continued to be significantly higher than the inflation rate, which delayed the economic recovery process.</p><p></li></ul><b>From this, we can conclude that the requirements for \"soft landing\" are relatively stringent-first of all,</b>Inflationary pressure cannot be too great, and the CPI inflation rate may need to fall back in time in the early stages of the recession.<b>Secondly,</b>The Fed's rate hike cannot be too aggressive, and even needs to cut interest rates in time when a recession comes.<b>Finally,</b>If the government intervenes excessively in prices, or a new supply shock unfortunately occurs, then the \"soft landing\" may only be temporary, and inflation may rebound in the future, and a \"hard landing\" will be more difficult to avoid.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/5c05ee90fc4945e31d8dc59cbb9f3a8c\" tg-width=\"1073\" tg-height=\"367\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>04. Clues to asset prices</b></p><p><b>From the 1970s to the 1980s, high inflation was the \"biggest enemy\" of the U.S. economy and policies, so the inflation situation also became the vane of the capital market. In this process, the market has a process of understanding and digesting the inflation situation and the logic of monetary policy. In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become the key clue of asset prices. In addition, the \"Great Stagflation\" has brought long-term pain to the economy and market, and then safe-haven assets such as the US dollar have performed positively for a long time.</b></p><p><b>4.1. U.S. stocks: Inflation is the biggest enemy</b></p><p><b>During this period, the trend of U.S. stocks was dominated by inflation. Whenever the inflation rate turned downward, U.S. stocks rebounded immediately.</b>July 1970, December 1974, and March 1980 corresponded to the three peaks of the U.S. CPI inflation rate, and were also the beginning of the rebound of the S&P 500 index. This may show that in the period of high inflation, the trend of inflation is what the market is most concerned about: as long as inflation remains high, the Federal Reserve may continue to tighten, and the U.S. economy will be threatened by both high inflation and high interest rates; As long as inflation falls, even if the economy is temporarily weak, the market believes that falling prices are conducive to economic recovery, and the Fed's tightening is expected to be relaxed, and the stock market will be included in the recovery expectation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f3acab3e6f335ccd1d9e96b22ddd4750\" tg-width=\"1069\" tg-height=\"519\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>U.S. stocks are bottom out in the middle of a recession, and the extent of the adjustment does not entirely depend on the degree of the recession.</b>At the beginning of the four rounds of recessions defined by NBER, U.S. stocks were all under pressure. However, when the recession was not over, as monetary policy expectations loosened, inflationary pressures began to ease, and market recovery expectations increased, U.S. stocks were often the first to usher in a rebound. In other words,<b>The \"policy bottom\" is ahead of the \"market bottom\", and the \"market bottom\" is ahead of the \"economic bottom\".</b>From the data point of view, the bottom of the S&P 500 index all occurred during recession periods.</p><p><b>However, the extent of the adjustment in U.S. stocks does not depend entirely on the extent of the recession:</b>In the \"soft landings\" of 1970 and 1980, and in the \"hard landings\" of 1981-82, the S&P 500 index fell no more than 20%; Only in the \"hard landing\" of 1973-75, the S&P 500 index fell nearly 40%. Judging from the magnitude of the rebound, after four rounds of recession and the adjustment of U.S. stocks, the rebound of U.S. stocks is relatively strong, and the S&P 500 index has rebounded by more than 30% from the trough.</p><p><b>The logic behind it may be:</b>The overall market after the \"soft landing\" remains optimistic. Although the market after the \"hard landing\" is not so optimistic, due to the previous low \"base\", the price-performance ratio of US stocks can still attract capital inflows. This means that no matter what the degree of the recession is, as long as the bottom is found and the U.S. stock market is moderately \"tilted forward\", it is possible to obtain good returns.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/164eaafd25fa17da2d93917b48fdcdc5\" tg-width=\"1063\" tg-height=\"500\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The Federal Reserve is not the \"eternal enemy\" of US stocks.</b>Comparing the performance of U.S. stocks after 1970 and 1980, even though the U.S. CPI inflation rate was higher, the Federal Reserve rate hike was more aggressive, and the degree of recession was not weak after 1980, the overall performance of U.S. stocks was significantly better than that in the 1970s. In the 1970s, the S&P 500 index remained almost sideways amid volatility, while after 1980, the S&P 500 index maintained a volatile upward trend. Especially compared with 1973-75 and 1981-82, they were both \"hard landings\", but the latter U.S. stocks fell less and rebounded more. The biggest difference between the two periods is that<b>The latter is more tightening by the Federal Reserve and may have played a more important role in \"creating\" a recession.</b>During the aggressive rate hike of the Federal Reserve, the inflation rate dropped significantly: on the one hand, it eased the suppression of high inflation on economic growth; on the other hand, the market had more confidence in the Federal Reserve, which in turn made recovery expectations stronger and risk appetite higher. In addition, after 1980, \"Reaganomics\" entered the historical stage, and after the market was fully and painfully cleared, American productivity increased rapidly. Therefore, U.S. stocks rebounded even stronger due to the \"two-wheel drive\" of the decline in policy interest rates after inflation was controllable and the profit growth of listed companies. From this perspective, inflation is the \"biggest enemy\" of US stocks, but the Federal Reserve is not; The Federal Reserve, which has the ability to curb inflation, eventually became a \"friend\" of the US stock market!</p><p><b>4.2. U.S. debt: \"dancing\" with monetary policy</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s, the U.S. bond market experienced a long-term bear market, with high inflation and high interest rates driving the US Treasury yields upward.</b>However, the volatility of 10-year US Treasury yields is significantly smaller than that of CPI inflation rate and policy interest rate. It is worth mentioning that the correlation between the U.S. economic recession and US Treasury yields is not obvious: before and after the four rounds of recessions in 1970, 1974-75, 1980 and 1982, the 10-year US Treasury yields fell back in the first round, the second round fluctuated upward, the third round rose sharply, and the fourth round fluctuated stronger. This may reflect the evolution of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy logic, that is, the emphasis on inflation continues to increase and the balance of the economy continues to weaken. Then<b>Over time, the market trades less \"recession\" and more \"tightening\".</b>It was not until after the third quarter of 1982, when the CPI inflation rate was lower than 5% and GDP shrank year-on-year, that the market believed that the Federal Reserve could cut interest rates without distractions, and US Treasury yields dropped significantly.</p><p><b>In the 1980s, the trend of 10-year US Treasury yields was more closely related to the trend of policy interest rates.</b>From 1980 to 81, the U.S. CPI inflation rate showed a downward trend, but the 10-year US Treasury yields rose rapidly, mainly driven by the strong tightening of monetary policy. After 1982, the 10-year US Treasury yields was relatively consistent with the fluctuation trend of policy interest rates, which reflected the effectiveness of monetary policy reform in the Volcker era, that is, the Federal Reserve's driving force for bond interest rates increased significantly.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9d465d535d3e18340e29dfe32d95faea\" tg-width=\"1068\" tg-height=\"502\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>Although the 10-year US Treasury yields \"danced\" with the policy rate, the volatility was even smaller.</b>Before the 1970s, the absolute levels and trends of US Treasury yields and Federal Funds rate were very similar in 10 years. In the 1970s, when high inflation came and the Federal Reserve rate hike, although the 10-year US Treasury yields would also rise, the increase was even smaller, and then \"underperformed\" the policy interest rate. The reasons are: on the one hand, the emergence of high inflation and high interest rates has reduced market risk appetite, and U.S. debt has played a certain safe-haven attribute; On the other hand, due to concerns about economic growth, the market doubts the sustainability of high interest rates, which in turn depresses the medium and long-term US Treasury yields (the maturity premium of U.S. bonds is negative). When inflation fell and the Federal Reserve cut interest rates, although the 10-year US Treasury yields also fell, the magnitude was still limited, making US Treasury yields \"outperform\" the policy interest rate. The reason for this phenomenon may be the rise in inflation expectations. In fact, after 1983, the 10-year decline in US Treasury yields was insufficient, which once became a new problem faced by the Federal Reserve: the inflation rate in the United States has dropped to around 2%, but because the market inflation expectation has not dropped in time, the bond market interest rate has dropped slowly, hindering the economic recovery. Later, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker began to regard the bond market interest rate as the yardstick of inflation expectations, and paid more attention to the management of inflation expectations. It took 10 years for the trend of US Treasury yields to further align with the policy interest rate.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/73d7be6ac6bef4e338dc445e6ab9169f\" tg-width=\"1065\" tg-height=\"503\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>4.3. US dollar: Multiple factors create a strong US dollar</b></p><p><b>Factors such as the Federal Reserve's rate hike, rising market demand for safe havens, and the impact on non-US economies jointly created a strong US dollar in 1981-84.</b>In the 1970s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system caused the rapid depreciation of the US dollar exchange rate. During this period, the US dollar exchange rate did not have a strong correlation with the US economic and monetary cycle. From 1981 to 84, the US dollar exchange rate continued to strengthen, and the the US Dollar Index once rose above the historical peak of 160 from around 85 in the second half of 1980; It was not until the Plaza Accord was signed in 1985 that the strong dollar came to an end.</p><p><b>How to understand the strong dollar during this period?</b>First of all, after 1980, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker strictly controlled the money supply, and the scarcity of the US dollar rose; Second, from 1981 to 82, the U.S. economy fell into recession due to the aggressive rate hike of the Federal Reserve, and U.S. stocks experienced significant adjustments. Economic and market risks stimulated the safe-haven attribute of the U.S. dollar; Third, in 1983-84, the U.S. economy bid farewell to high inflation and entered a strong recovery. The Federal Reserve's policy interest rate and US Treasury yields remained relatively high. During this period, the US dollar exchange rate is still strengthening: on the one hand, the market's confidence in the Federal Reserve has increased; On the other hand, the spillover effects of the Fed's tightening in the early stage on non-US economies appeared (such as the deep debt crisis in Latin America in 1982-85), which made US dollar assets fully attractive.</p><p>It is worth mentioning that<b>During the aggressive Fed rate hike, both the US Dollar Index and US Treasury yields are trending upward.</b>However,<b>The reaction of the US dollar exchange rate lags behind US Treasury yields:</b>For example, in June 1980, US Treasury yields had begun to rise rapidly in 10 years, while the US Dollar Index's rise lagged by about 3 months; In June, 1984, the 10-year US Treasury yields began to fall due to market expectations of interest rate cuts, but the US Dollar Index's decline lagged behind by nine months.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/61242bb3f7016cf966b35fefe3930648\" tg-width=\"1067\" tg-height=\"452\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>05. New enlightenment to the present</b></p><p><b>1. The causes of this round of U.S. inflation have many similarities with those in the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited.</b></p><p>Similar to the 1970s, the current high inflation in the United States is also the result of multiple factors such as monetary and fiscal easing, the slow action of the Federal Reserve, and supply shocks. But in comparison,<b>We tend to think that U.S. inflation will not get out of control as it was then:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This time, the U.S. government did not implement rude price controls like the Nixon administration did, and the balancing effect of price signals on supply and demand did not disappear, reducing the risk of recurrent inflation in the future;</p><p></li><li><b>And second,</b>At present, the risk of the \"wage-price\" spiral in the United States is relatively low. On the one hand, it benefits from the medium-and long-term inflation expectations that are still relatively stable, and on the other hand, it benefits from the long-term weakening of the power of American trade unions;</p><p></li><li><b>And third,</b>At present, the United States has a stronger ability to digest the \"oil crisis\". Especially after the shale oil revolution in 2010, the proportion of energy consumption in the United States in total private consumption has declined, and the United States has also changed from a net importer of crude oil to a net exporter. Therefore, the transmission of oil prices to the core inflation rate in the United States has declined. Therefore, even though the current U.S. CPI energy sub-item growth rate is as high as 40% year-on-year, reaching the level of the two oil crises in 1970s and 1980s, the core CPI inflation rate is significantly lower than at that time.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/8e9d6130cfa6c71161fdc10b5eaa79c0\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"411\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2. Although the Federal Reserve has \"made mistakes\" in this round, it has taken the initiative in fighting inflation.</b></p><p>The \"capriciousness\" of monetary policy and the market's lack of confidence in monetary policy were important backgrounds for repeated stagflation in 1970s and 1980s. In comparison,<b>The Fed now has more initiative, and even if it underestimated the sustainability of inflation in 2021 (the \"inflation temporary theory\"), there may still be room for recovery from this mistake:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>In terms of understanding and responding to \"stagflation\", the Federal Reserve is no longer \"crossing the river by feeling the stones\", and its monetary policy has already defined the goal of \"price stability\". Since the beginning of this year, the Federal Reserve has declared that \"price stability\" is the prerequisite for \"maximum employment\" and regards curbing inflation as the top priority of monetary policy.</p><p></li><li><b>Secondly,</b>After the Volcker-Greenspan era, the Federal Reserve had a stronger ability to monitor inflation expectations (such as the birth of inflation-protected bonds after 2000), communicated with the market more efficiently, and established a relatively good reputation. Since the beginning of this year, the Fed's tightening signal has significantly raised the nominal interest rate of U.S. debt, and the quick response of the capital market reflects the credibility of monetary policy. At present, U.S. inflation expectations have not been \"unanchored\". The ten-year inflation expectations monitored by the Cleveland Fed model do not exceed 2.5%, far below the level of 4-5% in the 1980s.</p><p></li><li><b>Finally,</b>The Federal Reserve is more independent today. Currently, inflation is the \"enemy\" faced by the Biden administration and the Federal Reserve, and the Fed's tightening is supported by the president. Even if economic pressure increases in the future and the president puts pressure on the Federal Reserve, it is expected that the Federal Reserve will defend its credibility more firmly. Just as Powell's Federal Reserve conducted four rate hike in 2018, despite criticism from then-President Trump.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/aeb68357b44663ea8caedbf43793c2db\" tg-width=\"1074\" tg-height=\"436\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3. This round of U.S. economic recession is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of a \"hard landing\".</b></p><p>In the 1970s and 1980s, when the U.S. CPI inflation rate rose above 5%, the economic recession came as expected. Compare the current:</p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This year, the U.S. CPI inflation rate reached a maximum of 9.1%, which not only exceeded the previous level that triggered the recession, but also exceeded the level during the \"soft landing\" period of the U.S. economy in 1970;</p><p></li><li><b>And second,</b>At present, the Federal Reserve has shown great determination to curb inflation, or maintain policy interest rates at a \"sufficiently restrictive level\" for a long time, at the cost of economic recession (refer to our previous report \"The Defense of the Federal Reserve's Credibility\"). This means that, similar to the Volcker period in 1981-82, the Fed's tightening may be enough to \"create\" a recession;</p><p></li><li><b>And third,</b>At present, the risk of recurrent inflation in the future cannot be ruled out. If a new supply shock unfortunately occurs in the future, or the actual tightening of the Fed is insufficient (for example, when the U.S. economy actually enters a recession, political pressure rises, or financial risks occur in the future, the Fed stops tightening or even cuts interest rates prematurely), then U.S. inflation may still be repeated, leading to a greater recession.</p><p></li></ul><b>4. The price trend of this round of major asset classes may be strongly similar to that of 1970s and 1980s.</b></p><p><b>1) U.S. stocks: Inflation is still the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment may not be too deep, and the rebound may wait for the recession to materialize.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the current inflation trend also has a strong correlation with the performance of US stocks.</b>In the first half of this year, as the U.S. CPI inflation rate continued to rise, U.S. stocks ushered in a round of deep adjustments; From mid-June to mid-August, commodity prices and inflation expectations cooled down, and U.S. stocks rebounded in stages; Since late August, as the persistence of high inflation has exceeded expectations, the Fed's policy orientation has become tougher, and U.S. stocks have paid more attention to monetary policy, staging a new round of \"tightening panic.\"</p><p></li><li><b>The U.S. stock market may remain under pressure for some time to come, similar to the 1981-82 period when Volcker fought inflation and \"created\" a recession.</b>From 1981 to 82, although the U.S. CPI inflation rate continued to fall, the Federal Reserve's tightening had an impact on the economy and stock market. Similarly, the current Federal Reserve seems to want to return to the \"Volcker era\" and is bound to ensure that inflation falls back at the cost of recession. At present, U.S. inflation is still at a high level, the economy has not yet experienced a substantial recession, and the market's valuation of the recession is not yet sufficient, and there may still be room for subsequent adjustments in U.S. stocks. Judging from historical experience, U.S. stocks may still fall in the early stages of the economic recession. It is not until monetary policy begins to relax in the middle and late stages of the recession that U.S. stocks will usher in a sustained rebound.</p><p></li><li><b>However, the Fed will not be the \"eternal enemy\" of U.S. stocks. If the Fed successfully helps inflation fall, the adjustment of U.S. stocks may not be too deep.</b>When Volcker \"created\" a recession in 1981-92, the adjustment of U.S. stocks was relatively limited and did not fall below the bottom in early 1980. Although the Fed's vigorous fight against inflation brings \"short-term pain\", it can avoid the \"long-term pain\" of repeated inflation. Considering that this round of inflation situation is more optimistic than in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Fed's actions are not too passive, this round of U.S. stock adjustment may not be too deep, and the rebound may be earlier than historical experience.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7f004d3c8a3173e8965e08861dace942\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2) U.S. debt: Monetary policy is still the core influencing factor, and it may not fall back immediately when the recession materializes. It needs to wait until monetary policy clearly begins to relax.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the core influencing factor of US Treasury yields in the current decade is also monetary policy.</b>The experience of the 1970s-1980s was that the bond market teetered between a \"recession trade\" and a \"tightening trade\". But as the Fed is more determined to fight inflation, the bond market is trading less \"recession\" and more \"tightening.\" In July this year, due to cooling inflation expectations and rising recession expectations, the 10-year US Treasury yields dropped significantly. However, since late August, as the Fed's policy orientation has become tougher, the market has paid more attention to tightening. Therefore, US Treasury yields has continued to rebound in the past 10 years and has risen above 4%, exceeding the stage high of 3.5% in mid-June.</p><p></li><li><b>If the Fed also insists on tightening during a recession, then the US Treasury yields in the early 10-year recession may not fall back soon.</b>Just as in the early days of the U.S. economic recession in 1981-82, even though the U.S. CPI inflation rate has dropped significantly from its high point, it is still far from the 2% target. Monetary policy has not been relaxed, and the 10-year US Treasury yields has remained at a high level. We expect that even if the U.S. economy begins to decline in the first half of 2023, the Federal Reserve may choose to stick to tightening and not cut interest rates, and the bond market may not trade in a recession prematurely.</p><p></li><li><b>A 10-year decline in US Treasury yields may require a substantial decline in policy interest rates.</b>In the second half of 1982, when the U.S. CPI inflation rate fell below 5% and the economic recession was deep, the Federal Reserve began to cut interest rates sharply, and the U.S. bond bull market really started. And note that the starting point of the decline in policy interest rates at that time was ahead of the 10-year US Treasury yields, and the decline was deeper. This means that after the monetary policy clearly begins to relax, the 10-year US Treasury yields may not drop significantly.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/18e234a92705cc42b9b876c30857ee92\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"410\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3) U.S. dollar: The \"strong U.S. dollar\" may last for a long time, and the fall in the U.S. dollar exchange rate may require US Treasury yields to fall</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Looking at the mid-cycle, the current logic of the \"strong dollar\" is very similar to that of the 1980s.</b>From 1980 to 84, the US Dollar Index came out of the \"historical peak\". Even though the Federal Reserve cut interest rates during this period, the US dollar exchange rate remained strong for a long time. At present, the logic of supporting the US dollar is very similar to that in the 1980s: the US economy has obvious advantages over non-US regions, and the Fed's tightening confidence is stronger than other developed economies. Looking back, even if the U.S. economy moves from \"stagflation\" to \"recession\", non-U.S. economic and financial risks may not be eliminated (this can be seen from the fluctuations in European and Japanese bond and exchange rate markets this year). On the contrary, the market's trust in U.S. dollar assets will increase (for example, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have weakened at present). Therefore, for at least the next 1-2 years, the volatility center of the the US Dollar Index is expected to continue to be higher than the pre-COVID-19 level.</p><p></li><li><b>In the short term, US Treasury yields may be a \"leading indicator\" to judge the trend of the US dollar.</b>In 1980, the 10-year US Treasury yields started its upward cycle earlier than the US Dollar Index; In 1984-85, US Treasury yields fell back before the US Dollar Index in 10 years. In fact, past market performance has basically confirmed US Treasury yields's leadership over the US Dollar Index:<b>1-3 months after the 10-year US Treasury yields peaks and falls, the US Dollar Index usually also peaks and falls.</b>As mentioned earlier, the start of this round of U.S. bond bull market may have to wait until the recession materializes and monetary policy becomes loosened. After that, the signs of the US Dollar Index peaking and falling may become increasingly clear.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa0454ffd0dbe555b8d8d2e59c3c5c0d\" tg-width=\"1075\" tg-height=\"408\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b><i>Risk warning:</i></b></p><p><b><i>1. The resilience of the US economy is less than expected.</i></b><i>Although there is still room for the recovery of the U.S. service industry, under the environment of high inflation and high interest rates, residents' consumer confidence is insufficient or actual consumption is suppressed, which in turn makes the economic growth weaker than the benchmark expectation; As the Federal Reserve's rate hike and demand cool, the pace of cooling in the U.S. job market may exceed expectations.</i></p><p><b><i>2. A new supply shock occurs.</i></b><i>If new supply shocks occur in the future and raise international energy, food and other commodity prices again, the pressure of \"stagflation\" in the United States may rise significantly, the Federal Reserve may have to \"create\" a recession to curb inflation, and market sentiment will turn pessimistic.</i></p><p><b><i>3. The Fed's tightening is insufficient or too strong.</i></b><i>If the Fed's insufficient tightening causes repeated inflation, the cost of the Fed's subsequent inflation control will be even greater; If the Fed's tightening efforts are significantly stronger than market expectations, the risk of market volatility may rise and may eventually threaten the real economy.</i></p><p><b><i>4. Economic and financial risks in non-US regions exceed expectations, etc.</i></b><i>At present, the economic and financial risks of large economies such as Europe and Asia are showing signs of rising. If large-scale economic and financial risk events occur in the future, the U.S. economy and market may be affected.</i></p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/49ae9add1640b1e283a53b027b0227c7\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"868\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc83db9c8a7fe6fe220fca7ca329cf0d\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"513\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/580ee36c20670ad5f1a888d715380e06\" tg-width=\"999\" tg-height=\"928\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p></body></html></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>Rethink the \"Great Stagflation\" in the United States! 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Also on the enlightenment to the current asset price\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<a class=\"head\" href=\"https://laohu8.com/wemedia/70\">\n\n<div class=\"h-thumb\" style=\"background-image:url(https://static.tigerbbs.com/86f6d9605fc344e28cd4247a93dcdc2b);background-size:cover;\"></div>\n\n<div class=\"h-content\">\n<p class=\"h-name\">钟正生经济分析 </p>\n<p class=\"h-time smaller\">2022-10-02 09:35</p>\n</div>\n</a>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><html><head></head><body><b>1. The complexity of high inflation.</b>The causes of high inflation in the United States from 1970s to 1980s were extremely complicated: first, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, rude price control and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively douse inflation; Furthermore, supply shocks represented by the two oil crises triggered cost-push inflation; Finally, the long-term overshoot inflation rate destabilizes inflation expectations, triggers a wage-price spiral, and deepens the obstinacy of inflation.</p><p><b>Second, the Fed's \"faults\" and \"merits\".</b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve was not resolute enough in tightening for many reasons: first, the Federal Reserve once believed that inflation was a \"non-monetary phenomenon\"; Second, the primary goal of the Federal Reserve at that time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability\"; Finally, the Fed's decision-making is also influenced by political factors. After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the concept of the \"monetary school\", regarded curbing inflation as its own responsibility, strengthened its rate hike and controlled the money supply. Since then, the Federal Reserve has been committed to stabilizing inflation expectations for a long time, reshaping its credibility.</p><p><b>3. \"Soft landing\" and \"hard landing\".</b>From 1970s to 1980s, there were four rounds of economic recessions in the United States, which can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82). The result of the combined effect of high inflation, high interest rates and supply shocks. However, the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are relatively harsh: first, the CPI inflation rate may need to fall in time in the early stage of the recession; Secondly, the Fed's rate hike cannot be too aggressive, and even needs to cut interest rates in time when a recession comes; Finally, if a new supply shock occurs, a \"hard landing\" may be more difficult to avoid.</p><p><b>4. Clues to asset prices.</b>In the 1970s and 1980s, inflation became the vane of the capital market. The U.S. CPI inflation rate has peaked three times in stages, and U.S. stocks have bottomed out in stages. But in this process, the market has a process of understanding and digesting the inflation situation and the logic of monetary policy. Over time, the U.S. bond market has traded less \"recession\" and more \"austerity.\" In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become the key clue of asset prices. After the end of the \"Great Stagflation\", safe-haven assets such as the US dollar still performed positively for a long time.</p><p><b>5. New enlightenment to the present.</b>First, the causes of this round of inflation in the United States have many similarities with those in the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited; Second, although the Federal Reserve has \"made mistakes\" in this round, it has taken the initiative in fighting inflation; Third, this round of U.S. economic recession is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of a \"hard landing\"; Fourthly, the price trend of this round of major asset classes may be strongly similar to that of 1970s and 1980s:<b>1）</b>U.S. stocks: Inflation is still the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment may not be too deep, and the rebound may wait for the recession to materialize.<b>2）</b>U.S. debt: Monetary policy is still the core influencing factor, and it may not fall back immediately when the recession materializes. It needs to wait until monetary policy clearly begins to relax.<b>3）</b>US dollar: The \"strong US dollar\" may last for a long time, and the US dollar may require US Treasury yields to fall back.</p><p><i>Risk warning: The U.S. economy is weaker than expected, there are new supply shocks, and non-U.S. financial risks are rising.</i></p><p>Since 2022, the U.S. CPI inflation rate once rose above 9%, real GDP has shrunk for two consecutive quarters, the (quasi-) stagflation characteristics of the economy have become more distinct, and the capital market has also experienced large fluctuations. Since the Jackson Hole meeting in late August, the Federal Reserve has repeatedly mentioned \"historical experience\" on various occasions, indicating that the current economic environment in the United States is very similar to that in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Federal Reserve will also fully learn from the response experience at that time and do something. Something is not done in order to help the United States overcome \"stagflation.\"</p><p>What is the current inflationary pressure in the United States? How will monetary policy respond? Can the U.S. economy still achieve a \"soft landing\"? When will the capital market usher in \"spring\"? In this report, with questions about the present, we review the inflation, monetary policy, economic growth and asset price performance during the \"Great Stagflation\" period in the United States from 1970s to 1980s, and try to understand the logic and laws, with a view to judging the U.S. economy, monetary policy and market trends in the future.</p><p><b>01. The complexity of high inflation</b></p><p><b>The causes of high inflation in the United States from 1970s to 1980s were extremely complicated: first, excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus initially pushed up inflation; Then, rude price control and hesitant monetary policy failed to effectively douse inflation; Furthermore, supply shocks represented by the two oil crises triggered cost-push inflation; Finally, the long-term overshoot inflation rate destabilizes inflation expectations, triggers a wage-price spiral, and deepens the obstinacy of inflation.</b></p><p><b>From 1969 to 1982, the United States fell into a crisis of high inflation. The CPI inflation rate was generally higher than 5%, with the highest reaching 14.8%.</b>The year-on-year growth rate of CPI in the United States has risen rapidly at a rate of more than 3% since 1968. In March 1969, the CPI exceeded 5% year-on-year, and the 13-year era of \"high inflation\" began. From 1969 to 1982, there were three peaks in the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. CPI, with the peaks in January 1970 (6.2%), December 1974 (12.3%) and March 1980 (14.8%). In February 1982, the CPI fell below 5% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0135dfd0a18c15e058312be783380d12\" tg-width=\"1066\" tg-height=\"490\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1965 to 1970, blind fiscal and monetary expansion gave birth to higher inflation.</b>With the end of economic reconstruction after World War II and the rise of European and Asian economies, the economic growth momentum of the United States has weakened, but blind stimulation at the policy level has led to obvious overheating of the economy. From 1965 to 1970, the real GDP growth rate of the United States continued to be higher than the potential growth rate, and the output gap (the difference between real GDP and potential GDP) accounted for as much as 3-6% of potential GDP. In other words, 3-6 percentage points of the U.S. economic growth rate at that time were stimulated by policies. During this period, the natural unemployment rate in the United States was 5.6-5.9%, but the actual unemployment rate basically remained within 4%. At that time, the role of fiscal stimulus was stronger than that of money. The proportion of U.S. federal fiscal expenditure to GDP increased by 3.2 percentage points from 1966 to 68, and the deficit ratio expanded from 0.2% in 1965 to 2.8% in 1968. In 1968, the U.S. government began to worry about fiscal balance. Then President Johnson signed the \"Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968\" in June to supplement fiscal revenue by increasing taxes. The Federal Reserve \"technically cut interest rates\" in August of the same year to hedge against the impact of tax increases, adding to the overheating of the economy.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fb7621fa84eb213f441091515980951c\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"426\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1971 to 74, rough price controls turned \"short pain\" into \"long pain\".</b>In August 1971, the Nixon administration imposed a 90-day wage and price freeze. But in fact, the scope of price control continued to expand, and it was not until 1974 that the U.S. government completely canceled its intervention in prices. During this period, except for special circumstances, all price increases of goods and services need to be approved by the government. In mid-1972, the U.S. CPI inflation rate fell below 3%. This price control is regarded as a special case of comprehensive government intervention in prices in peacetime in American economic history, and it is also regarded as a failed attempt. This is because, while the price limit measures curbed the price increase, they also severely dampened the enthusiasm of production enterprises, resulting in insufficient supply of social commodities, and paving the way for the subsequent deterioration of inflation. In 1974, Nixon stepped down due to the Watergate Incident, and the new President Carter came to power, and the price control measures gradually failed. Slightly funny, both the Nixon and Carter administrations tried to control prices through verbal \"exhortation\". For example, when Carter first came to power, he encouraged people to buy \"bargains\": \"Dare to show off to others, choose bargains yourself, and be proud of them\". These admonitions are almost futile in controlling prices. The U.S. CPI inflation rate broke 5% again in April 1973, and has since reached a stage high of 12.3% in December 1974.</p><p><b>A food crisis and two oil crises in 1973 and 1979 demonstrated the destructive power of supply shocks on American prices.</b>In 1973, the grain harvest in the former Soviet Union failed due to bad weather, and then entered the international market to buy a large amount of grain, which triggered the most serious food crisis since World War II. At the end of 1973, the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. food CPI once rose above 20%. From October 1973 to March 1974, the first oil crisis broke out: the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, led by Saudi Arabia, announced an oil embargo on countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War, with the United States bearing the brunt. The average price of crude oil at the World Bank jumped from US $2.7/barrel in September 1973 to US $13/barrel in early 1974, an increase of nearly 500%. From March to September 1974, the year-on-year growth rate of U.S. energy CPI exceeded 30%. From the beginning of 1979 to the beginning of 1980, the second oil crisis broke out: the Islamic Revolution broke out in Iran, and then the \"Iran-Iraq War\" broke out between Iran and Iraq, which led to a sharp drop in global oil production. World Bank international oil prices rose from less than US $15/barrel in December 1978 to more than US $40/barrel in November 1979. In March 1980, the U.S. energy CPI peaked at 47.1% year-on-year, and the U.S. CPI immediately peaked at 14.8% year-on-year.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/368b46087ff151100ed782e7aa94b78d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1980, after the headline inflation rate in the United States continued to overshoot, inflation expectations got out of control. With the help of trade unions, a \"wage-price spiral\" gradually formed.</b>After the CPI inflation rate has been higher than 2% or even higher than 5% for many years, American residents have lost their original confidence in prices and inflation expectations have risen. At that time, both the Fed and the market had limited awareness and tracking of inflation expectations. The widely quoted University of Michigan survey and Cleveland Fed model expectations were only born around 1980. The earliest inflation expectation monitoring tool in the United States was The Livingston Survey, which was born in 1946, and summarized inflation forecasts from businesses, governments, banking, and academia. The survey shows that inflation expectations in the United States have gradually increased since 1970, especially after the two oil crises, and inflation expectations have also risen sharply with the headline inflation rate. The reverse impact of inflation expectations on prices is mainly transmitted through wages: workers demand wage increases, and then the spending power of residents and the cost pressure of enterprises rise, which at the same time contributes to price increases, that is, a \"wage-price spiral\" is formed.<b>In particular, in the 1970s, American trade unions were huge, and the transmission of wage demands was relatively smooth:</b>According to the data of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), at that time, trade union members in the United States accounted for nearly 30% of the total employees in the society, and there were as many as 200-400 strikes by more than 1,000 people every year (since 2000, this number has been less than 30 all the year round). From mid-1976 to mid-1978, the CPI inflation rate in the United States fell back to around 5-7%, but the average hourly wage of non-agricultural and non-managerial personnel in the United States increased by 6-8% year-on-year, which continued to be higher than the CPI inflation rate. The stickiness of wage increases prevented inflation from falling further and paved the way for a subsequent rebound in inflation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa062f9510e45fda47f5e682ec9ba17b\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"457\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>From 1970 to 79, the Federal Reserve's policy response was relatively negative, continuing to \"lag behind the curve\" and failing to effectively curb inflation.</b>Before 1980, U.S. policy interest rates and inflation trends showed strong synchronization, reflecting that the Federal Reserve had been \"lagging behind the curve\" and \"catching up with the curve\" for a long time. In May 1969, the third month after the inflation rate exceeded 5%, the U.S. policy interest rate began to rise significantly and exceeded the inflation rate by more than 3 percentage points. After that, the inflation rate kept rising for about half a year before it began to fall. In the second half of 1973, while the inflation rate in the United States was still rising, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates due to economic pressure, and then the inflation rate accelerated. In 1978, the U.S. policy interest rate was basically the same as the inflation rate, and kept rising step by step. Until December 1978, the monthly federal funds rate rose above 10% and was 1 percentage point higher than the inflation rate, but soon the policy interest rate began to lag behind the inflation rate. Later, when the U.S. policy interest rate was significantly higher than the spot inflation rate, inflation dropped significantly, and the Federal Reserve took the initiative in curbing inflation: after 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker raised interest rates sharply to fight inflation; In mid-1981, the U.S. policy interest rate reached a peak of more than 19%. In October of the same year, the CPI fell both month-on-month and year-on-year; Since then, Federal Funds rate has continued to be 4-9 percentage points higher than the CPI inflation rate, and the inflation rate has continued to fall.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/707eeb51701422548c5e1b935b53479d\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>02. The Federal Reserve's \"faults\" and \"merits\"</b></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve was not resolute enough in tightening due to insufficient understanding of the relationship between inflation and monetary policy, as well as the lack of independence of monetary policy. After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the concept of the \"monetary school\", regarded curbing inflation as its own responsibility, strengthened its rate hike and controlled the money supply. Since then, the Federal Reserve has been committed to stabilizing inflation expectations for a long time, reshaping its credibility.</b></p><p><b>2.1. Reasons for the Fed's hesitation</b></p><p><b>From 1970 to 1979, the Federal Reserve continued to \"lag behind the curve\" for many reasons.</b></p><p><b>First, the Federal Reserve once considered inflation a \"non-monetary phenomenon.\"</b>At that time, the Federal Reserve was divided on the causes of high inflation, and tended to believe that inflation was mainly caused by non-monetary factors, and then monetary policy chose to respond negatively. For example, in 1970, the Federal Reserve led by Burns believed that the power of trade unions triggered cost-push inflation, and then advocated the use of \"income policy\" regulation rather than tightening the money supply. It also fueled the wage and price freeze later imposed by the Nixon administration. In 1974, Burns also believed that \"improper fiscal discipline\" was the main cause of inflation.</p><p><b>Second, the Fed's primary goal at that time was \"full employment\" rather than \"price stability.\"</b>Before the 1970s, Keynesian ideas dominated the logic of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve focused on aggregate demand management and firmly believed in the existence of the Phillips curve (the negative correlation between unemployment rate and inflation). Therefore, the primary goal of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy is to achieve \"full employment\", hoping to maintain a low and stable unemployment rate. Then, when the unemployment rate rises, the balance of monetary policy is tilted more towards the job market. When \"stagnation\" and \"inflation\" occurred at the same time, the Federal Reserve once believed that inflation would not continue to worsen. For example, Miller's Federal Reserve in 1978-79 believed that monetary easing would not deepen inflation as long as the unemployment rate was above full employment levels (above 5.5%).</p><p><b>Finally, the Fed's decision-making is also influenced by political factors.</b>Burns, who served as chairman from 1970 to 1978, and Miller, who served from 1978 to 79, were both influenced by the then president and lacked independence, wavering in balancing the relationship between inflation and economic growth. In hindsight, the Fed's tolerance for inflation in the 1970s may be exactly what the rulers wanted to see: on the one hand, the rulers did not want the Fed to undermine economic growth and affect votes by curbing inflation; On the other hand, higher inflation is also regarded as a hidden tax means, because the increase of nominal wages increases the progression of the whole tax system, resulting in a sharp increase in fiscal revenue. Data show that the proportion of personal income tax in GDP in the United States increased significantly during the periods of high inflation in 1969-70, 1974 and 1979-83.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/85870c4ece63c7cae63758bc6db5a828\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"421\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2.2. The achievements of the Volcker era</b></p><p><b>After 1979, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker absorbed the concept of the \"monetary school\" and took curbing inflation as its own responsibility. It firmly conducted rate hike and controlled the money supply. Although it \"created\" an economic recession, it finally defeated inflation.</b>In August, 1979, Volcker became the chairman of the Federal Reserve. He adopted the \"monetary school\" view represented by Friedman. The Federal Reserve led by him made it more clear that monetary policy was the core position of price stability, and incorporated the growth rate of money supply (M1) into the monetary policy goal, followed by a substantial rate hike, which made the Federal Funds rate higher than the CPI inflation rate, so as to achieve the goal of controlling money supply. In March 1980, Volcker carried out an ill-advised but short-lived experiment of credit control (the \"Special Credit Restriction Program\") in order to slow down the rate hike, but then restarted monetary policy tightening, and finally pushed Federal Funds rate to a peak of more than 20% in mid-1981. Although the sharp rate hike brought about the economic recession, it ultimately helped inflation fall.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7ab3004dd4948baa80533fe718adebaf\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"422\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>In addition, in the era of Volcker and Greenspan, the Federal Reserve established a new \"nominal anchor\" to stabilize inflation expectations and reshape the credibility of the Federal Reserve. This is also an important background for U.S. prices to return to long-term stability in the future.</b>In the 1980s, after experiencing the \"great stagflation\", the original expectation of price stability suffered serious damage. Even in the Volcker era, when the Federal Reserve defined its money supply target and firmly raised interest rates, the credibility of monetary policy was still questioned. It is not clear to the public whether the Fed can maintain its focus on inflation for a long time and have the ability to influence medium and long-term price trends. Therefore, Volcker and his next Federal Reserve President Greenspan are more committed to reconstructing stable inflation expectations, making them the \"nominal anchor\" of monetary policy, and ultimately re-establishing the credibility of monetary policy.</p><p><b>This is a complicated and long process: Volcker's experience of defeating inflation was a good starting point, and then the Fed shifted from money supply targeting to \"hidden inflation targeting.\"</b>In practice, the Federal Reserve focuses on the \"growth gap\" and the \"inflation expectation gap\" at the same time. In fact, it sets policy interest rates through the Taylor Rule, pursues stable medium-and long-term inflation targets, and achieves stable economic growth. In terms of inflation expectation management, the Federal Reserve monitors inflation expectations through changes in bond yields, and at the same time strengthens communication with the capital market, which enhances the credibility of monetary policy and the stability of market expectations. The monetary policy framework after the Volcker era achieved long-term results in price stability, creating the later era of Great Moderation (1984-2007).</p><p><b>03. \"Soft landing\" and \"hard landing\"</b></p><p><b>From 1970s to 1980s, there were four rounds of economic recessions in the United States, which were the result of the combined effects of high inflation, high interest rates and supply shocks. High inflation has a direct inhibitory effect on consumption, and drives the Federal Reserve to rate hike and further curb investment. Therefore, the degree of recession depends on the severity of inflation and the response of monetary policy, and the conditions for achieving a \"soft landing\" are relatively harsh.</b></p><p><b>3.1. The three major drivers of economic recession</b></p><p><b>According to the classification of the National Economic Research Bureau (NBER), the U.S. economy experienced four rounds of recessions from 1970s to 1980s:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>The first round was from January to November 1970 (11 months).</b>The real GDP of the United States fell from 3.2% in 1969 to 0.2% in 1970, but the economy hardly shrank. However, the unemployment rate in the United States rose significantly, from 3.5% in December 1969 to 6.1% in December 1970 (a stage high), and remained above 5% for the next 24 months.</p><p></li><li><b>The second round was from December 1973 to March 1975 (16 months).</b>The real GDP of the United States fell off a cliff from 5.6% year-on-year in 1973, and shrank year-on-year for five consecutive quarters, with the deepest quarterly year-on-year contraction reaching 2.3%. The unemployment rate in the United States has been higher than 7% for 31 consecutive months, rising from a low of 4.6% in October 1973 to 9.0% in May 1975, and then declining slowly.</p><p></li><li><b>The third round was from February to July 1980 (6 months).</b>The annualized rate of real GDP in the United States shrank sharply by 8% in the second quarter of 1980, but only by 0.8% year-on-year. During this period, the unemployment rate in the United States rose from 6.3% to 7.8%. In the second half of 1980, the U.S. economy immediately began to recover. In the fourth quarter, GDP rose sharply by 7.7% month-on-month, and the unemployment rate began to fall in August.</p><p></li><li><b>The fourth round was from August 1981 to November 1982 (16 months)</b>。 The real GDP of the United States has shrunk year-on-year for four consecutive quarters, with the deepest contraction of 2.6%. The unemployment rate in the United States began to rebound significantly from a stage low of 7.2% in August 1981, exceeded 8% in November of the same year, reached a peak of 10.8% in November 1982, and then slowly fell back, falling below 8% in February 1984.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/93377c7b4f0d061e8d18147cc001a54a\" tg-width=\"1061\" tg-height=\"483\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><b>One of the recession drivers: high inflation.</b>Comparing the economic and inflation trends at that time, the two showed a very close correlation:<b>The nodes at which the U.S. economic recession occurs all correspond to the time when the CPI inflation rate rises or peaks.</b>For example, when the CPI inflation rate peaked in 1970, it happened to be the beginning of the rebound in the unemployment rate and the economic recession; From 1973 to 75, this round of unemployment rate rebounded and the economy was recognized as a recession, both after the CPI inflation rate broke 8%; At the beginning of 1980, when the CPI inflation rate hit a very high level of more than 14%, the unemployment rate rebounded significantly and the economy began to decline.<b>If the inflation rate is still rising when the recession occurs, the U.S. economy will continue to decline; Only after the inflation rate dropped did the U.S. economy begin to recover.</b>For example, in late 1970, the U.S. economy did not begin to recover until inflation fell below 5%; In 1975, when the inflation rate peaked and fell for a quarter, the U.S. GDP growth rate turned positive quarter-on-quarter and the unemployment rate began to decline.</p><p><b>The direct impact of inflation on the economy is mainly reflected in consumption.</b>Compared with policy interest rates, the negative correlation between U.S. inflation rate and private consumption growth rate is more obvious. Especially in the 1980s, when the policy interest rate jumped sharply, the inflation rate had already fallen early, and private consumption also began to pick up at that time, indicating that the easing of inflation was obviously helpful to the recovery of consumption.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/157a3ac9e6b19301fad3ca7e2e88c069\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"419\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The second driver of recession: high interest rates.</b>Overall, the cooling effect of the Fed's rate hike on the economy at that time was obvious:<b>When the U.S. economy is overheating, rate hike's cooling effect on the economy can be described as immediate:</b>For example, in mid-1973, the U.S. manufacturing PMI exceeded 60, and the Federal Reserve rate hike quickly cooled the \"overheated\" economy.<b>When the U.S. economy itself is in a downturn or even recession, rate hike has deepened the economic contraction:</b>For example, in mid-1974, after the policy interest rate peaked, the downturn of the U.S. economy accelerated, and the U.S. GDP shrank sharply by 3.7% in the third quarter; From March to April 1980, after the monthly rate of federal funds reached a stage high of more than 17%, U.S. GDP shrank sharply by 8.0% in the second quarter of the same year.<b>On the contrary, interest rate cuts can help the economy recover:</b>In December 1970, when the policy interest rate fell below the inflation rate, the U.S. economy immediately recovered; In early 1975, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates and kept the policy rate nearly 5 percentage points below the inflation rate. The U.S. economy began to recover in the second quarter of 1975.<b>However, premature and immature interest rate cuts when inflation is not effectively controlled may end in \"repeated inflation + higher rate hike\", thus leading to a greater degree of recession or delaying the recovery that should have started earlier:</b>At the beginning of 1974, the Federal Reserve chose to cut interest rates, but as inflation continued to rise and the negative impact on the economy continued, the U.S. economy was still in recession; In May 1980, the monthly rate of federal funds had dropped to about 11% (supplemented by credit controls). In August, the U.S. economy temporarily left the recession range. However, since inflation repeatedly forced the Federal Reserve to choose greater rate hike, the U.S. economy fell into a new round of deeper recession in 1981.</p><p><b>The impact of interest rates on the economy is mainly reflected in investment.</b>Compared with inflation, the negative correlation between policy interest rate and private investment (lagging by one year) is more obvious. In the second half of 1980, the Federal Reserve briefly cut interest rates, and a year later, private investment in the United States rebounded significantly; In 1981, when the Federal Reserve resumed its sharp rate hike, the growth rate of private investment declined significantly a year later, but inflation also dropped significantly during this period, indicating that private investment is more sensitive to interest rate trends.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d940f253f486815be3e542cd6e173587\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"418\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The third driver of recession: supply shocks.</b>The food and oil crises of 1973 and 1979 caused many drags on U.S. economic growth, thus triggering economic recessions.<b>First,</b>As mentioned above, supply shocks have raised the CPI inflation rate, and rising consumer prices have suppressed aggregate demand. In particular,<b>Supply shocks have triggered higher energy consumption costs and crowded out other consumption.</b>After 1974, the proportion of consumption of energy products and services in private consumption in the United States increased from about 6% before the shock to 7-9%, and did not drop significantly until after 1985.<b>Second, the supply shock has increased the cost of U.S. oil imports, causing GDP to \"evaporate\".</b>The first oil crisis caused oil prices to rise by about $10/barrel. In 1974, the net oil imports of the United States were about 6 million barrels per day. We estimate that rising oil prices will drag down U.S. GDP by approximately US $21.9 billion by increasing net import costs, dragging down nominal GDP growth by 1.4 percentage points; Similarly, after the second oil crisis, the rising cost of net oil imports dragged down the nominal growth rate of US GDP in 1979 by 2.8 percentage points.<b>Third, the supply shock caused a shortage of raw materials, weakening the industrial production capacity of the United States.</b>After two rounds of supply shocks in the 1970s, the total industrial production index of the United States fell sharply year-on-year. Comparing the two shocks, it can be found that during the first shock, the CPI inflation rate in the United States was lower, while the PPI inflation rate was higher, and then the industrial production was hit deeper, which also reflected that the impact of supply shocks on economic output was more important. It is mainly manifested on the \"supply side\".</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/bbaa840667be8378540c48fd32436e79\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"439\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3.2. What does the degree of recession depend on</b></p><p><b>For the above four rounds of recession, according to the degree of GDP contraction and the duration of the recession, they can be divided into two \"soft landings\" (1970 and 1980) and two \"hard landings\" (1973-75 and 1981-82).</b></p><p><ul><li><b>1970 \"soft landing\"</b>The background is that inflationary pressures are relatively limited. At that time, the highest CPI inflation rate was only 6.2%, and then the Federal Reserve did not make a substantial rate hike, and the highest policy interest rate was only about 9%. Inflation is limited. On the one hand, it has not suffered from supply shocks, and on the other hand, it is also related to the price controls of the Nixon administration.</p><p></li><li><b>1980 \"soft landing\"</b>The background is that inflation peaked and fell, and the Federal Reserve cut interest rates in a timely manner. At that time, the U.S. CPI inflation rate once reached an all-time high of 14.8%, and the monthly federal funds rate once reached 17.6%. However, when the recession began, the Federal Reserve quickly cut interest rates, and the policy rate dropped sharply to around 9%, and the economy quickly began to recover.</p><p></li><li><b>1973-75 \"hard landing\"</b>The main reason is that under the supply shock, the inflation rate is still rising during the recession, and then the policy interest rate has to rise rapidly with inflation (even if the policy interest rate is not significantly higher than the inflation rate);</p><p></li><li><b>1981-82 \"hard landing\"</b>The background is that the Federal Reserve is eager to curb inflation, so it has taken very aggressive rate hike measures (Federal Funds rate once reached about 20%). Although the inflation rate soon began to decline, the policy interest rate continued to be significantly higher than the inflation rate, which delayed the economic recovery process.</p><p></li></ul><b>From this, we can conclude that the requirements for \"soft landing\" are relatively stringent-first of all,</b>Inflationary pressure cannot be too great, and the CPI inflation rate may need to fall back in time in the early stages of the recession.<b>Secondly,</b>The Fed's rate hike cannot be too aggressive, and even needs to cut interest rates in time when a recession comes.<b>Finally,</b>If the government intervenes excessively in prices, or a new supply shock unfortunately occurs, then the \"soft landing\" may only be temporary, and inflation may rebound in the future, and a \"hard landing\" will be more difficult to avoid.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/5c05ee90fc4945e31d8dc59cbb9f3a8c\" tg-width=\"1073\" tg-height=\"367\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>04. Clues to asset prices</b></p><p><b>From the 1970s to the 1980s, high inflation was the \"biggest enemy\" of the U.S. economy and policies, so the inflation situation also became the vane of the capital market. In this process, the market has a process of understanding and digesting the inflation situation and the logic of monetary policy. In the \"Volcker era\" after 1980, monetary policy began to become the key clue of asset prices. In addition, the \"Great Stagflation\" has brought long-term pain to the economy and market, and then safe-haven assets such as the US dollar have performed positively for a long time.</b></p><p><b>4.1. U.S. stocks: Inflation is the biggest enemy</b></p><p><b>During this period, the trend of U.S. stocks was dominated by inflation. Whenever the inflation rate turned downward, U.S. stocks rebounded immediately.</b>July 1970, December 1974, and March 1980 corresponded to the three peaks of the U.S. CPI inflation rate, and were also the beginning of the rebound of the S&P 500 index. This may show that in the period of high inflation, the trend of inflation is what the market is most concerned about: as long as inflation remains high, the Federal Reserve may continue to tighten, and the U.S. economy will be threatened by both high inflation and high interest rates; As long as inflation falls, even if the economy is temporarily weak, the market believes that falling prices are conducive to economic recovery, and the Fed's tightening is expected to be relaxed, and the stock market will be included in the recovery expectation.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/f3acab3e6f335ccd1d9e96b22ddd4750\" tg-width=\"1069\" tg-height=\"519\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>U.S. stocks are bottom out in the middle of a recession, and the extent of the adjustment does not entirely depend on the degree of the recession.</b>At the beginning of the four rounds of recessions defined by NBER, U.S. stocks were all under pressure. However, when the recession was not over, as monetary policy expectations loosened, inflationary pressures began to ease, and market recovery expectations increased, U.S. stocks were often the first to usher in a rebound. In other words,<b>The \"policy bottom\" is ahead of the \"market bottom\", and the \"market bottom\" is ahead of the \"economic bottom\".</b>From the data point of view, the bottom of the S&P 500 index all occurred during recession periods.</p><p><b>However, the extent of the adjustment in U.S. stocks does not depend entirely on the extent of the recession:</b>In the \"soft landings\" of 1970 and 1980, and in the \"hard landings\" of 1981-82, the S&P 500 index fell no more than 20%; Only in the \"hard landing\" of 1973-75, the S&P 500 index fell nearly 40%. Judging from the magnitude of the rebound, after four rounds of recession and the adjustment of U.S. stocks, the rebound of U.S. stocks is relatively strong, and the S&P 500 index has rebounded by more than 30% from the trough.</p><p><b>The logic behind it may be:</b>The overall market after the \"soft landing\" remains optimistic. Although the market after the \"hard landing\" is not so optimistic, due to the previous low \"base\", the price-performance ratio of US stocks can still attract capital inflows. This means that no matter what the degree of the recession is, as long as the bottom is found and the U.S. stock market is moderately \"tilted forward\", it is possible to obtain good returns.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/164eaafd25fa17da2d93917b48fdcdc5\" tg-width=\"1063\" tg-height=\"500\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>The Federal Reserve is not the \"eternal enemy\" of US stocks.</b>Comparing the performance of U.S. stocks after 1970 and 1980, even though the U.S. CPI inflation rate was higher, the Federal Reserve rate hike was more aggressive, and the degree of recession was not weak after 1980, the overall performance of U.S. stocks was significantly better than that in the 1970s. In the 1970s, the S&P 500 index remained almost sideways amid volatility, while after 1980, the S&P 500 index maintained a volatile upward trend. Especially compared with 1973-75 and 1981-82, they were both \"hard landings\", but the latter U.S. stocks fell less and rebounded more. The biggest difference between the two periods is that<b>The latter is more tightening by the Federal Reserve and may have played a more important role in \"creating\" a recession.</b>During the aggressive rate hike of the Federal Reserve, the inflation rate dropped significantly: on the one hand, it eased the suppression of high inflation on economic growth; on the other hand, the market had more confidence in the Federal Reserve, which in turn made recovery expectations stronger and risk appetite higher. In addition, after 1980, \"Reaganomics\" entered the historical stage, and after the market was fully and painfully cleared, American productivity increased rapidly. Therefore, U.S. stocks rebounded even stronger due to the \"two-wheel drive\" of the decline in policy interest rates after inflation was controllable and the profit growth of listed companies. From this perspective, inflation is the \"biggest enemy\" of US stocks, but the Federal Reserve is not; The Federal Reserve, which has the ability to curb inflation, eventually became a \"friend\" of the US stock market!</p><p><b>4.2. U.S. debt: \"dancing\" with monetary policy</b></p><p><b>In the 1970s, the U.S. bond market experienced a long-term bear market, with high inflation and high interest rates driving the US Treasury yields upward.</b>However, the volatility of 10-year US Treasury yields is significantly smaller than that of CPI inflation rate and policy interest rate. It is worth mentioning that the correlation between the U.S. economic recession and US Treasury yields is not obvious: before and after the four rounds of recessions in 1970, 1974-75, 1980 and 1982, the 10-year US Treasury yields fell back in the first round, the second round fluctuated upward, the third round rose sharply, and the fourth round fluctuated stronger. This may reflect the evolution of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy logic, that is, the emphasis on inflation continues to increase and the balance of the economy continues to weaken. Then<b>Over time, the market trades less \"recession\" and more \"tightening\".</b>It was not until after the third quarter of 1982, when the CPI inflation rate was lower than 5% and GDP shrank year-on-year, that the market believed that the Federal Reserve could cut interest rates without distractions, and US Treasury yields dropped significantly.</p><p><b>In the 1980s, the trend of 10-year US Treasury yields was more closely related to the trend of policy interest rates.</b>From 1980 to 81, the U.S. CPI inflation rate showed a downward trend, but the 10-year US Treasury yields rose rapidly, mainly driven by the strong tightening of monetary policy. After 1982, the 10-year US Treasury yields was relatively consistent with the fluctuation trend of policy interest rates, which reflected the effectiveness of monetary policy reform in the Volcker era, that is, the Federal Reserve's driving force for bond interest rates increased significantly.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/9d465d535d3e18340e29dfe32d95faea\" tg-width=\"1068\" tg-height=\"502\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>Although the 10-year US Treasury yields \"danced\" with the policy rate, the volatility was even smaller.</b>Before the 1970s, the absolute levels and trends of US Treasury yields and Federal Funds rate were very similar in 10 years. In the 1970s, when high inflation came and the Federal Reserve rate hike, although the 10-year US Treasury yields would also rise, the increase was even smaller, and then \"underperformed\" the policy interest rate. The reasons are: on the one hand, the emergence of high inflation and high interest rates has reduced market risk appetite, and U.S. debt has played a certain safe-haven attribute; On the other hand, due to concerns about economic growth, the market doubts the sustainability of high interest rates, which in turn depresses the medium and long-term US Treasury yields (the maturity premium of U.S. bonds is negative). When inflation fell and the Federal Reserve cut interest rates, although the 10-year US Treasury yields also fell, the magnitude was still limited, making US Treasury yields \"outperform\" the policy interest rate. The reason for this phenomenon may be the rise in inflation expectations. In fact, after 1983, the 10-year decline in US Treasury yields was insufficient, which once became a new problem faced by the Federal Reserve: the inflation rate in the United States has dropped to around 2%, but because the market inflation expectation has not dropped in time, the bond market interest rate has dropped slowly, hindering the economic recovery. Later, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker began to regard the bond market interest rate as the yardstick of inflation expectations, and paid more attention to the management of inflation expectations. It took 10 years for the trend of US Treasury yields to further align with the policy interest rate.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/73d7be6ac6bef4e338dc445e6ab9169f\" tg-width=\"1065\" tg-height=\"503\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>4.3. US dollar: Multiple factors create a strong US dollar</b></p><p><b>Factors such as the Federal Reserve's rate hike, rising market demand for safe havens, and the impact on non-US economies jointly created a strong US dollar in 1981-84.</b>In the 1970s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system caused the rapid depreciation of the US dollar exchange rate. During this period, the US dollar exchange rate did not have a strong correlation with the US economic and monetary cycle. From 1981 to 84, the US dollar exchange rate continued to strengthen, and the the US Dollar Index once rose above the historical peak of 160 from around 85 in the second half of 1980; It was not until the Plaza Accord was signed in 1985 that the strong dollar came to an end.</p><p><b>How to understand the strong dollar during this period?</b>First of all, after 1980, the Federal Reserve led by Volcker strictly controlled the money supply, and the scarcity of the US dollar rose; Second, from 1981 to 82, the U.S. economy fell into recession due to the aggressive rate hike of the Federal Reserve, and U.S. stocks experienced significant adjustments. Economic and market risks stimulated the safe-haven attribute of the U.S. dollar; Third, in 1983-84, the U.S. economy bid farewell to high inflation and entered a strong recovery. The Federal Reserve's policy interest rate and US Treasury yields remained relatively high. During this period, the US dollar exchange rate is still strengthening: on the one hand, the market's confidence in the Federal Reserve has increased; On the other hand, the spillover effects of the Fed's tightening in the early stage on non-US economies appeared (such as the deep debt crisis in Latin America in 1982-85), which made US dollar assets fully attractive.</p><p>It is worth mentioning that<b>During the aggressive Fed rate hike, both the US Dollar Index and US Treasury yields are trending upward.</b>However,<b>The reaction of the US dollar exchange rate lags behind US Treasury yields:</b>For example, in June 1980, US Treasury yields had begun to rise rapidly in 10 years, while the US Dollar Index's rise lagged by about 3 months; In June, 1984, the 10-year US Treasury yields began to fall due to market expectations of interest rate cuts, but the US Dollar Index's decline lagged behind by nine months.</p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/61242bb3f7016cf966b35fefe3930648\" tg-width=\"1067\" tg-height=\"452\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>05. New enlightenment to the present</b></p><p><b>1. The causes of this round of U.S. inflation have many similarities with those in the 1970s and 1980s, but the overall pressure is more limited.</b></p><p>Similar to the 1970s, the current high inflation in the United States is also the result of multiple factors such as monetary and fiscal easing, the slow action of the Federal Reserve, and supply shocks. But in comparison,<b>We tend to think that U.S. inflation will not get out of control as it was then:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This time, the U.S. government did not implement rude price controls like the Nixon administration did, and the balancing effect of price signals on supply and demand did not disappear, reducing the risk of recurrent inflation in the future;</p><p></li><li><b>And second,</b>At present, the risk of the \"wage-price\" spiral in the United States is relatively low. On the one hand, it benefits from the medium-and long-term inflation expectations that are still relatively stable, and on the other hand, it benefits from the long-term weakening of the power of American trade unions;</p><p></li><li><b>And third,</b>At present, the United States has a stronger ability to digest the \"oil crisis\". Especially after the shale oil revolution in 2010, the proportion of energy consumption in the United States in total private consumption has declined, and the United States has also changed from a net importer of crude oil to a net exporter. Therefore, the transmission of oil prices to the core inflation rate in the United States has declined. Therefore, even though the current U.S. CPI energy sub-item growth rate is as high as 40% year-on-year, reaching the level of the two oil crises in 1970s and 1980s, the core CPI inflation rate is significantly lower than at that time.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/8e9d6130cfa6c71161fdc10b5eaa79c0\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"411\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2. Although the Federal Reserve has \"made mistakes\" in this round, it has taken the initiative in fighting inflation.</b></p><p>The \"capriciousness\" of monetary policy and the market's lack of confidence in monetary policy were important backgrounds for repeated stagflation in 1970s and 1980s. In comparison,<b>The Fed now has more initiative, and even if it underestimated the sustainability of inflation in 2021 (the \"inflation temporary theory\"), there may still be room for recovery from this mistake:</b></p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>In terms of understanding and responding to \"stagflation\", the Federal Reserve is no longer \"crossing the river by feeling the stones\", and its monetary policy has already defined the goal of \"price stability\". Since the beginning of this year, the Federal Reserve has declared that \"price stability\" is the prerequisite for \"maximum employment\" and regards curbing inflation as the top priority of monetary policy.</p><p></li><li><b>Secondly,</b>After the Volcker-Greenspan era, the Federal Reserve had a stronger ability to monitor inflation expectations (such as the birth of inflation-protected bonds after 2000), communicated with the market more efficiently, and established a relatively good reputation. Since the beginning of this year, the Fed's tightening signal has significantly raised the nominal interest rate of U.S. debt, and the quick response of the capital market reflects the credibility of monetary policy. At present, U.S. inflation expectations have not been \"unanchored\". The ten-year inflation expectations monitored by the Cleveland Fed model do not exceed 2.5%, far below the level of 4-5% in the 1980s.</p><p></li><li><b>Finally,</b>The Federal Reserve is more independent today. Currently, inflation is the \"enemy\" faced by the Biden administration and the Federal Reserve, and the Fed's tightening is supported by the president. Even if economic pressure increases in the future and the president puts pressure on the Federal Reserve, it is expected that the Federal Reserve will defend its credibility more firmly. Just as Powell's Federal Reserve conducted four rate hike in 2018, despite criticism from then-President Trump.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/aeb68357b44663ea8caedbf43793c2db\" tg-width=\"1074\" tg-height=\"436\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3. This round of U.S. economic recession is almost inevitable, and there is a risk of a \"hard landing\".</b></p><p>In the 1970s and 1980s, when the U.S. CPI inflation rate rose above 5%, the economic recession came as expected. Compare the current:</p><p><ul><li><b>First,</b>This year, the U.S. CPI inflation rate reached a maximum of 9.1%, which not only exceeded the previous level that triggered the recession, but also exceeded the level during the \"soft landing\" period of the U.S. economy in 1970;</p><p></li><li><b>And second,</b>At present, the Federal Reserve has shown great determination to curb inflation, or maintain policy interest rates at a \"sufficiently restrictive level\" for a long time, at the cost of economic recession (refer to our previous report \"The Defense of the Federal Reserve's Credibility\"). This means that, similar to the Volcker period in 1981-82, the Fed's tightening may be enough to \"create\" a recession;</p><p></li><li><b>And third,</b>At present, the risk of recurrent inflation in the future cannot be ruled out. If a new supply shock unfortunately occurs in the future, or the actual tightening of the Fed is insufficient (for example, when the U.S. economy actually enters a recession, political pressure rises, or financial risks occur in the future, the Fed stops tightening or even cuts interest rates prematurely), then U.S. inflation may still be repeated, leading to a greater recession.</p><p></li></ul><b>4. The price trend of this round of major asset classes may be strongly similar to that of 1970s and 1980s.</b></p><p><b>1) U.S. stocks: Inflation is still the core influencing factor, and there will still be adjustment pressure in the future, but the adjustment may not be too deep, and the rebound may wait for the recession to materialize.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the current inflation trend also has a strong correlation with the performance of US stocks.</b>In the first half of this year, as the U.S. CPI inflation rate continued to rise, U.S. stocks ushered in a round of deep adjustments; From mid-June to mid-August, commodity prices and inflation expectations cooled down, and U.S. stocks rebounded in stages; Since late August, as the persistence of high inflation has exceeded expectations, the Fed's policy orientation has become tougher, and U.S. stocks have paid more attention to monetary policy, staging a new round of \"tightening panic.\"</p><p></li><li><b>The U.S. stock market may remain under pressure for some time to come, similar to the 1981-82 period when Volcker fought inflation and \"created\" a recession.</b>From 1981 to 82, although the U.S. CPI inflation rate continued to fall, the Federal Reserve's tightening had an impact on the economy and stock market. Similarly, the current Federal Reserve seems to want to return to the \"Volcker era\" and is bound to ensure that inflation falls back at the cost of recession. At present, U.S. inflation is still at a high level, the economy has not yet experienced a substantial recession, and the market's valuation of the recession is not yet sufficient, and there may still be room for subsequent adjustments in U.S. stocks. Judging from historical experience, U.S. stocks may still fall in the early stages of the economic recession. It is not until monetary policy begins to relax in the middle and late stages of the recession that U.S. stocks will usher in a sustained rebound.</p><p></li><li><b>However, the Fed will not be the \"eternal enemy\" of U.S. stocks. If the Fed successfully helps inflation fall, the adjustment of U.S. stocks may not be too deep.</b>When Volcker \"created\" a recession in 1981-92, the adjustment of U.S. stocks was relatively limited and did not fall below the bottom in early 1980. Although the Fed's vigorous fight against inflation brings \"short-term pain\", it can avoid the \"long-term pain\" of repeated inflation. Considering that this round of inflation situation is more optimistic than in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Fed's actions are not too passive, this round of U.S. stock adjustment may not be too deep, and the rebound may be earlier than historical experience.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/7f004d3c8a3173e8965e08861dace942\" tg-width=\"1077\" tg-height=\"417\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>2) U.S. debt: Monetary policy is still the core influencing factor, and it may not fall back immediately when the recession materializes. It needs to wait until monetary policy clearly begins to relax.</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Similar to the 1970s and 1980s, the core influencing factor of US Treasury yields in the current decade is also monetary policy.</b>The experience of the 1970s-1980s was that the bond market teetered between a \"recession trade\" and a \"tightening trade\". But as the Fed is more determined to fight inflation, the bond market is trading less \"recession\" and more \"tightening.\" In July this year, due to cooling inflation expectations and rising recession expectations, the 10-year US Treasury yields dropped significantly. However, since late August, as the Fed's policy orientation has become tougher, the market has paid more attention to tightening. Therefore, US Treasury yields has continued to rebound in the past 10 years and has risen above 4%, exceeding the stage high of 3.5% in mid-June.</p><p></li><li><b>If the Fed also insists on tightening during a recession, then the US Treasury yields in the early 10-year recession may not fall back soon.</b>Just as in the early days of the U.S. economic recession in 1981-82, even though the U.S. CPI inflation rate has dropped significantly from its high point, it is still far from the 2% target. Monetary policy has not been relaxed, and the 10-year US Treasury yields has remained at a high level. We expect that even if the U.S. economy begins to decline in the first half of 2023, the Federal Reserve may choose to stick to tightening and not cut interest rates, and the bond market may not trade in a recession prematurely.</p><p></li><li><b>A 10-year decline in US Treasury yields may require a substantial decline in policy interest rates.</b>In the second half of 1982, when the U.S. CPI inflation rate fell below 5% and the economic recession was deep, the Federal Reserve began to cut interest rates sharply, and the U.S. bond bull market really started. And note that the starting point of the decline in policy interest rates at that time was ahead of the 10-year US Treasury yields, and the decline was deeper. This means that after the monetary policy clearly begins to relax, the 10-year US Treasury yields may not drop significantly.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/18e234a92705cc42b9b876c30857ee92\" tg-width=\"1080\" tg-height=\"410\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b>3) U.S. dollar: The \"strong U.S. dollar\" may last for a long time, and the fall in the U.S. dollar exchange rate may require US Treasury yields to fall</b></p><p><ul><li><b>Looking at the mid-cycle, the current logic of the \"strong dollar\" is very similar to that of the 1980s.</b>From 1980 to 84, the US Dollar Index came out of the \"historical peak\". Even though the Federal Reserve cut interest rates during this period, the US dollar exchange rate remained strong for a long time. At present, the logic of supporting the US dollar is very similar to that in the 1980s: the US economy has obvious advantages over non-US regions, and the Fed's tightening confidence is stronger than other developed economies. Looking back, even if the U.S. economy moves from \"stagflation\" to \"recession\", non-U.S. economic and financial risks may not be eliminated (this can be seen from the fluctuations in European and Japanese bond and exchange rate markets this year). On the contrary, the market's trust in U.S. dollar assets will increase (for example, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have weakened at present). Therefore, for at least the next 1-2 years, the volatility center of the the US Dollar Index is expected to continue to be higher than the pre-COVID-19 level.</p><p></li><li><b>In the short term, US Treasury yields may be a \"leading indicator\" to judge the trend of the US dollar.</b>In 1980, the 10-year US Treasury yields started its upward cycle earlier than the US Dollar Index; In 1984-85, US Treasury yields fell back before the US Dollar Index in 10 years. In fact, past market performance has basically confirmed US Treasury yields's leadership over the US Dollar Index:<b>1-3 months after the 10-year US Treasury yields peaks and falls, the US Dollar Index usually also peaks and falls.</b>As mentioned earlier, the start of this round of U.S. bond bull market may have to wait until the recession materializes and monetary policy becomes loosened. After that, the signs of the US Dollar Index peaking and falling may become increasingly clear.</p><p></li></ul><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fa0454ffd0dbe555b8d8d2e59c3c5c0d\" tg-width=\"1075\" tg-height=\"408\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p><b><i>Risk warning:</i></b></p><p><b><i>1. The resilience of the US economy is less than expected.</i></b><i>Although there is still room for the recovery of the U.S. service industry, under the environment of high inflation and high interest rates, residents' consumer confidence is insufficient or actual consumption is suppressed, which in turn makes the economic growth weaker than the benchmark expectation; As the Federal Reserve's rate hike and demand cool, the pace of cooling in the U.S. job market may exceed expectations.</i></p><p><b><i>2. A new supply shock occurs.</i></b><i>If new supply shocks occur in the future and raise international energy, food and other commodity prices again, the pressure of \"stagflation\" in the United States may rise significantly, the Federal Reserve may have to \"create\" a recession to curb inflation, and market sentiment will turn pessimistic.</i></p><p><b><i>3. The Fed's tightening is insufficient or too strong.</i></b><i>If the Fed's insufficient tightening causes repeated inflation, the cost of the Fed's subsequent inflation control will be even greater; If the Fed's tightening efforts are significantly stronger than market expectations, the risk of market volatility may rise and may eventually threaten the real economy.</i></p><p><b><i>4. Economic and financial risks in non-US regions exceed expectations, etc.</i></b><i>At present, the economic and financial risks of large economies such as Europe and Asia are showing signs of rising. If large-scale economic and financial risk events occur in the future, the U.S. economy and market may be affected.</i></p><p><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/49ae9add1640b1e283a53b027b0227c7\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"868\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/fc83db9c8a7fe6fe220fca7ca329cf0d\" tg-width=\"1040\" tg-height=\"513\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/><img src=\"https://static.tigerbbs.com/580ee36c20670ad5f1a888d715380e06\" tg-width=\"999\" tg-height=\"928\" referrerpolicy=\"no-referrer\"/></p><p></body></html></p>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/4f6ec6e99c0c8b9feb7f296b78c65a54","relate_stocks":{".DJI":"道琼斯",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index"},"source_url":"","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1100486117","content_text":"一、高通胀的复杂性。1970-80年代美国高通胀的成因是极为复杂的：首先，财政和货币刺激过度，初步推升通胀；然后，粗暴的价格管制与犹豫的货币政策，未能有效浇灭通胀；再者，以两次石油危机为代表的供给冲击引发了成本推动型通胀；最后，长期超调的通胀率破坏了通胀预期的稳定，引发工资-物价螺旋，加深了通胀的顽固性。二、美联储的“过”与“功”。1970-1979年，美联储紧缩不够坚决，原因是多方面的：首先，美联储一度认为通胀是“非货币现象”；其次，当时美联储的首要目标是“充分就业”而非“物价稳定”；最后，美联储决策还受到政治因素影响。1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储吸收“货币学派”理念，将遏制通胀视为己任，坚定加息和控制货币供给。此后，美联储在较长时间里致力于稳定通胀预期，重塑了美联储的信誉。三、“软着陆”与“硬着陆”。1970-80年代美国共出现4轮经济衰退，可分为两次“软着陆”（1970年和1980年）和两次“硬着陆”（1973-75年和1981-82年），这是高通胀、高利率和供给冲击共同作用的结果。但实现“软着陆”的条件是较为苛刻的：首先，CPI通胀率或需在衰退初期及时回落；其次，美联储加息不能过于激进，甚至需要在衰退到来时及时降息；最后，若发生新的供给冲击，“硬着陆”可能更难避免。四、资产价格的线索。1970-80年代，通胀成为资本市场的风向标。美国CPI通胀率三次阶段性触顶，美股皆阶段性触底。但在此过程中，市场对通胀形势以及货币政策逻辑都有一个理解与消化的过程。随时间推移，美债市场更少地交易“衰退”、更多地交易“紧缩”。在1980年以后的“沃尔克时代”，货币政策开始成为资产价格的关键线索。“大滞胀”结束后，美元等避险资产仍在较长时间里表现积极。五、对当下的新启示。第一，本轮美国通胀成因与1970-80年代有诸多相似性，但整体压力更为有限；第二，本轮美联储虽然也曾“犯错”，但在抗击通胀方面更占据主动；第三，本轮美国经济衰退几成必然，且存在“硬着陆”风险；第四，本轮大类资产价格走势与1970-80年代或有较强相似性：1）美股：通胀仍是核心影响因素，未来仍有调整压力，但调整幅度或不会太深，反弹或待衰退兑现。2）美债：货币政策仍是核心影响因素，衰退兑现时也未必立即回落，需等到货币政策明确开始放松。3）美元：“强势美元”可能持续较久，美元回落或需美债利率回落。风险提示：美国经济弱于预期，出现新的供给冲击，非美金融风险上升等。2022年以来，美国CPI通胀率一度升破9%，实际GDP连续两个季度环比萎缩，经济的（类）滞胀特征更加鲜明，资本市场也经历了大幅波动。8月下旬杰克逊霍尔会议以来，美联储在各类场合不断提到“历史经验”，说明当前美国经济环境与1970-80年代极为相似，而美联储也将充分借鉴当时的应对经验，有所为而有所不为，以期帮助美国战胜“滞胀”。当前美国通胀压力几何？货币政策会如何应对？美国经济是否还能实现“软着陆”？资本市场何时迎来“春天”？在本篇报告中，我们带着对当下的疑问，重温1970-80年代美国“大滞胀”时期的通胀、货币政策、经济增长和资产价格表现，并尝试理解其中的逻辑与规律，以期对判断未来一段时间美国经济、货币政策和市场走向有所启发。01、高通胀的复杂性1970-80年代美国高通胀的成因是极为复杂的：首先，财政和货币刺激过度，初步推升通胀；然后，粗暴的价格管制与犹豫的货币政策，未能有效浇灭通胀；再者，以两次石油危机为代表的供给冲击引发了成本推动型通胀；最后，长期超调的通胀率破坏了通胀预期的稳定，引发工资-物价螺旋，加深了通胀的顽固性。1969-1982年，美国陷入高通胀危机，CPI通胀率普遍高于5%，最高曾达到14.8%。美国CPI同比增速自1968年开始便以3%以上的速度较快上升，1969年3月CPI同比破5%，从此开始了长达13年的“高通胀”时代。在1969-1982年里，美国CPI同比增速走势出现三轮波峰，峰值分别在1970年1月（6.2%）、1974年12月（12.3%）和1980年3月（14.8%）。1982年2月CPI同比回落至5%以下。1965-70年，财政和货币盲目扩张，孕育通胀走高。随着二战后经济重建告一段落，加上欧洲与亚洲经济的兴起，美国经济增长动能趋弱，但政策层面盲目刺激，导致经济明显过热。1965-1970年，美国实际GDP增速持续高于潜在增速水平，且产出缺口（实际GDP与潜在GDP差值）占潜在GDP的比重高达3-6%。换言之，当时美国经济增速中有3-6个百分点都是政策刺激出来的。这一时期，美国自然失业率在5.6-5.9%，但实际失业率基本保持在4%以内。在当时，财政刺激的角色强于货币。美国联邦财政支出占GDP比重由在1966-68年期间上升了3.2个百分点，赤字率由1965年的0.2%扩大至1968年的2.8%。1968年，美国政府开始担心财政平衡问题，时任总统约翰逊6月签署了“1968收支控制法”，通过加税补充财政收入。而美联储于同年8月“技术性降息”以对冲加税的影响，为经济过热添火助力。1971-74年，粗暴的价格管制将“短痛”变为“长痛”。1971年8月，尼克松政府实行了为时90天的工资和物价冻结。但实际上，随后价格管制的范围不断扩大，直至1974年美国政府才完全取消对物价的干预。这期间，除特殊情况外，所有商品和服务涨价都需要经过政府审批。1972年中，美国CPI通胀率回落至3%以下。这一次价格管制，被视为美国经济史上和平时期政府全面干预价格的一个特例，也被认为是一次失败的尝试。这是因为，限价措施在抑制物价上涨的同时，也严重打击了生产企业的积极性，造成社会商品供应不足，为后来通胀的恶化埋下伏笔。1974年尼克松因“水门事件”下台，新总统卡特上台，价格管制措施逐步失效。略显滑稽的是，尼克松和卡特政府均尝试通过口头“劝诫”来管控物价。例如，卡特刚上台时曾鼓励民众买“便宜货”：“要敢于向他人炫耀，自己专挑便宜货买，并为此感到自豪”。这些劝诫对于管控物价几乎是徒劳的，美国CPI通胀率自1973年4月重新破5%，此后一路上行并于1974年12月达到12.3%的阶段高点。1973年和1979年的一次粮食危机和两次石油危机，展示了供给冲击对美国物价的破坏力。1973年，前苏联谷物受恶劣天气影响而歉收，继而进入国际市场大量购买粮食，引发了二战以来最为严重的粮食危机。1973年末，美国食品CPI同比增速一度升破20%。1973年10月至1974年3月，第一次石油危机爆发：以沙特为首的石油输出国组织成员国宣布，对赎罪日战争期间支持以色列的国家实施石油禁运，美国首当其冲。世界银行原油均价由1973年9月的2.7美元/桶，跃升至1974年初的13美元/桶，涨幅接近500%。1974年3-9月，美国能源CPI同比增速均超过30%。1979年初至1980年初，第二次石油危机爆发：伊朗爆发伊斯兰革命，而后伊朗和伊拉克爆发“两伊战争”，导致全球石油产量锐减。世界银行国际油价由1978年12月的不到15美元/桶升，至1979年11月的40美元/桶以上。1980年3月，美国能源CPI同比达到47.1%的峰值，美国CPI同比也随即达到14.8%的顶点。1970-80年，美国标题通胀率持续超调后，通胀预期失控，在工会力量助推下，“工资-物价螺旋”逐渐形成。在CPI通胀率连续多年高于2%、甚至高于5%后，美国居民对物价失去原有的信心，通胀预期上升。当时，无论是美联储还是市场，对于通胀预期的认知和跟踪都比较有限。当下广泛引用的密歇根大学调查和克利夫兰联储模型预期，在1980年前后才陆续诞生。美国最早的通胀预期监测工具是1946年诞生的利文斯顿调查（The Livingston Survey），它总结了来自企业、政府、银行业和学术界的通胀预测。该调查显示，1970年以后美国通胀预期逐渐走高，尤其两次石油危机后，通胀预期也随标题通胀率陡然上升。通胀预期对于物价的反向影响主要通过工资传导：劳工要求涨薪，继而居民的消费能力与企业的成本压力上升，同时促成物价上涨，即形成“工资-物价螺旋”。尤其是，1970年代美国工会力量庞大，工资诉求的传导较为通畅：据美国劳工统计局（BLS）数据，当时美国工会成员占社会总雇员的近三成，每年发生千人以上罢工运动高达200-400起（2000年以后这一数字已常年低于30起）。1976年中至1978年中，美国CPI通胀率回落至5-7%左右，但美国非农非管理人员平均时薪同比增速达到6-8%、持续高于CPI通胀率。工资上涨的粘性阻碍了通胀的进一步回落，并为后来通胀的反弹做铺垫。1970-79年，美联储的政策应对较为消极，持续“落后于曲线”，未能有效遏制通胀。1980年以前，美国政策利率与通胀走势呈现较强同步性，体现了美联储在较长的时间里都在“落后于曲线”、“追赶曲线”。1969年5月，在通胀率破5%后的第三个月，美国政策利率才开始明显上升并超过通胀率3个百分点以上，此后通胀率保持上升了半年左右才开始回落。1973年下半年，美国通胀率仍在上升的情况下，美联储迫于经济压力而降息，继而通胀率加速上升。1978年，美国政策利率与通胀率基本持平，并保持亦步亦趋地上升，直到1978年12月，联邦基金月率升破10%并高出通胀率1个百分点，但很快政策利率又开始落后于通胀率。后来，当美国政策利率显著高于即期通胀率后，通胀才明显回落，美联储在遏制通胀方面才算拥有了主动：1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储大幅升息抗击通胀；1981年中，美国政策利率到达19%以上的高峰，同年10月CPI环比和同比同时下降；此后联邦基金利率持续高于CPI通胀率4-9个百分点不等，通胀率持续回落。02、美联储的“ 过” 与“ 功”1970-1979年，美联储紧缩不够坚决，原因既包括对通胀与货币政策的关系认知不足，也包括货币政策的独立性缺失。1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储吸收“货币学派”理念，将遏制通胀视为己任，坚定加息和控制货币供给。此后，美联储在较长时间里致力于稳定通胀预期，重塑了美联储的信誉。2.1、美联储犹豫的原因1970-1979年，美联储持续“落后于曲线”，原因是多方面的。首先，美联储一度认为通胀是“非货币现象”。当时，美联储对于高通胀的成因出现分歧，并倾向于认为通胀主要由非货币因素造成，继而货币政策选择消极应对。例如，1970年，伯恩斯领导的美联储认为，工会力量引发了成本推动型通胀，继而主张动用“收入政策”调控，而不愿收紧货币供给。这也推动了尼克松政府后来实施的工资和物价冻结。1974年，伯恩斯又认为，“不恰当的财政纪律”是导致通胀的主因。其次，美联储在当时的首要目标是“充分就业”而非“物价稳定”。1970年代以前，凯恩斯主义理念主导货币政策逻辑，美联储专注于总需求管理，并坚信菲利普斯曲线（失业率与通胀的负相关性）的存在。因此，美联储将货币政策的首要目标落脚在实现“充分就业”，希望维持较低且稳定的失业率水平，继而当失业率上升时，货币政策的天平更向就业市场倾斜。当“滞”与“胀”同时发生时，美联储一度认为通胀不会继续恶化。例如，1978-79年米勒领导的美联储认为，只要失业率在充分就业水平之上（5.5%以上），货币宽松就不会加深通胀。最后，美联储决策还受到政治因素影响。1970-1978年担任主席的伯恩斯、以及1978-79年任职的米勒，均受到时任总统的影响而缺乏独立性，在平衡通胀与经济增长的关系时摇摆不定。事后来看，1970年代美联储对通胀的容忍可能正是执政者所希望看到的：一方面，执政者不希望美联储因遏制通胀而破坏经济增长、影响选票；另一方面，较高的通胀也被视为一种隐性的税收手段，因名义工资上涨提高了整个税收体系的累进程度，使财政收入大幅上升。数据显示，美国个人所得税占GDP比重在1969-70年、1974年以及1979-83年的高通胀时期，均有明显上升。2.2、沃尔克时代的功绩1979年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储吸收“货币学派”理念，将遏制通胀为己任，坚定地加息和控制货币供给，虽然“制造”了经济衰退，但也最终战胜了通胀。1979 年8月，沃尔克就任美联储主席，其采取了以弗里德曼为代表的“货币学派”观点，其领导的美联储更加明确了货币政策对于物价稳定的核心地位，并将货币供给（M1）增速纳入货币政策目标，继而大幅加息，使联邦基金利率高于CPI通胀率，以达到控制货币供给的目标。1980年3月，沃尔克曾实施了一次不甚明智但短暂的信贷控制试验（“特别信贷限制计划”），以期减缓加息幅度，但随后又重启货币政策紧缩，并最终在1981年中将联邦基金利率一度推升至20%以上的峰值。大幅加息虽然带来了经济衰退，但最终帮助通胀回落。此外，在沃尔克和格林斯潘时代，美联储建立了新的“名义锚”，以稳定通胀预期并重塑美联储的信誉，这也是日后美国物价回归长期稳定的重要背景。1980年代，在经历“大滞胀”后，原本的物价稳定预期遭遇严重损害。即便在沃尔克时代，美联储明确了货币供给目标、坚定地提高了利率，但货币政策的可信度仍受质疑。公众并不清楚美联储能否长期保持对通胀的重视，并有能力影响中长期物价走势。因此，沃尔克和其下任联储主席格林斯潘，更致力于重构稳定的通胀预期，使其成为货币政策的“名义锚”，最终重新树立货币政策的可信度。这是一个复杂而漫长的过程：沃尔克战胜通胀的经历是良好起点，而后美联储由货币供给目标转向“隐性通胀目标制”。实际操作中，美联储同时盯住“增长缺口”和“通胀预期缺口”，事实上通过泰勒规则制定政策利率，追求稳定的中长期通胀目标，实现稳定的经济增长。在通胀预期管理上，美联储通过债券收益率变动来监测通胀预期，同时加强与资本市场的沟通，增强了货币政策的可信度与市场预期的稳定性。沃尔克时代后的货币政策框架，在物价稳定方面取得了长期性成果，造就了后来的大稳健时代（Great Moderation，1984-2007年）。03、“ 软着陆” 与“ 硬着陆”1970-80年代美国共出现4轮经济衰退，这是高通胀、高利率和供给冲击共同作用的结果。高通胀对于消费产生直接的抑制作用，并驱使美联储加息、进一步抑制投资。因此，衰退的程度取决于通胀的严峻性以及货币政策的应对，实现“软着陆”的条件是较为苛刻的。3.1、经济衰退的三大推手按照美国国民经济研究局（NBER）的划分，1970-80年代美国经济共出现四轮衰退：第一轮是1970年1月至11月（11个月）。美国实际GDP同比由1969年的3.2%下滑至1970年的0.2%，但经济几乎没有萎缩。而美国失业率却显著攀升，由1969年12月的3.5%升至1970年12月的6.1%（阶段高点），在此后的24个月里均保持在5%以上。第二轮是1973年12月至1975年3月（16个月）。美国实际GDP同比由1973年的5.6%断崖式下滑，曾连续5个季度同比萎缩，季度同比萎缩最深达2.3%。美国失业率连续31个月高于7%，由1973年10月阶段低点的4.6%，一路走高至1975年5月的9.0%，此后缓慢下降。第三轮是1980年2月至7月（6个月）。美国实际GDP环比折年率于1980年二季度大幅萎缩8%，不过同比仅萎缩0.8%。在这一时期，美国失业率由6.3%最高升至7.8%。1980年下半年，美国经济立即开始复苏，四季度GDP环比大幅上涨7.7%，失业率于8月开始回落。第四轮是1981年8月至1982年11月（16个月）。美国实际GDP曾连续4个季度同比萎缩、最深萎缩2.6%。美国失业率在1981年8月开始从7.2%的阶段低点显著回升，同年11月破8%，1982年11月达到10.8%的峰值，此后缓慢回落，1984年2月才降至8%以下。衰退推手之一：高通胀。比较当时的经济与通胀走势，二者呈现出十分紧密的相关性：美国经济衰退发生的节点，均对应CPI通胀率上升或触顶的时候。例如，1970年CPI通胀率触顶时点，恰好是失业率反弹与经济衰退的开端；1973-75年，这一轮失业率反弹和经济被认定为衰退的时点，都在CPI通胀率破8%以后；1980年初，当CPI通胀率触及14%以上的极高水平时，失业率显著反弹、经济开始衰退。如果衰退发生时，通胀率仍在上升，则美国经济继续下行；只有通胀率回落后，美国经济才开始复苏。例如，1970年末，直到通胀回落至5%以下，美国经济才开始复苏；1975年，当通胀率触顶回落一个季度后，美国GDP环比增速转正、失业率开始下降。通胀对经济的直接影响主要体现在消费上。相比政策利率，美国通胀率与私人消费增速的负相关性更为明显。尤其在1980年代，当政策利率大幅跃升时，通胀率已经提早回落，当时私人消费也开始回升，说明通胀缓和对于消费回暖有明显帮助。衰退推手之二：高利率。整体而言，当时美联储加息对经济的降温效应是明显的：当美国经济处于过热时，加息对经济的降温效果可谓立竿见影：如1973年中，美国制造业PMI超过60，美联储加息使“过热”的经济快速降温。当美国经济本身处于下行甚至衰退时，加息则深化了经济萎缩的幅度：如1974年中，政策利率达峰后，美国经济下行速度加快，三季度美国GDP环比大幅萎缩3.7%；1980年3-4月，联邦基金月率达到17%以上的阶段高点后，同年二季度美国GDP环比大幅萎缩8.0%。反之，降息可助力经济复苏：1970年12月，当政策利率降至通胀率之下时，美国经济立刻处于复苏状态；1975年初，美联储降息并使政策利率低于通胀率近5个百分点，美国经济于1975年二季度开始复苏。但是，在通胀未得到有效控制时过早地、不成熟地降息，可能会以“通胀反复+更高幅度的加息”收场，从而酿至更大程度的衰退，或延缓本应更早开始的复苏：1974年初，美联储选择降息，但由于通胀继续走高、对经济的负面影响持续，美国经济仍步入衰退；1980年5月，联邦基金月率已降至11%左右（辅以信贷管制），8月美国经济暂时脱离衰退区间，但由于此后通胀反复迫使美联储选择更大力度地加息，1981年美国经济陷入新一轮程度更深的衰退。利率对经济的影响主要体现在投资上。相比通胀，政策利率与私人投资（滞后1年）的负相关性更为明显。1980年下半年，美联储短暂降息，一年后美国私人投资明显反弹；1981年，当美联储重新大幅加息后，一年后的私人投资增速明显下滑，但该时期通胀也已明显回落，说明私人投资对利率走势更为敏感。衰退推手之三：供给冲击。1973年和1979年的粮食和石油危机，对美国经济增长造成了多方面拖累，因此都引发了经济衰退。第一，如上文提到，供给冲击抬升了CPI通胀率，消费价格上涨抑制了总需求。尤其是，供给冲击引发能源消费成本上升，并挤占了其他消费。1974年以后，美国能源产品和服务消费占私人消费比重，由冲击前的6%左右上升至7-9%，直到1985年以后才明显回落。第二，供给冲击增大了美国石油进口成本，导致GDP“蒸发”。第一次石油危机导致油价上涨约10美元/桶，1974年美国石油净进口量约为600万桶/日。我们测算，石油涨价通过增加净进口成本对美国GDP的拖累约为219亿美元，拖累GDP名义增速1.4个百分点；类似地，第二次石油危机后，石油净进口成本上升拖累了1979年美国GDP名义增速2.8个百分点。第三，供给冲击引发原材料紧缺，削弱了美国工业生产能力。1970年代的两轮供给冲击后，美国工业生产总指数同比均出现大幅下降。对比两次冲击可以发现，第一次冲击时，美国CPI通胀率较低、而PPI通胀率更高，继而工业生产所受冲击程度更深，这也体现了供给冲击对经济产出的影响更主要地表现在“供给端”。3.2、衰退程度取决于什么对于上述4轮衰退，按照GDP萎缩程度、以及衰退时长划分，可分为两次“软着陆”（1970年和1980年）和两次“硬着陆”（1973-75年和1981-82年）。1970年“软着陆”的背景是，通胀压力相对有限。当时CPI通胀率最高仅为6.2%，继而美联储也未大幅加息，政策利率最高仅为9%左右。而通胀有限，一方面是没有遭受供给冲击，另一方面也和尼克松政府的价格管制有关。1980年“软着陆”的背景是，通胀见顶回落、美联储及时降息。当时美国CPI通胀率一度达到14.8%的历史高点，联邦基金月率曾经达到17.6%，但当衰退开始时，美联储迅速降息，政策利率大幅下降至9%左右时，经济很快开始复苏。1973-75年“硬着陆”的主要原因是，供给冲击下，衰退期间通胀率仍在上行，继而政策利率也不得不跟随通胀快速上升（即使政策利率并未显著高于通胀率）；1981-82年“硬着陆”的背景是，美联储迫切希望遏制通胀，从而采取十分激进的加息措施（联邦基金利率曾达到20%左右），虽然通胀率很快开始下降，但政策利率仍持续、显著高于通胀率，使经济复苏进程延缓。由此，我们可以得出结论：“软着陆”的要求是较为苛刻的——首先，通胀压力不能太大，CPI通胀率或需要在衰退初期及时回落。其次，美联储加息不能过于激进，甚至需要在衰退到来时及时降息。最后，如果政府对价格进行过度干预，或者不幸发生了新的供给冲击，那么“软着陆”可能只是暂时的，日后通胀可能反弹、“硬着陆”更难避免。04、资产价格的线索1970-80年代，高通胀是美国经济和政策的“最大敌人”，因而通胀形势也成为资本市场的风向标。在此过程中，市场对通胀形势以及货币政策逻辑都有一个理解与消化的过程。在1980年以后的“沃尔克时代”，货币政策开始成为资产价格的关键线索。此外，“大滞胀”为经济和市场带来了长期伤痛，继而美元等避险资产在较长时间里表现积极。4.1、美股：通胀是最大的敌人这一时期美股走势由通胀主导，每当通胀率调头向下，美股便立即反弹。1970年7月、1974年12月和1980年3月，对应着美国CPI通胀率的三轮顶点，同时也是标普500指数反弹的开端。这或说明，在高通胀时期，通胀走势是市场最为关注的：只要通胀居高不下，美联储就有继续紧缩的可能，美国经济便受到高通胀和高利率的共同威胁；而只要通胀回落，即便经济暂时疲弱，市场相信回落的物价有利于经济复苏、且美联储紧缩有望放松，股市便计入复苏预期。美股在衰退中期触底反弹，调整幅度不完全取决于衰退程度。在NBER定义的4轮衰退初期，美股均承压，但衰退尚未结束时，由于货币政策预期趋松、通胀压力开始缓和，市场复苏预期增强，美股往往率先迎来反弹。换言之，“政策底”领先于“市场底”，“市场底”又领先于“经济底”。从数据上看，标普500指数的底部均出现在衰退时期内。不过，美股调整幅度并不完全取决于衰退程度：1970年和1980年的“软着陆”中，以及1981-82年的“硬着陆”中，标普500指数跌幅均不超过20%；只有1973-75年的“硬着陆”中，标普500指数跌幅接近40%。从反弹幅度看，四轮衰退和美股调整后，美股反弹都是较为强劲的，标普500指数由低谷反弹的幅度均超30%。其背后的逻辑或许在于：“软着陆”后的市场整体保持乐观，“硬着陆”后的市场虽然没有那么乐观，但由于此前“基数”较低，美股的性价比仍能吸引资金流入。这意味着，无论衰退程度如何，只要找准底部适度“前倾”布局美股，均有可能获得不错的收益。美联储不是美股“永远的敌人”。对比1970年后和1980年后的美股表现，即便1980年后美国CPI通胀率更高、美联储加息更为激进、衰退程度也不弱，但美股的整体表现显著好于1970年代。1970年代，标普500指数在波动中几乎保持横盘，而1980年以后标普500指数维持震荡上行趋势。尤其对比1973-75年和1981-82年，都是“硬着陆”，但后者美股下跌幅度更小、反弹幅度更大。两段时期最大的区别在于，后者美联储紧缩力度更强，在“制造”衰退中可能发挥了更重要的作用。在美联储激进加息过程中，通胀率显著下降：一方面缓解了高通胀对经济增长的抑制，另一方面市场对于美联储更有信心，继而令复苏预期更强、风险偏好更高。此外，1980年后，“里根经济学”登上历史舞台，在市场充分而痛苦地出清后，美国生产率快速提升。因而，美股受到通胀可控后的政策利率下降、以及上市公司盈利增长的“双轮驱动”，反弹更为强劲。从这个角度来看，通胀才是美股“最大的敌人”，而美联储不是；有能力遏制通胀的美联储，反而最终成为了美股的“朋友”！4.2、美债：与货币政策“共舞”1970年代，美债市场经历了一段长期熊市，高通胀和高利率共同驱动美债利率上行。但是，10年美债利率的波幅明显小于CPI通胀率和政策利率的波幅。值得一提的是，美国经济衰退与美债利率的相关性并不明显：在1970年、1974-75年、1980年和1982年的四轮衰退前后，10年美债利率在第一轮有所回落，第二轮震荡上行，第三轮大幅走高，第四轮震荡偏强。这或体现了美联储货币政策逻辑的演进过程，即对通胀的重视不断提高、对经济的兼顾不断弱化。继而随时间推移，市场更少地交易“衰退”、更多地交易“紧缩”。直到1982年三季度以后，当CPI通胀率低于5%、GDP同比萎缩时，市场相信美联储能够心无旁骛地降息，美债利率才明显走低。1980年代，10年美债利率走势与政策利率走势更加紧密。1980-81年，美国CPI通胀率呈下行走势，但10年美债利率快速上行，主要由货币政策强力紧缩驱动。1982年以后，10年美债利率与政策利率波动趋势比较贴合，这体现了沃尔克时代货币政策改革的成效，即美联储对债券利率的驱动力显著提升。虽然10年美债利率与政策利率“共舞”，但波动幅度更小。1970年代以前，10年美债利率与联邦基金利率的绝对水平和走势都很相近。1970年代，当高通胀到来、美联储加息时，10年美债利率虽然也会上升，但上升幅度更小，继而“跑输”政策利率。原因在于：一方面，高通胀和高利率的出现，降低了市场风险偏好，美债发挥了一定避险属性；另一方面，市场出于对经济增长的担忧，怀疑高利率的可持续性，继而压低了中长端美债利率（美债期限溢价为负）。当通胀回落、美联储降息后，10年美债利率虽也回落，但幅度仍然有限，使美债利率“跑赢”政策利率，这一现象的原因或许在通胀预期的上升。事实上，1983年以后，10年美债利率下降幅度不足，一度成为美联储面临的新问题：美国通胀率已回落至2%附近，但由于市场通胀预期仍未及时回落，债券市场利率下降缓慢，阻碍了经济复苏。后来，沃尔克领导的美联储开始将债券市场利率视为通胀预期的标尺，更加重视对通胀预期的管理，10年美债利率走势才进一步贴合政策利率。4.3、美元：多因素造就强美元美联储加息、市场避险需求上升、非美经济受冲击等因素，共同造就了1981-84年的强势美元。1970年代，布雷顿森林体系崩溃造成美元汇率迅速贬值，这一时期的美元汇率与美国经济和货币周期相关性不强。1981-84年，美元汇率持续走强，美元指数由1980年下半年的85左右，一度升破160的历史峰值；直到1985年《广场协议》签署，强势美元才得以终结。如何理解这一时期的强势美元？首先，1980年以后，沃尔克领导的美联储严格控制货币供给，美元的稀缺性上升；第二，1981-82年，美国经济因美联储激进加息而陷入衰退，美股经历明显调整，经济和市场风险激发了美元的避险属性；第三，1983-84年，美国经济告别了高通胀，步入强劲复苏，美联储政策利率和美债利率仍维持着相对高位。这一时期美元汇率仍在走强：一方面，市场对美联储的信心提升；另一方面，前期美联储紧缩对非美经济的外溢效应显现（如1982-85年拉美深陷债务危机），这使美元资产具备十足的吸引力。值得一提的是，在美联储激进加息时期，美元指数和美债利率均呈上行趋势。不过，美元汇率的反应滞后于美债利率：例如1980年6月，10年美债利率已经开始快速上行，而美元指数的上行滞后了3个月左右；1984年6月，10年美债利率受市场降息预期影响而开始回落，但美元指数的回落滞后了9个月。05、对当下的新启示1、本轮美国通胀成因与1970-80年代有诸多相似性，但整体压力更为有限。类似1970年代，当前美国的高通胀同样是货币和财政宽松、美联储行动迟缓、供给冲击等多重因素交织的结果。但对比来看，我们倾向于认为美国通胀不会像当时那般失控：第一，这一次美国政府并未像当年尼克松政府那样实施粗暴的价格管制，价格信号对供需的平衡作用并未消失，降低了日后通胀反复的风险；第二，当前美国“工资-物价”螺旋风险相对更低，一方面得益于目前仍较稳定的中长期通胀预期，另一方面得益于美国工会力量的长期削弱；第三，当前美国消化“石油危机”的能力更强，尤其2010年页岩油革命后，美国能源消费占私人消费总额的比重已下降，美国也从原油的净进口国转变为净出口国，因此油价对美国核心通胀率的传导下降。因此，即便当前美国CPI能源分项同比增速高达40%、达到1970-80年代两次石油危机的程度，但核心CPI通胀率明显低于当时。2、本轮美联储虽然也曾“犯错”，但在抗击通胀方面更占据主动。货币政策的“反复无常”，以及市场对货币政策缺乏信心，是1970-80年代滞胀反复的重要背景。对比来看，美联储如今掌握更多主动，即便在2021年低估了通胀的可持续性（“通胀暂时论”），但这一错误或仍有挽回的余地：首先，在认识和应对“滞胀”上，如今美联储已不再“摸着石头过河”，货币政策早已明确“物价稳定”的目标。今年以来，美联储宣称“物价稳定”是“最大就业”的前提，将遏制通胀视为货币政策的首要任务。其次，沃尔克-格林斯潘时代后，美联储监控通胀预期的能力更强（如2000年以后通胀保值债券诞生），与市场沟通的效率更高，建立了较为良好的信誉。今年以来，美联储紧缩信号显著抬升了美债名义利率，资本市场的敏捷反应折射出货币政策的可信性。当下美国通胀预期并未“脱锚”，克利夫兰联储模型监测的十年通胀预期不超过2.5%，远不及1980年代4-5%的水平。最后，如今美联储的独立性更强。当前，通胀是拜登政府和美联储共同面对的“敌人”，美联储紧缩受到总统的支持。即便未来经济压力加大、总统向美联储施压，预计美联储也会较为坚定地捍卫信誉。正如鲍威尔领导的美联储曾在2018年四次加息，不顾时任总统特朗普的批评一样。3、本轮美国经济衰退几成必然，且存在“硬着陆”风险。1970-80年代，当美国CPI通胀率升高至5%以上时，经济衰退便如期而至。对比当前：第一，今年美国CPI通胀率最高达到9.1%，不仅超过了此前触发衰退的水平，且已超过1970年美国经济“软着陆”时期水平；第二，当前美联储表现出很大决心遏制通胀，或将政策利率维持在“足够限制性水平（sufficiently restrictive level）”较长时间，不惜付出经济衰退的代价（参考我们此前报告《美联储信誉保卫战》）。这意味着，类似1981-82年沃尔克时期，本次美联储紧缩力度可能足以“制造”一场衰退；第三，目前尚不能排除未来通胀反复的风险。如果未来不幸发生了新的供给冲击，或者美联储实际紧缩力度不足（如未来当美国经济切实进入衰退、政治压力上升、或发生金融风险时，美联储过早停止紧缩甚至降息），那么美国通胀仍可能反复，从而酿至更大程度的衰退。4、本轮大类资产价格走势与1970-80年代或有较强相似性。1）美股：通胀仍是核心影响因素，未来仍有调整压力，但调整幅度或不会太深，反弹或待衰退兑现。类似1970-80年代，当前通胀走势与美股表现也有较强相关性。今年上半年，随着美国CPI通胀率不断上升，美股迎来一轮深度调整；6月中旬至8月中旬，大宗商品价格与通胀预期降温，美股阶段性反弹；8月下旬以来，随着高通胀的持续性超出预期，美联储政策取向更加强硬，美股对货币政策的关注加强，上演了新一轮“紧缩恐慌”。未来一段时间美股市场或仍将承压，类似1981-82年沃尔克抗击通胀并“制造”衰退的时期。1981-82年，虽然美国CPI通胀率持续回落，但美联储紧缩对经济和股市造成冲击。类似地，当前美联储似乎想要重回“沃尔克时代”，势必确保通胀回落，不惜付出衰退代价。目前，美国通胀仍处高位、经济尚未实质性衰退，市场对衰退的计价尚不充分，后续美股或仍有调整空间。从历史经验看，美股在经济衰退初期仍可能下跌，直到衰退中后期货币政策开始放松，美股才迎来持续性反弹。不过，美联储不会是美股“永远的敌人”，若美联储顺利帮助通胀回落，美股调整幅度或不会太深。1981-92年沃尔克“制造”衰退时，美股调整幅度相对有限，并未跌破1980年初的底部。美联储大力抗击通胀虽带来“短痛”，但可避免通胀反复的“长痛”。考虑到，本轮通胀形势比1970-80年代还更乐观一些，美联储行动也不算太过被动，这一轮美股调整幅度或不会太深、反弹也可能较历史经验更提前一些。2）美债：货币政策仍是核心影响因素，衰退兑现时也未必立即回落，需等到货币政策明确开始放松时。类似1970-80年代，当前10年美债利率的核心影响因素也是货币政策。1970-80年代的经验是，债券市场在“衰退交易”和“紧缩交易”之间徘徊。但随着美联储抗击通胀更加坚决，债券市场更少地交易“衰退”、更多地交易“紧缩”。今年7月，因通胀预期降温、衰退预期升温，10年美债利率明显回落。但8月下旬以来，随着美联储政策取向更加强硬，市场更加关注紧缩，因而近期10年美债利率持续反弹并已升破4%，超过6月中旬3.5%的阶段高点。如果美联储在衰退时也坚持紧缩，那么衰退初期10年美债利率未必很快回落。正如在1981-82年美国经济衰退初期，即便美国CPI通胀率已由高点明显回落，但与2%的目标仍有很大距离，货币政策并未放松，10年美债利率保持在高位。我们预计，即便2023年上半年美国经济开始衰退，但美联储可能选择坚持紧缩、不会降息，债市可能也不会过早交易衰退。10年美债利率下降或需政策利率实质性下降。1982年下半年，美国CPI通胀率回落至5%以下、经济衰退程度较深时，美联储开始大幅降息，美债牛市才真正开启。且注意到，当时政策利率下降的起点领先于10年美债利率、下降幅度也更深。这意味着，待货币政策明确开始放松后，10年美债利率或才能明显下降。3）美元：“强势美元”可能持续较久，美元汇率回落或需美债利率回落中周期看，当前“强势美元”的逻辑与1980年代十分相似。1980-84年，美元指数走出了“历史大顶”，即便期间美联储降息，美元汇率也长期保持强势。当前，支撑美元的逻辑与1980年代十分相似：美国经济相对非美地区有明显优势，美联储紧缩底气强于其他发达经济体。往后看，即便美国经济由“滞胀”走向“衰退”，非美经济金融风险也未必消除（这从今年欧洲、日本债券和汇率市场波动中便可窥见一斑），反而市场对美元资产的信任会增强（如当前比特币等加密货币已然走弱）。因此，至少在未来1-2年，美元指数波动中枢有望持续高于新冠疫情前水平。短周期看，美债利率或是判断美元走势的“领先性指标”。1980年，10年美债利率早于美元指数开启上行周期；1984-85年，10年美债利率先于美元指数回落。事实上，过往的市场表现也基本印证了美债利率对美元指数的领先性：在10年美债利率触顶回落后的1-3个月，美元指数通常也见顶回落。如前所述，本轮美债牛市的开启或需等到衰退兑现且货币政策趋松，在此之后美元指数触顶回落迹象或才能日渐清晰。风险提示：1、美国经济韧性不及预期。虽然美国服务业复苏仍有空间，但高通胀和高利率环境下，居民消费信心不足或压制实际消费，继而使经济增长状况弱于基准预期；随着美联储加息和需求降温，美国就业市场降温节奏或超预期。2、发生新的供给冲击。如果未来新的供给冲击发生，并再度抬升国际能源、食品等商品价格，美国“滞胀”压力或将显著抬升，美联储可能不得不“制造”衰退才能遏制通胀，市场情绪将转为悲观。3、美联储紧缩力度不足或过强。如果美联储紧缩力度不足造成通胀反复，美联储后续治理通胀的成本更大；如果美联储紧缩力度明显强于市场预期，市场波动风险或将上升并可能最终威胁实体经济。4、非美地区经济金融风险超预期等。当前欧洲、亚洲等大型经济体的经济金融风险出现上升迹象。如果未来发生大型经济金融风险事件，美国经济和市场或受到波及。","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{".SPX":0.9,".DJI":0.9,".IXIC":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":521,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":668629318,"gmtCreate":1664673789438,"gmtModify":1676537491579,"author":{"id":"4110531690656330","authorId":"4110531690656330","name":"Walden.","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d9305a33ceded43e6a928eb1b0b7616d","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"4110531690656330","idStr":"4110531690656330"},"themes":[],"htmlText":".","listText":".","text":".","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/668629318","repostId":"1153575084","repostType":2,"repost":{"id":"1153575084","kind":"news","weMediaInfo":{"introduction":"致力于提供最及时的财经资讯，最专业的解读分析，覆盖宏观经济、金融机构、A股市场、上市公司、投资理财等财经领域。","home_visible":1,"media_name":"券商中国","id":"9","head_image":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d482d56459984e8c86a6a137295b3c4f"},"pubTimestamp":1664668272,"share":"https://ttm.financial/m/news/1153575084?lang=en_US&edition=fundamental","pubTime":"2022-10-02 07:51","market":"us","language":"zh","title":"The Federal Reserve gives a rare warning, the next \"black swan\" is approaching, what's going on?","url":"https://stock-news.laohu8.com/highlight/detail?id=1153575084","media":"券商中国","summary":"华尔街的“多头”正经历绝望时刻。美股刚刚经历了一个动荡的9月，其中标普500指数、道指的月跌幅分别达9.3%、8.8%，是2002年以来最惨的9月；标普年内跌幅达25%，跌幅已经排到了史上第三（193","content":"<p><html><head></head><body>Wall Street's \"bulls\" are experiencing moments of despair.</p><p>U.S. stocks have just experienced a turbulent September, with the monthly declines of the S&P 500 Index and the Dow Jones Industrial Average reaching 9.3% and 8.8% respectively, the worst September since 2002; The S&P fell by 25% during the year, ranking third in history (since 1931). Compared with the high in January, the total market value of the S&P 500 has evaporated by about 10 trillion US dollars (about 71 trillion yuan). In the face of this tragic selling wave, U.S. stock bulls are falling into a desperate moment: retail investors fled frantically and spent an unprecedented amount of US $18 billion (about 128 billion yuan) to buy put options; Hedge funds' equity exposure has also fallen to an all-time low.</p><p><b>The Fed is getting nervous, too. On September 30, local time, Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Brainard warned that the Federal Reserve is paying close attention to the impact of its own policy actions on the global economy and financial system. In addition,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BAC\">Bank of America</a>It warned that the current credit pressure indicators in the United States are close to the critical point. If the Federal Reserve does not find a balance between controlling inflation and unexpected risks, a financial market crisis like that in the United Kingdom may break out in the United States.</b></p><p>It is worth noting that Britain, the \"eye of the storm\" in the European financial market, is about to face the next \"black swan\". On October 21, among the world's three major rating agencies, S&P,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/MCO\">Moody's</a>, will reassess the UK government's credit rating. Once the credit rating is downgraded, it will put great pressure on Britain's foreign debt.</p><p><b>The tragic September of US stocks</b></p><p>In the past September, U.S. stocks experienced a tragic decline.</p><p>On the last trading day of September, the three major U.S. stock indexes collectively fell sharply again. The S&P 500 Index and the Dow Jones Industrial Average both fell below their June lows, with monthly declines of 9.3% and 8.8% respectively, both hitting records in March 2020. The largest monthly decline since the outbreak of the epidemic in the United States was the worst September since 2002, and the Nasdaq index fell 10.5% in a single month.</p><p>In fact, throughout the third quarter, U.S. stocks were shrouded in the haze of a bear market. The S&P 500 index fell by 5.3% quarterly, which was the third consecutive quarter of decline, the longest quarterly consecutive decline since the 2008 financial crisis.</p><p>If the time period continues to be lengthened, since 2022, the cumulative decline of the S&P has reached 25%, and the decline has ranked third in history (since 1931). Compared with the record high in January 2022, the total market value of the S&P 500 The cumulative evaporation of approximately US $10 trillion (approximately RMB 71 trillion).</p><p>Under the continuous plunge, U.S. stock bulls are falling into a moment of despair. Even the most optimistic U.S. retail investors are on the flight, while spending record sums of money locking in protective options.</p><p>According to<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/JPM\">JPMorgan Chase</a>According to the public data of the exchange, retail investors sold a net $2.9 billion in stocks in the previous week, more than four times the number of stocks sold at the market trough in mid-June, and the second largest weekly sell-off in the past five years.</p><p>In addition, data from Options Clearing Corp compiled by Sundial Capital Research showed that small capital groups in U.S. stocks spent an unprecedented $18 billion (approximately RMB 128 billion) to buy put options last week due to concerns about the upcoming market crash.</p><p>At the same time,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/MS\">Morgan Stanley</a>Tracking hedge funds have trimmed their equity exposure to an all-time low, increasing their short positions against ETFs for the 11th straight session. The cash level of fund managers is also close to historical highs, and the wait-and-see sentiment in the market is getting stronger.</p><p><b>In the face of this tragic selling wave, the confidence of Wall Street's \"dead bulls\" has also begun to waver.</b></p><p>Known as the most determined bull on Wall Street, JPMorgan Chase strategist Marko Kolanovic pessimistically emphasized that the risk of Fed policy mistakes and geopolitical escalation is increasing, putting the target level of U.S. stocks in 2022 at risk of downward adjustment.</p><p>What makes bulls even more desperate is that the pain of the bear market in the US stock market may not be over yet.</p><p>According to U.S. media statistics, in several rounds of bear markets in U.S. history, the average decline of U.S. stocks reached 39% within 20 months, which means that there is still a potential decline of 19% in U.S. stocks; The current bear market lasts for 9 months, less than 50% of the average duration of the past 14 bear markets.</p><p><b>Fed warns of financial risks</b></p><p>At present, the important question that investors in the U.S. stock market have to think about is when the Fed's tightening cycle will end.</p><p>Because, in the past six rounds of bear markets in U.S. stocks, all bottoms were formed when the Federal Reserve cut interest rates. But Wall Street traders currently expect that Fed interest rates may not peak until April 2023.</p><p>The inflation data that has just been released is not optimistic either. Among them, the inflation indicator that the Federal Reserve values most unexpectedly accelerated upward.</p><p>On September 30, the latest data disclosed by the U.S. Department of Commerce showed that the U.S. core PCE price index (excluding food and energy prices) increased by 4.9% year-on-year in August, higher than the expected 4.7%. The previous value was 4.6% (revised up to 4.7%), the year-on-year growth rate reached the highest since May this year; In August, the core PCE price index increased by 0.6% month-on-month, higher than the expected 0.5%. The previous value was 0.1% (revised down to 0%), and the month-on-month growth rate was still close to historical highs.</p><p>At the same time, Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Lael Brainard once again emphasized on September 30, local time, that actions to curb high inflation should not be withdrawn prematurely, and higher restrictive interest rates should be maintained for a period of time.</p><p>This also means that the Federal Reserve's rate hike storm will most likely continue, and when it will end in the future still depends on the inflation data of the United States. Investors now expect a 57% probability of a 75 basis point Fed rate hike in November, according to the CME group Fed Watch tool.</p><p>But in the face of global financial market turmoil, the Federal Reserve is also beginning to get nervous. Most of brainard's speech on the 30th involved the financial stability risks that may be brought about by rapid rate hike by global central banks. It further stated that the Federal Reserve is paying close attention to the impact of its policy actions on the global economy and financial system.</p><p>Wall Street institutions are even more nervous. Bank of America warned in its latest report that the current credit pressure indicators in the United States are close to a critical point. If the Federal Reserve does not find a balance between controlling inflation and unexpected risks, the United States may have a financial crisis like that in the United Kingdom. market crisis.</p><p>Bank of America's high-yield bond strategy team believes that if the Credit Stress Indicator (CSI) reaches the \"critical zone\" above 75%, the situation will get out of control, and now it is time to pay attention to risk management. This means that at the next interest rate meeting, the Fed should slow down the pace of rate hike, and then pause so that the economy can fully adapt to all the extreme tightening policies that have been implemented.</p><p><b>Europe's next \"black swan\"</b></p><p><b>At present, Britain, the \"eye of the storm\" of European financial markets, is about to face the next \"black swan\".</b></p><p>On October 21st, Standard & Poor's and Moody's, among the world's three major rating agencies, will reassess the credit rating of the British government. If the financial situation continues to be tight, the UK's sovereign credit rating may be downgraded.</p><p>Once the credit rating is downgraded, it will put great pressure on the UK's foreign debt, and the outside world will face \"additional risks\" in providing debt financing to the UK, which may have an impact on the UK's economic prospects.</p><p>The market is very worried about the credit rating this time, because Standard & Poor's has taken the lead in issuing an \"alarm signal\". On September 30, local time, Standard & Poor's maintained the UK's AA/A-1 + sovereign rating, but lowered its rating outlook from \"stable\" to \"negative\".</p><p>Standard & Poor's said that after the UK announced the tax cut policy, the UK's fiscal deficit will increase and the risk of fiscal imbalance will rise.</p><p>Standard & Poor's estimates that if the new tax cuts continue to be implemented, the ratio of the British government's budget deficit to GDP will expand by 2.6 percentage points by 2025, which will make it difficult for the authorities to realize their ambition of reducing the ratio of public debt to national income.</p><p>Standard & Poor's believes that the British economy will shrink in the next few quarters, and GDP will decline by 0.5% next year.</p><p>At the same time, Moody's has labeled the largest tax reduction plan launched by the British government in 50 years as a \"negative\". Moody's believes this move will threaten Britain's credibility in the eyes of investors, but Moody's has yet to downgrade its outlook for the UK's rating to negative.</p><p>At present, Moody's's sovereign rating on the UK is Aa3 and Fitch's AA-, which are in the same grade, while Standard & Poor's credit rating on the UK is AA, one grade higher than Moody's and Fitch.</p><p><b>For Britain at present, it is already full of storms.</b></p><p>Previously, the radical tax reduction plan once triggered a major earthquake in the British capital market, the British Treasury Bond staged a \"big crash\", and the pound plummeted to a record low. In order to avoid a bigger crisis, the Bank of England had to rescue the market.</p><p>And British female Prime Minister Truss, who just took office, seems to be losing the support of most British people. On September 30, local time, a poll released by YouGov showed that among the nearly 5,000 Britons surveyed, about 51% believed that Truss should resign, and 54% believed that British Chancellor of the Exchequer Kwarten should resign.</p><p>One of the important reasons for the sharp drop in support rate is that the new economic policies just introduced by the Truss government include the most radical tax cuts in 50 years, with an estimated total tax reduction of up to 45 billion pounds, and a large-scale energy support plan, which is expected to cost more than 100 billion pounds in two years.</p><p></body></html></p>","collect":0,"html":"<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<head>\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" />\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1.0,minimum-scale=1.0,maximum-scale=1.0,user-scalable=no\"/>\n<meta name=\"format-detection\" content=\"telephone=no,email=no,address=no\" />\n<title>The Federal Reserve gives a rare warning, the next \"black swan\" is approaching, what's going on?</title>\n<style type=\"text/css\">\na,abbr,acronym,address,applet,article,aside,audio,b,big,blockquote,body,canvas,caption,center,cite,code,dd,del,details,dfn,div,dl,dt,\nem,embed,fieldset,figcaption,figure,footer,form,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,header,hgroup,html,i,iframe,img,ins,kbd,label,legend,li,mark,menu,nav,\nobject,ol,output,p,pre,q,ruby,s,samp,section,small,span,strike,strong,sub,summary,sup,table,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,time,tr,tt,u,ul,var,video{ font:inherit;margin:0;padding:0;vertical-align:baseline;border:0 }\nbody{ font-size:16px; line-height:1.5; color:#999; background:transparent; }\n.wrapper{ overflow:hidden;word-break:break-all;padding:10px; }\nh1,h2{ font-weight:normal; line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:.6em; }\nh3,h4,h5,h6{ line-height:1.35; margin-bottom:1em; }\nh1{ font-size:24px; }\nh2{ font-size:20px; }\nh3{ font-size:18px; }\nh4{ font-size:16px; }\nh5{ font-size:14px; }\nh6{ font-size:12px; }\np,ul,ol,blockquote,dl,table{ margin:1.2em 0; }\nul,ol{ margin-left:2em; }\nul{ list-style:disc; }\nol{ list-style:decimal; }\nli,li p{ margin:10px 0;}\nimg{ max-width:100%;display:block;margin:0 auto 1em; }\nblockquote{ color:#B5B2B1; border-left:3px solid #aaa; padding:1em; }\nstrong,b{font-weight:bold;}\nem,i{font-style:italic;}\ntable{ width:100%;border-collapse:collapse;border-spacing:1px;margin:1em 0;font-size:.9em; }\nth,td{ padding:5px;text-align:left;border:1px solid #aaa; }\nth{ font-weight:bold;background:#5d5d5d; }\n.symbol-link{font-weight:bold;}\n/* header{ border-bottom:1px solid #494756; } */\n.title{ margin:0 0 8px;line-height:1.3;color:#ddd; }\n.meta {color:#5e5c6d;font-size:13px;margin:0 0 .5em; }\na{text-decoration:none; color:#2a4b87;}\n.meta .head { display: inline-block; overflow: hidden}\n.head .h-thumb { width: 30px; height: 30px; margin: 0; padding: 0; border-radius: 50%; float: left;}\n.head .h-content { margin: 0; padding: 0 0 0 9px; float: left;}\n.head .h-name {font-size: 13px; color: #eee; margin: 0;}\n.head .h-time {font-size: 12.5px; color: #7E829C; margin: 0;}\n.small {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.9); -webkit-transform: scale(0.9); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.smaller {font-size: 12.5px; display: inline-block; transform: scale(0.8); -webkit-transform: scale(0.8); transform-origin: left; -webkit-transform-origin: left;}\n.bt-text {font-size: 12px;margin: 1.5em 0 0 0}\n.bt-text p {margin: 0}\n</style>\n</head>\n<body>\n<div class=\"wrapper\">\n<header>\n<h2 class=\"title\">\nThe Federal Reserve gives a rare warning, the next \"black swan\" is approaching, what's going on?\n</h2>\n<h4 class=\"meta\">\n<a class=\"head\" href=\"https://laohu8.com/wemedia/9\">\n\n<div class=\"h-thumb\" style=\"background-image:url(https://static.tigerbbs.com/d482d56459984e8c86a6a137295b3c4f);background-size:cover;\"></div>\n\n<div class=\"h-content\">\n<p class=\"h-name\">券商中国 </p>\n<p class=\"h-time smaller\">2022-10-02 07:51</p>\n</div>\n</a>\n</h4>\n</header>\n<article>\n<p><html><head></head><body>Wall Street's \"bulls\" are experiencing moments of despair.</p><p>U.S. stocks have just experienced a turbulent September, with the monthly declines of the S&P 500 Index and the Dow Jones Industrial Average reaching 9.3% and 8.8% respectively, the worst September since 2002; The S&P fell by 25% during the year, ranking third in history (since 1931). Compared with the high in January, the total market value of the S&P 500 has evaporated by about 10 trillion US dollars (about 71 trillion yuan). In the face of this tragic selling wave, U.S. stock bulls are falling into a desperate moment: retail investors fled frantically and spent an unprecedented amount of US $18 billion (about 128 billion yuan) to buy put options; Hedge funds' equity exposure has also fallen to an all-time low.</p><p><b>The Fed is getting nervous, too. On September 30, local time, Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Brainard warned that the Federal Reserve is paying close attention to the impact of its own policy actions on the global economy and financial system. In addition,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/BAC\">Bank of America</a>It warned that the current credit pressure indicators in the United States are close to the critical point. If the Federal Reserve does not find a balance between controlling inflation and unexpected risks, a financial market crisis like that in the United Kingdom may break out in the United States.</b></p><p>It is worth noting that Britain, the \"eye of the storm\" in the European financial market, is about to face the next \"black swan\". On October 21, among the world's three major rating agencies, S&P,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/MCO\">Moody's</a>, will reassess the UK government's credit rating. Once the credit rating is downgraded, it will put great pressure on Britain's foreign debt.</p><p><b>The tragic September of US stocks</b></p><p>In the past September, U.S. stocks experienced a tragic decline.</p><p>On the last trading day of September, the three major U.S. stock indexes collectively fell sharply again. The S&P 500 Index and the Dow Jones Industrial Average both fell below their June lows, with monthly declines of 9.3% and 8.8% respectively, both hitting records in March 2020. The largest monthly decline since the outbreak of the epidemic in the United States was the worst September since 2002, and the Nasdaq index fell 10.5% in a single month.</p><p>In fact, throughout the third quarter, U.S. stocks were shrouded in the haze of a bear market. The S&P 500 index fell by 5.3% quarterly, which was the third consecutive quarter of decline, the longest quarterly consecutive decline since the 2008 financial crisis.</p><p>If the time period continues to be lengthened, since 2022, the cumulative decline of the S&P has reached 25%, and the decline has ranked third in history (since 1931). Compared with the record high in January 2022, the total market value of the S&P 500 The cumulative evaporation of approximately US $10 trillion (approximately RMB 71 trillion).</p><p>Under the continuous plunge, U.S. stock bulls are falling into a moment of despair. Even the most optimistic U.S. retail investors are on the flight, while spending record sums of money locking in protective options.</p><p>According to<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/JPM\">JPMorgan Chase</a>According to the public data of the exchange, retail investors sold a net $2.9 billion in stocks in the previous week, more than four times the number of stocks sold at the market trough in mid-June, and the second largest weekly sell-off in the past five years.</p><p>In addition, data from Options Clearing Corp compiled by Sundial Capital Research showed that small capital groups in U.S. stocks spent an unprecedented $18 billion (approximately RMB 128 billion) to buy put options last week due to concerns about the upcoming market crash.</p><p>At the same time,<a href=\"https://laohu8.com/S/MS\">Morgan Stanley</a>Tracking hedge funds have trimmed their equity exposure to an all-time low, increasing their short positions against ETFs for the 11th straight session. The cash level of fund managers is also close to historical highs, and the wait-and-see sentiment in the market is getting stronger.</p><p><b>In the face of this tragic selling wave, the confidence of Wall Street's \"dead bulls\" has also begun to waver.</b></p><p>Known as the most determined bull on Wall Street, JPMorgan Chase strategist Marko Kolanovic pessimistically emphasized that the risk of Fed policy mistakes and geopolitical escalation is increasing, putting the target level of U.S. stocks in 2022 at risk of downward adjustment.</p><p>What makes bulls even more desperate is that the pain of the bear market in the US stock market may not be over yet.</p><p>According to U.S. media statistics, in several rounds of bear markets in U.S. history, the average decline of U.S. stocks reached 39% within 20 months, which means that there is still a potential decline of 19% in U.S. stocks; The current bear market lasts for 9 months, less than 50% of the average duration of the past 14 bear markets.</p><p><b>Fed warns of financial risks</b></p><p>At present, the important question that investors in the U.S. stock market have to think about is when the Fed's tightening cycle will end.</p><p>Because, in the past six rounds of bear markets in U.S. stocks, all bottoms were formed when the Federal Reserve cut interest rates. But Wall Street traders currently expect that Fed interest rates may not peak until April 2023.</p><p>The inflation data that has just been released is not optimistic either. Among them, the inflation indicator that the Federal Reserve values most unexpectedly accelerated upward.</p><p>On September 30, the latest data disclosed by the U.S. Department of Commerce showed that the U.S. core PCE price index (excluding food and energy prices) increased by 4.9% year-on-year in August, higher than the expected 4.7%. The previous value was 4.6% (revised up to 4.7%), the year-on-year growth rate reached the highest since May this year; In August, the core PCE price index increased by 0.6% month-on-month, higher than the expected 0.5%. The previous value was 0.1% (revised down to 0%), and the month-on-month growth rate was still close to historical highs.</p><p>At the same time, Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Lael Brainard once again emphasized on September 30, local time, that actions to curb high inflation should not be withdrawn prematurely, and higher restrictive interest rates should be maintained for a period of time.</p><p>This also means that the Federal Reserve's rate hike storm will most likely continue, and when it will end in the future still depends on the inflation data of the United States. Investors now expect a 57% probability of a 75 basis point Fed rate hike in November, according to the CME group Fed Watch tool.</p><p>But in the face of global financial market turmoil, the Federal Reserve is also beginning to get nervous. Most of brainard's speech on the 30th involved the financial stability risks that may be brought about by rapid rate hike by global central banks. It further stated that the Federal Reserve is paying close attention to the impact of its policy actions on the global economy and financial system.</p><p>Wall Street institutions are even more nervous. Bank of America warned in its latest report that the current credit pressure indicators in the United States are close to a critical point. If the Federal Reserve does not find a balance between controlling inflation and unexpected risks, the United States may have a financial crisis like that in the United Kingdom. market crisis.</p><p>Bank of America's high-yield bond strategy team believes that if the Credit Stress Indicator (CSI) reaches the \"critical zone\" above 75%, the situation will get out of control, and now it is time to pay attention to risk management. This means that at the next interest rate meeting, the Fed should slow down the pace of rate hike, and then pause so that the economy can fully adapt to all the extreme tightening policies that have been implemented.</p><p><b>Europe's next \"black swan\"</b></p><p><b>At present, Britain, the \"eye of the storm\" of European financial markets, is about to face the next \"black swan\".</b></p><p>On October 21st, Standard & Poor's and Moody's, among the world's three major rating agencies, will reassess the credit rating of the British government. If the financial situation continues to be tight, the UK's sovereign credit rating may be downgraded.</p><p>Once the credit rating is downgraded, it will put great pressure on the UK's foreign debt, and the outside world will face \"additional risks\" in providing debt financing to the UK, which may have an impact on the UK's economic prospects.</p><p>The market is very worried about the credit rating this time, because Standard & Poor's has taken the lead in issuing an \"alarm signal\". On September 30, local time, Standard & Poor's maintained the UK's AA/A-1 + sovereign rating, but lowered its rating outlook from \"stable\" to \"negative\".</p><p>Standard & Poor's said that after the UK announced the tax cut policy, the UK's fiscal deficit will increase and the risk of fiscal imbalance will rise.</p><p>Standard & Poor's estimates that if the new tax cuts continue to be implemented, the ratio of the British government's budget deficit to GDP will expand by 2.6 percentage points by 2025, which will make it difficult for the authorities to realize their ambition of reducing the ratio of public debt to national income.</p><p>Standard & Poor's believes that the British economy will shrink in the next few quarters, and GDP will decline by 0.5% next year.</p><p>At the same time, Moody's has labeled the largest tax reduction plan launched by the British government in 50 years as a \"negative\". Moody's believes this move will threaten Britain's credibility in the eyes of investors, but Moody's has yet to downgrade its outlook for the UK's rating to negative.</p><p>At present, Moody's's sovereign rating on the UK is Aa3 and Fitch's AA-, which are in the same grade, while Standard & Poor's credit rating on the UK is AA, one grade higher than Moody's and Fitch.</p><p><b>For Britain at present, it is already full of storms.</b></p><p>Previously, the radical tax reduction plan once triggered a major earthquake in the British capital market, the British Treasury Bond staged a \"big crash\", and the pound plummeted to a record low. In order to avoid a bigger crisis, the Bank of England had to rescue the market.</p><p>And British female Prime Minister Truss, who just took office, seems to be losing the support of most British people. On September 30, local time, a poll released by YouGov showed that among the nearly 5,000 Britons surveyed, about 51% believed that Truss should resign, and 54% believed that British Chancellor of the Exchequer Kwarten should resign.</p><p>One of the important reasons for the sharp drop in support rate is that the new economic policies just introduced by the Truss government include the most radical tax cuts in 50 years, with an estimated total tax reduction of up to 45 billion pounds, and a large-scale energy support plan, which is expected to cost more than 100 billion pounds in two years.</p><p></body></html></p>\n</article>\n</div>\n</body>\n</html>\n","type":0,"thumbnail":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/0f9e9a265cb0e7e8cb195039b2fe24a4","relate_stocks":{"161125":"标普500","513500":"标普500ETF","SDS":"两倍做空标普500 ETF-ProShares","BK4581":"高盛持仓","UDOW":"三倍做多道指30ETF-ProShares","BK4534":"瑞士信贷持仓","SPXU":"三倍做空标普500ETF-ProShares","DDM":"2倍做多道指ETF-ProShares","SQQQ":"纳指三倍做空ETF","SH":"做空标普500-Proshares",".IXIC":"NASDAQ Composite","BK4559":"巴菲特持仓","BK4504":"桥水持仓","DXD":"两倍做空道琼30指数ETF-ProShares","BK4550":"红杉资本持仓","QLD":"2倍做多纳斯达克100指数ETF-ProShares",".SPX":"S&P 500 Index","SPY":"标普500ETF",".DJI":"道琼斯"},"source_url":"","is_english":false,"share_image_url":"https://static.laohu8.com/e9f99090a1c2ed51c021029395664489","article_id":"1153575084","content_text":"华尔街的“多头”正经历绝望时刻。美股刚刚经历了一个动荡的9月，其中标普500指数、道指的月跌幅分别达9.3%、8.8%，是2002年以来最惨的9月；标普年内跌幅达25%，跌幅已经排到了史上第三（1931年以来），相比1月的高位，标普500的总市值累计蒸发约10万亿美元（约合人民币71万亿）。面对这一轮惨烈的抛售潮，美股多头正在陷入绝望时刻：散户投资者疯狂出逃，并史无前例地花费了180亿美元（约合人民币1280亿元）买入看跌期权；对冲基金的股票敞口也降至历史最低。美联储也开始紧张。当地时间9月30日，美联储副主席布雷纳德警告称，美联储正在密切关注自身政策行动对全球经济和金融系统的影响。另外，美国银行警告称，当前美国的信用压力指标已经接近临界点，如果美联储再不从控制通胀和意外风险找准平衡点，美国有可能爆发英国那样的金融市场危机。值得警惕的是，欧洲金融市场的“风暴眼”英国，即将面临下一只“黑天鹅”。10月21日，全球三大评级机构中的标普、穆迪，将重新评估英国政府的信用评级。一旦信用评级遭下调，将对英国的外债形成巨大压力。美股的惨烈9月刚刚过去的9月，美股经历了惨烈一跌。9月的最后一个交易日，美股三大指数再度集体重挫，标普500指数、道琼斯工业指数双双跌破6月低点，单月跌幅分别达9.3%、8.8%，均创下2020年3月美国疫情暴发以来的最大月度跌幅，更是2002年以来最惨的9月，而纳斯达克指数单月跌幅更是达10.5%。其实，整个第三季度，美股都笼罩在熊市阴霾之下，标普500指数季度跌幅达5.3%，为连续三个季度下滑，这是自2008 年金融危机以来最长的季度连跌。若将时间周期继续拉长，2022年以来，标普累计跌幅已达到25%，跌幅已经排到史上第三（1931年以来），相比2022年1月的纪录高位，标普500的总市值累计蒸发约10万亿美元（约合人民币71万亿元）。连续的暴跌之下，美股多头正在陷入绝望时刻。即使是最乐观的美国散户投资者也开始出逃，同时花费创纪录的资金锁定保护性期权。据摩根大通根据交易所公开数据测算，散户投资者在此前一周净抛售29亿美元股票，超过了6月中旬市场低谷的卖出股票数量的4倍，是过去五年以来的第二大单周抛售量。此外，Sundial Capital Research编制的Options Clearing Corp的数据显示，由于对即将到来的市场崩盘忧心忡忡，美股的小资金群体上周史无前例地花费了180亿美元（约合人民币1280亿元）买入看跌期权。与此同时，摩根士丹利追踪的对冲基金已将股票敞口削减至历史最低水平，连续第11个交易日增加针对ETF的空头头寸。基金经理的现金水平也接近历史高位，市场观望情绪愈发强烈。面对这一轮惨烈的抛售潮，华尔街的“死多头”的信心也开始动摇。号称华尔街最坚定的多头，摩根大通的策略分析师Marko Kolanovic悲观地强调，美联储政策失误和地缘政治升级的风险正在增加，使得2022年美股目标位面临下调风险。而让多头更绝望的是，美股熊市的痛苦可能还未结束。据美国媒体统计，在美国历史的几轮熊市中，20个月内美股平均跌幅达到39%，这意味着，当前美股仍存在19%的潜在下跌空间；而当前这轮熊市持续的时间为9个月，不足过去14轮熊市平均持续时间的50%。美联储警告金融风险当前，美股市场的投资者不得不思考的重要问题是，美联储的紧缩周期何时才会结束。因为，美股过去的6轮熊市中，所有的底部都是美联储降息时形成的。但目前华尔街交易员们预计，在2023年4月之前，美联储利率可能不会见顶。而刚刚出炉的通胀数据，也不容乐观，其中美联储最重视的通胀指标意外加速上行。9月30日，美国商务部披露的最新数据显示，美国核心PCE物价指数（剔除食品和能源价格）8月同比增长4.9%，高于预期的4.7%，前值为4.6%（上修至4.7%），同比增速创今年5月以来最高纪录；8月核心PCE物价指数环比增长0.6%，高于预期的0.5%，前值0.1%（下修至0%），环比增速仍接近历史高位。同时，美联储副主席布雷纳德（Lael Brainard）于当地时间9月30日再次强调称，不应过早撤除遏制高通胀的行动，要将较高的限制性利率保持一段时间。这也意味着，美联储的加息风暴大概率仍将继续，未来何时结束，仍取决于美国的通胀数据。芝商所美联储观察工具显示，投资者目前预计美联储11月加息75个基点的概率为57%。但面对全球金融市场动荡，美联储也开始紧张。布雷纳德30日的讲话大部分内容都涉及到，全球央行迅速加息可能带来的金融稳定风险。其进一步表示，美联储正在密切关注自身政策行动对全球经济和金融系统的影响。华尔街机构则更为紧张，美国银行在最新的报告中警告称，当前美国的信用压力指标已经接近临界点，如果美联储再不从控制通胀和意外风险找准平衡点，美国有可能爆发英国那样的金融市场危机。美国银行的高收益债券策略团队认为，如果信用压力指标（CSI）达到75%以上的“临界区”，局面将变得失控，现在已经到了重视风险管理的时候。这意味着，在下一次议息会议上，美联储应当放缓加息步伐，之后应该暂停，以使经济能够完全适应已经实施的所有极端紧缩政策。欧洲的下一只“黑天鹅”当前，欧洲金融市场的“风暴眼”——英国，即将面临下一只“黑天鹅”。10月21日，全球三大评级机构中的标普、穆迪，将重新评估英国政府的信用评级。若财政状况持续紧张，英国主权信用评级可能遭到下调。而一旦信用评级遭下调，将对英国的外债形成巨大压力，外界向英国提供债务融资将面临“额外风险”，或将对英国经济前景造成冲击。市场对这一次的信用评级非常担忧，因为标普已经率先发出了“警报信号”。当地时间9月30日，标普维持英国AA/A-1+主权评级，但将评级展望由“稳定”下调为“负面”。标普表示，英国公布减税政策后，英国财政赤字将增加，财政失衡的风险上升。标普估算，如果新减税政策继续实施，到2025年英国政府预算赤字与GDP的占比将扩大2.6个百分点，这将使当局很难实现降低公共债务占国民收入比例的雄心。标普认为，英国经济将在未来几个季度陷入萎缩，明年GDP将下滑0.5%。同时，穆迪已经将英国政府推出的50年来最大规模减税计划打上了“负面”标签。穆迪认为，这一举措将威胁到英国在投资者心目中的信誉，但穆迪尚未将英国评级展望下调为负面。目前，穆迪对英国的主权评级为Aa3，惠誉是AA-，这二者为同一档，而标普对英国的信用评级为AA，比穆迪和惠誉高一档。对于当前的英国而言，已是山雨欲来风满楼。此前，激进的减税计划一度引发英国资本市场大地震，英国国债上演“大崩盘”，英镑暴跌刷新历史新低。为了避免更大的危机，英国央行不得不出手救市。而刚上任不久的英国女首相特拉斯似乎正在失去大多数英国民众的支持。当地时间9月30日，英国舆观调查公司(YouGov)公布的民调显示，在接受调查的近5000名英国人中，约51%的人认为，特拉斯应该辞职，54%的人认为，英国财政大臣克沃滕应该辞职。支持率大跌的重要原因之一便是，特拉斯政府刚刚出台的经济新政，其中包括，50年来最激进的减税政策，预计减税总额高达450亿英镑，以及大规模的能源支持计划，预计将在两年内花费超过1000亿英镑。","news_type":1,"symbols_score_info":{"161125":0.9,"513500":0.9,"SQQQ":0.9,"UDOW":0.9,"SDS":0.9,"SPY":0.9,".DJI":0.9,"SH":0.9,"DDM":0.9,"DXD":0.9,".SPX":0.9,"QLD":0.9,".IXIC":0.9,"ESmain":0.9,"SPXU":0.9}},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":210,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0},{"id":668099880,"gmtCreate":1664283926741,"gmtModify":1676537424911,"author":{"id":"4110531690656330","authorId":"4110531690656330","name":"Walden.","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d9305a33ceded43e6a928eb1b0b7616d","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"4110531690656330","idStr":"4110531690656330"},"themes":[],"htmlText":"6","listText":"6","text":"6","images":[],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":1,"paper":1,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/668099880","repostId":"661483449","repostType":1,"repost":{"id":661483449,"gmtCreate":1664184790755,"gmtModify":1676537405312,"author":{"id":"3527667568191018","authorId":"3527667568191018","name":"胖虎福利","avatar":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/733bbf790057cc91c5e0b1aa5569977c","crmLevel":1,"crmLevelSwitch":0,"followedFlag":false,"authorIdStr":"3527667568191018","idStr":"3527667568191018"},"themes":[],"title":"一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜？特斯拉2022 AI Day即將揭曉答案","htmlText":"有個機器人管家爲你做早餐、搬行李、開車甚至照顧父母是什麼體驗？科幻電影般的想象，可能很快就能實現！北美時間2022年9月30日（預計北京時間10月1日），特斯拉2022 AI Day活動將於加州帕羅奧圖舉行，屆時，將科幻照進現實的Tesla Bot預計首次亮相，帶動科技發展前往下一個時代。此外，特斯拉自動駕駛技術和Dojo超級計算機的最新進展也或將於當天公佈，令無數車迷、科技控和特粉們翹首以盼。回顧去年8月20日的AI Day活動，Tesla Bot的發佈可謂一大重磅彩蛋。特斯拉稱其高1.72米，重56.6千克，臉上的屏幕可顯示信息，擁有人類水平的雙手，並有力反饋感應，以實現平衡和敏捷的動作。僅僅一年後，特斯拉就將把這個彩蛋變爲現實，讓人感嘆其高效率的同時萌生無限期待。前不久，在發表於《中國網信》雜誌的文章中，馬斯克寫道：“特斯拉機器人最初的定位是替代人們從事重複枯燥、具有危險性的工作。但遠景目標是讓其服務於千家萬戶，比如做飯、修剪草坪、照顧老人等。”“特斯拉機器人的身高體重接近一位成年人，可搬運或手提重物，還能小步快走，它臉上的屏幕是與人溝通的交互界面，”馬斯克表示，“你或許會好奇，我們爲什麼要設計這個有腿的機器人？因爲人類社會是基於擁有兩條手臂和十個手指的雙足人形的互動而形成的。因此，如果我們想讓機器人適應環境並能做人類所做之事，他就得擁有與人類大致相同的尺寸、形狀和能力。”馬斯克稱：“此後，隨着生產規模擴大和成本下降，人形機器人的實用性將逐年提升。在未來，一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜。也許在不到十年的時間裏，人們就可以給父母買一個機器人作爲生日禮物了。”只要關注智能駕駛，就一定對去年特斯拉純視覺方案FSD的進展、神經網絡自動駕駛訓練、D1芯片、Dojo超級計算機等重磅信息有着深刻印象，如今，特斯拉的這些成就依然保持在世界科技前沿。爲實現人工智能訓練的超高算力，同","listText":"有個機器人管家爲你做早餐、搬行李、開車甚至照顧父母是什麼體驗？科幻電影般的想象，可能很快就能實現！北美時間2022年9月30日（預計北京時間10月1日），特斯拉2022 AI Day活動將於加州帕羅奧圖舉行，屆時，將科幻照進現實的Tesla Bot預計首次亮相，帶動科技發展前往下一個時代。此外，特斯拉自動駕駛技術和Dojo超級計算機的最新進展也或將於當天公佈，令無數車迷、科技控和特粉們翹首以盼。回顧去年8月20日的AI Day活動，Tesla Bot的發佈可謂一大重磅彩蛋。特斯拉稱其高1.72米，重56.6千克，臉上的屏幕可顯示信息，擁有人類水平的雙手，並有力反饋感應，以實現平衡和敏捷的動作。僅僅一年後，特斯拉就將把這個彩蛋變爲現實，讓人感嘆其高效率的同時萌生無限期待。前不久，在發表於《中國網信》雜誌的文章中，馬斯克寫道：“特斯拉機器人最初的定位是替代人們從事重複枯燥、具有危險性的工作。但遠景目標是讓其服務於千家萬戶，比如做飯、修剪草坪、照顧老人等。”“特斯拉機器人的身高體重接近一位成年人，可搬運或手提重物，還能小步快走，它臉上的屏幕是與人溝通的交互界面，”馬斯克表示，“你或許會好奇，我們爲什麼要設計這個有腿的機器人？因爲人類社會是基於擁有兩條手臂和十個手指的雙足人形的互動而形成的。因此，如果我們想讓機器人適應環境並能做人類所做之事，他就得擁有與人類大致相同的尺寸、形狀和能力。”馬斯克稱：“此後，隨着生產規模擴大和成本下降，人形機器人的實用性將逐年提升。在未來，一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜。也許在不到十年的時間裏，人們就可以給父母買一個機器人作爲生日禮物了。”只要關注智能駕駛，就一定對去年特斯拉純視覺方案FSD的進展、神經網絡自動駕駛訓練、D1芯片、Dojo超級計算機等重磅信息有着深刻印象，如今，特斯拉的這些成就依然保持在世界科技前沿。爲實現人工智能訓練的超高算力，同","text":"有個機器人管家爲你做早餐、搬行李、開車甚至照顧父母是什麼體驗？科幻電影般的想象，可能很快就能實現！北美時間2022年9月30日（預計北京時間10月1日），特斯拉2022 AI Day活動將於加州帕羅奧圖舉行，屆時，將科幻照進現實的Tesla Bot預計首次亮相，帶動科技發展前往下一個時代。此外，特斯拉自動駕駛技術和Dojo超級計算機的最新進展也或將於當天公佈，令無數車迷、科技控和特粉們翹首以盼。回顧去年8月20日的AI Day活動，Tesla Bot的發佈可謂一大重磅彩蛋。特斯拉稱其高1.72米，重56.6千克，臉上的屏幕可顯示信息，擁有人類水平的雙手，並有力反饋感應，以實現平衡和敏捷的動作。僅僅一年後，特斯拉就將把這個彩蛋變爲現實，讓人感嘆其高效率的同時萌生無限期待。前不久，在發表於《中國網信》雜誌的文章中，馬斯克寫道：“特斯拉機器人最初的定位是替代人們從事重複枯燥、具有危險性的工作。但遠景目標是讓其服務於千家萬戶，比如做飯、修剪草坪、照顧老人等。”“特斯拉機器人的身高體重接近一位成年人，可搬運或手提重物，還能小步快走，它臉上的屏幕是與人溝通的交互界面，”馬斯克表示，“你或許會好奇，我們爲什麼要設計這個有腿的機器人？因爲人類社會是基於擁有兩條手臂和十個手指的雙足人形的互動而形成的。因此，如果我們想讓機器人適應環境並能做人類所做之事，他就得擁有與人類大致相同的尺寸、形狀和能力。”馬斯克稱：“此後，隨着生產規模擴大和成本下降，人形機器人的實用性將逐年提升。在未來，一臺家用機器人可能比一輛汽車更便宜。也許在不到十年的時間裏，人們就可以給父母買一個機器人作爲生日禮物了。”只要關注智能駕駛，就一定對去年特斯拉純視覺方案FSD的進展、神經網絡自動駕駛訓練、D1芯片、Dojo超級計算機等重磅信息有着深刻印象，如今，特斯拉的這些成就依然保持在世界科技前沿。爲實現人工智能訓練的超高算力，同","images":[{"img":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/d9327ca5b98a1761a3de3864f295c901","width":"-1","height":"-1"},{"img":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/058669d709b4bda6ca11888f1fe825bf","width":"-1","height":"-1"},{"img":"https://static.tigerbbs.com/67256fa209e44b7ae28ffda3f04db43a","width":"-1","height":"-1"}],"top":1,"highlighted":1,"essential":2,"paper":2,"likeSize":0,"commentSize":0,"repostSize":0,"link":"https://ttm.financial/post/661483449","isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":0,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":4,"langContent":"CN","totalScore":0},"isVote":1,"tweetType":1,"viewCount":304,"authorTweetTopStatus":1,"verified":2,"comments":[],"imageCount":0,"langContent":"EN","totalScore":0}],"lives":[]}